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Abstract 
 
The purpose of this study is to examine whether Indonesian Badan Usaha Milik Negara (BUMN) or 
State-Owned Enterprises (SOE) are successful vehicles for attaining government socio-economic and 
financial objectives. The motives for undertaking this study arise from the importance of SOEs in 
national economic and socio-political roles in developing countries like Indonesia, even after their 
privatisation. This thesis identifies the implications of policy changes for the Indonesian 
government’s objectives for SOEs. 
First, an historical examination of changes in the institutional and economic environment in 
Indonesia (Chapters 6-8) identifies substantial impacts on the evolution of the structure of SOEs and 
the government’s objectives for SOEs. The first stage of this analysis reveals that the “see-sawing” of 
economic policy between centralisation and market orientation led to changes in the structure and 
objectives of the SOEs. Initially, the state enterprises established during the Indonesianisation period 
(1945-1958) had multiple socio-political objectives with little concern for economic of financial 
objectives. The reforms during the nationalisation period (1958-1966) included the restructuring of 
previously nationalised companies as Perusahaan Negara, and the introduction of profit objectives 
for some Perusahaan Negara. In the corporatisation period (1966 – present), the Perusahaan 
Negara were reformed and divided into three types of entities: Persero, Perum and Perjan. The 
Persero are incorporated entities that have both commercial and social welfare objectives. The 
Perum are incorporated entities that are not commercial but have profit objectives and social 
welfare objectives. The Perjan are not incorporated (remaining as state agencies) and have only 
social welfare objectives. Perusahaan Negara poor performance and fiscal problem in the early 
1980s encouraged the reform of Perusahaan Negara structure as Badan Usaha Milik Negara 
(BUMN/SOE).   The introduction of partial-privatisation policy in 1991 encouraged profit and 
efficiency objectives for SOEs that could potentially be privatised. The implementation of fast track 
privatisation in 2002 caused significant changes in the SOEs structure and objectives. The 
government encouraged all SOEs to implement corporatisation principles in which emphasise 
financial objectives such as profit and efficiency. The government eliminated the Perjan structure, 
which it considered to have become a barrier to the implementation of full corporatisation and fast 
track privatisation. In practice, social welfare and non-economic remained a major Badan Usaha 
Milik Negara (BUMN/SOE) objectives.  
From the late 1990s, external pressure from international financial institutions was a significant 
factor in the government’s efforts to privatise the SOEs. In the second part of the historical analysis 
in this thesis, privatisation is shown to be a major influence on policies and SOEs’ objectives. 
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Privatisation represents a fundamental change in the government-stated objectives and policies for 
SOEs, and included the introduction of an ‘open market’ policy, development of domestic capital 
market activities, and full implementation of corporatisation principles. However, privatisation in 
Indonesia is constrained by the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia regarding the control policy, which 
leads to different categories of SOEs with respect to privatisation and the importance of economic or 
financial objectives. There are now three categories of SOEs: those that have been identified as not 
available for privatisation, those that can be privatised but are still fully owned by the government, 
and those that have been privatised. As a consequence of the constitutional barrier and political 
interests, most privatisations of SOEs were partial. The continuation of government control over 
these partially privatised SOEs increased the potential for conflict between the greater emphasis on 
financial objectives arising from private investors and the government’s continuing socio-political 
objectives for these SOEs. This is emphasised in analysis of the most intensive period of privatisation 
(2002-2004).  
An examination of SOEs objectives in practices shows that privatisation policy makes some 
differences in regards to the government objectives and treatment for the SOEs. In addition to three 
different categories of SOEs, privatisation policy encourages the importance of profit and efficiency 
objectives which apply to all SOEs. In contrast, the content analysis (Chapters 8-9) reveals that the 
government inconsistency in implementing the new profit and efficiency policies and caused the 
absence of profit and efficiency objectives as part of the government objectives for numbers of SOE. 
The potential conflicting objectives arises between the government and SOEs when the SOEs have to 
deal with the pressure and changes from their markets.  
Building on the conceptually conflicting objectives identified in the historical analysis, the thesis then 
empirically assesses the extent of apparent conflicts within government objectives, and between the 
government’s and SOEs objectives, and the implication on the performance of SOEs with respect to 
government objectives. First, the extent of apparent conflicts emerges as the government 
introduces profit and efficiency objectives, while in practice; the government has never made any 
changes in the government-stated objectives for each individual SOE. Second, the company 
constitution and management objectives are more likely to make changes of the objectives in order 
to accommodate the changes in their market. Next, identifies the objectives for which objective 
(proxy) performance measures are available: these are financial performance and financial 
performance that represent the social welfare. Using these measures, the different types of 
performance of SOE’s are regressed against indicators of government-stated objectives for SOEs, 
whether the objectives make a different or affect the SOEs performance.  
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Examination of the relations between the government-stated objectives and SOEs financial 
performance shows some weak negative relations between the government-stated objectives and 
SOEs financial performance. The reliance of many Indonesian SOEs on non-core business income 
(such as subsidies and asset disposals) and external financial support (such as soft loans from 
government-controlled lenders) indicates the inconsistency between the SOEs financial objectives 
and achieving the government’s social welfare and non-economic objectives. 
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
 
This thesis examines to what extent the Indonesian Badan Usaha Milik Negara (BUMN), or State-
Owned Enterprises (SOEs), are successful vehicles for attaining their government’s socio-economic 
and financial objectives, as reflected by their financial performance. The motivation for this study is 
the importance of SOEs in national economic and socio-political spheres, particularly for countries 
like Indonesia, even after the companies have been privatised. Further, as shown in Chapter 6, SOEs 
are very sensitive to the dynamics of social and political change and market situations. To evaluate 
whether Indonesian SOEs are successful at attaining their government’s objectives, three areas to be 
examined are: 
1. The evolution of SOEs in relation to the historical changes in government-stated objectives for 
SOEs 
2. The implications of privatisation policy, and partial privatisation, on the government-stated  
objectives for SOEs 
3. The potential for Indonesian SOE objectives to be in harmony or conflict. 
The main focus of this historical path analysis is the evolution of government-stated objectives for 
SOEs and their implications. Meanwhile, the main foci of the interpretive and content analyses are 
the Indonesian SOE objectives in practice following the implementation of privatisation policy. In the 
final part of this thesis, the implications of government-stated objectives on SOE performance will be 
the focus of empirical and quantitative analysis. 
1.1 Background and Motivations 
A major motivation for this study arises from the significant contribution of SOEs to Indonesia’s 
economic development and social welfare. Some studies of Indonesian SOEs indicate changes in SOE 
structure and financial performance after the introduction of Indonesia’s privatisation policy 
(Indrawati, 2002; McLeod, 2002a; 2002b; Nugroho R and Wrihatnolo, 2008; Siahaan, 1996; 
Sugiharto, 2005; Sutojo, 1996; Wang, 2005; Yonnedi, 2010). However, there has not been any 
systematic analysis of the implication of policy changes regarding SOE objectives particularly the 
government-stated objectives for SOEs. This is important, because objectives influence outcomes by 
determining actions selected by actors or organisations (Boyd and Levi, 1996; Granger, 1964). 
Meanwhile, several prior studies of SOEs show that as government bodies, SOEs have the potential 
to carry multiple or mixed objectives that may have policy implications (Chang & Wong 2009; 
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Javidan & Dastmalchian 1988; Lawson 1994). This section provides a brief literature background and 
examines why government-stated objectives are important particularly for the Indonesian SOEs. 
1.2 Literature Background 
SOEs often accomplish the requirement to meet both social welfare and commercial objectives. 
Socio-political objectives usually pertain to an SOE’s specific product (Bai et al., 2000; Boardman et 
al., 1986; Boardman and Vining, 1989; Chang and Wong, 2009; Janet, 2006; Shirley and Xu, 1998; 
Shleifer, 1998; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Willner, 1999), while maximising public welfare is a major 
role of the government. Due to the political costs of establishing specialised agencies to provide 
public goods and services, governments often use SOEs to pursue their social welfare function, 
including public goods and services (Bai et al., 2000; Levy, 1987; Martin, 1996; Shirley and Xu, 1998; 
Willner, 1999). The provision of public utilities is a common example, which also supports the roles 
of SOEs in developing markets and industrialisation (Bhatt, 1984; Caporaso, 1982; Yu, 2001). The 
failure of markets in developing countries to provide public utilities, reflecting economic 
development and political uncertainty, becomes a major reason for governments to establish and 
control SOEs (Martin, 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Yu, 2001). In many countries, SOEs are 
commonly used to improve national economies and social welfare services where private 
enterprises lack the resources or volition to participate in such projects (Bai et al., 2000; Kaur, 2004; 
Yu, 2001). Meanwhile, in some countries, the role of public enterprises is limited to acting as 
subsidiaries of private or foreign investors (Sobhan, 1979b) for the provision of public utilities or to 
facilitate national economic development, which historically have been held or operated by the 
state. 
Change in market economy conditions has changed government roles and functions regarding the 
provision of public utilities. Privatisation, for example, is most likely to break up SOE monopolies or 
to reduce government involvement. This may drive market competition, where profit and efficiency 
objectives become the public and government’s main concern in relation to government financial 
support and privileges. Compared to private entities, SOEs are distinguished by holding monopolies 
and privileges from the government. This support is commonly a major cause of public and 
government pressure for SOEs to present their profit and efficiency performance. In contrast, this 
requirement is not easy to achieve while the enterprises are also controlled by the government as 
the owner, with the main purpose for enterprise is the provision of social and public services (Levy, 
1987; Ramamurti, 1987). Many SOEs are created to fulfil the provision of public or community 
services that historically originated from government regulatory or legislative initiatives (Martin, 
1996). In many instances, providing social and public services may decrease SOE profitability 
(Boardman and Vining, 1989; Boardman et al., 1986). Willner (1999) demonstrates that maximising 
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welfare is associated with high unit cost in public firms (Willner 1999: p. 144). Another study shows 
that the cost of decision and selection for public enterprises is different from private enterprises, 
since they do not depend fully on decision-makers (Aivazian et al., 2005). Socio-political spheres are 
considered to have an impact on the government and SOEs’ action or decision. Although the 
government may treat the provision of public or community services indifferently, providing public 
or community services through public service obligation (Thompson, 1995) may still cause a financial 
burden that is greater than the SOEs’ income. This situation leads to a requirement for government 
subsidies. Martin (1990) states that community service costs have not always been directly or fully 
reimbursed by the government (Martin, 1996). In the case where the fund is budgeted, social service 
delivery is taken into consideration for overall budget allocation (Martin and Parker, 1995). 
Government subsidies may potentially burden SOEs’ financial performance when pressure for 
providing community service becomes a priority, but costs are not fully or directly reimbursed 
(Martin, 1996). 
Besides their roles and function, SOEs are also different in terms of their relationship with their 
owners. Unlike private enterprises, SOEs commonly deal with bureaucrats who act as shareholders 
on behalf of government (Chang and Wong, 2009). Aharoni (cited in Levy 1978) argues that SOEs are 
potentially commanded by multiple principles and a variety of perspectives (Levy, 1978: p. 77). SOEs 
are likely to operate as instruments of bureaucracy, based on connectedness with business groups 
and operating industries, which are strictly regulated. Consequently, they tend to perform poorly 
and are also poorly managed (Abeng, 2002; De Castro et al., 1996; Gylfason et al., 2001; Mardjana, 
1995). Conflict between their political, public interest and commercial objectives may arise from a 
variety of commands from several different ministers, or the fact that they operate under specific 
constraints (Abeng 2001; Bai et al. 2000; Lawson 1994; McLellan 2005; Mardjana 1992; Shirley 
1999). The functions of regulator and owner potentially conflict when the SOE’s economic purpose 
encounters regulation constraints, or when different agendas originate from different ministerial 
portfolios (Abeng, 2001; McLellan, 2005). McLellan (2005) concludes that when a company has 
unclear residual claimants it will operate less efficiently (McLellan 2005: p. 116). The right to control 
and claim the benefits that are usually associated with ownership is irrelevant for SOEs. Since SOEs 
commonly deal with several ministries, there is no single entity that can clearly claim an SOE’s 
benefits from its operational activities (Jim Brumby, 1997; Shirley, 1999). As government enterprises, 
their decisions are commonly predetermined by the influence of socio-political objectives, rather 
than the economic objectives of the current regime (Arens & Brouthers 2001; Chang & Wong 2009; 
Chen et al. 2009; Shleifer & Vishny 1994; Yonnedi 2010). This situation not only causes SOEs to hold 
multiple objectives, but also has implications for their performance. 
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As a consequence of these relationships and roles, SOEs potentially have mixed or multiple 
objectives. Mixed objectives can be a major problem because prioritising profit conflicts with 
delivering services to the public at acceptable prices (Bai et al. 2000; Boardman et al. 1986b; Chang 
& Wong 2009; Shirley 1999; Shleifer & Vishny 1994; Willner 1999). The dominance of national and 
public interests over commercial objectives potentially contributes some ambiguity to the SOEs’ 
objectives and strategic plans (Ramamurti, 1987; White, 2002; Yonnedi, 2010). Meanwhile, the SOEs’ 
objectives are commonly devised in a general form and vague statements (Ramamurti, 1987; Zif, 
1981; Yonnedi, 2010). Levy (1987) comments that objectives pursued by SOEs are commonly are not 
well defined (Levy 1987: p. 76). Even though SOEs’ objectives may engage with the government 
goals to provide national welfare, relating the SOEs’ objectives to government direction is made 
difficult by the convoluted political process of accommodating national goals, political interests and 
public interests. 
In summary, SOEs objectives are determined by the government functions and SOEs roles in the 
provision of public utilities and national socio-economic development. These functions and roles 
create mixed or multiple objectives which potentially conflict. Meanwhile, bureaucrats, politicians, 
political processes and the public exert influences on the selection and determination of objectives 
for SOEs. These influences cause the objectives to often be stated in general or vague statements 
which raise several interpretations. Later, changes in the market economy environment encourage 
changes in the government policies and functions. These changes are identified as affecting the SOEs 
roles and objectives in the provision of public utilities. Potential conflicting objectives and interest 
amongst the government’s new policies, pressures from markets, and requirements to meet the 
government’s and public’s social welfare expectations are the most common consequences of these 
changes. Earlier studies in this area show that stated policies may appear to differ from the 
government’s espoused objectives, suggesting more research is needed to better inform policy 
development. The lack of studies concerned with government objectives for SOEs leave knowledge 
gaps regarding the extent to which policy and market changes induce changes in government-stated 
objectives for SOEs. The knowledge gaps this thesis seek to address include: the evolution of 
government-stated objectives for SOEs in Indonesia, the extent to which the changes in policy and 
market reforms generate conflict between various government-stated objectives for SOEs, and the 
extent to which changes in stated objectives and the potentially conflicting objectives impact on 
SOEs business activities and performance.  
1.3  Indonesian State-Owned Enterprises in Brief 
In the context of the theoretical background above, SOEs have important roles in national socio-
economic spheres dealing with various issues. The role of SOEs as government bodies providing 
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public utilities is in line with public and governmental pressure to be profitable and efficient. This 
section illustrates how SOEs deal with mixed objectives and roles under the influence of government 
in achieving their socio-political objectives as well as their commercial or financial objectives, as in 
Indonesia. 
The importance of SOEs in current Indonesian economic development is largely affected by their 
historical roles in the socio-economic sphere. SOEs involvement in Indonesian economic 
development occurred when the government had to take control of economic and political authority 
to achieve national socio-economic stabilisation. The economic roles of SOEs were revealed in their 
roles in Indonesian economic growth (Hill, 2007). When the market orientation policy was 
implemented and the government role was limited, Indonesian SOEs still played significant roles in 
both economic and social welfare development (Abeng, 2001; 2002; Diah, 2003). Their involvement 
in major industries, such as defence, banking, transportation and telecommunication has strategic 
implications for the nation (Diah 2003; MSOEs 2011; Siahaan 1996; Sugiharto 2005; Sukardi 2002). 
Some contributions have been made by Indonesian SOEs to improve their market capitalisation and 
national economic activities during the period of this study. Focusing exclusively on the period 
2007—2010, the total SOE contribution to capital expenditure in 2007 was Rp. 91 trillion (Djalil, 
2008), which increased to Rp. 354.89 trillion in 2008 (equivalent to 32.9 per cent of the total market 
capitalisation) (Wibowo and Nurlaila, 2009). In 2008, Indonesian SOEs made Rp. 79.27 trillion profit 
from their total assets of Rp. 2.040.26 trillion. SOEs contributed about 24 per cent of Indonesian 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), around 25 per cent of income tax for Rp. 200 trillion, and a Rp. 29.09 
trillion dividend for the state budget (Gunarto and Aditya, 2009). In 2009, with total SOE assets of 
Rp. 2,252 trillion, Indonesian SOEs contributed 40 per cent of total national GDP from Rp. 993.20 
trillion of their profit, Rp. 26.1 trillion from dividend payments, and Rp. 92.3 trillion from taxes, equal 
to 15 per cent of total national taxes paid (MSOEs, 2011; MoCommunication, 2010). Meanwhile, the 
Jakarta Stock Exchange (JSX) reported that the capitalisation from 14 listed SOEs by December 2008, 
as mentioned previously, reached Rp. 354.89 trillion, equivalent to 32.9 per cent of the total market 
capitalisation (Wibowo and Nurlaila, 2009). Total capital expenditure in 2009 was Rp. 637 trillion, or 
31.57 per cent of total market capitalisation (Aliya, 2011; MSOEs, 2011). Total SOE capitalisation at 
the JSX in 2010 was Rp. 818 trillion, equal to 23.30 per cent of total market capitalisation (MSOEs, 
2012). Data in 2011 indicates that the 18 listed SOEs on the JSX reached a total capital of Rp. 837 
trillion, equalling 26.8 per cent of total market capital (Burhani, 2011). Based on these data, SOEs 
continue to make significant contributions to the Indonesian economy. 
In addition to their economic roles, Indonesian SOEs also play an important role in the social welfare 
sphere. The social role of Indonesian SOEs arose as a consequence of Article 33 of the 1945 
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Constitution of Indonesia, which highlights the importance of controlling natural resources and 
production by government authority (Abeng 2001; Diah 2003; Indonesia 2002; Ruru 2006; Mardjana 
1992). In addition, Article 34 of the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia underlines the requirement and 
importance for the state to provide and be responsible for the social security system and public 
utilities (Constitution, 1945; Higgins, 1958). These indicate that government should remain in the 
SOE business. In practice, the  social roles include being the main investor in public infrastructure, 
such as roads, seaports and telecommunications; and the operator of public utilities such as 
electricity, postal services, water and fuel (Abeng, 2001; Yonnedi, 2010) still part of the SOEs’ roles, 
even though many Indonesian SOEs do not carry a PSO. These requirements to provide public 
utilities and social welfare are also part of the centralisation of economic policy under the 
government. Up to now, the majority of Indonesian industries were still under government control 
(PerPRes Negatif List Investasi no 36/2010), through SOE roles. This control policy became a major 
issue for the government when it was later required to privatise the SOEs. 
The requirement to improve SOE performance and resolve the Indonesian economic situation 
following the fiscal crises ensured that privatisation was the government’s most important economic 
policy. Privatisation has become an economic policy since the 1966 financial crisis, analysed in detail 
in Chapter 7. Privatisation became the most conventional economic policy when the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) pressured the Indonesian government to implement it to qualify for economic 
recovery assistance. Intensive privatisation began in 1998 when the government separated 
regulatory and shareholder functions to speed up the privatisation process (Abeng, 2001; 2002; IMF, 
1997a; 1997b). The centralisation of the SOEs under the Ministry of State Owned Enterprises was 
mainly aimed at improving SOE performance, eliminating bureaucracy and speeding up the 
privatisation process required to resolve the national economic situation (Abeng, 2001; 2002). In 
practice, conflict between economic and regulatory constraints still arose when the government 
undertook privatisation. In many cases, privatisation followed the removal of SOE privileges and 
monopolies for the provision of public utilities, which engages with the government and SOEs’ social 
welfare duties. One example is the privatisation of PT Angkasa Pura II (Airport Company). Planning 
for the privatisation of PT Angkasa Pura II began in 1998 (DiBiasio, 1998; Sukardi, 2005). This 
privatisation aimed to improve company performance and efficiency, as well as to support the state 
budget. In practice, social welfare objectives, as stated in the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia and 
Undang-Undang Penerbangan no. 15/1992 (Aeronautical Act no. 15/1992/UU Penerbangan) 
hindered this privatisation plan. The Act states that aeronautical activities are public service 
facilities, with consequences for national security and assimilation objectives (UU Penerbangan, 
1992). Consequently, the government, or SOEs on behalf of the government, are the only authorities 
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allowed to provide airport service and management (UU Penerbangan, 1992). Privatisation is not 
appropriate for providing airport services; consequently, privatisation of PT Angkasa Pura II has been 
postponed until these laws are amended. 
Privatisation is still an important issue for the Indonesian government in the context of its control 
policy. The requirement for government to reduce its involvement in SOE business activities and 
decision-making processes does not sit easily with Indonesian SOEs. Although most transfer 
ownership is undertaken for less than 49 per cent, some SOEs commence their public listing by 
issuing new shares. This is done to maintain majority control by the government. This also indicates 
the requirement for fresh funding is mostly aimed at internal company purposes, such as investment 
or business expansion, and that this transfer of ownership does not disadvantage the government’s 
control or ownership structure. The requirement to retain control also encourages the government 
to issue golden shares, or Saham Dwi-Warna (Dual Colour Share–Red and White), as an alternative 
for the government to retain control and regulate SOEs.1 Ramamurti (1999) argues that 
governments retain control through golden shares, providing concession or holding board seats, as 
most SOE activities operate within imperfect market competition, and the government still needs to 
anticipate changes that may affect the national economy (Ramamurti, 1999). In practice, 
government golden share ownership becomes a barrier for publicly listed SOEs in meeting 
international capital markets’ corporate governance requirements (AnTam, 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 
2008; 2009; 2010). 
As part of the control issue, privatisation in Indonesia has created the opportunity for the 
government to emphasise the importance of financial objectives. An increasing possibility of 
maximum shared ownership by the public through privatisation in Indonesia relates to the 
development of economic objectives, which are part of the requirement for SOEs to fully implement 
for corporatisation. External pressure from the IMF through the ‘Letter of Intent’ (Wise, 2002) 
emphasised intensive implementation of corporatisation as part of the fast-track privatisation 
programme. The government emphasises this implementation by noting the importance of SOEs 
profitability and efficiency, through the introduction of Undang-Undang Badan Usaha Milik Negara 
no. 19/2003 (SOEs Act no. 19/2003/UU BUMN No 19/2003) and Peraturan Pemerintah (PP) no. 
33/2005 tentang Privatisasi (Privatisation Rule no. 33/2005/PP Privatisation no. 33/2005). Profit and 
efficiency objectives are applied to all SOEs, including Perum and Persero, with PSO duties. In 
practice, the implementation of new objectives is not easy. Problems appear when government still 
                                                          
1
 Saham Dwi-Warna (Red–White Share/Golden Share Ownership) is a single share owned by government, 
which specifies voting and veto rights (TELKOM, 2008. PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia  Annual Report 2008, 
Bandung: PT Telkom Tbk.). The share is named after the colors of the Indonesian flag: red and white, usually 
called the two-color or Dwi-Warna. 
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uses SOEs as a vehicle for social welfare functions. A number of SOEs still deal with conflicting 
objectives due to government requirements and bureaucratic involvement in their business, also 
requiring SOEs to achieve other objectives (Abeng, 2001; 2002, AnTam, 2004; 2005, Chandola, 1976; 
Siahaan, 1996; Wicaksono, 2008). An example is the requirement for SOEs to participate in national 
energy and food sustainability programmes (MSOEs, 2012; Sugiharto, 2005). The potential for 
conflicting objectives occurs when new objectives differ from existing objectives (Manzetti, 2003).  
State ownership and multiple objectives are identified as the major reasons for SOE inefficiency. The 
privatisation policies are a pathway for reducing government control, and the introduction of the 
financial objectives for SOEs. In practice, this also becomes a factor for emerging conflicts of interest 
and policies. This brief background description holds that, in practice, multiple objectives create 
some potential conflicts that significantly affect SOEs’ business activities. Privatisation as part of the 
government reform program for SOEs does not work as expected as it is constrained by the 1945 
Constitution of Indonesia provisions regarding the control of resources. From this situation, the 
knowledge gap is found as privatisation conceptually aims for reducing government involvement 
within SOEs, the case of Indonesian SOEs shows that privatisation creates some potentially 
conflicting objectives which encourage the Indonesian government to conduct partial privatisation 
to accommodate external and constitutional pressures. The Indonesian situation also leaves 
knowledge gaps about whether partial privatisation and the introduction of new policy regarding 
SOEs objectives following privatisation alter the government objectives for SOEs. This situation is the 
motivation for, and background of, this thesis: to what extent are SOEs successful vehicles for 
attaining their government stated objectives, particularly after the introduction of privatisation 
policy. 
1.4 A Framework of Study 
This section provides the framework for the main area of analysis in this thesis. The three main areas 
of the focus of this section are historical path, SOEs, and government-stated objectives. This section 
is provided to guide a broader scope to the analysis. At the beginning of this framework, it is 
important to set a theoretical boundary as the guidance for the analysis process. The theory is used 
as a guide to analyse how the influence of changes and policy implementation on particular 
sequence period has effects on the organisation economic performance. The basic theory relies on 
the influence of institutions and the organisation in adjusting the dynamic of change and the roles of 
information (North, 1990). Following the theory, the concepts of SOE and government-stated 
objectives are developed as the foci of analysis. There are two main foci on institutional change 
theory; the organisation and institution. Organisation is the player on the process of change. The 
organisation exists when the opportunity set and the aim of its existence is to meet the objectives 
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(North, 1978). Meanwhile, an institution is defined as a constraint that structures the interaction 
which may be followed by the enforcement (Mantzavinos et al. 2004; North 1991; 1993; 
Landesmann and Pagano 1994). An institution is developed from a mix between formal and informal 
constrain; and the enforcement characteristic that are created or elaborated over the time (North 
1990; 1994; Mantzavinos et al. 2004). The interaction between organisation and institutions starts 
when the changes happened. This institutional change is a result from the interaction between 
institutions and organisation (North, 1995).  Later, historical path which developed from path 
dependence is used to guide the analysis of these changes. Path dependence is selected as it focuses 
on sequence events that formulate the current or later events (Liebowitz and Margolis 1995; 
Ebbinghaus 2005).  Therefore, this section aims to specify the area of analysis to eliminate an overly 
board scope of the subject that may appear during the analytic process. 
1.4.1 Institutional Change Theory : Path Dependence 
The selection of path dependence from institutional change theory is reasoned by the importance of 
changes sequence events in the past that affect to the current economic performance.  For this 
thesis, path dependence is employed as a reference to develop the historical path which is explained 
in detail in Chapters 3 and 5. This is mainly when the institutional change theory is used to 
understand how the path of institutional change occurred. For this analysis, the path of institutional 
change is a guide to analyse the changes of organisation, or SOEs, to the current situation or 
structure and objectives. The process of change may occurs in two different ways, discontinuation or 
incrementally. There are several factors that may lead to different results or patterns that develop 
during the evolution process (North, 1990). In his study, Mahoney (2000) highlights three important 
feature of path dependence: the earlier part of sequence, the earlier event, and causal pattern or 
inertia that set the motion and tracks for the outcome (Mahoney, 2000). Ebbinghaus (2005) notes 
two different interpretations of the analysis; trodden trail as when the spontaneous selection of a 
path is used as repetition of a subsequence; and road junction when the branching point is an 
available alternative or selection option selected in order to continue the journey (Ebbinghaus, 
2005). Meanwhile, Mahoney (2000) adds two types of sequences; self-reinforcing sequence is 
characterised by particular institutional patterns results from long term and fix formation, while 
reactive sequence is when the event on the sequence is a reaction from independent or causally 
occurs events (Mahoney 2000: pp 508-509). These indicators path of institutional changes are used 
to guide the analysis of this thesis in the contexts of the evolution of the government-stated 
objectives for SOEs as well as the structure of SOEs.  
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1.4.2 State-Owned Enterprises:  Definition  
As mentioned in the pervious section, Section 1.4, SOE as an organisation is the focus of analysis on 
this thesis. It is important for this thesis to set boundaries for the SOE in term of definition. The 
reason is SOE is not easy to model due to the influence of various factors; perspective and term are 
used to determine or define the SOE. Haririan (1998) notes that SOEs can be defined based on the 
author’s own view (Haririan, 1989). For some people, SOEs can be government entities run for 
providing public goods and service, while others claim they are government entities for profit-
making objectives (Gillis, 1980). SOEs can also be defined based on their relationship with the 
government as the principle shareholder or stockholder. According to their relationship with the 
government, definitions develop in various ways from the legal system, relating to board 
appointments and government utilities (McLellan, 2005), the government’s role (OECD, 2005b), the 
ownership structure (Gillis 1980; 2003; OECD 2005) as well as their own role and function (Lawson, 
1994; Martin, 1996). Gillis (1980) notes that in some categories the definition of an SOE is based on 
particular factors, such as the government being the principle stockholder, the provision of goods 
and services, and policy matters (Gillis, 1980). As a mixed entity between the private and 
government sectors, SOE structures and objectives are commonly influenced by both sectors. This 
also makes SOEs institutionally different from other economic entities, such as private companies or 
government departments. 
For this thesis, the government is the main factor setting the scheme or model for Indonesian SOEs. 
This is intertwined with the government’s roles and functions, which are underpinned by the 1945 
Constitution of Indonesia. Although policy and the provision of public utilities can still be considered 
as the government’s motives to establish SOEs, some Indonesian SOEs are no longer providing public 
utilities. A number of studies support the role of SOEs as no longer being limited to the public goods 
area (Gillis, 1980); for example, banking, trading and hotels (Tynan 2003; Willner 1999). For the 
purpose of this study, an SOE is defined by following the Indonesian definition: 
An enterprise whose capital is wholly or for the major part owned by the state through direct 
placement originating from reserved state assets (UU BUMN, 2003).2 
 
This definition clearly emphasises government ownership. However, a substantial part of this 
analysis is concerned with the impact of partial privatisation, which has ensured that some SOEs’ 
ownership structures are different. For the purposes of this study, new structure has been 
developed accommodate this situation. In order to eliminate potential ambiguous definition appears 
                                                          
2
 This definition based on the UU BUMN no 19/2003 (SOEs Act no. 19/2003), from the unofficial translation by 
the USAID-MSOEs privatisation project. 
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in relation to the Persero structure when it engages with privatisation issues, as the ownership 
structure changes; an extended definition of SOE in regard to the structure is required: 
SOE in the form of a limited liability company which capital is divided in shares that are 
wholly or minimally 51 per cent owned by the State of the Republic of Indonesia with the 
principal objective of seeking profit (UU BUMN, 2003). 
 
This definition is important to provide a broader government structure, which may be found during 
the analysis process. Only a company that has 51 per cent or more of central government ownership 
is categorised as an SOE.3 
1.4.3 Government-Stated Objectives : Definition 
Part of the analysis in this thesis is the evolution of government objectives. The changes of SOE’s 
structure may have a relationship with the changes of government objectives. Therefore, it is 
important to set boundaries for the government-stated objectives. In common practice, corporate 
objective is commonly defined as the required expectation from all the purposed activities of 
particular organisation such as company (Sundaram and Inkpen, 2004). In many cases, the objectives 
of an organisation are largely determined by the founder and for particular purposes. The case of 
SOEs where the objectives are determined by the government as the founder, it is possible for the 
government set certain goals to be part of the corporate objectives. A difference in SOE structure 
and the establishment rationale constitutes a requirement to have specific objectives from the 
government. Determining the government objectives for SOEs is mostly influenced by the SOEs’ role 
and function in national socio-economic development, as well as the change in institutional 
environment. However, in particular cases, SOEs are also established to counter certain institutions, 
as shown previously in the background section of this thesis. This also ensures that SOE structures 
are different from other organisations, such as government departments or private entities. The 
most common implication of this ownership structure is the potential for SOEs to carry multiple or 
mixed objectives, which might differ from their original or existing objectives (White, 2002). 
The influence of state ownership presents different perspective on the SOE’s objectives. The 
provision of public utilities and national economic development are the dominant factors underlying 
the government’s decision to establish SOEs, which later becomes the driving factor for the 
government to set up socio-political objectives for SOEs. In traditional views, SOE objectives engage 
with the requirement to meet government social welfare maximising objectives (Bai et al. 2000; 
                                                          
3
 The emphasis on an ownership structure with 51 per cent or more of central government ownership is 
important. Two industrial estate companies (PT Jakarta Industrial Estate and PT Surabaya Industrial Estate 
Rungkut) are excluded from the analysis because the central government has only 50 per cent of the 
ownership, while the other 50 per cent is owned by regional or city governments, and they are not considered 
as SOEs based on the UU BUMN. 
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Boardman et al. 1986a; Gillis 1980; Hanschen & Erspamer 2004; Shleifer & Vishny 1994; Willner 
1999; Ramamurti 1987). SOEs are also encouraged to reconcile with the government’s socio-political 
objectives. For example, an SOE must provide infrastructure in a certain rural area/community. This 
objective may focus on a particular needy community; however, because the public has needs, it 
tends to be understood collectively (Hamzah, 2007). SOEs also have to carry certain non-economic 
objectives, which still relate to industrialisation or national economic development, such as 
employment, state budget or public utility facilities (Boardman et al. 1986a; Gillis 1980; Ramamurti 
1987). These objectives are considered to be the government social welfare or non-economic 
objectives for SOEs. For the Indonesian SOEs, the social welfare or non-economic objectives are all 
the government expectation statement from the SOEs purposive activities in socio-economic 
spheres.  
In addition to their social welfare objectives, SOEs have financial objectives. These have mostly 
developed since the SOE is considered as a business entity. The development of financial objectives 
are mostly influenced by the private entities whose run in the same business area. In a general 
context, financial objectives can be defined as both direct and indirect, with implications for cost 
(Keeney, 1988); while for general business entities, financial objectives commonly engage with 
profit. For business entities, profit seeking, or maximising profit, is a natural economic or financial 
objective (Ansoff, 1965). In fact, there is a difference between ‘profits’, as excess of revenue over 
cost, and ‘profitable’, as a measure of return on resources (Ansoff, 1965), which is not clearly stated 
as part of the SOEs’ obejctives. For the Indonesian SOEs, the economic objectives are all the 
government expectation statement from the SOEs purposive activities which has financial or cost 
implications. Because of the financial or cost implication, the economic objectives, for this study, are 
included the financial objectives. As the main focus of this study is to examine the government 
objectives as stated on the establishment rules for the SOEs, it is defined as the government-stated 
objectives. 
1.5 Research Methods 
The research design has been developed based on research questions as well as the availability of 
and access to data. The main concern of this research is to examine whether SOEs successfully meet 
their government-stated objectives. Due to political sensitivities that may potentially arise as a 
consequence of using methods such as surveys, case studies or observation; historical path analysis 
with interpretive and content analysis are selected as the most appropriate methods. This is 
particularly since the majority of data are from publicly available sources. Historical path analysis is a 
method that analyses the changes (Mahoney, 2004) continuously over time by focusing on the time, 
process, and causes (Thompson, 2009). Meanwhile, interpretive and content analyses investigate 
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and analyse the deep meaning or message of documents and archives which are used for further 
analysis or study (Bearman, 1995). For this study, government documents, SOEs annual reports and 
regulations in relations to the government objectives for SOEs are used.   
There are three processes of analysing data to answer research questions. The historical study 
provides the first stage of analysing the evolution of the objectives, followed by the content and 
interpretive analyses to examine the implications of the policies and objectives. The last stage is an 
empirical study, based on the findings of the previous analysis in this study. This is then followed by 
quantitative analysis, to test the relationships and implications of the objectives on performance. 
Since the main goal for this study is to examine the success of SOEs at attaining their government-
stated objectives, the test will focus on the reflection of government-stated objectives on SOEs’ 
performance. This last stage of quantitative analysis will develop in detail separately in Chapter 5 as 
part of the performance analysis. 
1.5.1 Historical Path Analysis 
The aim of this study is to develop a map of government-stated objectives for SOEs and the 
evolution of privatisation policy in Indonesia. This analysis will establish the background and patterns 
of the relationships between SOEs and government, as well reconstruct the development of 
privatisation policy in Indonesia. The study focuses on revealing the nature of government-stated 
objectives for SOEs from government and SOE documents and archival history records. 
Reconstructing policy from historical study has been selected to present a description of the nature 
of the government’s objectives. Parker (2004) notes that historical study offers possibilities to 
discover causes and consequences, to identify patterns and to deduct, infer and explain historical 
events (Parker 2004: p. 144). The study begins by developing categories of objectives, as mentioned 
on Appendix 1. Categories are used to distinguish items based on the nature of research and 
particularities of data (Breg, 1989). The historical study relies on empirical material in chronological 
order or sequence, where a complex case is described through reconstructing the past (Smith & Lux, 
1993). Chronological or sequence events will provide a map of the evolution of Indonesian SOEs and 
privatisation policy, which will also help to conduct further analysis into how the structure and 
objectives evolved. Besides reconstructing the past, this method also allows researchers to discover 
the causes and consequences of particular events which may sufficiently affect the end process. 
These events may include intervening cases in relation to the analysis process (Mahoney, 2004). 
Focusing on particular events may disclose more information that may enrich and support 
reconstructing the evolution of SOEs and privatisation policy in Indonesia. Using literature 
references also controls for problems that may arise due to misinterpretation or data complexity. 
The data is analysed by developing the patterns, cause-and-effect relationships, consequences and 
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chronological list. Historical study, supported by interpretive and content analysis, offers benefits 
not only in the technique, but also the potential to reveal the social and organisational context over 
time (Duriau et al. 2007b; Parker, 1997). During archival analysis, problems may arise because of the 
large time gap. The ‘snowball’ technique is used to trace related documents, based on current 
references or records. The ‘snowball’ technique is also used to enrich data and narrow the analysis. 
1.5.2 Implications of the Objectives 
There are two main foci when examining the implications of the objectives. The first focus area is the 
implication of privatisation policy on SOEs and the government’s objectives. Focusing exclusively on 
privatisation policy, this study examines whether privatisation policy causes differences in 
government and SOEs objectives and in the way the government oversees SOEs. The second focus 
area is the Indonesian government policy in determining the objectives for SOEs after the 
introduction of privatisation policy; whether in practice these are in harmony or conflict. Content 
analysis and interpretive study are employed to reveal the implicit and explicit meanings of 
privatisation policy, using documents and archival records for both SOEs and government. Berelson 
(cited in Marshal & Rossman 2006) describes content analysis as an objective and neutral way of 
obtaining a quantitative description of the content of various forms of communications; thus, 
counting the mention of specific items is important (Marshall & Rossman, 2006). The choice of 
content analysis is mainly rationalised by the importance of text (Duriau et al. 2007a). Neumann 
(2006) suggests that content analysis can be used to reveal the unseen or difficult aspects of a text’s 
content (Neumann, 2006). 
Interpretive analysis is employed to help and understand the meaning and context of data. 
Interpretive analysis is focused on the text as the object of study, which it is important for the study 
to ensure the text is clear, coherent and makes sense (Myers, 1994; Maitland-Gholson and Ettinger, 
1994). For this study, interpretive analysis is employed to support both historical and content 
analysis based on archival records. As the main data for this study is based on government and SOE 
public records, some records, such as regulation and law statements, are commonly vague and 
ambiguous. Some statements may be written in general terms for a particular purpose. Therefore, 
interpretation is important to ensure clarity and coherence. Meanwhile, the other reason to use this 
method is that some records, considered as laws and regulations, can be interpreted broadly where 
the sources and value of the policy may not be stated or interpreted explicitly (Furgeson et al., 
2008). 
The study refers to the historical results for both the objectives of the SOEs and privatisation policy. 
The objectives are categorised into the source of objectives and the type of objectives. Although the 
main focus of analysis is the government objectives, the other sources of objectives may be included 
  15 
as part of the analysis. Based on the source of the objectives, they are classified into three 
categories: 
1. The government-stated objectives as stated in the SOE’s rules at the time of their 
establishment, including any further changes up to 2010. 
2. The SOE or company constitution objectives as stated in the Articles of Association (AoA), 
the organisation’s annual report or financial report. 
3. The management’s objectives as stated in the company’s vision and mission. 
The reason to develop this classification is that there are some indications of differences or gaps 
among these institutional objectives, which become part of the analysis. The SOEs’ or company’s 
objectives and management objectives are separated, as the preliminary findings reveal some 
potential difference between these two objective resources. The literature is also used as a 
reference to compare with the potential drivers identified to eliminate multiple interpretations. 
Multiple interpretations may lead to difficulties in recognising the objectivities. Using the literature 
references will also help to anticipate problems with data that may arise due to misinterpretation or 
complexity. 
1.5.3 Unit Analysis 
The unit analysis for this research is government-stated objectives for SOEs. The Indonesian SOE and 
government public information, such as annual reports, websites, press releases, regulations and 
public archival records are the major data resources for this study. The study relies on archival 
records; two different records are employed, public and private archival records. Since private 
archives are potentially written for certain audiences and purposes, access may be either too 
restricted or too broad; public archives, such as mass media or actuarial records, will help eliminate 
potential problems with public data (Breg, 1989). The major target for data collection is divided into 
two types. First, government regulations and SOE documents from 1945 to the present will assist in 
examining the development of the SOEs. Second, SOE annual reports from the period 2004–2010, 
will be used to examine the implementation of privatisation and corporatisation plans for SOEs, from 
the 140 out of 141 SOEs in Indonesia that are required publish annual reports. In addition, this study 
also concentrates on government documentation, particularly regulations that relate to industrial 
concerns. Content analysis and interpretive analysis are important tools to support investigation of 
the archival records, where data is permanently recorded. In practice, this tool also needs a clear 
system and procedure to meet the reliability and validity criteria (Collis & Hussey, 2003). 
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1.6 Chapter Development 
This thesis is presented in twelve chapters, as follows: 
‐ Chapter 1: Introduction 
The chapter consist of the motivation, framework and research method to analyse this thesis.  
- Chapter 2 : Literature Review 
The chapter reviews the SOEs reforms and comprehensive analysis regarding privatisation in various 
regions. 
- Chapter 3 : Framework of study 
The chapter consist of nature of SOEs and government objectives as the main focus of research, and 
framework of study for this thesis. 
- Chapter 4 : Proposition and Hypotheses 
The chapter consist of proposition and hypothesis development based on knowledge gaps identified 
from literature review and framework of study. 
- Chapter 5 : Research Methods 
The chapter consist of method, unit analysis, data collection and data analysis which are used to 
analyse and answer the research questions of this thesis.  
‐ Chapter 6: The Evolution of Government-Stated Objectives for SOEs 
The chapter examines the evolution of government-stated objectives and SOE structures. The study 
in this chapter is largely historical description, based on the interpretive analysis. The chapter 
describes the development of the SOEs’ structures and objectives, from Indonesianisation to 
nationalisation, followed by the development of economic performance period under the 
corporatisation eras. This chapter also analyses the implications of institutional environmental 
changes in the structure and objectives of the SOEs. 
- Chapter 7: The implications of Privatisation Policy and Partial Privatisation on the Government’s 
Objectives for SOEs 
The chapter examines the implication of privatisation policy and partial privatisation on the 
government’s objectives for the SOEs. The chapter is largely based on historical description and 
interpretive analysis of the government and SOE archives and records on privatisation policy in 
Indonesia. The chapter emphasises the analysis of the evolution of privatisation and the implications 
of policy in the current situation. 
‐ Chapter 8: The Government-Stated Objectives in Practice: Publicly Listed State Owned 
Enterprises Cases 
This chapter examines the implications for the government-stated objectives and policies on the 
practices of publicly listed SOEs. The reason to analyse publicly listed SOEs is based on a preliminary 
  17 
analysis that indicated that the privatisation policy has directly affected the publicly listed SOEs. The 
chapter identifies that these changes are not limited to structure and ownership; it also includes 
some industrial policy implications that indicate the effects on the SOEs’ business activities and 
decision-making processes. 
- Chapter 9: The Government-Stated objectives in Practice: Non-Privatised State Owned 
Enterprises Cases 
This chapter examines the implications of the government-stated objectives and policies on the 
practices of the non-privatised SOEs following the implementation of the privatisation policy. The 
chapter builds on the results from Chapter 7, where privatisation policy was found to result in 
certain indirect implications for non-privatised SOEs and the environment where these SOEs 
operate. 
- Chapter 10: The Relations between the Government-Stated Objectives and SOEs Financial 
Performance  
This chapter examines whether the SOEs are successful in meeting their government-
statedobjectives, as reflected by their performance. The chapter has two main foci, the evaluation of 
the government-statedobjectives’ influence on SOE performance and the relationship between the 
governments stated objectives and SOE performance. This chapter is developed based on the results 
of the analyses presented in Chapters 6 to 9, as an empirical and quantitative analysis to support 
these results, showing the reflection of the government’s objectives in SOE performance. 
- Chapter 11: The success of SOEs in Achieving the Government’s Objectives 
The chapter focuses on the multivariate test as the regression test to examine and estimate the 
relations between the objectives and performance.  
- Chapter 12 : Discussion and Conclusion 
This chapter provides the discussion, main conclusion and results of this study, including 
recommendations for future study and the limitations of this study. 
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Chapter 2:  
Literature Review: Studies of SOEs 
 
This chapter reviews the literature regarding the dynamics of SOEs in market economies where 
market sensitivity and policy changes affect SOEs’ objectives and business activities. Public policy 
reforms, privatisation, corporatisation and liberalisation often require the government to change the 
ownership and management structure of SOEs. Earlier studies have identified that these changes 
also affect their performance (Aivazian et al., 2005; Eric Williams, 2002; Guthrie et al., 2003; Shirley, 
1999). Although there has been widespread research into SOEs’ performance, there have been 
limited studies of public policy reforms regarding government objectives for SOEs. 
This chapter aims to provide an understanding of the outcome of SOEs’ reforms in market 
economies and key issues with respect to government objectives for SOEs. Government reform of 
SOEs has been encouraged for various reasons, including inefficiency, political constraints and fiscal 
problems (Guthrie and English, 1997; Yarrow, 1999). The reform of SOEs affects national economic 
activities and the SOEs themselves. However, SOE reforms have been criticised for failing to resolve 
social welfare issues (Ahmed, 1999; Bai et al., 2000; Currie, 2005; Eric Williams, 2002; Haque, 2001; 
Kemal, 2000; Salih, 2000). Social welfare is a crucial issue in the transition of market economies 
where SOEs have dominated socio-economic activities. High reliance on government support and 
the provision of public utilities has impeded the implementation of SOE reforms (Bai et al., 2000; Eric 
Williams, 2002). In practice, the failure of SOE reforms does not only occur in emerging market 
economies. Studies have shown that some advanced market economies also fail to reform their 
SOEs (Caves, 1990; Channon, 1980; Jenkinson and Mayer, 1988; Mazzolini, 1979; Perotti, 1995). The 
effect of SOE reforms, in particular privatisation policy, is one of the main focuses of the review in 
this chapter. 
A part of SOE reforms is the development of SOEs’ objectives. Earlier studies have shown that SOEs 
often need to have multiple objectives (Lawson, 1994; Mazzolini, 1979; Rousseau and Xiao, 2008; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). SOEs’ objectives are often very sensitive to changes in government 
policy, as government policy is a double-edged sword for SOEs. SOEs are often used as a government 
vehicle for implementing policy and regulation (Lawson, 1994; Ruys, 1988; Yu, 2001), and the 
involvement of the government and politicians often creates overlapping and conflicting policies and 
interests for SOEs to deal with. In practice, government policy is not the only factor that creates the 
multiple and conflicting objectives. Markets influence SOEs’ activities and objectives (Sexty, 1980), 
and different market economies can create different settings for SOEs’ roles and objectives (Ayub 
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and Hegstad, 1987). Social welfare objectives may not be the government or SOEs’ main concern in 
advanced market economies (Lawson, 1994); however, the government and SOEs in emerging 
market economies play a crucial role in providing social welfare and industrialisation (Ayub and 
Hegstad, 1987; Caporaso, 1982; Hill, 1982; Yu, 2001). These differences are the main focus of this 
literature review. 
This review focuses on three different market economies by emphasising the implications of the 
privatisation policy. The three market economies are: advanced market economies, Asian emerging 
market economies and non-Asian emerging market economies. Meanwhile, the focus of the review 
is the government’s role and policies for SOEs before, during and after reforms or privatisation. 
Three different stages of reform are important in distinguishing the government’s role and policies 
for SOEs, as well as the implications of reforms for new privatised firms. The different roles and 
periods, as shown below, distinguish SOEs’ objectives. Through this review, these roles and reforms 
are analysed to evaluate the extent to which the roles, policies and reforms alter the objectives. The 
remainder of this chapter is separated into: SOE reforms as a general overview of privatisation, SOEs 
in advanced market economies or developed countries, SOEs in non-Asian emerging market 
economies, and SOEs in Asian emerging market economies. These sections are followed by a 
conclusion to identify the key issues and knowledge gaps addressed by this thesis. 
2.1. SOE Reforms: Privatisation 
Earlier studies of SOEs emphasised the conceptualisation of SOEs as a government commercial entity 
with social welfare objectives (Lawson, 1994; Mazzolini, 1979; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). This 
concept is a key point for the relationship between the government and SOEs, as it underlines the 
differences between SOEs and private entities. Government involvement, for example, is justified as 
part of the government’s authority (Lawson, 1994), which later generates ‘unfair’ treatment 
between SOEs and private entities (Yu, 2001). The government’s involvement usually refers to 
national economic development and social welfare (Boardman et al., 1986; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1994; Yu, 2001), and it has been examined in the context of natural monopolies, economic planning, 
stabilisation policy and the redistribution of power, income or wealth (Lawson, 1994). There is 
evidence that SOEs are able to keep prices lower or affordable for the community, and for this, SOEs 
often have captive markets and customers where the government provides privileges and protection 
for SOEs to run their business (Mascarenhas, 1989). Consequenty, SOEs’ financial performance 
remains a major public and government’s issue. 
SOEs’ financial performance and their relationship with the government have received the most 
attention in prior studies of SOEs where Inefficiency and poor performance were central concerns 
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(Bai et al., 2000; Boardman et al., 1986; Bozec and Dia, 2007; Chen et al., 2008; Shleifer and Vishny, 
1994). SOEs’ multiple objectives have been identified as barriers for their performance (Chen et al., 
2008; Lawson, 1994; Ramamurti, 1987). Some studies showed that profit maximisation is not the 
government’s main concern for SOEs (Boardman et al., 1986; Hanschen and Erspamer, 2004; Hill, 
1982; Ramamurti, 1987). Besides multiple objectives, the literature indicates that ambiguity of 
residual claim principals can lead management to operate inefficiently (Brumby, 1997; Shirley, 
1999). An unclear identified principal is found through government functions where the government 
is both the regulator and state representative owner or principal for SOEs. In practice, the 
government also includes politician, bureaucrats and other government agents. This unclear 
identified principal has two consequences. First, the involvement of politicians, bureaucrats or other 
government agents brings different agendas for SOEs other than profit or economic objectives or 
even the existing objectives (Chang and Wong, 2009; Ramamurti, 1987; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). 
These involvements also generate a lack of control and monitoring from the government. Earlier 
studies regarding SOEs’ management showed that the government, politicians or bureaucrats might 
not have sufficient knowledge to control or monitor SOEs (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Zif, 1981). 
Despite a lack of knowledge to monitor SOEs, politicians still use SOEs for political and legitimacy 
purposes (Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Second, unclear identified principals make it difficult for these 
principals to claim the economic effects of SOEs’ benefits or surplus (McLellan, 2005). Consequently, 
the government may resist disciplining SOEs. This resistance is also a reason why the government 
may keep SOEs running their business, even when the company consistently does not make any 
profit (Hill, 1982). 
Agency theory also emphasises the role of risk. The relationship of the agent and principal may 
create interest differences that involve each institution’s risk (Eisenhardt, 1989). Risk sharing 
emerges when the end result of business activities may affect each party differently. These effects of 
risks determine each party’s selection regarding their actions and objectives (Eisenhardt, 1989). 
Although separated functions between agent and principal are argued to eliminate the entire 
control and claim of wealth domination (Jensen and Meckling, 1976), agency theory also shows that 
this separation of control and function creates potentially conflicting interests when information is 
crucial (Rees, 1988). Management as an agent may hold information to protect their interests. 
Asymmetric information potentially produces conflicts between the agent and principal. It also 
makes it difficult for the principal to hold agents accountable in relation to their obligations to meet 
the target (Shirley, 1999). Stakeholder theory shows that management may take the interests and 
concerns of the group or individual, who are the company’s stakeholders, into account when making 
their decision (Buchholz and Rosenthal, 2004). Risk and interest govern the selection of agents and 
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principals’ actions and decisions. This situation is also found within SOEs. Risk and interest of SOE 
managers may influence the selection of actions and decisions, in particular when the government 
as the owner and stakeholder in involved in the decision-making process. 
Separated functions of agent and principal have consequences for monitoring structure. Monitoring 
structure in private entities commonly runs based on objectives set by the principals. Profit 
maximising, which engages with managers’ benefits, is regularly informed or published by the 
managers through firms’ performance report (Estrin and Pérotin, 1991). However, these things often 
do not apply within SOEs. SOEs’ objectives are frequently stated in general or ambiguous statements 
that raise several interpretations and implications. The objectives are commonly very sensitive to 
change and also potentially in conflict. In some cases, SOEs’ objectives are also subject to political 
processes (Estrin and Pérotin, 1991), which the government may not openly elaborate for public 
sector firms (Wong, 2004). These objectives may lead to unsettled plans and monitoring 
mechanisms that are often found within SOEs. Agency theory underlines the role of equity to 
monitor management when the mechanism of control and monitoring fails to meet expectations (De 
Castro et al., 1996). In practice, this mechanism does not work properly for SOEs. SOEs can ease to 
get an access for their capital as a result of their relationship and protection from the government. 
SOEs’ management has fewer risks because two major issues protect them: bankruptcy and take-
overs (OECD, 2005a; 2005b). These protections have some consequences. Bankruptcy and take-over 
protection from the government cause less motivation for SOEs’ management to protect and 
present their best interests (OECD, 2005b; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). These protections also result 
in a less attractive sanction and reward system, which provide an opportunity for SOEs’ managers to 
carry out their own interests (Peng et al, 2003). These situations contribute to SOEs’ poor 
performance and free rider issues, which may not be easy to resolve through privatisation only. 
The phenomena of privatisation and corporatisation emerge as the result of public pressure for SOEs 
to show better performance and efficiency. Privatisation and corporatisation have developed in both 
advanced and emerging economies driven by two main reasons: the development of market 
economies and the breakdown of the Soviet Communist regime. The development of market 
economies is claimed to be a driving factor for corporatisation and privatisation (Christensen and 
Pallesen, 2001). Privatisation is determined as a transfer of ownership or assets from state to private 
ownership (Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009; Boubakri et al., 2009; Pangestu, 1990; Shirley, 1999). 
Through privatisation, SOEs are expected to have better performance where new culture, economic 
or financial objectives such as profit and efficiency become both the agent and principal’s concerns 
(Willner, 1999). Through privatisation, the government is also encouraged to open its market, where 
new privatised firms run their businesses for private and foreign participants (Chandola, 1976). This 
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means that both new privatised firms and private firms will compete fairly in market economy 
spheres. Meanwhile, corporatisation has developed as a result of the development of a relationship 
between agents and principals (Aivazian et al., 2005; Mueller, 1992). Agency theory emphasises that 
changes of the ownership structure through privatisation generates the development of a new 
structure and monitoring function mechanism (Bozec and Dia, 2007). Early studies argued that 
corporatisation is also part of privatisation and/or modernisation of SOEs, which also aims to 
improve SOEs’ performance (Aivazian et al., 2005; Christensen and Pallesen, 2001). Control and 
monitoring mechanisms work through the roles of board, committee and auditor are considered to 
improve firms’ performance and efficiency (Yarrow, 1999). This improvement occurs because 
corporatisation requires SOEs to be more accountable and transparent. 
The requirements for SOEs to be accountable and perform well have also become a major topic in 
various discussions regarding SOE reforms. Besides privatisation, corporatisation is claimed as 
another way to improve SOEs’ performance and efficiency (Aivazian et al., 2005). Corporatisation is 
defined as efforts to make SOEs operate as private entities in a competitive market without 
monopoly or strict regulation barriers (Shirley, 1999). This underlines that the government should 
not support or protect SOEs when they run their business activities. In practice, the most common 
result of corporatisation is through restructuring modern corporate governance structures where 
the control and monitoring mechanism is crucial as part of the new corporate governance structure. 
Separated functions between agent and principal are commonly followed by the introduction of a 
control structure. A common practice of the control structure is through a contract mechanism 
between SOEs’ management as the agent and the government as the owner or principal (Eisenhardt, 
1989). Contract has become a standard of the corporatisation mechanism. An earlier study revealed 
that management and regulatory contract mechanisms demonstrate better achievements for SOEs 
to improve their performance when the market is competitive (Shirley, 1999). This shows that the 
change in control structure, both internal and external, through privatisation or corporatisation, 
affects successful SOEs in improving their performance and efficiency. 
Besides performance improvement, privatisation is also driven by socio-political reasons. An 
empirical study of privatisation showed four possible determinant areas for privatisation: political 
preferences, hard budget constraints, influence of their legal structure regarding control policy, and 
stock market development (Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009; Bortolotti et al., 2004; Errunza and 
Mazumdar, 2001). These four determinant areas established the willingness of the government to 
conduct privatisation. Less democratic states where the centralisation of control is under the 
government or certain agents tends to show less interest in privatisation, while good functioning of 
stock markets actively encourages the government to conduct privatisation (Bortolotti et al., 2004). 
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The most common reasons for privatisation are to strengthen the state budget or reduce 
government involvement in SOEs (Errunza and Mazumdar, 2001). Hard state budget occurs following 
high public debt when the government has to provide funds for the provision of public utilities. For 
example, the case with the Australian government prior to 1992 showed that high government debt 
motivated the Australian government to privatise the Commonwealth Bank and Qantas (Ryan, 
2012). Privatisation is not only driven by internal or domestic nation interest. For some countries, 
such as Brazil and Indonesia, privatisation arose from external pressure when their governments 
engaged with international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the 
World Bank (Ruys, 1988). These backgrounds influence the end result of privatisation. 
Legal structure and market economy environment present some influences on the success of SOEs’ 
privatisation. Different legal structures and socio-economic environments provide different 
structures of ownership, which affect SOEs’ objectives and policy (Boubakri et al., 2005c; 2009). 
Legal structure is argued to have significant effects on the willingness of the government to remove 
its control and involvement in economic activities. An empirical study in both Civil and Common Law 
structures shows that a Civil Law country is likely to have less privatisation compared to a Common 
Law country (Boubakri et al., 2009). Governments in Civil Law countries have a tendency to hold 
control of economic policy. A similar case is also shown in less democratic countries or countries 
with external privatisation pressures. These tendencies and pressures affect the government’s 
willingness to conduct privatisation. Later, this government willingness determines the new 
structure of ownership and performance of new privatised firms (Ayub and Hegstad, 1987; Bortolotti 
and Faccio, 2009). Besides legal structure, good functioning of stock market liquidity encourages the 
government and firms to conduct privatisation (Bortolotti et al., 2004; 2005c). A less developed 
stock market may encourage the government to privatise SOEs in order to improve market activities. 
In practice, a less developed stock market causes asset transfer and the voucher distribution popular 
privatisation method. Further analysis regarding this method is reviewed in detail in the following 
sections in this chapter. The intensity of privatisation is also demonstrated through the 
government’s relationship and control towards SOEs or new privatised firms, along with social 
welfare issues. 
This review shows that some SOE issues motivate governments to reform their SOEs. Earlier studies 
indicated that SOE reforms are not easy to achieve (Levy, 1987; Ramamurti, 1987). Legal structure, 
market and government interest determine the selection of the privatisation process and method. 
When the government’s interests are in conflict with the market pressure, will government reforms 
the SOEs, and what the implications in SOEs roles are. Whether the privatisation generates changes 
  24 
in the government and SOEs’ roles, these are the main issues of this review through the privatisation 
cases in three different market economies. 
2.2. SOE Reforms in Advanced Market Economies 
SOE socio-political roles may show different SOE reform outcomes in different market economies. 
These distinctions are affected by two factors: country and company characteristics (Ayub and 
Hegstad, 1987). As mentioned previously, legal structure and the government’s national socio-
economic objectives contribute to distinguishing policies and objectives for SOEs. SOEs in advanced 
market economies largely aim to promote industrialisation development (Lawson, 1994) and to 
implement industrial policy (Ruys, 1988). The role of the state as the centre of economic functions 
places SOEs as the government’s vehicles to carry out traditional public utilities duties (Clifton et. al, 
2003). Besides the roles of government, the history, cultural and political structures show their 
influences on the government and SOEs’ roles and structure and also differ them from SOEs in 
advanced market economies and emerging market economies (Ayub and Hegstad, 1987). Historical 
studies about SOEs in Western countries showed that SOEs in advanced market economies are part 
of the state’s role in resolving market failures resulting from economic collapse or industrial bailouts, 
nationalisation and the effect of the capitalism evolution (Toninellie, 2000). Later, socio-political 
purposes strongly affect the role of SOEs, in particular during post-war periods and economic 
collapse. Securing national defences, social welfare instruments and political unification are the 
motivations for advanced market economy governments to establish SOEs (Millward, 2011). Some of 
the SOEs in this market economy are part of nationalisation during periods of war and economic 
collapse. Later, full employment and better working condition are the main roles of SOEs in 
advanced market economies (Toninellie, 2000; Clifton et al., 2003). These motivations make natural 
monopoly no longer the main factor for the government to become involve in market economy 
activities, as it has been done through continuing tradition or licence (Lawson, 1994). This situation 
makes the government a passive player in market economy activities. These differences affect the 
government’s decision to privatise SOEs. 
The development of market economy activities encourages the emergence of competition. In 
advanced market economies, markets are mainly driven by competition (Ryan, 2012). The replacing 
of government involvement in market economy activities with the invisible hand of the market 
(Ryan, 2012) has considerable effects on SOEs’ policy. Privatisation in advanced market economies is 
likely driven by policy implementation or market incentives. Privatisation in advanced market 
economies is often aimed at disciplining SOEs. A study of Canadian SOEs revealed that new public 
policy could facilitate more autonomy and independence of SOE managers in making decisions 
(Sexty, 1980). Open market competition is argued to have an important effect, particularly in 
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disciplining firms and their managers (Caves, 1990). New policy about ownership structure or 
competition is also a reason for the government to privatise SOEs in advanced market economies. In 
the United Kingdom (UK) and France, privatisation aims to limit the government’s involvement, 
improve competition or finance tax cuts (Caves, 1990; Jenkinson and Mayer, 1988; Newbery, 1997; 
Stern, 1997). Privatisation in advanced market economies is also driven by the balancing power 
between public and private (Bös, 1993). Through privatisation, the role of SOEs is limited and 
replaced by private entities. These privatisation cases show that privatisation in advanced market 
economies tends to be driven by economic objectives such as market incentives, competition or tax 
cuts. 
Less government involvement in market economy activities does not always resolve the inefficiency 
issues for public enterprises or SOEs. Inefficiency and government involvement are still major 
industrial issues, particularly for public utilities industries. There are several remaining issues in 
relation to SOEs and new privatised firms following the reforms. For instance, social cost and 
monopoly regulation are claimed to be major factors in an inefficient market economy (Ruys, 1988). 
Social cost and monopoly regulation often applies within the provision of public utilities. The 
requirement for entities to provide public goods and services in lower or affordable prices is often 
difficult to achieve unless the government provides support (Hanschen and Erspamer, 2004; Martin, 
1996). This causes the market to be inefficient. Meanwhile, anti-competition policy in some 
European countries, particularly public utilities, has generated some difficulties for new privatised 
firms and the government to make changes (Jenkinson and Mayer, 1988; Newbery, 1997; Stern, 
1997). These situations show that public utilities prevent the government from implementing reform 
and privatisation. 
Besides public utilities issues, the implementations of privatisation and corporatisation leave some 
unresolved issues. Natural monopoly versus the liberalisation of the market economy becomes a 
double-edged sword for the government and SOEs. Liberalisation of resources through open market 
competition may work perfectly for highly competitive industries (Caves, 1990), but it might not be 
easy to apply in public utilities. SOEs’ nature products often have widespread effects on the 
community. Earlier studies showed how governments fail to open the public utilities market because 
of socio-political reasons (Boardman et al., 1986; Newbery, 1997; Ogden and Watson, 1999). The 
previous review above showed that SOEs are established to resolve industry bailouts or economic 
collapse. This situation may cause difficulty for the government to privatise SOEs. The government’s 
involvement in determining their industrial policy by providing protection such as in Austria for small 
enterprises (Ryan, 2012), or anti-competition policy in German and British governments for gas and 
network industry (Caves, 1990; Jenkinson and Mayer, 1988; Mazzolini, 1979), have also postponed 
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the process of the liberalisation of the regulated market. Socio-political constraints also contribute 
to slowing down the privatisation process, as shown in government and public involvement in other 
countries’ cases. The influence of management and the union in the Belgian Railways Company 
during the decision-making process is an example of the government and public’s involvement that 
occurs in advanced market economies (De Borger, 1995). Another study showed a number of 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries’ governments retain 
direct and indirect control of their new privatised firms through golden shares or majority control 
ownership (Bortolotti and Faccio, 2009). The government is indirectly involved in socio-economic 
activities through introducing new policies. The introduction of a new concept of national interest by 
the British government to be implemented by both private and public enterprises (Channon, 
1980;Perotti, 1995) is an example of how governments still try to intervene and control market 
economy activities. Another example of government involvement is shown in the commercialisation 
of Community Service Obligations (CSOs) by the Australian government, which generates funding 
and costing issues (Martin, 1996). These examples demonstrate that government involvement and 
control are still found and needed, even in advanced market economies and after privatisation, 
liberalisation and corporatisation are implemented. 
In summary, given that markets control most of the national business activities, the government is a 
passive player in advanced market economies. As the main role of SOEs in advanced market 
economies is to promote industrialisation development, policy implementation, employment and 
socio-political duties; privatisation is driven by market incentives, policy implementation and 
competition. In practice, public utilities and political structure remains a barrier for SOEs to become 
independent economic entities. Government and public involvement is still found, even though it 
occurs in a wider scope, such as industrial policy or the implementation of national socio-political 
interest. 
2.3. SOE Reforms in Non-Asian Emerging Market Economies 
The state is a main or key stakeholder for SOEs in emerging market economies. State involvement in 
national economic development often derives from a lack of private participants, and to improve 
national economic development and industrialisation growth (Ayub and Hegstad, 1987; Caporaso, 
1982; Hill, 1982; Yu, 2001). These make government involvement and SOEs’ roles crucial. SOEs are 
established to actively play their role in national market economy activities and industrialisation. 
Monopoly and government protection are often attached to support SOEs’ activities and speed up 
economic activities and industrialisation. However, a number of governments in emerging market 
economies have resisted reducing their control upon SOEs, even when their markets have been 
opened for private participation. 
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Governments’ resistance to removing their control within SOEs has several causes. The development 
of a social democratic system that emphasises equal social welfare and outcomes has set up the 
government as a crucial agent to achieve these expectations (Ryan, 2012). The economic transition 
and socio-political tradition also shapes legal and political structures, which are mostly based on high 
social welfare consensus. Centralisation of control on economic policy motivates the government to 
establish SOEs to meet these expectations and implement its public policy (Anastassopoulos, 1985; 
Lawson, 1994; Levy, 1987; Ramamurti, 1987). Centralisation of control and socio-economic policies is 
considered an aspect of government resistance to reduce its control within SOEs. Government 
resistance strengthens SOEs’ roles in national socio-economic activities and industrialisation. 
The important role of SOEs in national economic activities and industrialisation do not apply 
comparably in emerging market economy societies. For example, SOEs in Central and Eastern Europe 
and Latin America have different roles in national economic activities and industrialisation. In Central 
and Eastern European countries, SOEs play a crucial role in all socio-economic activities. This 
situation is supported by large numbers of SOEs and their roles in most economic and social welfare 
activities. The role of SOEs in this region is not restricted to national economic activities. It also 
includes non-productive activities or considered social welfare duties such as hospital, schools and 
housing (Aghion et al., 1994). These later activities should be operated independently as seen within 
other societies. In Central and Eastern European countries, these duties remain under the control of 
the government and SOEs. Although the government runs and controls these activities for social 
welfare and political consensus purposes, the government’s involvement as the state representative 
agent for SOEs is confined to the absentee owner only (Aghion et al., 1994; Bardhan and Roemer, 
1992; Carlin et al., 1992). Government control is taken by management, workers and politicians who 
have full authority and control upon SOEs (Aghion et al., 1994). This government absentee can be 
seen as SOEs’ managers are very powerful in controlling SOEs operationally. In practice, SOEs’ 
managers have to deal with pressures, interests and bargaining issues from workers, local 
governments and politicians (Aghion et al., 1994; Carlin et al., 1992). Potential conflicts emerge as a 
result of these parties’ pressures and interests. Meanwhile, bargaining positions appear among 
parties that bear risks for SOEs’ managers. This is mainly because, for some Central and Eastern 
European countries, unions or politicians can replace SOEs’ management (Aghion et al., 1994). 
Political and social welfare expectations are more dominant as part of SOEs and related parties’ 
concerns, while economic objectives have been weakened by internal and external firms’ socio-
political interests. 
SOEs in Latin American countries mostly play a role in industrialisation and market economy 
development. Governments’ involvement in market economy and industry activities is encouraged 
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by three factors: the implementation of theory Import–Substituted–Industrialisation, foreign 
influence on domestic industrialisation and externalities related to equity (Baer and Birch, 1992). 
These involvements put SOEs in Latin America to operate as government industry policy vehicles. 
Government involvement through SOEs is limited to natural resources such as mining and specific 
industries only. Compared to other emerging market economies, limited control from the 
government makes the Latin American market economy environment more open to private 
participants. However, insufficient private participation, in particular for heavy industry and the 
manufacturing and financial sectors, forces the government to extend its involvement in national 
economic activities (Baer and Birch, 1992; Sepúlveda et al., 1993). 
A global wave of public policy reforms has encouraged most governments in emerging market 
economies to make changes to their way of governing their SOEs. The liberalisation of the regulated 
market has led a number of countries in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America to conduct 
massive privatisation. Privatisation in Central and Eastern European countries is encouraged by 
changes in political orientation, while changes in the market environment are a motivation for Latin 
American governments to privatise their SOEs (Perotti, 1995). Massive privatisation in Central and 
Eastern European countries is driven by high public expenditure and the breakdown of the Soviet 
Union regime (Nellis, 2003). The national economic activities in Central and Eastern European 
countries are dominated by a state with limited private entities’ involvement (Aghion et al., 1994; 
Aivazian et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2009; Frydman et al., 1999). These privatisations are aimed at 
extending the ownership structure of new privatised firms. However, less developed market 
economy activities and private participants mean that Central and Eastern European countries 
conduct privatisation through a partnership structure (Aulakh and Kotabe, 2008). 
Privatisation in Latin American countries has been encouraged by the wave of British privatisation in 
1980s. Privatisation in this region occurs gradually in quite long periods. High debt expenditure and 
national economic crises in various Latin American countries also encourage privatisation (Estache 
and Trujillo, 2008; Morley et al., 1999; Nellis, 2003). For Latin American countries such as Brazil, 
privatisation is also part of the government’s engagement with the IMF (Aulakh and Kotabe, 2008). 
There is high pressure for governments to obtain massive amounts of funding and resolve their fiscal 
problems to deregulate their industrial policies (Aulakh and Kotabe, 2008). The liberalisation of the 
market economy is crucial for the Latin American market economy, particularly to encourage foreign 
and private participants in their market activities. Massive privatisation in this region occurs through 
asset or ownership transfers from public to private entities. A competitive market with limited 
government involvement is common in various Latin American countries, except for particular 
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industries such as natural resources or infrastructure industries (Estache and Trujillo, 2008; Morley 
et al., 1999). These industries remain under government control. 
These privatisation cases show almost similar results. Although their reasons for privatisation are 
different, the end results and new structure of privatised firms in both regions are similar. Massive 
privatisation in Central and Eastern European countries produces little change in the context of 
ownership structure. Governments still hold majority control within SOEs and new privatised firms 
(Aghion et al., 1994; Aulakh and Kotabe, 2008). Partnership structure is mostly addressed to meet 
technology, innovation and market expansions rather than changes in ownership or control 
structures. A similar case is found in Latin American SOEs. Post-privatisation and reforms, the 
government still has to take-over some services and control because privatisation fails to resolve 
these social problems. The privatisation programmes in Latin America do not work successfully for 
public utilities and infrastructure SOEs (Nellis, 2003). The importance of natural resources and 
infrastructure industries in Latin American countries cause the government to conduct different 
privatisation processes. Despite opening their market competition, the government retains its 
control through contracts, concessions or leasing infrastructure industries for socio-political reasons 
(Estache and Trujillo, 2008). Transparency, concession prices and unemployment are major public 
critiques during the privatisation process. Corruption and lack of government commitments have 
hindered private and foreign investors from taking part in the privatisation process (Baer and Birch, 
1992). Numbers of foreign investors have withdrawn from their privatisation process, which cause 
governments to cancel privatisations (Nellis, 2003; Sanchez and Corona, 1993). 
Post-privatisation in both regions shows that governments retain their control through direct or 
indirect majority ownership within new privatised firms. A study showed that reforms likely occur 
through the deregulation of internal environment and open trade policy rather than reducing the 
government’s role in the public sector (Aulakh and Kotabe, 2008). In both Latin America and Central 
and East European regions, governments retain their control of new privatised firms. Government 
control is still found through co-shares with private firms or workers. Both cases above show that 
privatisation and deregulation have socio-political cost consequences that prevent governments 
from fully privatising their SOEs (Bortolotti et al., 2004; Christensen and Pallesen, 2001; Shirley, 
1999). These government control policies are also influenced by government interest in protecting 
legitimacy and interests (Estache and Trujillo, 2008; Nellis, 2003). These reviews show that 
privatisation in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America have fewer economic intentions 
despite political interest purposes. 
Finally, a lack of private participants and the importance of industrialisation growth in emerging 
market economy societies generate the centralisation of economic activities under government 
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hands through the role of SOEs in Central and Eastern Europe. The liberalisation market and changes 
in the political system drive massive privatisation and liberalisation market economy activities in 
both Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America. The reviews of these regions show that social 
welfare and political legitimacy are still the main concerns of governments, which also affect their 
privatisation decisions. Government interest, public pressure or socio-political matters are barriers 
for governments to privatise their SOEs for economic purposes. Consequently, governments still play 
an important role in national market economies. 
2.4. SOE Reforms in Asian Emerging Market Economies 
Asian market economies are more varied compared to the two previous market economy systems. 
Wide economic distinctions spread from Japan as the most advanced economy to Lao PDR or Bhutan 
as the less developed market economies. This distinction makes them difficult to classify based on 
their national economies. Meanwhile, the historical background contributes to other differences, 
from one with long (neo) colonial experience (e.g., Indonesia) to one that has never been 
colonialised (e.g., Thailand). They all produce a multifaceted process of economic development and 
roles of the state in the economic development process (Broadberry and Eng, 2010). The national 
economic development in each country in this region mostly grows after the state achieves 
independence and sovereignty. As a result, the role of the government is primarily to achieve 
national stabilities in both socio-political and economic spheres. 
The role of the government is crucial for national socio-economic development in this region. 
Referring to its nature, the state is the only authority agent that can pass rules, and its activities will 
collectively affect the community (Ryan, 2012). Through these roles, protection and welfare are 
distributed equally among the community. In less developed, or at the beginning of nations, these 
critical roles of state are shown in the distribution of welfare together with improving economic 
activities. In his study, Caporaso (1982) noted four roles of state participation in economic 
development: lump-sum capital requirements, demand side of economy, low-level equilibrium trap, 
and the relationship between delayed development and the state (Caporaso, 1982). Asian emerging 
market economies have different roles of state in economic development. The Asian government 
plays a crucial role in mobilising resources, providing public utilities and reorganising productivity 
and national economic development (Caporaso, 1982). For countries with colonialism experiences 
(e.g., Indonesia, Vietnam and Philippines), the government roles are eminent, particularly for socio-
economic stabilisation purposes. Government involvement in economic activities appears during the 
post-colonialism period when indigenous bourgeois and class forces have not shown their influence 
in economic activities (Sobhan, 1979a; 1979b). Culture and social structure are claimed to be a 
barrier for indigenous and private participants to be involved in market economy activities (Kroef, 
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1952; 1954). Government control is needed to prevent political and power abuse following the end 
of colonialism. For this reason, governments have to nationalise numbers of firms post-colonialism. 
The failure of the market economy has also encouraged governments to become involved in 
coordinating and developing market activities (Ryan, 2012; Yu, 2001). The government involvement 
is shown by providing capital and products or determining the productivities, organisational 
structure and speed or rate of industrial growth (Caporaso, 1982; Gerschenkron, 1992). In some 
Southeast Asian countries, governments provide facilities and policies to encourage indigenous and 
private participants in economic activities (Balassa, 1988; Carney and Gedajlovic, 2002; Dick, 1985). 
The government involvement in banking and insurance services or competitive industries such as 
trading or manufacturing is as to encourage indigenous and private participants. Most of these roles 
are carried out by SOEs. This is why SOEs in some ex-Soviet and Asian countries are involved in wider 
market economy activities such as trading, banking and insurance, which are supposed to be open to 
private entities (Boehmer et al., 2005; Bortolotti et al., 2001; Boubakri et al., 2005a; McLeod, 2002b; 
Sharma, 2001). 
Similar to government roles in Central and Eastern Europe or Latin America countries, the roles of 
SOEs in the Asian emerging market economy are not limited to economic and industrialisation 
development only. The state as a main agent that influences industrial transformation can 
determine the degree of consolidation, political resistance to productive development, and cultural 
and political support to particular industries’ development (Ryan, 2012). Some Asian emerging 
market economies still deal with unstable power and wealth following the transfer of sovereignty, 
which makes the roles of the state crucial in determining industrial policies and policy instruments. 
Long-term planning and protection policies are often used as an indicator of the centralisation of 
industrial policies (Ryan, 2012). These policies emphasise the crucial roles of SOEs in industrialisation 
growth. 
Centralisation of socio-economic policy is crucial for some Asian emerging market economies to 
achieve equality. SOEs are often used to redistribute power, income and wealth (Lawson, 1994) to 
meet this equality. Governments are often required to handle public issues such as education, social 
welfare and infrastructure besides the provision of public utilities. This is a reason that some SOEs in 
Asian emerging market economies have been established to operate in social welfare spheres such 
as hospital and staple distribution (Aghion et al., 1994; Hamzah, 2007). These roles and policies have 
two significant effects on SOEs. They contribute to SOEs’ domination in both social welfare and 
economic activities. These roles also determine SOEs’ socio-political objectives. 
Changes in global market economy environments have affected Asian market activities. A financial 
crisis hit most Asian countries in 1997 and resulted in pressure on governments to resolve their 
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internal economic situations. Protection policy was argued to deteriorate the economic situation 
following the crisis. National economic stabilisation is a priority for most Asian governments to 
reform their fiscal policies and resolve the effects of the financial crisis. For countries like Indonesia 
and Philippines, the liberalisation of the market economy is often part of the fiscal reform package 
agreement with international organisations such as the IMF and World Bank in relation to financial 
assistance (Aulakh and Kotabe, 2008; Bajpai, 1995; Pangestu, 1990). Public policy reforms also 
require governments to reduce their involvement in market economies and SOEs’ activities. This 
common reason is driven by high debt expenditure as a consequence of government involvement. 
This makes privatisation a priority for governments in the Asian emerging market. 
As part of fiscal reforms, some Asian emerging market economy countries have conducted massive 
privatisation. A further review shows how SOE reforms through privatisation occur in different Asian 
emerging market economy regions and the implications for the government and SOEs’ roles. Some 
countries like Bangladesh and China have conducted massive privatisation, while some Southeast 
countries such as Indonesia, Thailand and Philippines have limited privatisation. The change in 
political constraints has driven some governments to conduct privatisation as found in Central and 
East Asian countries. Meanwhile, the change in the market economy environment is a driving factor 
for Southeast and South Asian countries’ governments to conduct privatisation. 
In East Asia, massive privatisation occurred within China and Mongolia after the breakdown of the 
Soviet Communist regime in the early 1990s. Prior to the reforms, the influence of socialist economic 
control was identified through the important roles of SOEs in both social welfare and economic 
activities (Anderson et al., 1999; Zengxian, 1997). Fiscal problems are driven by the highly regulated 
market economy, and changes in political constraints encouraged governments to reform their SOEs. 
In China, SOE reforms occurred in two separate periods. In 1978, the government conducted 
decentralisation of autonomy and incentive improvement, while share issue privatisation occurred 
in the 2000s (Rousseau and Xiao, 2008). The common method for privatisation is partnerships, which 
create possibilities for new privatised firms to conduct transfers of technology and innovation, as 
well as to expand their market from their new partner (Aulakh and Kotabe, 2008). Meanwhile, the 
absence of market institutions in Mongolia meant that their reforms occurred in several stages, from 
privatisation followed by the establishment of the stock market, and then another privatisation 
wave (Denizer and Gelb, 1992; Jermakowicz and Kozarzewski, 1996). The first period of privatisation 
in Mongolia was voucher privatisation to transfer assets, while the second period was cash 
privatisation to expand ownership (Jermakowicz and Kozarzewski, 1996). The results of both 
countries’ privatisation show that there are limited changes in terms of ownership structure. In both 
countries, the government remained the main shareholder and controller, even after the 
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privatisation (Jermakowicz and Kozarzewski, 1996; Rousseau and Xiao, 2008; Siqueira et al., 2009; 
Sun and Tong, 2003). The Chinese government later conducted share issue privatisation, which 
shows slightly different results in the context of the ownership structure, despite the main control 
still being with the government (Rousseau and Xiao, 2008; Siqueira et al., 2009; Sun and Tong, 2003). 
From this review of privatisation in China and Mongolia, privatisation does not make any difference 
to new privatised firms’ ownership and control structure. 
Following their privatisation, both the Chinese and Mongolian governments still had to deal with 
some issues and critiques. The first critique was about share issue privatisation. This method is often 
used to improve capital market activities where the government sell its share of ownership through 
the market. At the same time, this method gives an opportunity for the public to participate in the 
ownership structure of a new privatised firm. In contrast, some studies showed that share issue 
privatisation still gives an opportunity for the government to continue its control of the new 
privatised firm through a substantial number of shares or a golden share ownership (Megginson, 
2007; Sun and Tong, 2003). Based on these studies, share issue privatisation can also be interpreted 
as government resistance to reduce its control and involvement, even after the firm is privatised. 
The second critique related to the objectives of privatisation. These critiques referred to the 
government’s plan and firms’ selection. A study of privatisation in Mongolia argued that the 
Mongolian government has no philosophy or goals regarding its privatisation plans (Jermakowicz 
and Kozarzewski, 1996). An economic collapse drives the government to conduct massive 
privatisation and liberalise the market. As the government is under pressure to resolve its fiscal 
problems, the privatisation selection is based on the size of SOEs rather than a specific industry or 
SOE (Jermakowicz and Kozarzewski, 1996). Meanwhile, voucher privatisation and two-type 
privatisation methods are selected by governments to speed up the transfer of the asset and 
ownership process (Denizer and Gelb, 1992). At the end of the privatisation, the diffusion of 
ownership is still dominated by the government, which is also argued to prevent control abuse from 
outsiders (Jermakowicz and Kozarzewski, 1996). Further, the less developed market in Mongolia 
leaves some privatisation problems. The corporate governance mechanism, for example, is still a 
major issue for new privatised firms resulting from the lack of a control mechanism. At the same 
time, government involvement is still required to resolve the remaining socio-economic problems. 
SOE reform in the Central Asia emerging market is also driven by changes in political constraints. Five 
ex-Soviet Union countries—Kyrgyz Republic, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan— 
actively transformed and reformed their economies from central planned to market orientation 
policy (Nichols, 1996). Similar to China and Mongolia, these five countries were experienced with 
Communist control before the breakdown of the Soviet regime. Compared to China and Mongolia, 
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the breakdown of the Soviet Union strongly affected both the socio-political and economy of these 
countries. Centralisation of control under the Soviet Union generates a lack of indigenous 
management capabilities to transform their economic system. This situation occurs because their 
prior economic activities were centralised under the government; in some cases, the socio-economic 
activities were also centralised under the central planning of the Soviet Union (Pomfret, 2006). The 
breakdown of the Soviet Union caused massive socio-economic problems within these countries. 
Centralisation of planning under the Soviet Union caused an imbalance of demand and supply of 
resources in each country. The needs to establish nation institutions and resolve hyperinflation were 
two major effects of radical political change, along with the imbalanced supply and demand of 
resources (Pomfret, 2006). The liberalisation of the regulated market and privatisation are needed to 
resolve these financial problems. In practice, privatisation does not occur equally within these 
countries. Kazakhstan and the Kyrgyz Republic show high commitment to privatising SOEs, while 
Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan show relatively less commitment to conducting 
privatisation (Nichols, 1996). Meanwhile, privatisation has occurred in several different ways: 
voucher, cash auction or public offering. Voucher privatisation is the most popular method at the 
beginning of the privatisation process, while public offering or cash auction are selected during the 
second or last stage of reforms. The end result of privatisation shows that most countries still have 
strong control of the government within new privatised firms. The government retains its control, 
particularly for firms with high social and political considerations (Nichols, 1996). These privatisation 
cases indicate government resistance to removing its control on new privatised firms and resources. 
Compared to Central and East Asia countries above, privatisation in the Southeast Asia emerging 
market economy is less affected by political constraints. The development of public enterprises or 
SOEs in Southeast Asian emerging market economies is driven by three major factors: improve 
private participations, reduce Chinese domination and develop industrialisation (Celoza, 1991; 
Milne, 1991; Yuen and Wagner, 1989). Similar to other Asian countries, SOEs have played a wide 
range of government roles both in social welfare distribution and national economic development. 
Centralisation of the socio-economic policy under the government is found in most Southeast Asian 
countries. This means that their SOEs mainly run and operate under the government framework. In 
1997, financial problems and hyperinflation hit most Southeast Asian countries. The crisis hit each 
market economy, which required the governments to resolve the crisis. The liberalisation of the 
regulated market and public policy reforms are the government’s priorities to resolve these fiscal 
problems. Privatisation in this region is mainly driven by: inefficient SOEs’ performance, hard budget 
constraints and the development of market competition (Yuen and Wagner, 1989). In practice, from 
10 Southeast Asian countries, a few engage with privatisation. Some privatisations are the 
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government’s obligation as part of its engagement with international aid organisations such as the 
IMF, Asian Development Bank (ADB) or World Bank (Celoza, 1991; De Castro et al., 1996; Milne, 
1991; Pangestu, 1990; Wise, 2002). Philippines and Indonesia are in this category. Therefore, asset 
transfers and public offerings are the most common methods for privatisation in this region. In 
practice, most countries fail to meet privatisation expectations. High resistance from the 
government, public, group control and internal firms delay or even stop the privatisation process 
(Celoza, 1991; Milne, 1991; Yuen and Wagner, 1989). Only a few countries can conduct full 
privatisation. The rest do partial privatisations or even delay the process. This shows that 
privatisation post-financial crisis in Southeast Asian countries tends to strengthen the market 
economy at the expense of the state (Milne, 1991), rather than reducing government control and 
involvement. The end results of these privatisations show that government interests remain strong 
to control socio-economic activities in Southeast Asian countries. 
Privatisation in South Asia emerging market countries is also driven by changes in the market 
economy environment. Five countries have considered conducting massive and intensive 
privatisation: Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, India and Pakistan. Privatisation in these South Asia 
emerging market economies is encouraged by hard budget constraints due to inefficient public 
expenditure resulting from high reliance on government support (Haque, 2003; Joshi, 2000). Similar 
to other Asian countries, historical background has strengthened SOEs’ roles in various sectors. 
Centralisation of control under the government has been developed since the pre-colonial phase 
under Muslim rulers, and it remains stronger even post-British colonial period (Haque, 2001). This 
means that private and indigenous involvement in socio-economic activities is limited. Consequently, 
most socio-economic activities have been run under SOEs. These roles make SOEs heavily reliant on 
the government support and budget. In South Asian countries, SOEs also play an important role in 
social welfare sphere, particularly in resolving employment issues in fast-growing populations 
(Haque, 2003; Joshi, 2000). Overstaffing is a common picture in most SOEs in this region. This 
generates inefficiency and hard budget constraints, which motivate governments to privatise SOEs. 
In regards to the privatisation method, they vary from divesture assets to public offerings, including 
Employee and Management Buy Outs (EMBO). Similar to other Asian emerging countries, 
privatisation in this region fails to meet expectations. Issues of transparency, accountability and a 
lack of government commitment have halted further progress of privatisation (Ahmed, 1999; Haque, 
2001; Kemal, 2000; Salih, 2000). A lack of transparency and accountability causes a transfer of new 
privatised firms’ control under particular groups. Government ownership has been transferred to 
former top management, high-ranking officers or politicians who take the benefit of privatisation 
(Haque, 2001). Meanwhile, social effects from massive redundancies and the increased price of 
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goods and services are found in most countries, thereby becoming a double-edged sword for the 
government. 
The Asia emerging market cases above show that the liberalisation of the market economy through 
privatisation does not work easily. Government protection for SOEs and market-regulated policies 
generates public critiques. Protection generates hard budget constraints, inefficiency and less 
competition. Pressure to conduct privatisation mostly underlines the requirement for governments 
to reduce their involvement, resolve national economic situations and improve SOEs’ performance. 
In practice, high reliance on government protection and support has hindered the progress of 
privatisation. These social welfare and national economic development roles become a dilemma for 
governments and SOEs, particularly when governments are forced to cease their involvement in 
socio-economic activities. Privatisation is argued to bring about some social effects, which are clearly 
found in South Asian emerging market economies (Haque, 2001, 2003; Kemal, 2000; Salih, 2000). 
Although massive privatisation as a central aspect of the transformation process has been conducted 
by a number of Asian emerging market economies’ governments, a limited transfer of ownership or 
control occurs from the government to private firms (Bennett and Maw, 2003; Gupta, 2005; Milne, 
1992). Privatisation occurs mostly through partial privatisation, where limited or small portions of 
government ownership are sold to public or private investors (Salih, 2000). Partial privatisation is 
considered a win–win solution for the government to accommodate parties’ interests regarding 
privatisation. Through partial privatisation, the government can still assure the quality and quantity 
of public goods and services for the community (Ramamurti, 1999). A study of privatisation in 
developing or emerging market economies supports the arguments of government preferences to 
keep controlling firms through partial privatisation (Boubakri et al., 2005b, 2005c; Milne, 1991; 
Ramamurti, 1999; Shirley, 1999). 
Government resistance to reducing its control and involvement is also shown through the selection 
of the privatisation method. For East and Central Asian countries where market institutions are less 
developed, gradual and voucher privatisations are an option to implement privatisation programs 
and develop market activities (Megginson, 2007). Gradual privatisation creates competition for the 
non-state sector for successful privatisation. Voucher privatisation gives possibilities for new firms 
and governments to widen owners’ distribution, while governments still hold a major control or 
ownership (Nichols, 1996). These cases are often found in Central and East Asian countries where 
government control is still an issue. Limited success of privatisation contributes to limited changes in 
new privatised firms’ control and ownership structure. Some examples, such as centralisation 
ownership and management control in China and Mongolia or price control in Indonesia, 
demonstrate that there are no significant changes in the context of government control and 
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involvement, even after the government privatises the firms (Broadberry and Eng, 2010). Some 
countries in the Southeast region delayed or stopped their privatisation process because of political 
pressures (Celoza, 1991; Milne, 1991; Yuen and Wagner, 1989). This shows that privatisation is even 
more difficult to implement when socio-political interests become part of privatisation decisions. 
In summary, public policy and SOE reforms have been conducted in different ways in Asian emerging 
market regions. Political constraint is a driving factor for privatisation in most Central and East Asian 
regions, while the financial crisis and changes in the market motivated the emergence of 
privatisation in South and Southeast Asian regions. The aims of privatisation are commonly to open 
and liberalise the market and resolve fiscal problems. In fact, most countries fail to achieve their 
privatisation goals. High reliance on government roles in socio-economic activities, a lack of 
commitment from the government and undeveloped market institutions are barriers to successful 
privatisation in these regions. 
2.5. Chapter Conclusion 
The literature review in this chapter showed that the historical background of SOEs’ roles in market 
economy activities distinguishes reforms and methods for their privatisation. SOEs’ roles in general 
are to provide public utilities, industrialisation and economic growth. For SOEs in emerging market 
economies, their roles are extended to carry out social welfare activities such as the redistribution of 
income, power and wealth. For SOEs in advanced market economies, their roles are part of the 
countries’ socio-political history. The roles of SOEs in advanced market economies often aim to 
balance private and public participation and full employment expectations. These differences in 
SOEs’ roles have some implications for governments’ decisions to reform their SOEs. 
Changes in the global market economy environment have altered the mechanism of governing SOEs. 
For advanced market economies, changes in the market economy cause pressure for governments 
to equally treat both private and public enterprises. SOEs should have full autonomy in order to 
compete fairly in the market. Privatisation in the market economy is often followed by the 
liberalisation of the market. In contrast, fiscal problems result in pressure on governments to 
privatise SOEs in emerging market economies. Changes in the market economy environment in 
emerging market economies ensure that the government removes its involvement and control. In 
practice, market and public pressure are not the only reasons for governments to reform their SOEs. 
Political constraints drive governments in the ex-Soviet Union and East Asia to privatise their SOEs 
(Rousseau and Xiao, 2008; Jermakowicz and Kozarzewski, 1996). International organisations such as 
the IMF, ADB and World Bank take part in forcing governments to conduct market liberalisation and 
privatisation for SOEs (Wise, 2002; Abbott et al., 2010). 
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Country and company characteristics have determined the objectives and selection of the 
privatisation method. Advanced market economies have more dynamic market competition and 
limited government involvement. Therefore, their privatisation aims to achieve market incentives 
and discipline SOEs. Market incentive is argued to give more autonomy to SOEs’ managers to run 
their companies (Sexty, 1980). In contrast, privatisation in emerging market economies is driven by 
social welfare and economic matters. Privatisation is considered the government’s affair to safely 
resolve national economic problems. Voucher, EMBO and strategic alliance are the most common 
methods selected by governments in ex-Soviet Union emerging market economies (Aghion et al., 
1994; Balassa, 1988; Jermakowicz and Kozarzewski, 1996). These methods are also selected because 
their market institutions have not fully developed to facilitate the privatisation process. Meanwhile, 
public offering, strategic partner and EMBO are the common methods for privatisation in South and 
Southeast Asian emerging market economies. These methods mainly aim to expand new firms’ 
ownership structure while the government retains control over them. 
Privatisation and liberalisation market economies do not seem to resolve the state and SOEs’ 
problems. Inefficiency and free riders remain major problems for government and SOEs as a result of 
the provision of public utilities and social welfare duties. SOEs in emerging market economies still 
have to deal with government involvement, including politician and group interest in their decision 
making and business activities (Abeng, 2002; Shirley, 1999; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Although a 
natural monopoly is no longer a barrier for SOEs in advanced market economies, commercialisation 
of public goods and services is not easy to implement because of funding and cost payment issues 
(Martin, 1996). The requirement to produce affordable public goods and services for the community 
may hinder SOEs’ opportunities to gain profits. Therefore, government privileges and subsidies are 
crucial for SOEs. Meanwhile, privatisation in emerging market economies shows that there are some 
unsolved problems following privatisation. Privatisation leaves out some social welfare problems, 
such as employment and social costs, which require government assistance to resolve. Both 
advanced and emerging market economies still deal with a lack of government commitment and 
conflicts of interest that delay or even stop the progress of privatisation. These privatisation and 
reform cases demonstrate that socio-political issues are still a barrier for government and SOEs to 
implement privatisation policies. 
Government involvement is not easy to remove or reduce through privatisation because of social 
welfare and political stability issues. The government and interest groups may resist their influence 
and control upon SOEs for political purposes. In practice, conflicts of interest are found in both 
internal and external SOE spheres. This literature review shows some potential conflicts of interests 
and expectations among the government, SOEs and the public that prevent the privatisation 
  39 
process. Privatisation and liberalisation fail to reduce government involvement for socio-political 
reasons. Certain industries may still need to be regulated to prevent power abuse or the domination 
of a particular group, as shown in the case of SOEs in Latin America, the UK and Germany. This 
situation makes it easy for the government to occupy new private firms with social welfare interests 
as the government keeps involving itself in economic activities through SOEs’ roles or industrial 
policies (Ryan, 2012).  
In summary, privatisation and reforms fail to help SOEs and new privatised firms to improve their 
efficiency or performance. Some cases of SOE reforms also show that privatisation fails to reduce 
government involvement. SOE reform and privatisation are expected to bring more economic 
objectives where profit maximising and competition becomes new privatised firms’ objectives. In 
practice, privatisation and public policy reforms present different end results. Reducing government 
involvement has been prevented by social welfare and political constraint issues. Consequently, 
government involvement is required. As shown in this literature review, the government retains 
control of new privatised firms. This literature review has identified knowledge gaps regarding 
whether the government makes changes regarding the objectives and policies for SOEs when the 
government privatises SOEs, and whether changes in objectives and policy are complementary to, or 
in conflict with, SOEs objectives. As government involvement is still required to resolve the social 
welfare and political issues, partial privatisation is likely to be an option. However, this option also 
leaves a knowledge gap regarding whether partial privatisation can resolve these social welfare and 
political issues. These knowledge gaps are the main focus of this thesis. 
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Chapter 3: 
Framework of Study 
 
This chapter aims to provide a framework to examine the extent to which Indonesian BUMN/SOEs 
are successful vehicles for attaining the government’s objectives in the context of changes in the 
government’s objectives and policies for SOEs. 
The main area of analysis is the changes government policy and objectives, and SOEs. Based on 
these three main areas of analysis, institutional change theory is employed to provide a guidance 
and framework. Institutional change theory is used as a theory idea for analysing this thesis. From 
the literature review in Chapter 2, it is shown that change is a central factor that alters relations 
between the government and SOEs. This chapter is developed based on the literature review, where 
the changes encourage the government and SOEs to adjust and deal with the implications. 
Institution as government policy is also developed as part of the framework. This is because 
institution is argued to be the factor that encourages the emergence of change and the subject of 
change (North, 1990). The relations between the institution and actor during the process of change 
are the central factor of the analysis, while performance is often used as a reflection and implication 
of the changes. The importance of changes is claimed to affect the current performance of 
organisations (North, 1989, 1990, 1993). The idea of institutional change theory in particular is that 
path dependence is employed as the path analysis that emphasises and analyses this process of 
change and its implications. For these reasons, institutional change theory is employed as a theory 
idea to develop a conceptual framework for this thesis. This chapter is developed into the following 
sections: definition; the nature of SOEs; the nature of government objectives; conceptual 
framework; and the conclusion. 
3.1. Definition 
From Chapter 1, an Indonesian SOE is defined as  
SOE in the form of a limited liability company which capital is divided in shares that are 
wholly or minimally 51 per cent owned by the State of the Republic of Indonesia with the 
principal objective of seeking profit (UU BUMN, 2003). 
 
A government objective is defined as: 
The government statement which underlines the purpose of government in relations to its 
roles and function to the provision of national economic and social welfare, and financial or 
commercial expectations that are carried by government business entity or SOE. 
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3.2. Nature of State-Owned Enterprises 
As discussed in Chapter 1, SOE is a hybrid entity in which private and government structure influence 
SOEs’ organisational structure, objectives and activities. Understanding a model of SOEs in a 
particular country requires an understanding of state ideology and economy. SOEs are commonly 
established because of the importance of production provided by the state in relation to the 
provision of public goods and services. The government involvement is justified as for socio-political 
purposes (Lawson, 1994). Marxist economic and political theory argues that the government 
involvement is for controlling natural monopolies in the interest of national security (De Castro et 
al., 1996) and eliminate capital class who can ban others access to the production (Lawson, 1994). In 
contrast, socialist principles assert that state role as the sole owner of production unit means all 
supply needs for population is produced and distributed through specific economic organ 
(Supranowitz, 1961). These two perspectives of ideology and economic theory demonstrate a reason 
to categories SOE as a public economic agent based on their control and roles (De Castro et al., 1996; 
Lawson, 1994; Supranowitz, 1961). 
The nature of the government’s role in the provision of public utilities is a key factor in relations 
between the government and SOEs, which mainly aim to provide services or products that, are non-
marketable (Stiglitz, 2000). These relations, in particular, are in context of the government and SOEs’ 
roles and function (Lawson, 1994; Martin, 1996; OECD, 2005a; 2005b). Later, the reason for SOE 
establishment was developed through; take-overs, nationalisation, social safety network, absence of 
private enterprises, war, and constitution (Haririan, 1989; Lawson, 1994; Martin, 1996; Tynan, 2003; 
Yu, 2001). From literature review in Chapter 2, the change of market economy may alter the 
government roles and functions in economic activities. Industrialisation and social safety net become 
reasons for government to establish SOE following the development of market activities. Limited of 
local participants motivates government involvement through the roles of SOEs. Because of these 
reasons, in some cases, SOE‘s roles are no longer limited to the public goods and services only (Gillis, 
1980). The literature review in Chapter 2 showed SOEs’ involvement in various economic activities or 
some areas that are open for private participants particularly in emerging market economies. These 
reasons extend SOEs’ roles as the government vehicle for economic development. This key factor 
sets the objectives for SOEs. 
The nature of SOEs is also often determined based on the structure. Legal system of SOE underline 
the definition based on the ownership structure (Gillis, 1980; OECD, 2005a; 2005b), board 
appointment authority and government utilities (McLellan, 2005). Property right from agency theory 
determines ownership is commonly constituted with the right to control the firm and claim the 
benefits. In many large corporations, the extent of rights and responsibilities also determine the 
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level of ownership and control (Blair, 1995). For SOEs, the government facilities can be an indication 
that a company is categorised as public enterprises or SOEs. The relations between SOEs and 
government allow SOEs to get access to use or utilise the government facilities (McLellan, 2005). 
SOEs are also defined through the ownership structure. Ownership can also be identified through a 
number of elements including exclusiveness, dependency, documentation, transferability and 
inheritance (Halper et al., 2007). Ownership structure is considered a factor when clarifying the 
definition and nature of SOEs. SOEs are not owned by individuals instead of the government. 
Government as shareholder is unlikely indicated who the government is (Nugroho R and Wrihatnolo, 
2008). This unclear identified principal as mentioned in the previous chapter, Chapter 2, is included 
government, politician and public. 
The development of financial markets facilitates transfer of ownership through commercial 
transactions or the exchange of stock/shares from one owner to other. This makes ownership is no 
longer concentrated. In case of SOEs, the control often is not in line with the ownership structure. 
Transfer ownership for SOEs occurs through privatisation or nationalisation, which may not be 
followed by the transfer of the control structure. Some governments are more reluctant to 
relinquish control. Control is often found as part of SOEs and government relationships. This control 
relationship emerges through majority control or special instrument such as golden share ownership 
or asset. Therefore, this study underlines the important of government as a majority principal 
stockholder and shareholder as the references to determine the definition and nature of SOE. 
3.3. Nature of Government Objective 
Objective is often considered as the end result of expectation from all activities. The roles of 
objectives are shown through determining the aim of actions, or eliminate differences during the 
process of achieving expectations (Boyd and Levy, 1966), the aim or end of the action (Granger, 
1964), or a set of organisation commitment. For government bodies like SOEs, objectives are a 
reflection of the firms’ function or roles, which are set during the period of establishment. 
Consequently, SOEs have multiple roles and functions depending on the government’s interests, 
functions, roles and history. The government as the owner determines SOEs’ objectives. Based on his 
study in various countries, Gillis (1980) noted three different rationales to develop SOEs’ objectives: 
economic reason, socio-political reason and mixed motives (Gillis, 1980). For some governments, 
their objectives for SOEs are directed from both socio-political and economic reasons, which are 
called mixed motives. SOEs’ objectives and structure emphasise an obligation for SOEs to act as 
public entities based on the state plans and directions (Bai et al., 2000). As the government 
controlled entities, maximising social welfare becomes more important objectives than other 
economic objectives such as profit maximising and efficiency (Boardman and Vining, 1989; Hafsi, 
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1985; Ramamurti, 1987; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). Additionally, some SOEs may aim to improve 
market, industrialisation and/or distribution of income (Caporaso, 1982; Freeman et al., 2004; 
Martin, 1996; Yu, 2001). These objectives are mostly influenced by lack of private participation in 
particular industries where the demand is very high. Consequently, SOE is established to meet this 
requirement. Market activities and industrialisation encourage government to consider financial or 
commercial objectives, which become the objectives for SOEs. 
Ownership structure for SOEs may differ from private entities, as they are more related to matters of 
control. The owner of SOEs may not be the controlling party who has direct influence on SOEs’ 
decision making and business activities. Therefore, SOEs are potentially to have more than single 
‘principal’. Multiple or unclear principal have some consequences for SOEs’ objectives. Referring to 
SOE ownership structure, the objectives for SOEs are potentially determined by government, 
bureaucrats and politician who claim as the ‘owner’ or state representative owner. This involvement 
leads to political interest, which may become part of SOE objectives. In traditional view, SOEs’ 
objectives often engage with the requirement to meet the government social welfare maximising, 
legitimacy and political expectations (Bai et al., 2000; Boardman et al., 1986; Gillis, 1980; Hanschen 
and Erspamer, 2004; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994;, Willner, 1999). In practice, the impact of state 
ownership presents different perspectives of socio-political objective. For example, the requirement 
for government to develop particular industries becomes a rationale for government to constitute 
and set regulation where SOEs have an obligation to comply with (Mazzolini, 1979). The role of SOEs 
in this industry is no limited to develop the market. The roles are included stabilising the price and 
distribution, and not to disadvantages the other participants. 
As the business entity, SOE is required to focus on the economic or financial objectives. Economic or 
financial objectives become part of SOEs’ objectives when the new public reform such as 
privatisation and liberalisation are introduced. These changes alter the roles of SOEs. Economic 
motive develops and encourages the development of economic or financial objectives. As a business 
entity, the economic objectives such as profit seeking or maximising profit are a natural objective 
(Ansoff, 1965). Economic objectives can be defined as, both direct and indirect, implications of cost 
(Keeney, 1988). In some cases, this economic or commercial objective remains ambiguous. Ansoff 
(1965), for example, emphasises the different between profits, as excess of revenue over cost and 
profitable as a measure of return on resources (Ansoff, 1965). In practice, there is no clear definition 
between profit and profitable maximising. The most common economic objective for SOEs is either 
profit or profitable maximising, and it has to be in line with efficiency. The economic or financial 
objectives for SOEs often require SOEs to improve their performance improvement in relation to 
cost efficiency (Willner, 2001). Since interpreting the economic objectives may not be easy 
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particularly for SOEs. For this thesis, economic or financial objectives are determined as those that 
have cost implications. 
From this analysis, government objectives are the government expectation statement that affects 
SOE’s function, roles and business activities. The objectives may be stated on the establishment rule 
or other related regulation issued by government. The objectives can be both social welfare and 
financial or combination of both social welfare and financial. 
3.4. Conceptual Framework 
The main focus of this study is the changes. The changes have enforced institutions and organisation 
to make adjustment and adaptation. Change is also considered as an event that engages with other 
events, and then presents its implications. For this study, two main changes are analysed, the 
changes of market economy environment and the changes of organisational structure and 
objectives. These two main changes are references to develop a framework for further analysis of 
this thesis. The interaction between market and organisation as a consequence of changes is a basic 
reference for institutional change theory (North, 1995). From the previous literature review in 
Chapter 2, institution is a key factor for change, while the process or evolution is an implication of 
institution changes. Using the institutional change theory as the theory idea, this framework is 
developed based on the key element of change, institution and historical path in order to 
comprehend the process of change. As part of institutional change theory, the framework of 
performance is also developed as a reflection and as implications of changes. This section is 
developed into three subsections: institutional change, historical path and performance. 
3.4.1. Institutional Change 
The development of conceptual framework for this study focuses on analysing the institutional 
change that contemplates to the objectives and performance. The selection of institutional change 
theory as the theory idea is reasoned by the important of changes and institutions development; 
particularly on certain period of time, which results from the interaction between organisation and 
institutions (North, 1990). The role of this theory is to understand the evolution of society through 
the path of organisation change and the implication of past and present situation on the 
performance. 
From Chapter 1, the change of market economy in Indonesia drove the changes of government 
economic policy. The introduction of privatisation policy encouraged the government to review the 
policy for SOEs. This new policy is identified to encourage changes of SOEs’ objectives and business 
activities. Government policy as the institution is a rule of game for SOEs in Indonesia, which govern 
their interaction in market economy, and effort to achieve the objectives. North (1991) mentions 
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institutions are created as a device to produce order and reduce uncertainty in exchange (North, 
1991). Institutional change theory points out that change does not only underline the relationship 
between environment and organisation, but it is also emphasises its effects on the future prediction 
of the performance, and selection of actions made by the actor or organisation (North, 1993). 
SOE as an organisation is developed as to makes a change when the opportunity is appeared. 
Organisation is defined as a purposive agent consists of group of people who bound with similar 
interest to meet the determined objective (North, 1990). An organisation exists when the 
opportunity is set, and the aim of its existence is to meet this objective (North, 1992). The 
establishment of organisation is also affected by the institution constrain which is driven by the 
emergence of opportunity (North, 1990; Hollingsworth, 2000). A part of organisation structure, the 
objective is set as guidance for the actor to maximise the expectation (Dacin et al., 2002). From the 
nature of SOEs in Section 3.1, SOE is considered as purposive organisation, which established for the 
purpose of government. The structure and objectives are determined by the opportunity arise 
within the market, which are also affected by the development of institutions. Organisation engages 
and interacts with other organisations, and as which a framework or the rule of game for 
organisation exists (North, 1990; 1993; 1995). Consequently, their organisation’s objectives and 
activities are affected by institution constraints. 
Institution is often defined as a humanly devised constraint that structure political, economic and 
social interaction (Mantzavinos et al., 2004; North, 1991, 1993; Landesmann and Pagano, 1994). 
Government policy and constitutions are the main devise constraint for SOEs. The influence of 
institution constraint is as shown on the nature of SOEs and government objectives as to set and 
determine the expectation and interaction of SOEs in market. Institutions’ roles are often supported 
by enforcement (North, 1990), which becomes a peer control and monitoring tool in context of their 
interactions (Aoki, 2009). In practice, institution can be classified into two aspects: external, where 
the institutions share regularity among the population; and internal, where institution are a mental 
model to social interactions (Mantzavinos et al., 2004). These two aspects later shape the 
differences between formal and informal constraints that develop within the community. 
The interaction between organisation and institution begins when the change is happened. The 
interaction mostly takes place when the change generates an effect on the organisation’s effort to 
achieve their objectives. Institutions demonstrate their roles to reduce the effect of changes, which 
usually appear as uncertainties. The opportunity drives actors to exercise their position to respond 
to the changes. Cooperation and coordination are made amongst actors, which aim to fulfil the 
opportunity. 
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The reason for an organisation to make change is also encouraged by its performance. Poor or 
unsatisfactory performance is the most common reasons for organisation to make change. An early 
study shows that besides crisis and environment fast growth, unsatisfactory performance 
encourages institutional reforms to improve existing performance (Skott, 1999). Welfare maximising 
is often a main objective of organisation. However, limited resources enforce organisations to 
compete. This makes resources no longer costless. Meanwhile, the change may take place as the 
consequence of the change on price. The role of price is crucial when the price play a role as the 
incentive for the opportunity that may cause the organisation to change. North (1990) explains the 
institutional change begins when the change is engaged with the price, which has a consequence on 
the choice and actor’s welfare (North, 1990). The changes of price and cost may alter the 
organisation or actor behaviour toward the objective. 
In summary, the framework in this study is developed from institutional change theory as a theory 
idea, which emphasises relationships between SOEs and institution environments. The interaction 
encourages the changes, which are mainly driven by the market and/or government policy or 
institutions. Changes in institution environments drive actors to alter their structure and objectives. 
3.4.2. Historical Path 
Historical path is employed to provide guidance for this thesis analysis. Historical path is developed 
based on the theory idea of path dependence from institutional change theory, which emphasises 
evolution of change as the key analysis. The process of change is analysed to identify the difference 
of organisation performance and how the organisation survive or develop during period of time. 
North (1990) emphasises the importance of path as to explain the differences of patterns and factor 
that makes the actor or organisation survival even when the organisation is persistently poor 
performance (North, 1990). As mentioned previously, the changes occur when actor sees an 
opportunity for his/her to improve efficiency and maximising their welfare. North (1990) notes the 
process to reach efficiency leads to the development of mechanism, which characterised by multiple 
equilibria, possible inefficiency, lock in, and path dependence (North, 1990). The process of change 
occurs as an ergodicity and evolution where both actor and institution show each other influence 
and improvement to reach efficiency. The selection of historical path for this thesis is because the 
history matter is crucial. Path is used to examine and reconstruct the Indonesian SOEs evolution in 
relation to the historical changes in government-stated objectives for SOEs as one of the main areas 
to be examined in order to be able to address the extent to which Indonesian SOEs are successful 
vehicles for attaining the government’s objectives. This selection is also based in the previous study 
of institutional changes which underlines the importance of sequence events occurred in the past to 
determine the prosperity or future (Ebbinghaus, 2005; Mahoney, 2000). 
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Institutional change theory underlines the difference of economic performance across economy 
society as a consequence of the evolution of changes. The evolution of economic structure makes 
the economic performances across economy society are different. Institutional change theory also 
emphasises the role of time or evolution that causes the difference (North, 1993; Hollingsworth, 
2000). Evolution or timeline is claimed to differ the end result when the actor’s skill and knowledge 
is developed during the selection process (North, 1993; 1995; Aulakh and Kotabe, 2008). For 
example, the study of corporate governance structure by Bebchuk and Roe (1999) reveals that the 
differences of corporate and country’s economic structure are influenced by the country’s pattern at 
any point of time (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). 
Path dependence as an idea of historical path analysis is employed to understand the concept of 
choice. Path dependence emphasises a way to narrow conceptually the choice of set and link of 
decision making through time (David, 1985; North, 1990; 1993; Sjostrand, 1993) which is crucial 
during the analysis process of historical path. There are two dominant sequence types, self-
reinforcing sequence and reactive sequence. The major differences between these types of 
sequences are on how the contingent historical events corresponds with the determining pattern 
corresponds (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000). The different of events makes the roles of sequence 
and evolution is crucial to guide how prosperity and objectives are achieved. 
The relationship amongst events is crucial in analysing the sequence events as part of historical path. 
There are three key major determinants: initial period, initial event and deviant event. An early 
study emphasised the interconnection of events, as each event in path dependence is not an 
independent event (Ebbinghaus, 2005; Mahoney, 2000). This statement means that each event is 
engaged and affected to each other. Mahoney (2000) emphasised the important of early period and 
initial event as an initial condition where criteria and rules are set (Mahoney, 2000). The important 
of initial event is acknowledged as a beginning of pattern where future outcome and expectation are 
determined or set. The event emerges as a beginning and no other event preceding the event. This 
initial event at early period controls others or next event even when their economic environment is 
very much alike (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). The crucial role of initial event at early period as 
determinant and future expectation factor is explained through a Polya Urn experiment. A Polya Urn 
experiment by Arthur et al (cited by Goldstone, 1998) reveals that the end result is hypothetically 
determined by the initial and choice of outcome (Goldstone, 1998). This experiment shows the early 
event at the beginning of path limits the potential next events’ options or alternative4. An early 
                                                          
4
 Polya urn experiment develops based on the outcome of ball’s colour selection. The first colour is selected 
will cause an addition ball with similar colour put into the urn. This makes the colour composition is narrowed 
to certain colour.  
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event narrows the option for an actor to take the next action. Meanwhile, the QWERTY case also 
shows how the initial event of the typing machine developed has enforced people to accept the way 
the machine was set (Ebbinghaus, 2005; Mahoney, 2000; North, 1990). These two cases 
demonstrate the crucial roles of initial outcome from the early event that enforces and narrows the 
actor’s selection options. The pattern develops as a consequence of the outcome from prior event, 
and then narrows the next events’ option. The inter-influence amongst events, later, develops as a 
sequence of events or path dependence. Ebbinghaus (2005) mentions the term ‘trodden trail’, 
where the sequence of events is selected and then repeated as a path or pattern by the actor or 
organisation (Ebbinghaus, 2005). In particular moment, these events lead to lock-in situation where 
efficiency is achieved and solution may not be easy to exist from (North, 1990). 
Besides the initial event and period, the casual, contingent, or deviant event is considered as a key 
factor that influences the end result of path dependence. The selection of lock-in is acknowledged 
when an efficient way is achieved. In this situation, path has been transferred to become lock-in 
where change is not easy (North, 1990). In practice, evolution of changes demonstrates that the 
existing outcome may no longer efficient (Pierson, 2000). As efficiency is related to actor’s objectives 
and welfare, at particular time, actor may make a change or look another alternative. The process of 
evolution is no longer a cohesive process. Branching point arises when there is an opportunity for 
actor or institution to alter their selection or decision. Ebbinghaus (2005) notes the path dependence 
may develop from non-linear self-enforcement, which differ or distinguish the original expectation 
when spontaneous or casual event appears (Ebbinghaus, 2005). The unique or radical event as 
deviant event may appear during the path, and alter the prediction of outcome (Mahoney, 2000). 
Road juncture is occurred result from unique or radical event when the actor alters its choice during 
the evolution process (Ebbinghaus, 2005). Road juncture can occur as actors collectively decide to 
introduce new rules. The process may happen through radical enforcement surrounding the actors. 
The change is also happened as the consequence of cost and political pressure. In Section 3.2.1.3, 
North (1990) mentions the roles of cost and political pressure may generate the emergence of 
radical enforcement, which may differ the existing objectives from the original prediction (North, 
1990). 
A study of organisation ownership structure revealed that there are two driving factors for the 
development of the path: structure-driven and rule-driven (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). Internal or 
structure-driven factors are found within organisations through ownership, rules or control 
structures. The structure-driven factor has a tendency to develop as a trodden trial process. The 
organisation is likely to resist the change after they have achieved equilibrium. This occurs in 
particular when the potential changes and cost affect the actor or organisation welfare or benefits 
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(Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). In contrast, the change may be encouraged by external or rule-driven 
factor when the changes of institutions create an opportunity for the actor or organisation to meet 
equilibrium. The requirement to make change is often followed by the enforcement from particular 
interest group (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). Consequently, change is no longer an option in spite of an 
obligation for organisation. 
Finally, historical path is developed to refer to path dependence from institutional change theory, 
which determines the long-term process of institutionalisation where the sequence events govern 
the process and end result. Historical path analysis is developed to focus on the timeline or historical 
matter, which is crucial for this thesis. The sequence of time plays an important role to reconstruct 
the evolution of Indonesian SOEs. Two main events are the focus of analysis as; the initial event and 
period as where rules and objectives are set, and then a deviant event that discontinues or alter the 
sequence of path. 
3.4.3. Performance 
Performance is a measureable tool to evaluate the end result of activities. The role of performance is 
mainly used to evaluate the process, outcome or target. Performance as the end result is affected by 
number of factors. Interaction between organisation and institution through various process and 
time has placed welfare maximising as the actors’ objectives priority. The main purpose of 
interaction is equilibrium, which is considered the best outcome. Equilibrium is achieved through the 
most efficient process and resources allocation (Pierson, 2000). Performance is affected by the 
development of actor’s skills and knowledge. The development of actor’s skill and knowledge may 
change actor’s need and intention (Carpenter and Feroz, 2001; DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; North, 
1990). Meanwhile, performance is also affected by the information when the resource is limited. An 
early study shows how information determines the impact of cost and benefit particularly when 
large numbers of parties involved (North, 1990). 
Part of performance measurement, efficiency is an important determinant factor. Efficiency is 
considered as the most equilibrium situation achieved when the distribution of benefits and 
resource allocation structures the economy where competition arises as part of achieving the 
market efficiency (North, 1992). Efficiency is achieved through various processes. Existing 
institutions are established through process of addressing needs and problems, which may make the 
institutions having efficiency advantages (Bebchuk and Roe, 1999). Efficiency is achieved as 
consequence of enforcement, which shapes the alternatives. Open market, for example, allow firm 
to extend its network to and from the resource. This opportunity may affect the cost of production, 
which directly affects the ability of actor to reach welfare maximising. Potential conflict often 
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proceeds as consequence of resources allocation problems in particular when the allocation engages 
with different set of institutions (Mahoney and Thelen, 2009). Conflict of interest appears when each 
party compete for price, quality and profit in market activities (Ames, 1984; Persson, 2002). Lower 
costs in relation to information, negotiation, monitoring, coordination and enforcement significantly 
affect the level of efficiency and parties’ pay off (Bardhan, 1989). Rent seeking appears when the 
willingness of actor to control may not match with the payoff from controlling (Bebchuk and Roe, 
1999). 
Performance measurement is often used for institutional, managerial or technical purposes 
(Townley, 2005). These measurements are purposed to pursuit the effectiveness of activities or 
resources allocation in relation to the target. Goal, system resources and constituency approached 
are the major framework that often used to analyse organisational performance (Dess and 
Robinson, 1984). For this study, goal approach is utilised to measure SOEs’ expectation. In practice, 
limited tools to measure SOEs’ performance make SOEs’ performance should follow the common 
performance indicators, which are used by private firms. Most performance measurement for SOEs 
relies on benchmarks with similar industries (Morck and Stangeland, 1996). The problem with this 
performance tools is they fail to accommodate SOEs’ social welfare duty. However, lack of 
knowledge about SOEs’ industry causes government relies on the benchmarking tool. This reliance is 
also considered as institution’s influences when market requires SOEs and government to obey and 
accept the standard measurement. This performance measurement is the equilibrium, even though 
the measurement is not the most efficient ones. For this thesis, performance measurement is 
referred to the financial performance, which commonly uses for the business best practice purposes. 
Detail performance measurement develops through method section in Chapter 5. 
In summary, performance is the measurement of organisation end result. Efficiency is the main tool 
of performance, which is set based on the equilibrium distribution of benefits and resources. The 
requirement for organisation to be evaluated often rationale by the institution. In context of SOEs, 
performance measurement is referred to best business practices, although the measurement is not 
the perfect one. 
3.5.  Chapter Conclusion 
The framework of study for this thesis is developed based on the idea of institutional change theory, 
which emphasises the historical path of SOEs regarding changes in government objectives for SOEs, 
the evolution of institutions that sets SOEs’ structure and objectives,  performance as the reflection 
and implications of the changes, and relations between the objectives and SOEs’ business activities.  
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Chapter 4:  
Propositions and Hypotheses 
 
This chapter aims to develop propositions and hypotheses that will be used to examine the extent to 
which Indonesian SOEs are successful vehicles for achieving the government’s objectives. The 
propositions and hypotheses are developed based on the nature of the problems found in the 
Chapter 2, the literature review. 
The potential conflicting interests and obligations in meeting the government’s expectations have 
made it difficult for SOEs to prioritise the expectations. An early study showed that firms are 
obligated to pursue activities based on the original charter or statement of incorporation (Sundaram 
and Inkpen, 2004). SOEs are obligated to carry out government roles in social welfare and economic 
growth. The knowledge gaps identified in the literature review in Chapter 2 are used to develop the 
propositions and hypotheses in this thesis: whether the government makes changes regarding the 
objectives and policies for SOEs when the government privatises SOEs; whether changes in the 
objectives and policies are complementary or in conflict with SOEs; and whether partial privatisation 
affects the government’s objectives and SOEs’ ability to meet the objectives. These questions have 
emerged based on findings from the literature review in Chapter 2 regarding the government’s 
objectives for SOEs. 
There are four main areas that need to be focused on prior to answering the questions. The first 
area is the government’s objectives. The government as the stockholder for SOEs shows its influence 
in determining the objectives. The literature review also showed how the government affects the 
process of determining SOEs’ objectives and national economic policies through its role as SOEs’ 
principal and stakeholder. The second area is the effect of the privatisation policy. Privatisation is 
considered a deviant event that alters original expectations. From the literature review in Chapter 2, 
privatisation shows its influence in encouraging changes. The third area is the effect of partial 
privatisation. Partial privatisation indicates a contradiction, as the market is opened for competition 
while the government’s control remains strong. The fourth area is changes in policy and the market, 
which may have consequence for the objectives. The literature review in Chapter 2 shows that social 
welfare is still an issue for the government and SOEs following the introduction of privatisation. 
These issues have emerged regarding whether changes in objectives are complementary or 
conflicting, and the extent to which SOEs achieve these expectations. 
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4.1 Government Objectives 
The government’s objectives for SOEs often engage with the government’s roles and the state’s 
needs. The government is the only authority body within society; thus, its activities will have 
collective effects (Ryan, 2012). Besides social welfare duties, the government’s roles include 
facilitating national economic growth, providing public facilities and improving market activities 
when private participants are limited. The development of the national economy and other parties’ 
participants in national economic activities contributes to the intensity of the government’s 
involvement in these activities. A lack of private participants and resources drives the development 
of the public sector where government plays its important roles, while an open market limits the 
government’s role as the facilitator or passive player in national economic activities. SOEs are part of 
the government body in carrying out these social welfare duties. The important role of social net 
stability motivates the government to be involved in socio-economic activities. Community 
development, employment and poverty are the government’s main concerns. Reducing 
unemployment, crime and poverty motivates the government to develop national economic 
activities through the roles of SOEs. Employment and community development are often part of the 
government’s main concern in determining the objectives for SOEs (Bai et al., 2000; Boycko et al., 
1996). Therefore, the government’s roles and duties constitute the government and SOEs’ 
objectives. As an objective is also a picture of a problem that an organisation needs to resolve 
(Keeney, 1988), employment and community development become part of SOEs’ objectives when 
the government is required to resolve these issues. Employment and community development also 
justify the government’s involvement in social welfare duties and makes these non-productive duties 
part of the government’s objectives for SOEs. 
As a business entity, SOEs are expected to maximise profits or shareholders’ expectations. Profit 
becomes SOEs and government concern, following the implementation of privatisation and SOEs’ 
policy reforms. In common practice, the profit objective is not only determined by shareholders. The 
literature review in Chapter 2 showed that the market also encourages the development of the 
profit objective. Competition may place pressure on SOEs and private entities to be profitable and 
efficient. In practice, SOEs’ managers may deal with other parties who are part of the stakeholder 
group, such as employees, the government and communities. These stakeholder groups may also 
determine the basic needs and end result of SOEs’ business. Profits, efficiency and good-quality 
goods and services are the public and government’s major critiques for SOEs. The public and the 
government often require SOEs to be more profitable and efficient, like private entities. As 
stockholder and stakeholder for SOEs, the government’s influence is not limited to determining the 
objectives. The government regulates the market where SOEs and private participants run their 
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businesses. The regulation often requires SOEs to fairly compete with private entities, and they are 
also obligated not to disadvantage private participants in the market. SOEs have to balance their 
market activities as businesses and public entities. This requirement potentially creates conflicting 
objectives and roles. Referring to these situations, the propositions or issues are whether: 
P1: When the government introduces a new policy regarding SOEs’ roles and expectation, the 
government-stated objectives for SOEs are changed. 
 
4.2 Impacts of Privatisation Policy 
The development of national economic activities has encouraged private participants to be involved 
in the activities. Consequently, the role of the government in economic activities is declined as 
private participants start to take part in economic activities in some ways. Declining government 
involvement in economic activities is also driven by the shrinking of the public sector. The shrinking 
of the public sector is often motivated by high expenditure and a lack of government ability to 
support these roles. Private participants in national economic activities require government to pay 
attention to the success of the national economy by facilitating the improvement of business 
performance (Ryan, 2012). Pressure from the public to reduce the government’s monopoly and 
protection encourages the government to reduce its involvement by introducing public policy 
reforms such as privatisation and the liberalisation of the regulated market. These changes in the 
market economy environment also require the government to alter its SOE policies and the way it 
governs SOEs by encouraging SOEs to fairly compete with private entities. 
Changes in the national market economy affect SOEs’ business structure and objectives. Through 
privatisation, the government’s ownership is transferred to private. In common practice, this 
transfer is followed by changes to objectives. Economic expectations, such as profit maximising and 
efficiency, often become new goals for new privatised firms. In practice, the changes may be limited. 
An earlier study showed that the new structure of new privatised firms’ ownership is determined by 
the level of investor protection and firm performance (Boubakri et al., 2005b; 2005c). The study 
explained that the degree of control from new owners is determined by the minority protection 
provided by the government. Minority protection from the government plays an important role in 
the selection and degree of new ownership structure. The intensity of legal protection for investors 
and minority owners has implications for the privatisation method preference, whether through 
transferring asset or sharing issue privatisation (Megginson, 2007). The selection of privatisation 
method preferences also affects the intensity or degree of control under new owners, whether a 
new structure is a full or partial ownership. When the transfer of ownership generates centralisation 
control under a new owner, the new owner may alter the culture and objectives of the company. 
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These new structures are claimed to enable possibilities for new privatised firms to improve their 
performance. When the centralisation of control is transferred to private investors whose main 
concerns are profit and economic objectives, firm performance is more likely to improve (Willner, 
2001). In contrast, partial privatisation may still provide possibilities for the government to hold 
majority control for new privatised firms. 
Changes in the market economy are not only affected by privatisation; they may result from the 
liberalisation of the regulated market. This change mostly affects non-privatised SOEs where the 
government is still the sole owner or principal. The liberalisation of the regulated market drives SOEs 
to compete fairly in open market while the control of ownership is still centralised under the 
government. SOEs and the government may alter SOEs’ structure, for example, by establishing and 
implementing corporatisation. The market economy environment is argued to have significant 
effects on the development of internal corporate policy for SOEs (Sexty, 1980). SOEs’ internal policy 
and objectives are adjusted to accommodate market expectations. Restructuring the internal 
governance structure is usually applied through a separation function of owner and manager, and 
the introduction of an internal control through the role of an internal auditor. A control mechanism 
underlines the importance for both the government and SOEs to comply with accountability and 
responsibility standards. The government may not be able to directly involve SOEs in the decision-
making process. Restructuring the internal governance structure through corporatisation may 
improve SOEs’ performance and efficiency (Aivazian et al., 2005). The government is required to put 
aside its own socio-political interests as a result of the market and public’s pressure regarding 
accountability and responsibilities. The introduction of a new privatisation policy encourages 
changes in the government’s way of governing SOEs, and in the way that SOEs deal with the new 
market environment. Therefore, the proposition is: 
P2: Changes in SOEs’ market economy environment through the introduction of the 
privatisation policy and the liberalisation of the market economy generates changes in the 
government and SOEs’ objectives. 
 
4.3 Performance implications 
Performance has become a central aspect of controlling and monitoring measurement. The role of 
performance is often used as a tool to assess the success of a firm or organisation in meeting its 
expectations or targets. These assessments emphasise the relationship between objectives and 
performance. An early study showed that the application of performance has been used by various 
traditional business measurement fields (Sirgy, 2002). Performance as an effective measurement 
tool has not been limited to businesses or the private sector. Rather, it has been used as a 
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measureable tool in other sectors. For example, the development of new public administration 
underlines the importance of performance as a device for measuring the government and public 
sector’s achievements (Townley, 2005). Objectives are set as part of the performance measurement 
tool. Objectives are a basis for shared expectations, planning and performance evaluations (Pearce, 
1982). They are set based on the commitment that members of firms or organisations want to 
achieve. This commitment is included in the planning and performance evaluations. The most 
important factor of determining the objectives is the end result and the basic needs that need to be 
satisfied (Boyd and Levy, 1966). Therefore, the performance evaluation mainly aims to assess 
whether the organisation can resolve or meet the expectations. 
The role of performance becomes more essential when the agency function is separated. Potential 
conflicting objectives appear when the agent and principal show different interests and risks. Within 
a disputed ownership structure, risks may be distributed among the owners, while management has 
to deal with all potential risks as a consequence of their role. The separated function of agent and 
principal is argued to give more opportunities to managers as the agent to achieve their own 
interests at the expense of shareholders (Short, 1994; Sharon and Jahera, 1991). This separated 
function leads to conflict, which largely result from asymmetrical information and incentives. A study 
of management theory showed that management behaviour is affected by risks and incentives, 
which are commonly asymmetrical to the achievement (Short, 1994). Managers’ efforts to achieve 
the objectives are directed by the degree of their own risks, such as replacement and future 
expectations in relation to their incentives. External factors also become an influential factor for 
managers’ decisions in the context of performance achievements. Mergers, acquisitions and market 
labour are considered to contribute to management’s behaviour related to performance 
achievements. Other factors, such as control, value-maximising size and regulation, are also crucial 
in completing expectations (Demsetz and Lehn, 1985). In common practice, these factors have a 
more significant influence on the success of management in meeting value-maximising expectations 
rather than the structure of ownership. The separated function of agent and principal requires a 
mechanism of control and monitoring to ensure that owners’ interests are in the best interests of 
management. 
Performance is often attached to ownership structure. The centralisation of ownership often occurs 
within public or family enterprises. An earlier study showed that the centralisation of owners has 
negatively affected the ability of firms to make a profit (Band, 1992; Demsetz and Lehn, 1985; Short, 
1994). A distinction of owner concentration from distinguish owners is attached with financial 
arrangement settles the power or control in the decision-making process (Sharon and Jahera, 1991). 
Therefore, the centralisation of ownership provides more opportunities for blocked owners to 
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monitor and be involved in management decision. The emergency of potential conflicts between 
managers and owners is stronger compared to disputes regarding ownership structure. The transfer 
of ownership is considered an effective way of preventing power abuse from blocked owners in the 
decision-making process. Performance and ownership become a prominent study following the 
transfer of ownership (Sharon and Jahera, 1991). A study showed that performance improvement 
occurs following the transfer of ownership when the management share is part of the ownership 
structure (Band, 1992). This is because owner interest is a crucial factor that motivates firm 
behaviour (Branch, 1973). Owners’ expectations are mainly pursued to maximise their wealth. 
Privatisation has consequences for the transfer of ownership and performance. The literature review 
in Chapter 2 showed that privatisation generates two significant changes: new firm structure and 
objectives. Further, privatisation is frequently driven by poor performance or inefficient public 
expenditure resulting from government involvement and privileges. Changes in market and 
government policies significantly affect SOEs’ business activities. An earlier study showed that firms 
could easily change their structure and process when the market around them changed (Arens and 
Brouthers, 2001). Changes in the market environment through privatisation and liberalisation 
encourage SOEs or new privatised firms to anticipate the changes. In contrast, the literature review 
mentioned the potential socio-political problems resulting from privatisation. Socio-political 
problems develop as SOEs and new privatised firms are required to focus on economic objectives 
because of changes in their market and/or owner structure. These problems are also a major 
consideration when the government is still part of the controlling principal through partial 
privatisation. New objectives are commonly set to anticipate the changes. Referring to these 
situations, the theory of privatisation predicts that: 
H1: The introduction of new objectives resulting from the privatisation policy and the 
liberalisation of the market economy cause conflicting objectives for SOEs and new privatised 
firms’ objectives and business activities. 
 
H2: Changes in SOEs and new privatised firms’ objectives and business activities resulting 
from the privatisation policy improve SOEs and new privatised firms’ performance. 
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Chapter 5:  
Research Methods 
 
This chapter presents the research design that has been used to examine the extent to which 
Indonesian SOEs are a successful vehicle for achieving the government’s objectives. The research 
method has been created to provide detailed plans and tasks during the study and analysis process. 
The research method has been developed based on the knowledge gaps identified in the literature 
review in Chapter 2, and it will be used to develop the propositions and hypotheses. Both qualitative 
and quantitative methods have been employed in this thesis to examine the implications of changes 
and the relations between the government-stated objectives for SOEs and SOEs’ structure and 
performance. Qualitative methods, including interpretative, historical and content analysis, have 
been employed to resolve the following issues or propositions developed in the literature review: 
P1: When the government introduces a new policy regarding SOEs’ roles and expectations, 
the government-stated objectives for SOEs are changed. 
 
P2: Changes in SOEs’ market economy environment through the introduction of the 
privatisation policy and the liberalisation of the market economy generate changes in the 
government and SOEs’ objectives. 
 
Meanwhile, quantitative methods—two-sample t-test and regression—have been employed to 
examine whether the introduction of new objectives resulting from the privatisation policy can 
cause conflicting objectives, and whether the changes affect SOEs’ business activities and 
performance. For this thesis, the relations between the government’s objectives and performance 
are examined as: 
H1: The introduction of new objectives resulting from the privatisation policy and the 
liberalisation of the market economy cause conflicting objectives for SOEs and new privatised 
firms’ objectives and business activities. 
 
H2: Changes in SOEs and new privatised firms’ objectives and business activities resulting 
from the privatisation policy improve SOEs and new privatised firms’ performance. 
 
This chapter is developed into five subsections: historical path analysis; content analysis for 
evaluating the government-stated objectives; quantitative method for relations and performance 
measurement; unit analysis; and data analysis. Interpretive analysis is described in detail as part of 
the historical path and content analysis. 
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5.1. Methods 
The research method for this thesis has been developed in reference to the main research area 
issues. A mixed method has been employed to examine the extent to which SOEs are successful in 
attaining the government’s objectives. Qualitative methods are used to investigate the issues which 
are developed as the propositions. The methods used to evaluate the propositions are historical 
path, interpretative and content analysis. Quantitative methods—two-sample t-test and regression 
test—are employed to examine the hypotheses. This section is developed into three sub-sections: 
historical path analysis, content analysis and quantitative method. 
5.1.1 Historical Path Analysis 
Historical path analysis is selected as the analysis tool because the method focuses on history and 
path or sequence events, which are key factors for this thesis. The key topic of this thesis is changes 
where sequences of time as evolution are crucial. From the conceptual framework in Chapter 3, a 
historical path is developed by combining path dependence and the historical method as the 
framework for analysing the phenomena of change in the government’s objectives for SOEs and 
SOEs’ structure and objectives. Path analysis points out the important role of continuing events 
during a period, while an event that is unrelated may influence the variable or continuity (Newman, 
2000). Historical analysis has also been selected to examine the cause–effect and movement of the 
events during the process of change. Time is the main factor in the historical method, as it 
reconstructs or tells what has happened and seeks to untangle complex causes and movements of 
human events in the past (Smith and Lux, 1993). 
The selection of historical path analysis is based on the knowledge gaps identified in the literature 
review in Chapter 2, as well as problems identified in Chapter 1. The literature review in Chapter 2 
underlined that the government’s policy and objectives statement for SOEs is often related to the 
situation when the SOE is established. The review also mentioned the possibility of the government 
and firms making changes driven by changes in the market or political environment. Historical 
analysis provides procedures that allow the researcher to investigate the issues deeply and to 
eliminate these potential bias issues, while path analysis emphasises the evolution and changes. 
There are two approaches in the historical study: constructionist/hermeneutic, which focuses on 
changes or continuity over time; and positivist, which emphasises data analysis to interpret and 
present causal evidence (Thompson, 2010). For this study, both the constructionist and positivist 
approaches are combined and employed. The positivist approach is utilised to examine changes by 
identifying the causal evidence, while the constructionist approach uses continuity events as the key 
analysis. 
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The selection of the historical path analysis method for this study has been motivated by some 
considerations. The most important reason is the relation between the research method, 
hypothesis, framework and research questions. The main research question, propositions and 
hypotheses focus on the evolution of government policy and objectives for SOEs. There are some 
advantages of historical analysis. First, it provides procedures and rules that help the researcher to 
collect the evidence and facts based on connections among facts, including the interpretation and 
selection of facts (Lucey, 1984). Further, it gives researchers procedures to reconstruct the past, and 
it explains the complex causes of change, demonstrates the persistence of phenomena and analyses 
the trends (Smith and Lux, 1993). Second, the historical analysis method offers possibilities for the 
researcher to search and make deep considerations regarding contemporary issues, including factors 
that influence the issue (Lucey, 1984; Parker, 2004; Rowlinson, 2004), along with the possibility of 
obtaining insights into the precedents and conditioning factors (Parker, 1997). This method gives 
researchers the opportunity to search values, relationships, significance, causation and explanations 
of certain events or facts (Parker, 2004). Third, using the historical analysis method, the 
government’s policies and objectives are reconstructed, and the researcher can identify whether the 
changes have consequences for the current structure and performance. Meanwhile, path analysis is 
combined, as it focuses on chronological constraints and unusual deviations. The continuity of 
events, times, places and manners is used to evaluate the events by developing a map of the 
periodisation or sequence of events. The historical analysis method systematically collects all 
possible facts and information and then examines them through chronological constraints before 
presenting them as knowledge or proof (Lucey, 1984). At the same time, path analysis is utilised to 
identify and analyse the crucial events that significantly affect the evolution. Based on these results, 
the past is reconstructed by developing a map of periodisation or events. This process is the 
historical path analyst’s main concern. 
As part of this historical method, interpretive analysis is employed to support the historical path 
analysis. It is utilised to help understand the meaning and content of the data. As mentioned 
previously, the government’s policy and objectives statement is often biased or vague; thus, 
interpretive analysis is expected to reduce these barriers by focusing on the meaning of each 
objective and policy statement as a text. Interpretive analysis brings sense to text or text analogues 
that are found in hermeneutic studies about interpretation (Myers, 1994). The importance of 
meaning in analysing the government’s policy and objectives is examined using interpretative 
analysis. 
Historical analysis is employed to analyse the propositions. It is utilised to reconstruct the 
government’s objectives for SOEs based on evolution and historical changes. There are two parts to 
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the analysis of SOEs’ evolution. The first part is the structure and objectives of SOEs during the 
period of evolution, from 1945 to 2010. The second part is the structure and objectives of SOEs and 
new privatised firms after the introduction of fast-track privatisation during 2004 to 2010. Detailed 
data analysis is presented in Section 5.4. 
5.1.2 Content Analysis for Evaluating the Government-Stated Objectives 
Content analysis has been selected as the second qualitative method to analyse the implications of 
the government’s policy on SOEs’ objectives. The selection of content analysis is mainly rationalised 
by the importance of the text (Duriau et al., 2007). The literature review in Chapter 2 emphasised 
that the government’s policy and objectives statement is potentially biased or vague (Ramamurti, 
1987; Zif, 1981) and it is not clearly elaborated for public sector firms (Wong, 2004). This ambiguity is 
a reason for this thesis to employ content analysis. Content analysis is used to reveal the implicit and 
explicit meanings of government policy for SOEs using documents and archival records when the 
policy was developed and promulgated. Neumann (2006) suggested that content analysis could be 
used to reveal the unseen or difficult aspects of a text’s content (Neumann, 2006). 
The advantage of content analysis is the detail of the information. The relations and implications of 
the government’s policy and objectives on SOEs are important aspects of analysis. The government 
and SOEs’ manuscripts are the focus of resources to gain detailed information, both explicit and 
implicit, that significantly affects SOEs’ objectives. A deeper meaning of the text and the latent 
content will enrich the interpretation. Content analysis is employed to understand the content and 
text related to the government and the privatisation policy, which affects SOEs’ objectives and 
business activities. This is an important part of this study, as content analysis also engages with 
value, intention and cognition. Content analysis is specifically utilised for this thesis to explore the 
message, value and intention of the government-stated objectives for SOEs. This message, value and 
intention are reflected through policies and regulations where the deep meaning of the content and 
text is investigated for the purpose of this thesis. 
The next step of the content analysis method is coding, which is utilised to quantitatively analyse the 
content and text from every manuscript, particularly those that have similar values, intentions and 
meanings. Coding is developed to describe the message based on the quantitative approach. 
Berelson (cited in Marshal and Rossman, 2006) described content analysis as an objective and 
neutral way of obtaining a quantitative description of the content of various forms of 
communication; thus, it was important to count the number of times that specific items were 
mentioned (Marshall and Rossman, 2006). The content or information is selected based on what was 
written—both word and theme—in the policies and reports. As part of this process, the content or 
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information is counted to find the frequency with which the information appears (Neumann, 2006). 
The next step is to record all of the content or information from the government’s policies and SOEs’ 
reports that indicate the objectives. Coding is classified into various categories based on patterns, 
themes and chronological events of policy changes. In this method, the objectives are identified and 
then categorised into social and economic objectives. This method is also employed to identify the 
dominant objectives based on the frequency with which they appear. These objectives are then used 
as ‘variables’, which examine whether each institution makes any changes during the period of 
study. Two key processes of content analysis in this thesis are the meaning and coding as the basis 
for further quantitative analysis. 
Interpretive analysis is also employed in this thesis to help understand the meaning and context of 
the data. Interpretive analysis focuses on the text as the object of study, which is important for the 
study in order to ensure that the text is clear, coherent and makes sense (Myers, 1994; Maitland-
Gholson and Ettinger, 1994). For this study, interpretive analysis is employed to understand the 
meaning, sense and coherence of each text or text analogue found in the archival records. 
Interpretive analysis is employed because the main data for this study are government and SOEs’ 
public records. Interpretive analysis is utilised to evaluate the statements and eliminate the bias that 
is often found within government records. Some record statements may be written in general terms 
for a particular purpose, or the source and value of the policy may not be explicitly stated or 
interpreted as stated (Furgeson et al., 2008). These situations may cause these laws and regulations 
to be interpreted broadly or in different ways. Therefore, interpretive analysis is employed to make 
both the text and text analogues clear and coherent. 
5.1.3 Quantitative Method for Relations and Performance Measurement 
There are two main purposes for employing the quantitative method. The first is to examine 
whether Indonesian SOEs successfully attain the government’s objectives. The second is to evaluate 
whether changes in objectives affect SOEs’ performance. Therefore, this section focuses on 
providing the methods for measuring the relations and implications of the government’s objectives 
on SOEs’ business activities as reflected in their performance. Financial performance indicators and 
quantitative tools are utilised to test the relations and implications of the objectives and 
performance. Two statistic parameters—two-sample t-test and regression model—are used to test 
these relations and implications of the government’s objectives and performance. 
A mixed method of qualitative and quantitative analysis is employed because both methods 
complement each other. A combination of both qualitative and quantitative methods is an effective 
way to conduct research where validity is crucial. A study of mixed methods notes that the 
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quantitative method can identify the representative sample, while the qualitative method assists in 
the development of conceptual and instruments of analysis (Johnson et al., 2007). From the 
historical path and content analyses, conceptual changes are developed based on patterns, while 
instruments of analysis are established based on the identifying samples. Later, quantitative analysis 
is employed to confirm and support the analysis by providing richer data and results (Johnson et al., 
2007). The relations and performance implications are measured as the quantitative method for this 
study, and the method aims to support and confirm the results. 
Measuring performance is an effective tool for evaluating the effectiveness of the control system 
and achieving the objectives. There are many tools for measuring the effectiveness of companies’ 
operations. The most common tool is a financial statement such as earning per share (EPS), 
economic value added (Devarajan et al., 1996) or accounting system. Most of these indicators 
declare to be effective tools in presenting performance. However, there is no single performance 
indicator that is accepted worldwide as the most effective control for business processes (Monks 
and Minow, 2008), as most performance indicators have limitations. For example, they can only 
present a picture of the company in a limited framework, period or field of performance. Most tools 
demonstrate a lack of presenting the whole picture of the corporation. The lack of a single 
performance indicator is clear when it is applied to SOEs. For example, the implementation of 
common performance measurements, such as private companies, may not be suitable for SOEs. In 
several cases, measuring SOEs’ performance is commonly based on the benchmark across similar 
industries (Morck and Stangeland, 1996). In practice, this measuring tool cannot accommodate the 
social welfare and non-economic objectives. The measuring tool potentially causes problems when it 
is not suitable for the objectives. For example, employment productivity may not be a good tool for 
SOEs when employment creation is part of the objective. In this thesis, some financial performances 
are employed as representative of SOEs’ social welfare. This is described in detail in Chapter 10. 
Two statistic parameters are employed in this thesis: two-sample t-test and regression model. The 
two-sample t-test has been selected to determine whether the objectives cause SOEs’ financial 
performance to present differently from those without the objectives. The result from this test will 
signify whether the objectives have a relationship to SOEs’ financial performance. Further, the 
regression model is used to examine and estimate the relationship between independent variables 
(objectives) and dependent variables (SOEs’ financial performance) where the dependent variables 
(performance) are specifically selected from all possible values of independent variables (Groebner 
et al., 2005). To support the analysis, the regression model is used to examine the value or 
implication of objectives on SOEs’ performance. A similar model is used to test whether the 
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objectives are complementary or conflicting. From this test, a further evaluation is conducted to test 
whether the conflicting objectives affect SOEs’ performance. 
5.2 Unit Analysis 
Unit analysis is key case or variable in research analysis. It is defined as a kind of case, phenomenon 
or variable that is collected, researched and analysed (Collis and Hussey, 2003). In social science, unit 
analysis is determined as a case or social phenomenon where concept and measuring tools are 
developed in data analysis (Neumann, 2006). From these definitions, unit analysis contains two key 
factors: a case and an analysis tool or process. Unit analysis varies depending on the main purpose of 
the study. The rule for the best selection of unit analysis is the lower or simple level of the 
phenomenon, individual case or variable, event, object, relationship or aggregate (Collis and Hussey, 
2003). In this study, unit analysis is a relationship between the government and SOEs in the context 
of objectives. 
The objectives are the variables of analysis. Variables are determined based on whether the 
objectives are changed following changes in the government’s objectives and policy. Objectives are 
also used to measure the extent to which they affect SOEs’ performance. Early studies that 
presented the influence of the government’s socio-political objectives on SOEs’ performance are 
identified through the effect of the company’s inefficiency and loss (Aivazian et al., 2005; Bhatt, 
1984; Guthrie and English, 1997; Hill, 1982; Morley et al., 1999; Willner, 1999). This study mainly 
focuses on the emergence and effect of multiple objectives, and the relations of objectives with 
measureable performance. The reason to focus on these variables is the existence of multiple 
objectives and characteristic differences that may provide an opportunity for this thesis to develop a 
new theory of SOEs. However, measuring SOEs’ objectives is not easy. Performance measurements 
for these social welfare objectives often raise a number of critiques. The issue of determining the 
framework of social objectives as the government’s objectives is still controversial among a number 
of researchers, as the accountability will be biased unless there is a clear definition of social 
objectives (Baird, 2001). Several financial performances can be used as a representative of social 
welfare financial measurements such as tax or employees. In this thesis, unit analysis uses the 
government’s objectives as stated or found through the government and SOEs’ public data, and 
SOEs’ performance as shown in their financial reports. 
5.3 Data Collection 
In this study, archival records are the main source of data. The main reason for focusing on archival 
records is because of politically sensitive issues resulting from relations between the government 
and SOEs. As part of the government body, SOEs and their business activities may have nuanced 
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politics that become sensitive issues for investigation. Therefore, in this study, Indonesian SOEs and 
the government’s public information, such as annual reports, websites, press releases, regulations 
and public archival records, are the major data source. Data are collected from 141 publicly listed 
and unlisted SOEs’ financial performance during 2004–2010, as well as the government’s regulations 
for establishing or amending SOEs until the cut-off date of 2010. 
The importance of archival records requires some collecting procedures. Archival records can be 
divided into two different types: public archival records and private archival records (Breg, 1989). 
This study relies on the secondary data and/or archival records from SOEs and the government as 
the primary source. In general, archival and relics are two classifications of sources for historical and 
empirical studies. Archival data offer a variety of potential uses for constructing and revealing 
indicators of precedents or previous experience that affect the present action and policies (Parker, 
1997, 2004). There are some limitations regarding public data. For example, public data are 
potentially written for certain audiences, and the access may be restricted or very broad. Further, 
the results may be distorted, and using supporting records, such as mass media or actuarial records, 
will help to eliminate potential problems (Breg, 1989). As government policy is often written in 
general statements that lead to many interpretations, this study will conduct checks and re-checks 
regarding the government’s policy. This study also focuses on the government’s documentation, 
particularly regulations related to industrial policies and concerns. 
As mentioned previously, two research methods are employed in this study. The first is the 
qualitative analysis method, which aims to reconstruct the evolution of SOEs’ objectives. For this 
historical path analysis, systematic procedures and rules support historical methods for collecting 
facts and evidence (Lucey, 1984). For this process, researchers can develop the combination and 
interpretation of facts and evidence to obtain answers for their study (Postan, 1939; Parker, 2004). 
Although there are many different classifications, this thesis focuses on the classification that is 
based on the content, aim, time, place, manner and production based on the written evidence. As 
this system and procedure are very clear, the reliability and validity is highly acceptable (Collis and 
Hussey, 2003). The second method is quantitative, which focuses on statistic measurements. 
Financial performance measurement is the main focus of analysis using this method. The 
performance measurement in this study refers to common performance measurement practices, 
which focus on financial performance. The performance measurement is based on SOEs’ measurable 
social and economic indicators as found and collected from SOEs’ financial reports during 2003 to 
2010. As this study engages with a significant amount of data, classification may ease the process of 
documentation tracing and analysis. For example, SOEs are categorised based on the Indonesian 
Ministry of SOEs’ categories, with modifications for the banking, cement and fisheries industries due 
  65 
to the limited number of SOEs. Banking and financing are classified in the same category, cement 
and mining are placed in the same group, and fisheries and farming are classified together. SOE 
industries are modified into 17 groups of industries from the existing 33 industries in order to obtain 
sufficient data. The objectives are collected during the reconstruction of SOEs’ objectives and 
structure, while coding and categories are developed based on the findings from the analyses in 
Chapters 6–9. These results are then utilised to examine the relations and implications of the 
government’s objectives and SOEs’ performance as the main analysis in Chapters 10 and 11. 
5.4 Data Analysis 
This study aims to examine whether SOEs are successful vehicles for implementing the government’s 
objectives by focusing on two measurement models. The relation of the government and SOEs is the 
first model of analysis, referring to the study within SOEs in Canada by Hafsi (1985). The relationship 
of the government and SOEs becomes an indicator for classifying and examining the independence 
of SOEs in carrying out the real objectives. Next, the study focuses on measuring the implementation 
of the government’s objectives through SOEs’ business activities. The focus of this study is the 
government’s objectives and Indonesian SOEs’ business activities as a reflection of SOEs’ efforts to 
attain the government’s objectives. Financial performance indicators and quantitative tools are 
utilised to test the relations and implications of the objectives on SOEs’ performance. 
This study focuses the analysis within three different stages, which are selected based on the 
propositions and hypotheses developed in Chapter 4. The first stage focuses on historical path 
analysis to analyse the evolution of the government’s objectives. The aim of this stage is to 
reconstruct the evolution of SOEs in relation to historical changes in the government-stated 
objectives for SOEs, and the effect on the current institutional structure. The second stage focuses 
on the cycle pattern model to analyse the relations among the objectives. The purpose of this stage 
is to examine how SOEs achieve the real objectives. Finally, the third stage examines and estimates 
the relations and implications of the objectives on SOEs’ performance. This final stage of analysis is 
conducted by applying two statistical tools. 
The first stage of analysis in this study focuses on historical studies by emphasising the long history 
of economic changes under the historical path framework. The evolution of political and economic 
conditions is examined to identify their effect on the evolution of the government-stated objectives 
for SOEs. Institutional change theory offers a tool to understand national economic changes and the 
transformation of Indonesian SOEs. The sequence of events and patterns refers to the characteristics 
of path dependence studies, which focus on the sequence of time, institutional patterns, event 
chains, a wide range of social outcomes, large consequences from small events, and impossible to 
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reverse the timeline (Mahoney, 2000; Pierson, 2000). This characteristic gives this study the 
opportunity to emphasise the critical events to shape the analysis. 
The second stage of the analysis is the quantitative method. Several studies have measured SOEs’ 
objectives and performance. For example, the cycle pattern study of SOEs in Canada focused on the 
relationship between the government and SOEs as an alternative to measuring the government’s 
objectives for SOEs. The cycle pattern model was developed based on Hafsi’s (1985) study, which 
emphasised three types of relationships: cooperation, confrontation and autonomy patterns as 
references for measuring the government’s objectives (Hafsi, 1985). In the cooperation stage, the 
value of the company is the value of the government. The growth of business has significant effects 
on operation activities when the SOE or firm is no longer influenced by the government and 
becomes an autonomous entity. The changes of the company’s pattern into autonomy make the 
company more independent in achieving its objectives. In this study, publicly listed and non-
privatised SOEs without privatisation restrictions are in this category. In practice, some key variables 
also need to be included and considered, such as industry type, the government’s expectation and 
involvement in the business, political and economic environments (Zif, 1981) to classify the SOEs 
with special treatment from the government. The study of SOEs in Canada revealed that certain 
industries, such as utilities, transportation and communication, were still controlled by the 
government through prices and services (Sexty, 1980).  In this study, SOEs with privatisation 
restrictions are categorised in this group. 
This study will also focus on the political and economic environment as an indicator of analysis. The 
reason for using the political and economic environment is based on the findings of the previous 
literature study of SOEs, which demonstrated the influence of political and economic stability on 
SOEs’ performance (Bhatt, 1984). The domination of ideology provides a chance for the state to 
control the resources and determine the other objectives. Early studies about public enterprises’ 
performance showed that politics plays a decisive role for public enterprises to meet the 
government’s requirements (Bhatt, 1984; Vernon, 1984). The study also showed how often 
management enforces short-term planning and meets long-term planning. Political involvement 
potentially intervenes in SOEs with some short-term planning, as found in the study about SOEs’ 
planning, where most corporate planning tended to become budget-oriented instead of planning-
oriented (Javidan and Dastmalchian, 1988). This condition has a significant influence on the 
relationship between the government and the company and performance. As a substantial 
relationship is often based on budget subsidies, corporate planning is also an opportunistic objective 
measurement because of the possibilities for SOEs to carry out other objectives. The universality of 
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time and condition commonly influences the other objectives, which are potentially confronted with 
the real objectives (Estrin and Pérotin, 1991). These indicators are also evaluated in this thesis. 
The third stage of analysis is quantitative analysis, which focuses on the relations and implications of 
objectives and performance. The quantitative analysis section focuses on measuring the 
implementation of the government’s objectives through SOEs’ business activities, as reflected in 
their performance. Financial performance indicators and quantitative tools are utilised to test the 
implications of the objectives. The evaluation begins by identifying the government’s objectives, 
particularly those that present the effects on SOEs’ performance and business activities. Meanwhile, 
the process of change is employed to identify the evolution of SOEs’ current structure and 
objectives, which may be helpful in supporting the analysis. In this process, the results from the 
historical path analysis and content analysis are used as a foundation and framework for 
quantitative analysis. The next step is to test the implications of the objectives on performance using 
statistical parameters. Two-sample t-test is employed to evaluate whether the objectives show 
differences in SOEs’ financial performance. Meanwhile, regression model is used to test and 
estimate the relationship between independent variables (objectives) and dependent variables 
(SOEs’ financial performance). The same model is utilised to examine and estimate whether the 
objectives are complementary or in conflict, and whether they affect SOEs’ performance. Chapters 
10 and 11 detail the performance measurement tools. 
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Chapter 6:  
The Evolution of Government-Stated Objectives 
For State-Owned Enterprises 
 
This chapter identifies the nature of the government-stated objectives for SOEs in the context of the 
SOEs’ structural evolution. This study mainly focuses on two main features of change, the 
institutional environment and organisational structure which have both affected the government’s 
objectives for the SOEs. These two main features are necessary because the socio-economic with 
whom environment are regarded to highly influential for organisations as they adjust to the 
dynamics of change (North, 1990). Earlier studies show that changes in institutional environments 
are consequences of socio-economic dynamics (Meggison and Netter, 2001; Newberry, 1996; 2002). 
For example, privatisation has caused a number of governments to re-determine SOEs’ objectives 
(Caporaso, 1982; De Castro et al., 1996; Guthrie, 1990). The changes are mostly driven by the 
existence of new owners as part of the SOEs structure which may alter the company’s orientation.  
In the context of Indonesian SOEs, the socio-economic environment has politically determined the 
institutional environment where the SOEs operate. Historical analysis has revealed that economic 
policy in Indonesia has swung from centralisation to market orientation as a result of changes in the 
socio-economic situation. Focusing exclusively on the period from 1945, after Indonesia became an 
independent nation, up to 2010, several earlier studies indicate that Indonesia’s socio-economic 
situation has determined the SOEs’ institutional environments (Abeng, 2001; Anoraga, 1995; Higgins, 
1958; Siahaan, 1996; Sutter, 1959). Since SOEs is sensitive to the changes of the policies, the changes 
socio-political environment for this period of study may cause some changes in the government 
policy for SOEs.  
This chapter is largely historical description, based on an interpretive analysis of government and 
SOE documents. In terms of policy and political regimes, this period of study is divided into three 
periods. The first is the Indonesianisation. The second is nationalisation period. Both 
Indonesianisation and Nationalisation occur during the Old Order regime of 1945–1965 under 
Sukarno’s leadership. The third period is the corporatisation period starts from the New Order 
regime of 1966–1998, under Suharto’s leadership; and followed by the current reformation regime 
from 1998 to 2010. This chapter’s results are important to support the analysis in the next chapters, 
which focus on current Indonesian SOEs. The chapter is divided into four sections, each of sections 
6.1 to 6.3 examine a different era, based on the fundamental changes that significantly affected the 
SOEs’ structure and objectives: Section 6.1 examines Indonesianisation from 1945 to 1958; Section 
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6.2 looks at nationalisation from 1958 to 1965; Section 6.3 the corporatisation period from 1969 to 
2010; and Section 6.4 discuss the government-stated objectives for the SOEs based on the analysis 
of the previous sections. 
6.1 The Indonesianisation Period (1945-1958) 
Indonesianisation is the most crucial period of the Indonesian SOEs evolution. This is the earliest 
event of Indonesian SOEs evolution. From the path dependence study by Mahoney, he highlights the 
influence of earliest events as the initial condition that rules out the final outcome of the sequence 
(Mahoney, 2000). His study result is used as guidance for this thesis to examine the early period of 
the Indonesian SOEs.  
The changes in socio-political circumstances during the initial period of Indonesianisation had 
particular consequences with the government choosing to centralise control. Following Indonesian 
independence in 1945, taking over from Dutch control of economic and political authority, under 
pribumi, became crucial and demanding.5 Conflict between the two political powers, the new 
Republic of Indonesia and the Dutch Federation, occurred in the initial period of Indonesian 
independence, particularly when the Dutch put much effort into protecting their economic interests 
in Indonesia (Anderson, 1983; Dick, 1985; 2002). This continuance of Dutch domination in economic 
and political activities caused wide resentment from pribumi, which generated the Indonesianisasi 
(Indonesianisation) programme as the main agenda for state administration (Sutter, 1959). 
Indonesianisation of political control began as the government pursued a centralist control policy 
under a nationalisation agenda. The establishment of Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia 
(PPKI/Committee for Indonesian Independence) began the initiative for an Indonesian Independent 
state in 1945. Later, PPKI also drafted the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia (Siahaan, 1996; Sutter, 
1959), which emphasised the importance of the government in controlling the nation’s socio-
economic activities and resources, particularly the resources and production vital for the state 
(Constitution 1945). 
The crucial requirement for pribumi control of economic activities faced some obstacles. Political 
instability and lack of skills and resources were obstacles for the Indonesianisation programme. 
Limited pribumi participation in economic activities was prompted by previous Dutch policy to ban 
pribumi from taking part in economic activities (Adams, 1996; Kroef 1954; 1955). This restriction on 
participating in economic activities developed into a restrictive cultural influence on Indonesian 
entrepreneurial growth and ambitions (Adams, 1996). This ensured that Indonesian economic 
activities during this period were dominated by Dutch, Chinese and Arabian merchants, while 
                                                          
5
 Pribumi is the official name for the indigenous people of Indonesia. 
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pribumi involvement was limited (Anderson, 1983; Kroef, 1954). This situation meant the 
Indonesianisation of the economy was not easily implemented. Nationalisation of resources and 
enterprises prevented the potential empowerment of former colonial powers and outside nations 
participating in economic activities. This was important during the initial period of Indonesian 
statehood. Therefore, pribumi and the state used enterprises to create jobs; this was seen as 
important for national economic development (Constitution 1945; Sutter, 1959). 
The socio-political environment affected the emergence of centralised economic policy in Indonesia. 
Indonesia’s long colonial period had several implications, such as lack of skills and cultural influences 
banning pribumi participation in national economic activities (Higgins, 1958). These effects hindered 
the Indonesianisation of the economy. Consequently, centralising economic policy was crucial to 
mobilising pribumi economic activities. These were the reasons for state welfare leaders to 
emphasise both the importance of government in the provision of public utilities and services, and 
the importance of collective effort or a cooperative society (Higgins, 1958). In practice, centralisation 
of economic policy under the government occurred at various time during 1945 to 2010, and caused 
significant policy changes in relation to SOEs. The army’s centralised control of nationalised Dutch 
enterprises during nationalisation in 1958, for example, endangered national objectives while the 
country was still confronted with instability issues (Anderson, 1983). 
From 1945 to 1948, there were rapid political changes caused by competition between political 
parties. This period was one of deep instability and political uncertainty, which hindered the 
government’s application of market orientation policies (Higgins, 1958; Sutter, 1959). Indonesia’s 
economic recovery became a crucial concern of the Indonesian government after the handover of 
sovereignty. The result of the Round Table Conference in The Hague in 1949 forced the Dutch 
government to transfer full sovereignty to the Indonesian government. The transfer also created the 
opportunity for Indonesian leaders to determine national objectives without intervention from the 
Dutch government. The extreme socio-economic condition became a national priority agenda; the 
government created a number of economic plans to solve the country’s socio-economic problems. 
In 1949, the Dutch government announced Indonesian sovereignty through the Round Table 
Meeting. The meeting had major effects on the Indonesian socio-political and economic situation. 
The government set the economic plan by focusing on socio-economic recovery. This began through 
economic management development, implementing the Rencana Pekerjaan Industri (Industrial Plan) 
in 1950 and Rencana Urgensi Perekonomian (RUP/Urgency Economic Plan) in 1951 (Bajpai, 1995). 
The Indonesian economy was the main project of the Benteng Program (Fortress programme), which 
was part of RUP (Dick, 2002). The Benteng Program emphasised industrial development as the 
vehicle for economic activities. The government implemented the Benteng Program by opening 
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certain categories of industries for Indonesian importers who had trade credits from Bank Negara 
Indonesia (State Bank Indonesia/BNI) (Dick, 2002). 
The commencement of the Indonesianisation programme, the lack of private participation, and 
political instability were reasons for the government to control the socio-economic situation that 
might lead to potential conflicts of interest arising from independence. Therefore, the 1945 
Constitution of Indonesia emphasised the importance of government in controlling the nation’s 
socio-economic activities and resources (Constitution 1945; Higgins, 1958). Two articles of the 
Constitution, Articles 33 and 34, underlined government control policies. Article 33 of the 1945 
Constitution of Indonesia highlighted the importance of the state roles in the national economic 
activities as: 
(1) The economy shall be organised as a common endeavour based upon the principle of family 
system (kekeluargaan). 
(2) Production branches which are important for the state and which affect the livelihood of the 
people at large shall be controlled by the state. 
(3) The land and water and the natural resources contained therein shall be controlled by the state 
and shall be used for the greatest prosperity of the people. The national economy shall be 
organised based on economic democracy with the principles of togetherness, efficiency with 
justice, sustainable and environmental perspective, independence, as well as by maintaining 
balance between progress and unity of the national economy. Further provisions concerning 
the implementation of this article shall be regulated in law. 
(Source: Unofficial English translation, downloaded from the Indonesian State Secretariat’s website 29 September 2013) 
 
Focusing exclusively on the article above, there were three important items in regard to Indonesian 
economic policies. The Constitution emphasised the importance of collective efforts, the control of 
natural resources and production vital to the state (Abeng, 2001; 2002; Constitution 1945; Ruru, 
2006). These were references for the implementation of centralisation economic policy. In addition 
to Article 33, Article 34 was the main reference for government roles in the provision of public goods 
and services. The article highlighted this role as: 
(1) Poor and neglected children shall be taken care of by the state. 
(2) The state shall develop a social security system for the entire people and shall empower the weak 
     and underprivileged people in accordance with human dignity. 
(3)The state shall be responsible for the provision of adequate health service facilities and public 
service facilities. Further provisions concerning the implementation of this article shall be 
regulated in law. 
(Source: Unofficial English translation, downloaded from the Indonesian State Secretariat’s website, 29 September 2013) 
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This article underlines the importance of government duty in the provision of public utilities. 
Indonesianisation and the socio-political situation were the reasons behind these statements. These 
constitutional provisions were also a reference for the government to establish state enterprises and 
jobs, which were important, particularly for national economic improvement. 
6.1.1 Structure and Objectives of the first SOEs 
Pressure to implement Indonesianisation was a reason for the government to establish new state 
enterprises. Prior to the establishment of BNI as the first state enterprise, the government set up 
Pusat Bank Indonesia (Indonesia Central Bank). The main duty of Pusat Bank Indonesia was to co-
ordinate the government’s economic programme; including circulating Indonesian money and 
managing the foreign exchange (Sutter, 1959). In 1946, BNI replaced Pusat Bank Indonesia. The main 
aims of BNI were to facilitate economic activities purely under Indonesian authority, and to circulate 
the Oeang Republik Indonesia (ORI) as the official Indonesia currency (BNI 2008a; 2008b). As the only 
state bank owned by the Indonesian government at this time, BNI played multiple roles; such as 
monetary, debt and credit management (Hensley, 1964), including being the central bank. BNI 
operated as the central bank for the Indonesian government until 1949. As the Dutch government 
was still keen to control Indonesian economic activities, the Dutch government transferred De 
Javasche Bank (DJB) to act as the central bank of Indonesia. In 1953, the Indonesian government 
purchased DJB’s ownership, nationalised it, and commissioned it officially as the Indonesian central 
bank. 
The requirement for the Indonesian government to control economic activities was important, 
particularly when the Dutch army blockaded inter-island trading to control the Indonesian trading 
system. This blockade compelled the government to establish two state trading enterprises: Bank 
and Trading Corporation (BTC) and Sumatra Banking and Trading Corporation, known as CTC. Both 
new state enterprises were established to resolve the inter-island trading blockade. In practice, the 
establishment process made their functions and objectives different. BTC was set up as part of BNI 
due to a policy issue. Consequently, BTC held multiple objectives, which were less likely to be 
commercial objectives. In contrast, CTC was set up by the government with support from Indonesian 
entrepreneurs; therefore, CTC was likely to be more commercially oriented than BTC (Sutter, 1959). 
Following the recognition of Indonesian sovereignty, the government implemented a market 
orientation policy. The government introduced the Benteng Program, which focused on improving 
national market activities through the role of pribumi. The government established NV Bank Industry 
Negara (BIN/State Industry Bank), which aimed to provide financial assistance for economic recovery 
and to manage state trusts for a number of government industries. BIN was operating on a 
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commercial basis when government regulated its financial separation (Sutter, 1959). The main 
function of BIN was to provide long-term credit for all projects and economic activities under the 
Rencana Urgency Perekonomian (Economy Urgency Plan) and Benteng Program (Glassburner, 1962; 
Kanumoyoso, 2001). In practice, the role of BIN was not limited to supporting government economic 
activities. In addition to its roles as the financial supporter, organiser and/or sponsor for a number of 
private and government projects, BIN was also involved in company stock trading and taking over 
some private companies (Hensley, 1964; Siahaan, 1996). By 1960, BIN became the biggest state 
holding bank, controlling more than 40 companies in various industries (Hensley, 1964; Siahaan, 
1996; Sutter, 1959). 
6.1.2 Key Points Analysis from Indonesianisasi Period 
Referring to Mahoney’s path institutional analysis, the earliest period of historical path is the most 
influence events that affect the future outcome. The earliest period of Indonesian SOEs evolution 
points out some factors that become foundation for the development of Indonesian SOEs.  There are 
two driving factors for the emergence of Indonesianisation program: the conflict between the 
Indonesian and Dutch government to protect their interest and sovereignty in Indonesia, and the 
requirement to empower the pribumi involvement in socio-economic activities in Indonesia. These 
driving factors lead to the government control policy. Centralisation of economic policy is also aimed 
to prevent the conflict of interest over the resources and lack of pribumi involvement in socio-
economic activities. These situations, later, turn into the background for the PPKI to set control 
policy under the government hand as stated in the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia. As the 
consequence of this framework, the structure and objectives of state enterprises during the 
Indonesianisation period were set for the socio-political purposes.  
6.2 The Nationalisation Period (1958-1966) 
The nationalisation period began in 1958 when the conflict between the New Indonesia Republic 
and the Dutch Federation led to economic and political catastrophes. Under Sukarno’s leadership 
and through Ekonomi Terpimpin (Guided Economy), the centralisation of socio-political and 
economic policy was stronger. Through Ekonomi Terpimpin, the government affirmed the 
importance of Indonesia to return to, and implement, the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia (Siahaan, 
1996).6 This also meant the end of market orientation policy which led to centralisation of economic 
policy under the government hands. 
                                                          
6
 During the parliamentary period, the government implemented the 1950 Provisional Constitution of 
Indonesia. 
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Instability in the socio-political and economic situation caused the failure of government to improve 
the economic situation. The rejection of the Irian Barat (West Irian/West Papua) resolution and 
Dutch enforcement to protect their businesses in Indonesia sharpened Indonesian resentment 
(Anderson, 1983; Kanumoyoso, 2001). This situation provoked a massive labour strike and economic 
blockade in 1965. The strike generated crucial action from the Indonesian government to take over 
numerous Dutch companies, as mentioned in Undang-Undang no. 18/1958 tentang Nasionalisasi 
Perusahaan-Perusahaan Belanda (Nationalisation Act no. 18/1958/ UU Nasionalisasi 1958). The 
centralisation of control policy under the Indonesian government strengthened when a labour strike 
led to a massive takeover of Dutch companies (UU Nasionalisasi 1958; The American 1960). Military 
involvement was needed to protect and take over supervision of many nationalised companies, 
particularly in the outer islands (Crouch, 1975). Following nationalisation, the government managed 
and supervised 822 companies under the state enterprise structure. 
In the political context, the strike caused a change of political orientation in Indonesian leaders, 
particularly when Indonesia encountered economic blockade by several western European countries 
and the United States of America (USA). This economic blockade caused massive damage to 
Indonesia’s international trading (Dick, 2002). At the same time, the Soviet Union and Eastern 
European countries offered investment aid towards the recovery of Indonesia’s economic situation 
(Siahaan, 1996). However, communist riots in 1965 devastated the Indonesian economic and 
political situation, leading to a transfer of political power in 1966 from the Old Order regime to the 
New Order regime. 
6.2.1 Change to the SOEs Structure and Objectives 
In 1958, nationalisation was a driving factor for the Indonesian government to re-apply 
centralisation of economic policy. As indicated previously in Section 6.2, economic and political 
instability following the massive labour strike encouraged the Indonesian government to protect the 
Dutch companies’ assets by taking over control of companies (The American, 1960). The majority of 
nationalised companies were classified under Dutch classifications: IBW (Indonesische Bedrijvenwet) 
and ICW (Indische Comtabiliteitswet wet). At the same time, the Indonesian government took over 
the control of several different structures of companies. This later caused some difficulty for the 
government in managing them. As a result of nationalisation, the government managed and 
supervised 822 state enterprises, which were classified as: 
- IBW 
State enterprises where capital came from the state budget as loans; the companies’ 
objectives were profit-oriented. 
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- ICW 
State enterprises where capital came from state budget as equity; the company constitution 
objectives were social welfare. 
- Nationalised Dutch companies. 
- Private companies under BIN and BNI, due to their financial problems. 
- Former bureau or agencies under a government department (Anoraga 1995; Diah 2003). 
 
To manage these companies, the government established Badan Nasionalisasi Perusahaan-
Perusahaan Belanda (BANAS/Nationalisation Body for Dutch Companies). BANAS was established to 
ensure that all nationalised assets were controlled by the state (UU Nasionalisasi 1958). Following 
the establishment of BANAS, the government took further action for these companies; such as, 
mergers, acquisitions, transferring companies to a new status, and transferring control to regional 
government (Kanumoyoso, 2001; Nugroho & Wrihatnolo, 2008). At the same time, the government 
created some new state enterprises to take over the Dutch nationalised companies’ activities 
(Abeng, 2001; Diah, 2003; Kanumoyoso, 2001; Ruru, 2006).7 These takeovers were mostly aimed at 
providing public utilities by using their facilities to distribute staples to Indonesians (Kanumoyoso, 
2001). Social welfare maximising was strongly represented as a role for these new state enterprises. 
The takeovers and centralisation of control of these 822 companies led to financial problems. This 
was because most companies, particularly with IBW and ICW status, were not-profit oriented; their 
main roles were for the provision of social and public services for communities (Research, 1998). At 
the same time, others were companies supervised by other state enterprises due to their financial 
problems. The control authority later resolved this by separating the control authority between 
central and regional governments. The central government still held most companies or state 
enterprises with public utility provision functions, while the regional government supervised the rest 
of the companies, which did not have these duties. 
These massive takeovers caused supervisory issues, which also affected the SOEs’ structures and 
objectives. Diversity in organisational structure and the size of the new state enterprises motivated 
the government to introduce a new structure under the Perusahaan Negara (state company) 
structure. Perusahaan Negara structure was implemented in 1960, through Peraturan Pemerintah 
no. 19/1960 tentang Perusahaan Negara (Perusahaan Negara Rule no. 19/1960/ Perusahaan Negara 
Rule 1960). The law regulated the Perusahaan Negara under their respective sector’s ministries 
                                                          
7
 Most of the Dutch nationalised companies were trading companies. The takeover occurred as the 
government established new companies under Badan Urusan Dagang (the government body to manage the 
trading nationalised companies). The takeovers were: PT Budi Bahkti to continue NV Boorsumij, PT Aneka Bakti 
to continue NV Internatio, PT Juda Bhakti to continue NV Jacobson van de berg, PT Tulus Bhakti to takeover NV 
Lindeteves, and PT Marga Bahkti to takeover NV Geowehry. 
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(MSOEs, 2008). Through this new structure, the government began to categorise the companies’ 
objectives into provision of services, handling of public interest, and obtaining revenue (Perusahaan 
Negara Rule 1960; MSOEs 2008). The establishment of the Perusahaan Negara structure was 
followed by the establishment of Badan Pimpinan Umum (BPU/General Management Board), who 
acted as the state representative by conducting a management function for individual state 
enterprises, or coordinating several Perusahaan Negara (Perusahaan Negara Rule 1960). In practice, 
the establishment of Perusahaan Negara did not fully resolve the supervisory issue. Badan Pimpinan 
Umum roles overlapped with the director’s duty, and also required the involvement of military and 
bureaucrats with little talent for managing the companies (Abeng, 2001; 2002). Meanwhile, the 
introduction of the Perusahaan Negara structure was not equally applied to all state enterprises. 
Several state enterprises, such as Pertamina and the state banks retained the same status under 
separate legal arrangements (MSOEs, 2008). This situation left a number of Perusahaan Negara still 
aligned with bureaucratisation, which led to poor performance, inefficiency and becoming a state 
financial burden. This situation contrasted with the state’s expectations when Perusahaan Negara 
was instituted, which was to become the state’s production and economic power. 
6.2.2 The Key Points from Nationalisation period 
The key points from nationalisation period are the returning of control over the nationalised 
resources under the government hands through nationalisation. The centralisation of control over 
resources occurred through the role state companies in order to prevent the control abusing 
following the nationalisation. Centralisation of control under the government led to the introduction 
of new structure of Perusahaan Negara. The new structure resulted in the roles of state companies 
from socio-political to become state production and economic power.   
6.3 The Corporatisation Period (1966–2010) 
Prior further analysis for this session, it is necessary to clarify the context of corporatisation. The 
corporatisation of Indonesian SOEs’ has started since 1966 when the government introduced three 
structure of Perusahaan Negara. However, this corporatisation was limited to management scope. 
In 2003, the corporatisation principles were fully implemented to entire SOEs.  The description of 
corporatisation in this section will be divided into two sub-periods, under the Perusahaan Negara 
structure from 1966 to 1983, and under the Badan Usaha Milik Negara (BUMN/SOEs) structure from 
1983 to 2010.  
6.3.1. Under Perusahaan Negara structure (1966-1983) 
The change of political power in 1966 caused some fundamental changes in governing the 
Perusahaan Negara. Economy stability was the government’s agenda priority, focusing on market 
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orientation policy. This new policy affected Perusahaan Negara roles in Indonesia’s economic 
market activities. Perusahaan Negara was encouraged to be an economic pioneer in the Indonesian 
market; this included running their business competitively with private and foreign companies. The 
New Order regime emphasised the importance of national economic stability and rehabilitation, as 
the application of neoliberal macro-economic policies, to allow private and foreign participation in 
Indonesian national economic activities (Nugroho & Wrihatnolo, 2008). Through this new policy, the 
government’s involvement in Perusahaan Negara began to reduce, following the introduction of 
Keputusan MPR no 23/1966 (Consultative Assembly Rule no 23/1966/TAP MPR 1966). The TAP MPR 
no 23/1966 underlined two main issues of Perusahaan Negara; inefficiency and management issues. 
As a consequence of these issues, the Assembly underlined the roles of government in Perusahaan 
Negara as limited to that of an advisor (MSOEs, 2008; Nugroho & Wrihatnolo, 2008). 
Market orientation policy and national economic stability was the New Order regime’s economic 
agenda following political catastrophe in 1965. Indonesia’s new regime priority agenda was focused, 
with economic policy on stabilisation, rehabilitation and development (Arndt, 1981). Market 
orientation policy replaced the former centralisation economic policy. Economic development was 
centred on stabilisation and rehabilitation through the socio-political, economic and military spheres 
as three characteristic of New Order regime at its initial period of transition (Anderson, 1983). 
Market orientation policy, as part of the new economic policy under the new regime, provided 
opportunity for the private sector to engage actively in the Indonesian economy, while the state’s 
role was limited to social welfare development (Arndt, 1981; Dick, 2002; Nugroho & Wrihatnolo, 
2008). The government started to open a number of industries to private and foreign investors, 
although several industries were still under government control through the role of SOEs. The role of 
SOEs during this period was mainly aimed at supporting the government’s economic development. 
These policies showed that the government started to reduce its involvement in economic activities, 
which had some implications for SOEs’ roles and functions. The government later introduced new 
structures of Perusahaan Negara, based on their function and roles. The introduction of market 
orientation policy started to ensure that the economic objectives of the SOE meshed with the 
provision of public utilities. 
6.3.1.1 Change to the Structure and Objectives of Perusahaan Negara  
The implementation of The TAP MPR no 23/1966, in regard to the Perusahaan Negara issue, was 
revealed through the issuances of Instruksi Presiden (INPRES) no. 17/1967 tentang Pengarahan dan 
Penyederhanaan Perusahaan Negara Dalam Tiga Bentuk Badan Usaha Milik Negara (INPRES for 
Simplification of Perusahaan Negara structure no. 17/1967/INPRES Perusahaan Negara  1967), and 
the Undang-Undang Bentuk-bentuk Usaha Negara no. 19/1969 (State-Owned Structure Act no. 
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19/1969/UU Badan Usaha Negara 1969), regarding the new structure of Perusahaan Negara. 
Through these laws, the government introduced a new management system and structure for 
Perusahaan Negara. Although Perusahaan Negara remained controlled by related sectoral 
ministries, the new structure of Perusahaan Negara required the Perusahaan Negara to be focused 
on economic efficiency, reducing financial burden and improving the performance. Through these 
rules, the Perusahaan Negara were classified into three categories, based on their socio-economic 
functions and roles (Abeng, 2001; MSOEs, 2008; Nugroho & Wrihatnolo, 2008), as shown in Table 
6.1. These classifications are: 
– Perjan (Perusahaan Jawatan/Bureau Enterprises) are defined as enterprises operating in public 
service areas that provide vital and strategic utilities, without any profit-making duty. These 
enterprises were attached to ministries and managed, based on the mechanism of management 
of state budgets, since they were financed from the government’s budget without separate state 
assets being invested. The government was positioned as the owner of enterprises through the 
ministry. The management was directly appointed and controlled hierarchically by government 
and civil servants. Perjan were transferred from IBW status. 
– Perum (Perusahaan Umum/Public Company) are defined as incorporated entities operating in 
public utility spheres, and are fully owned by the government. These enterprises were also 
charged with making a profit and were managed based on the corporation system. Even though 
Perum obtained some subsidies, the state assets invested in them were constituted as separate 
state assets. The management was appointed and controlled by the government and their 
official status was specifically organised. Perum were transferred from state enterprises status. 
– Persero (Perseroan Terbatas/Limited Incorporation) are defined as corporations where shares 
were wholly or partly owned by the government, and these organisations were required to 
operate selected business activities on a commercial basis. The management was appointed by 
shareholder meetings. The employees’ status and their scope of activities were treated as 
private sector contracts. Persero were transferred from ICW, which referred to commercial law 
(Wetboek van Koophandel voor Indonesie) Staablad 1847.23 (INPRES Perusahan Negara 1967; 
UU Badan Usaha Negara 1969; Abeng, 2001; Anoraga, 1995; MSOEs, 2008; Nugroho & 
Wrihatnolo, 2008; Research, 1998). 
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Table 6.1: Indonesian SOE Types 
Description Perjan Perum 
Persero 
Rules 
19/1969 replaced by 6/2000 
13/1998 12/1969 replaced by 12/1998 
replaced by 45/2001 
Ownership structure Part of ministry as bureau enterprises 
Wholly owned by 
government 
Government ownership through 
share ownership 
State finances Not separated Separated Separated 
Duties/objectives 
 vital and strategic sector focus on 
community service8 
 non-profit oriented 
 provide the public 
utilities9 
 profit oriented 
 Acquiring the selected business 
activities in commercial based 
 Profit-oriented 
Official status Civil servant Specific Private 
Board10 appointment Ministry Ministry Shareholder meetings 
 
In addition to these rules, the government introduced the Undang-Undang no. 19/1969 tentang 
Pengganti UU no. 1/1969 Bentuk-Bentuk Usaha Negara (UU to replace UU no. 1/1969 on State-
Owned New Structure no. 19/1969) and Peraturan Pemerintah tentang Persero no. 12/1969 (PP for 
Persero structure no 12/1969/PP Persero 1969) which referred to the Consultative Assembly Rule 
no. 23/1969.11 The PP Persero structure no.12/1969 emphasised the status of the Persero structure 
as a commercial entity. Through Peraturan Pemerintah tentang Pedoman Hubungan Tata Kerja 
Antara Menteri Bidang Teknis dan Menteri Keuangan Yang Mewakili Negara Selaku Pemegang 
Saham Perusahaan Perseroan (Persero) no 11/1973 (PP for Supervisory and Guidance between 
Regulator industries and Ministry Finance as state shareholders for Persero structure no 11/1973/PP 
Persero 1973), the government emphasises the Persero’s commercial entity and roles  which was a 
consequence of their capital being separated from the state budget; and they were supervised by 
the Ministry of Finance, who acted as the shareholder (INPRES Perusahan Negara 1967; UU Badan 
Usaha Negara 1969; PP Persero 1969; Mardjana 1992). Persero became the government’s profit-
oriented business entity. The changes to Perusahaan Negara’s structure placed Persero as the 
Indonesian economic backbone, with equal treatment to private and foreign investors (Anoraga, 
1995). Through this new structure, the government’s expectation for Persero to help achieve its 
industrialisation plans.  
                                                          
8
 Vital and strategic industries include natural resources and heavy industries; for example, mining, shipping 
yards and automotive (DIAH, M. 2003. Restrukturisasi BUMN di Indonesia (Indonesian SOEs Restructuring), 
Jakarta, Literata Jendela Dunia Ilmu). 
9
 Public utilities, such as post offices, telecommunications, electricity, gas and transportation (train and 
airlines) ibid. 
10
 The terminology used in Indonesia for Board: Dewan Direksi or Direksi (Board of Directors), the chief or 
management board for all types of SOEs, and Komisaris or Dewan Komisaris (Commissioner or Commissioner 
Board) as the supervisory board for Persero, and Dewan Pengawas (Oversight Board) for Perum and Perjan. 
11
 Undang-Undang no. 19/1969 tentang Perusahaan Negara Pengganti UU no. 1/1969 Bentuk- Bentuk Usaha 
Negara (UU New Structure 1969) was replaced by UU Badan Usaha Negara no. 1/1969 (UU Badan Usaha 
Negara 1969). 
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Through the PP Persero no 12/1969, Persero was encouraged to implement corporatisation. The PP 
Persero no 12/1969 was the initial steps of corporatisation process particularly for Persero by 
emphasised the profit oriented objective in order to reduce the state financial burden. The 
government management and supervisory function within Persero has been replaced by board 
management (directors) and board of supervisor (commissioners). In practice, Persero still met 
several issues, such as performance, regulation and management. Monopolies and privileges were 
still a barrier for companies operating effectively and fairly (Nugroho & Wrihatnolo, 2008; Siahaan, 
1996). This was because Persero still had an obligation to become government economic backbone 
to meet the industrialisation plans. In the meantime, military and bureaucratic involvement 
remained strong, with a number of Perusahaan Negara’s management, including Persero structure, 
being dominated by military officers (Crouch, 1975). These involvements and privileges led to less 
concern for the government and Persero to focus on profit objectives.  
6.3.2 Under Badan Usaha Milik Negara (BUMN/SOEs) structure (1983–2003) 
Increasing oil prices in the early 1980s actuated the implementation of centralised economic policy 
by the government. Increasing oil prices motivated the government to enforce protectionist policies, 
particularly for foreign investors, restricting a number of industries to being SOEs, applying 
monopolies and investment restrictions (Fane, 1999; Pangestu, 1990). The reason for this was the 
government’s ability to support SOEs’ business activities from oil revenue. A number of industries 
were monopolised as for Perusahaan Negara only. This situation created an opportunity for the 
SOEs and the government to increase their activities.  As SOE control was under their technical 
ministries, this caused the development of social welfare maximising expectations, and resulted in 
the involvement of bureaucrats and the military in the SOEs’ business activities. However, the 
government’s ability to harness financial resources from oil revenue resulted in fiscal problems when 
the oil price went down (Fane, 1999). These situations led to some financial problems for the 
Perusahaan Negara, as well as fiscal problems for the state when the oil price went down. Fiscal 
problems became a crucial pressure for the government in resolving the national economic 
situation. A massive infrastructure investment by the government and the SOEs contributed to the 
Indonesian financial problems. The government’s evaluation of Perusahaan Negara during this 
period revealed that the majority of Perusahaan Negara showed poor performance (Pangestu & 
Habir, 1989). Consequently, the government sought to improve the performance of the SOEs and to 
resolve its fiscal problems through privatisation. 
The requirement to improve the Perusahaan Negara’s performance encouraged the government to 
introduce the new structure of BUMN/SOEs. This new structure was also driven by the intensive 
market orientation policy, when the government opened a number of industries to private 
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participation; these had previously been monopolised by Perusahaan Negara, unless the industries 
were affected by the need to provide community livelihoods (Panglaykim & Thomas, 1967). Through 
Peraturan Pemerintah no. 3/1983 tentang Tatacara Pembinaan Perusahaan Jawatan (Perjan), 
Perusahan Umum (Perum) dan Perusahaan Perseroan (Persero) (PP Pembinaan Perusahaan Negara 
no. 3/1983: Supervisory and Governing Procedure and Guidance Perusahaan Negara for Perusahaan 
Jawatan [Perjan] Perusahaan Umum [Perum] and Perusahaan Perseroan [Persero]), the government 
underlined the new structure for these SOEs and the importance of economic objectives. The new 
structure of the SOEs was intended to give clear objectives and roles for Persero, as both 
government and business entities (PP Pembinaan Perusahan Negara no 3/1983; MSOEs 2008). At 
the same time, the government separated its functions from the role of maximisation of social 
welfare under Perum and Perjan status. 
 The centralisation of economic policy is also factor that leads Indonesian to financial crisis in late 
1990s. Indonesia was the one of the countries most affected by the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The 
requirement to resolve the national financial problems led to acceptance of financial assistance from 
the IMF through the Letter of Intent (LoI) (Wise, 2002), which pointed out the importance of 
government in conducting privatisation as part of the assistance requirements. While the SOEs were 
incorporated entities, their structure did not allow them to conform to market conditions. The LoI 
engagement encouraged the government to restructure SOEs in order to meet the requirement to 
fast-track privatisation. 
6.3.2.1 Structure and Objectives of BUMN/SOEs 
The introduction of the Perusahaan Negara structure and the distribution of control did not fully 
solve the companies’ problems. Poor performance, state involvement through bureaucrats and the 
military, and monopolies were major problems that Perusahaan Negara confronted in the early 
1980s. This situation motivated the government to introduce the BUMN/SOE structure. The 
introduction of the BUMN (or SOE) structure was the beginning for SOEs to implement corporate 
principles, particularly for the Persero structure. Through the new rules, the government underlined 
the requirement for Persero, as business entities, to apply several business entity clauses, such as 
management structure, internal audits and strategic plans (PP Pembinaan Perusahaan Negara no 3/ 
1983). This implementation of certain clauses initiated corporatisation for Indonesian SOEs, even 
though in practice, these corporatisation principles were not fully implemented. To facilitate the 
implementation of these corporatisation principles, the government required the Persero to comply 
with the Indonesian Undang-Undang Perseroan no. 1/1995 (The Indonesian Corporate Act no. 
1/1995). The government separated the shareholder and regulatory roles for Persero by transferring 
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the Persero’s supervisory authority to the Ministry of Finance. Meanwhile, for the other structures, 
Perum and Perjan, the supervisory authority remained under related sectoral ministry supervision. 
Privatisation became one of the LoI’s requirements for the government to receive assistance. At the 
same time, SOE structures, which were not fully incorporated, became another problem for the 
success of privatisation during this period. Following the introduction of the new Corporate Act no. 
1/1995 in 1998, the government replaced the PP Persero no. 12/1969 with the Peraturan 
Pemerintah no. 12/1998 tentang Perusahaan Perseroan (PP Limited Liability/Persero no. 12/1968) 
for Persero, and issued the Peraturan Pemerintah no. 13/1998 tentang Perusahaan Umum (Perum) 
(PP Perum no. 13/1998) for Perum. Both new decrees underlined the importance for Persero and 
Perum to obtain revenue. Through these laws, the financial objectives became part of all Perum and 
Persero objectives. However, these new rules did not help for the success of privatisation during this 
period. Several SOEs failed to be privatised due to socio-political issue. Therefore, the government 
introduced fast-track privatisation. 
Fast-track privatisation was a motivation for the Indonesian government to rearrange the SOEs 
structure. There were two main changes for the government to facilitate fast-track privatisation: the 
implementation of full corporatisation principles and the restructuring of the SOEs. The restructuring 
of SOEs occurred as the government eliminated Perjan structure.  The Perjan structure was reduced 
in 2005, when the government transferred 15 Perjan to their relevant sectoral ministries authorities, 
and acquired four fertiliser holding SOEs under PT Pupuk Sriwijaya (PT PUSRI/Fertiliser Holding 
SOE)12. The main reasons for these transfers were to eliminate budget constraints from Perjan 
status, focus on the implementation of fast-track privatisation policy, and encourage the SOEs to be 
more concerned with financial objectives. Perjan structure was considered to be a barrier for the 
government to implement full corporatisation principles where profit became a main concerned for 
government and SOEs. This restructuring was followed by full implementation of corporatisation 
principles and financial objectives such as efficiency and profit. These were intensively applied in line 
with the provision of public utilities (UU BUMN 2003).  
6.3.3 The Key Points from Corporatisation Period  
This corporatisation period presents three key points of SOEs evolution. The first point is the 
introduction of economic or financial objectives such as profit and efficiency. Profit has been part of 
the Perusahaan Negara objectives since the beginning of corporatisation period in 1966. Later, this 
introduction of profit objective encourages to the establishment new structure of Perusahaan 
                                                          
12
 Thirteen Perjan Hospital SOEs were transferred to the Ministry of Health, two Persero Mass Media, PT 
Televisi Republik Indonesia (Television Republic Indonesia/Public Television) and PT Radio Republik Indonesia 
(Radio Republic Indonesia/Public Radio) under the supervision of the Ministry of Information. 
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Negara for Perum and Persero structure, while Perjan remains focusing on social welfare objectives. 
Second is the beginning of privatisation which later will be analysed in Chapter 7. Third, the 
development of new structure of BUMN/SOEs is aimed to accommodate these economic or financial 
objectives and privatisation. These economic or financial objectives encourage the establishment of 
new structure of SOEs for Perum and Persero structure only.  
6.4 Identifying Government-Stated Objectives for State-Owned Enterprises: Discussion 
This section focuses and identifies the findings and analyses the key points from each section of the 
evolution of Indonesian SOEs. This section is also analysing proposition one whether the 
introduction of new policy regarding SOEs roles and expectations affect government stated 
objectives for SOEs. The proposition expects that the introduction of new policy for SOEs regarding 
roles and objectives will change the government expectation for SOEs.  
Using the historical path analysis which refer to path dependence, this section examines the theory-
path of institutional changes as compared with findings from the case of Indonesian SOEs. The path 
dependence emphasises three major areas of analysis; the early period of sequence, the early event 
and the causal events (Mahoney, 2000). Meanwhile, the prior study of institutional changes 
emphasises the importance of change as the consequences of the interaction between organisation 
and institution. Meanwhile, the study of ownership structure by Estrin and Perotin (1991) reveals 
that the influence of market and socio-political environment at a time when the objectives are set 
also has significant effects on a company’s objectives (Estrin and Perotin, 1991). These indicators are 
the main elements to analyse the government-stated objectives for SOEs.  
The early period of sequence and the early event are of the important parts of the historical path 
analysis. Sewell as cited by Mahoney notes the importance of early period and early events of the 
sequence will impact the possible outcomes at the end of sequence (Mahoney, 2005: p. 510). The 
importance of early period and early event is the unforeseen event which could not be analysed 
based on the prior event. The case of Indonesian SOE evolution shows that some of this conceptual 
framework of path dependence cannot be applied. This is a reason to develop historical path 
analysis which a combining of path dependence and historical analysis. Although the early period 
and event of the Indonesian SOE sequence is still considered as the most important part of the 
evolution, the factors that create the first or early event are analysable. As mentioned in Section 6.1, 
the early period of the Indonesian nation is still occupied by conflicts between the Indonesian and 
Dutch governments. The Indonesianisation developed as a consequence of the resentment against 
Dutch colonialism, this lead to flourishes of the nationalisation for pribumi. The introduction of 
Ekonomi Terpimpin in 1958, for example, affirmed the failure of market orientation policy at the 
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beginning of the Indonesian nation which leads to the centralisation of socio-economic policy. The 
Indonesianisation and centralisation of socio-economic control are considered as the crucial early 
events of the Indonesian SOEs sequence. This is because the events set the objectives framework for 
the future of the Indonesian nation emphasises that the better community socio-economic situation 
can be achieved under the government’s hands (Constitution 1945). These events also determined 
the framework for future Indonesian SOEs structure and objectives. These early events show the 
influence of the state welfare orientations in determining the Indonesian government objectives as 
well as the beginning of the centralisation of control for the government.  
The historical path analysis shows that socio-economic environment and the early period of 
Indonesian evolution have set the structure and objective for Indonesian enterprises. The 
institutional changes analysis shows that once the solution for resolving a situation is determined, 
this event is locked-in and integrated into the evolution (North, 1990). The centralisation of socio-
economic policy under the government’s hand has been locked-in and developed as a pattern 
solutions or traditions for the Indonesian government to reach socio-economic stabilisation. The role 
of SOEs becomes crucial to implement these government roles and policies. The ownership structure 
of the Perusahaan Negara, which was represented by the state, shows the influence of political 
expectations and policies in determining company constitution objectives (Estrin & Pérotin, 1991). 
Later, the evolution of Indonesian SOEs revealed a political process in determining the objectives, 
which was also influenced by the failure of market orientation policy in several political periods, 
particularly during the initial period of statehood, ensuring the centralisation of economic policy was 
crucial to obtain national socio-political stability (Anderson, 1983). These make the social welfare 
objectives more dominant for the Indonesian SOEs.  
The process of evolution is not always cohesive. The causal or contingent event may have occurred 
during the evolution process. Ebbinghaus (2005) notes that path dependence is a result from non-
linear self-enforcement, as the process of evolution may differ or deviate from the original 
expectation as a result of spontaneous events (Ebbinghaus, 2005). Two metaphors of path 
dependence from Ebbinghaus (2005), the trodden trail and road juncture respectively distinguish the 
persistent diffusion path and branching pathways. This situation is more likely to apply to the 
evolution of Indonesian SOEs. Privatisation is considered to be the causal or contingent event which 
later disrupts the SOEs objectives and structure from the original framework. As shown in Diagram 
6.1, the original objectives for SOEs are in relation to socio-economic expectation as stated on 
Articles 33 and 34, the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia only, later were the profit and efficiency 
objectives added.  Through the introduction of privatisation, the government underlines the profit 
and efficiency objectives as part of corporatisation and privatisation process. For some SOEs, the 
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government profit objective is different from their original government-stated objectives, even 
though later profit and efficiency apply to all SOEs. From this situation shows that privatisation has 
disrupted the SOEs original objectives from social welfare to economic or financial objectives.  
Several causal or spontaneous events also appear during the evolution of Indonesian SOEs that 
shapes the current Indonesian SOEs structure and objectives. Market economy policy which was 
applied in the 1980s made Perusahaan Negara the economic pioneers to improve market activities. 
The changes to Perusahaan Negara’s role were made by the government to continue its policies in 
attaining national economic stability. This role of the Perusahaan Negara had certain consequences. 
Social welfare was no longer the Perusahaan Negara’s main objective and role. Perusahaan Negara 
was required to compete equally with other economic entities, private and foreign. This requirement 
has changed the role of the Perusahaan Negara from the government social welfare vehicles to 
become the economic vehicles functions.  
The roles of profit and efficiency objectives are driving factors for the changes of Perusahaan Negara 
objectives and structure. In this Indonesian SOEs case, the introduction of profit objective in 1966 
lead to the change of Perusahaan Negara structure into three different structures; Persero, Perum 
and Perjan. At the beginning of these changes, the changes do not run as smoothly as expected since 
the constitution still requires the government to control the resources. Therefore, the changes of 
objectives are likely to underline the importance of profitability and efficiency for the Perusahaan 
Negara, without disadvantaging the Perusahaan Negara main duty of the provision of public utilities. 
In 1998, the implementation of privatisation policy causes fundamental changes in the objectives of 
government for SOEs. These changes are seen as a coercive action as a respond to the external 
pressure in relations to economic assistance and privatisation. This pressure also causes the 
emergence of profit and efficiency as part of the objectives. Through UU BUMN no 19/2003 and PP 
Privatisation no 33/2005, the government emphasises that profit and efficiency should apply to all 
SOEs. The changes of objectives and structure may also be proposed as an alternative selection that 
constructs further institutional changes of Indonesian SOEs. These financial objectives cause the 
elimination of the Perjan structure, since this could not conform to the new expectation. In current 
practice, the social welfare expectation remains part of the government-stated objectives for SOEs. 
It is found through the possibilities for SOEs, both Perum and Persero, to carry the social welfare 
duty, even though these objectives may not be part of their objectives.  
From this discussion, it is shown that the path of institutional changes for Indonesian SOEs is 
determined by two important events. The early period and events of the evolution of Indonesian 
SOEs are the first crucial occurrences that set the framework for the SOEs objectives and roles. 
These events also show the influence of the state welfare orientations and the beginning of the 
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centralisation of control in Indonesia. Centralisation of control is locked-in which later develops as a 
pattern for the government to reach national economic stability through the role of SOEs. This 
shows that social welfare is the main government-stated objective for SOEs. In contrast, the second 
crucial event, privatisation, has disrupted the original government-stated objectives for SOEs. 
Privatisation is seen as an unplanned event that happens during the evolution and influences the 
institutional evolution. Meanwhile, privatisation is regards as an alternative government selection 
that sharpens the structure and objectives for Perusahaan Negara allowing it to become the current 
SOEs structure as shown in Diagram 6.1 below.  This implication of these changes are shown as the 
objectives of the SOEs evolved from socio-political to socio-economic, then from socio-economic and 
to financial objectives. These changes are also followed by changes in their structure, from simple 
government bodies such as state enterprises, to government economic entities such as Perusahaan 
Negara, and then the BUMN or SOEs structure. Focusing on proposition one, this discussion and 
analysis indicate that changes in SOEs structure and objectives are driven by the introduction of new 
SOEs policy. The new policy is introduced as the government alters its roles in national socio-
economic activities. The evolution of SOEs structure and objectives in relation to government roles 
and objectives is engaged with some adjustment particularly in regard to centralisation of control 
and financial objectives where profit and efficiency should be in line with the original government 
social welfare objectives.  
Diagram 6.1: The evolution of Indonesian SOEs’ structure and objectives
Social Welfare Expectation  
Economic/Financial Expectation 
Indonesianisation  Nationalisation  
Privatisation  
Perusahaan Negara 
BUMN/SOEs 
Financial problems 
Full Corporatisation          
The 1945 Constitution of Indonesia 
Fiscal Problems 
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Chapter 7: 
Privatisation and Government-Stated Objectives  
For State-Owned Enterprises 
 
This chapter analyses the implementation of privatisation policy in Indonesia, and to what extent 
this policy affects government-stated objectives for SOEs. This chapter is important for further 
analysis because privatisation is still the government’s conventional economic policy to resolve 
national fiscal problems. From the analysis presented in Chapter 6, the implementation of 
privatisation in Indonesia resulted in several fundamental changes to SOEs structure, objectives and 
policies. From the path analysis of Indonesian SOEs evolution in Section 6.4, privatisation considers 
as the alternative event which later formats the further Indonesian SOEs structure and objectives.  
The emergence of economic or financial objectives is indicated as a consequence of privatisation. 
Privatisation, which is commonly used as a pathway to reduce government control, is also used to 
establish key economic objectives, such as networking, transfer of technology, production efficiency, 
raising revenue and reducing subsidies (Jupe 2003; Meggison & Netter, 2001; Ramamurti, 1999; 
Zahariadis, 1999). Several studies regarding privatisation show that party power and leadership may 
influence the extent to which a government retains control and regulates companies (Ramamurti, 
1999; Zahariadis, 1999). This is claimed to be an influence factor for the SOEs’ inefficiency (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1984).  Therefore, privatisation is commonly aimed to reduce the government 
involvement in order for SOEs to become more efficient. In some cases, privatisation is also 
purposed to bring a new equity capital that is needed by the government or the SOEs operation 
(Abeng, 2001). This may give chance for new owners to gain incentive from careful and successful 
management (McLeod, 2002). This shows that economic objectives become an important reason for 
privatisation.  
The seesawing of economic policies between centralisation and market orientation, as shown in 
Chapter 6, raised the issue of control of resources. Control becomes a central issue following 
privatisation (Estrin et al. 2009; Yarrow, 1999; Yarrow et al. 1986; Zif, 1981). In practice; privatisation 
in Indonesia does not seem to hinder the emergence of conflict. The conflict is most frequently 
apparent when the government control of resources is the chosen solution for market failure (Aoki, 
1996) and meets with external pressure to reduce government involvement in business activities 
(Aivazian et al., 2005). Based on other international studies on privatisation policy, the SOEs’ 
objectives changed after privatisation, due to the influence of new private owner (Bös, 1987; Estrin 
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et al. 2009; Estrin & Pérotin, 1991) is also considered as a reason for the emergence of conflict. The 
focus in this chapter is to analyse the evolution of privatisation policy and how changes in the socio-
economic environment affect policies and the government-stated objectives for SOEs. The chapter is 
developed based on the two different ways of privatisation in Indonesia: Section 7.1 outlines the re-
privatisation in 1965; Section 7.2 discusses the partial privatisation period during the economic 
deregulation period from 1971 to 2005. Finally, Section 7.3 details the results and findings from the 
previous sections. 
7.1 Re- Privatisation: 1965  
Re-privatisation was the first privatisation occurred during the evolution of Indonesian SOEs13. It 
began as part of the Economic Stabilisation Policy in 1966. Re-privatisation occurred following the 
nationalisation of the Dutch and other foreign companies and the transfer of political power from 
the Old Regime to the New Regime. Market orientation policy became a driving factor for the 
emergence of re-privatisation. Although market economy policy has been applied since the initial 
period of Indonesia’s statehood in 1945, the implementation of market orientation policy in 1966 
was a reason for the Indonesian government to undertake re-privatisation. As mentioned in the 
previous chapter, a massive strike against Dutch colonialism and the failure of The Hague meeting in 
regard to Irian Barat led to hostile action towards Western investors. Numerous Western foreign aid 
groups and investors, which were crucial for Indonesia’s economic development, were withdrawn 
following this hostility (James, 1996; Oei, 1968). The consequence of this hostility was that the 
Indonesian economy was very weak. The external pressure for the Indonesian government to pay 
nationalisation compensation was made worse by the economic situation (James, 1996).  
A weak national economic situation was the motivation for the government to apply several new 
policies. Opening markets to foreign and private investors was the government’s main policy to 
improve national economic and market activities (Oei, 1968; 1969). Re-privatisation was pursued to 
reduce the state’s financial burden as a consequence of the compensation payment due to 
nationalisation. Re-privatisation was also used to attract foreign investors to Indonesia (Oei, 1968; 
1969). Re-privatisation occurred through full transfer ownership of Western companies to their 
former owners, such as Goodyear (USA), Unilever (USA), Bata (Canada), and Philips (Oei, 1969; 
Pangestu, 1990). Following this transfer of ownership, the Indonesian government sought to re-
privatise several plantation companies owned by the British and Malaysians. However, the process 
of transfer for plantation companies did not go well, as the owners preferred to take compensation 
(Oei, 1968). Therefore, to this day they are still under government control. 
                                                          
13
 Re-privatisation was the returning of nationalised Dutch and foreign companies to their prior owners. 
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This re-privatisation did not make any significant changes in the government-stated objectives for 
SOEs. The transfer of ownership mainly occurred through returning their full ownership to the 
previous owners. The aim of re-privatisation was mainly to resolve the national economic situation 
following the transfer ownership and external pressure for the nationalisation compensation 
payment. Therefore, there are no significant effects on the government-stated objectives for SOEs.  
7.2 Partial Privatisation: 1971–2005 
Partial privatisation has become the Indonesian government conservative economic policy since 
1971. The selection to undertake the privatisation is often reasoned by the implementation of 
market orientation policy. This section analyses the environment background for the emergence of 
privatisation in Indonesia and its consequence on the current SOEs structure and the government-
stated objectives for SOEs. Although the main focus of analysis is the privatisation after 1991, some 
parts of analysis also include the privatisation of PT Intirub in 1971. The reason is to provide a link or 
coherency of analysis.  
7.2.1 Privatisation of PT Intirub: 1971  
The implementation of market orientation policy encouraged the emergence of privatisation in 
Indonesia during the beginning of industrialisation period in 1970s. The involvement of private 
participants in Indonesia economic activities was reasoned by the opening a number of industries 
which were only SOEs. Although there was no implication on the privatisation policy and the 
government-stated objectives for SOEs, transfer ownership of PT Intirub was acknowledge as the 
first domestic partial privatisation in Indonesia. Transfer of ownership of PT Intirub occurred through 
the direct sale to private owners, PT Bimantara Citra14. The transfer of ownership was continued 
when PT Astra, a vehicle company, joint its ownership for PT Intirub through the purchase of 32.5 
per cent of 70 per cent of PT Bimantara Citra’s ownership of PT Intirub (Pangestu, 1990). While the 
ownership transfer of PT Intirub helped the company avoid financial difficulty (Pangestu, 1990), the 
process of the transfer raised a number of critiques due to transparency issues (Schwarz, 1990)15.  
7.2.2 Deregulation Economy: 1980-1988 
Deregulation economic policy in Indonesia in 1980s was part of the Indonesian economic history for 
resolving the financial and fiscal problems. As mentioned in Chapter 6, fiscal problems emerged as 
                                                          
14
 PT Bimantara Citra is owned by President Suharto’s son, Bambang Trihatmodjo. 
15
 The transfer of ownership of PT Intirub was alleged to have been affected by corruption and transparency 
issues, as the state suffered a loss of Rp 6 billion (SCHWARZ, A. 1990. Retread for Tyre Maker. Far Easter 
Economic Review). Since 2006, the company has not operated due to financial difficulties. The government had 
planned to sell the whole of PT Intirub in 2003; however, the privatisation of PT Intirub was not finalised until 
2011. 
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the government took control of national economic activities following the increasing oil prices in 
1972-1983. This control of economic activities generated the government to take control of 
economic activities through the roles of SOEs. This was followed by government intervention and 
protection policies relating to economic activities (PP Persero 1973; McCawley, 2011; Pangestu and 
Habir 1989). A massive infrastructure investment through SOEs mostly funded petrodollar. The 
government also established new SOEs as PERTAMINA’s subsidiaries which had some financial 
implications to the company (Robinson and Rosser, 1998). At the same time, the government 
deregulated the banking system by imposing a ceiling on bank assets, leading to a large number of 
private banks (Fane, 1999; McLeod, 2002b; Pangestu, 1990). These new private banks mostly were 
established by relying on the state bank expenses which later worsened the Indonesian economic 
situation (Fane, 1999; McLeod, 2002b). The government ability to provide funding from oil 
strengthened the centralisation of control policy under the government hands. This also generated 
the increasing of government involvement in national economic activities, particularly when the 
government started to reduce the private participants by limited for SOEs only (Robinson and 
Rosser, 1998). The centralisation of economic policy began to deal with a problem particularly when 
the oil price went down; and these massive investments became a burden on the state budget.  
The need to improve national economic activities again became a reason for the government to 
undertake privatisations in 1991. Privatisation became part of the government’s deregulation policy 
in 1988, and was aimed at resolving the economic situation and improving the SOEs’ performance 
(Pangestu & Habir, 1989). The private outstanding credits with state banks, and the SOEs over-
investment in infrastructure, were two crucial fiscal problems during this period. The government 
encountered pressure to resolve the country’s financial problems as it re-implemented market 
orientations policy.  Meanwhile, the poor performance of Perusahaan Negara became a state 
burden, particularly when the government found it difficult to support the Perusahaan Negara’s 
business activities. Prior to privatisation, the government evaluated the SOEs. This evaluation 
showed that only 60 out of 180 Perusahaan Negara performed well, which later became a driving 
factor for privatisation (Pangestu, 1990; Pangestu & Habir, 1989).  Privatisation was also followed by 
the requirement to improve SOE performance and budget efficiency; motivation for the Indonesian 
government to conduct ownership divestiture as stated through PP Pembinaan Perusahaan Negara 
no. 3/1983 (PP Empowerment of Perusahaan Negara no 3/1983) and Keputusan Menteri Keuangan 
(KMK/Ministry of Finance’s decision) Republik Indonesia no. 740/KMK.00/1989: Peningkatan Efisiensi 
dan Produktivitas Badan Usaha Milik Negara (KMK no. 740/KMK.00/1989: State-Owned Enterprises 
Productivity and Efficiency Improvement). 
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7.2.3 The First Initial Public Offering: 1991  
Prior the first Initial Public Offering (IPO) of the Indonesian SOEs, the Indonesian government 
undertook the privatisation of custom operation. The government privatised custom operations to a 
Swiss private surveillance company, Société Générale de Surveillance (SGS). This was aimed at 
reducing the heavy cost of surveillance activities through private/foreign investor involvement 
(Pangestu, 1990). The privatisation of custom operation had no policy or objectives implication on 
the government-stated objectives for SOEs. In 1991, the government established PT Surveyor 
Indonesia as a joint venture between the Indonesian government, PT Sucofindo (surveillance SOE) 
and SGS (Surveyor, 2005; 2006) to operate surveillance activities in Indonesia. 
PT Semen Gresik (cement SOE) was the first listed SOE in the stock exchange market, followed by PT 
Indosat (a nationalised USA satellite and international telecommunications SOE). The IPO of PT 
Semen Gresik occurred in 1991 when 35 per cent of stocks were offered to the market. From these 
35 per cent of its share offered to the market, of which 27 per cent were new shares issued for 
internal capitalisation purposes. The privatisation of PT Semen Gresik was motivated by a number of 
socio-economic reasons. Privatisation of PT Semen Gresik was pursued to open opportunity for SOEs 
and private entities to be involved in capital market activities. The privatisation of PT Semen Gresik 
was focused on the development of domestic capital markets and the requirement for the company 
to obtain fresh funds for its expansion. The privatisation of PT Semen Gresik was planned to be 
followed by two other SOEs, PT Telekomunikasi Indonesian (PT Telkom/telecommunication SOE) and 
PT Semen Tonasa (cement SOE). However, only PT Semen Gresik was successfully privatised, due to 
procedural and political risks from state welfare orientations and the public. The privatisation of PT 
Semen Gresik met the government’s objective to develop the domestic capital market, while the 
privatisation itself failed to meet the market price expectation (Tony, 1992). 
Privatisation of PT Semen Gresik was followed by the privatisation of PT Indosat. Similar to PT Semen 
Gresik, the privatisation of PT Indosat aimed to open opportunity for SOE and private entity 
involvement in capital market activities, particularly international capital market activities. In 
practice, other reasons also motivated this privatisation. The privatisation of PT Indosat was a result 
of the company’s financial difficulties when the government issued Undang-Undang no. 3/1989 
tentang Telekomunikasi (Telecommunication Act no. 3/1989/UU Telekomunikasi 1989). The law 
allowed private industry to provide telecommunication services (UU Telekomunikasi 1989). This law 
encouraged the establishment of PT Satelindo in 1993; a consortium of PT Telkom, PT Bimantara 
Citra and PT Indosat (Borsuk, 1993). The formation of this consortium resulted in PT Indosat facing 
financial difficulties. The government’s fiscal problems were also a motivation for the privatisation of 
PT Indosat. The government encountered external pressure to repay the private sector external debt 
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bond (Daily, 1995; James, 1996). Following the issuance of the UU Telekomunikasi no. 3/1989, the 
telecommunication SOEs at the time, PT Indosat and PT Telkom, had to compete with private 
entities in the telecommunication industry.16 Following PT Indosat’s privatisation, the government 
privatised 35 per cent of PT Telkom and PT Timah in 1994 and 1995 respectively. These 
privatisations aimed to earn fresh investment funds for further improvement of the companies’ 
services (Pangestu, 1990). 
7.2.4 Fast Track Privatisation: 1998-2004 
Fast track privatisation was the last period of privatisation evolution for Indonesian SOEs. The 
privatisation during this period showed fundamental changes in SOEs’ structure and objectives. This 
privatisation was driven by instability in the Indonesian national economic situation as a result of the 
Asian financial crisis in 1997. Privatisation became the reformation regime’s main economic agenda 
following the IMF engagement. The agreement emphasised the requirement for the Indonesian 
government to conduct several economic actions in consideration of the assistance required for 
economic recovery. The common objectives of the IMF and the World Bank, in regard to their 
assistance, emphasised economic stabilisation and structural adjustment for economic reforms in 
developing countries (Sinha, 1995). To facilitate this requirement, the government established the 
Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises (MSOEs) and implemented fast-track privatisation. The 
government also facilitated the process through the issuance of laws and restructuring SOEs. The 
new laws, the UU BUMN no 19/2003 (SOEs Law no 19/2003/UU BUMN 2003) and the PP 
Privatisation no 33/2005 (Privatisation Rule no 33/2005/PP Privatisation 2005), emphasised the 
importance for SOEs to fully apply corporatisation principles, which were implemented in all SOEs. 
This meant all SOEs were encouraged to attain profit and efficiency objectives in line with the 
provision of public utilities as part of their objectives. At the same time, the government 
restructured SOEs, by eliminating the Perjan structure, which was a barrier to fast-track 
privatisation. In addition to the privatisation programme, the IMF’s LoI emphasised the requirement 
for government to improve control and governance structure of the central and state banks. The 
government was forced to conduct re-capitalisation for state banks, which were later followed by 
their privatisation (IMF 1997a; 1997b).  
7.2.5 Key Points from Partial Privatisation  
It is important to underline some key points from this period of privatisation because some 
significant changes occurred and had the consequences on the government-stated objectives for 
                                                          
16
 PT Indosat was not categorised as an SOE when the government sold more 65 per cent of its ownership in 
2002.  Since 2002, the government’s ownership was only 15 per cent. 
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SOEs. This period of privatisation mainly focuses on the partial privatisation where the government 
still hold 51 percent or more of the ownership. There are two key points from this period of 
privatisation. First is the beginning of public or private to be part of the SOEs ownership structure. 
Second is the change of government-stated objectives for SOEs, and then followed by the change of 
SOEs structure.  
7.3 Policy Implications 
The challenges for the Indonesian government to undertake the privatisation has been found in two 
periods of privatisation analysis. There were many reasons that hinder the successful of 
privatisation. In the first period of privatisation or re-privatisation, a number of nationalised 
plantation companies could not be returned to their previous British and Malaysian owners 
(Kanumoyoso, 2001). This was because the owners preferred to take the compensation. The 
Indonesian government remains their control over these plantation companies.  
At the second period of privatisation or partial privatisation, policy constraint is identified as the 
most frequent barrier factors for the successful of privatisation. For some SOEs, privatisation policy 
was not easy to be implemented due to certain regulatory concerns. Constitutional obligations may 
hinder the success of privatisation. The pressure to privatise numbers of SOEs was inconflict with the 
economic policy control. As shown in Table 7.1, a number of privatisations have been delayed or 
postponed due to regulation, protection and political risk from other parties. The failures of 
government to privatise PT Telkom and PT Semen Tonasa in 1991 were an example. A similar 
situation occurred when the government conducted fast-track privatisation under the IMF’s LoI 
agreement from 1998 to 2004. Table 7.1 presents the gaps between the numbers of SOEs launched 
for privatisation and the numbers that were successfully privatised from 1991 to 2010. From Table 
7.1, it is evident that the government was only able to privatise less than 20 per cent of the 
privatisation target. During this period, there were several years when no privatisation took place.  
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Table 7.1: Privatisation History 
Year Number of SOEs launched for privatisation Number of SOEs successfully privatised 
1991 3 PT Semen Gresik 
1992–1994 8 PT Indosat 
1995 6 PT Tambang Timah 
PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia (PT Telkom) 
1996 4 PT Bank Negara Indonesia (BNI) 
1997 2  PT Aneka Tambang  
1998 12 PT Semen Gresik  
1999 11 carried over from 1998 PT Pelabuhan Indonesia II (Subsidiary) 1999 
PT Pelabuhan Indonesia III (Subsidiary) 1999 
PT Telkom 1999 
2000 16 - 
2001 16 carried over from 2000 PT Kimia Farma 
PT Indofarma 
PT Socfindo 
PT Telkom 
2002 25 PT Indosat 
PT Telkom 
PT T Tambang Batubara Bukit Asam 
PT Wisma Nusantara Indonesia17 
2003 8 PT Bank Mandiri 
PT Indocement Tunggal Prakarsa18 
PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia 
PT Perusahaan Gas Negara 
2004 14 PT Pembangunan Perumahan 
PT Adhi Karya 
PT Bank Mandiri 
PT Tambang Batubara Bukit Asam (PTBA) 
2005 10 - 
2006 20 PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (PT PGN) 
2007 14 PT Bank Negara Indonesia 
PT Jasa Marga 
PT Wijaya Karya 
2008 37 - 
2009  PT Bank Tabungan Negara 
2010  PT Pembangunan Perumahan 
PT Krakatau Steel 
PT Bank Negara Indonesia 
Sources: IMF 1997; MSOEs; International Herald Tribune; Asia Money; The Jakarta Post; EIU Views wire; 
Notes: Italics indicate the LoI IMF period. 
 
The influences of regulation also show several implications for the privatisation of SOEs in Indonesia. 
In addition to the economic stabilisation objectives, privatisation in Indonesia is confronted with the 
constitutional obligations underlining the requirement for government to hold and centralise the 
control of natural resources and production, as well as to provide public utilities. External pressure 
forces the government to undertake privatisation. Therefore, partial privatisation considers as the 
way of government to accommodate conflicting interests and policies in regard to privatisation. The 
government did continue privatisation through selling a portion of its share ownership, or by issuing 
new shares. As shown in Table 7.2, several publicly listed companies sold several small portion of 
their ownership by selling parts of their share, up to 49 per cent, or by issuing new shares. Through 
                                                          
17
 The Indonesian government was PT Wisma Nusantara Indonesia’s minority shareholder (41.99 %); the 
majority owner was JAL Hotel Co.  
18
 The Indonesian government was PT Indocement Tunggal Prakasya’s minority shareholders (16.67 %); the 
majority owner was Heidelberg Cement Co. 
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this continual selling of small portions of ownership, the government and SOEs are still able to 
accommodate conflicts of interest and external pressure, as well as to obtain financial support for 
the state budget. During this period of study, the government also sold its minority’s ownership of 
PT Indocement Tunggal Prakasya, PT Wisma Nusantara Indonesia and PT Socfindo. 
Table 7.2: Indonesian Privatisation Results 
Year SOE 
Per cent 
sold Method Proceeds 
Per cent 
Indonesian govt. 
ownership 
1991 PT Semen Gresik Tbk (Cement) 
27* 
8 
IPO 
Rp. 280 billion 
Rp. 126 billion 
65 
1994 
PT Indosat Tbk (Telecommunications for international 
providers) 
10* 
25 
IPO 
Rp. 2,537 billion 
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1995 PT Tambang Timah Tbk (Nickel mining) 
25 
10* 
IPO Rp. 511 billion 65 
 
PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia (Telkom) 
(telecommunications) 
10* 
13 
IPO Rp. 5,058 billion 65 
1996 PT Bank Negara Indonesia Tbk (Banking) 25 * IPO Rp. 920 billion 99** 
1997 PT Aneka Tambang Tbk (Mining) 35* IPO Rp. 603 billion 65 
1998 PT Semen Gresik Tbk 14 SS Rp. 1,317 billion 51 
1999 PT Pelindo II (Sea port in Jakarta) 49*** SS US$ 190 Million  
 PT Pelindo III (Seaport in Surabaya) 51*** SS US$ 157 Million  
 PT Telkom Tbk 9.62 Placement Rp. 3,188 billion  
2001 PT Kimia Farma Tbk (Pharmaceutical) 9.2 IPO Rp. 110 billion 90.8 
 PT Indofarma Tbk (Pharmaceutical) 19.8 IPO Rp. 150 billion 80.2 
 PT Socfindo (Palm oil plantation) 30 SS US$ 45.4 Million 10 
 PT Telkom Tbk 11.9 Placement Rp. 3.100 billion 54 
2002 PT Indosat Tbk 
8.06 
41.94 
Placement 
SS 
Rp. 967 billion 
US$ 608,4 billion 
15 
 PT Telkom Tbk 3.1 Placement Rp. 1,100 billion 51 
 PT Tambang Batubara Bukit Asam Tbk (Coal mining) 
15 
1.26* 
IPO Rp. 156 billion 84 
 PT Wisma Nusantara Indonesia (Office & hotel building) 41.99 SS Rp. 255 billion 0 
2003 PT Bank Mandiri Tbk (Banking) 20 IPO Rp. 2,547 billion 80 
 PT Indocement Tunggal Prakasya Tbk (Cement) 16.67 SS Rp. 1,157 billion 0 
 PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia Tbk (BRI) (Banking) 
30 
15* 
IPO Rp. 2,512 billion 59.5 
 PT Perusahaan Gas Negara Tbk (Natural gas) 
20 
19* 
IPO Rp. 1,235 billion 61 
2004 PT Pembangunan Perumahan (Housing) 49 EMBO Rp. 60.49 billion 51 
 PT Adhi Karya Tbk (Construction) 
24.5 
24.5* 
EMBO 
IPO 
Rp. 65 billion 51 
 PT Bank Mandiri Tbk 10 Placement Rp. 2.844 billion 69.5 
 PT Tambang Batubara Bukit Asam Tbk 12.5 SO Rp. 180 billion 65 
2005 No Privatisation     
2006 PT PGN Tbk 5.31 Placement Rp. 2,088 billion 55.33 
2007 PT BNI Tbk 
11.3 
15* 
SPO 
Rp. 3,086 billion 
Rp. 3,854 billion 
76.36 
 PT Jasa Marga Tbk 30* IPO Rp. 3,362 billion 80 
 PT Wijaya Karya Tbk 31.7 IPO Rp. 759.58 billion 68.3 
2008 No Privatisation     
2009 PT Bank Tabungan Negara Tbk 27.08* IPO Rp.. 1,819 Billon 72.92 
2010 PT Pembangunan Perumahan Tbk  21.46* IPO Rp. 566 Billion 51 
 PT Krakatau Steel Tbk 20* IPO Rp. 1,994 Billion 80 
 PT Bank Negara Indonesia Tbk 3.1 SPO Rp. 2,097 Billion 60 
Notes: *new shares issued; **including bank re-capitalisation; ***sub-company privatisation 
Source: (Nugroho &Wrihatnolo 2008; MSOEs) 
 
The conflict between economic expectation and policy constraint in regard to privatisation were a 
motivation for the government to introduce the UU BUMN no 19/2003 and PP Privatisation no 
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33/2005. The laws aimed to facilitate the privatisation process and to accommodate some prior 
potential conflicts between policies that hindered the success of privatisation. As mentioned in the 
previous analysis of the Indonesian SOEs evolution in Chapter 6, Article 34 the 1945 Constitution of 
Indonesia emphasised the government social welfare expectation through the role of SOEs. This 
makes the control policy is not the only barrier for the successful of privatisation, but also the 
requirement to meet the social welfare expectation. Both new laws still emphasised the importance 
of the SOEs social welfare duty. Both laws underline the possibility for SOEs to conduct particular 
duty as a requirement from the government (UU BUMN 2003; PP Privatisation 2005). The laws also 
tried to accommodate SOEs’ social functions, which were not covered by corporate law. Both UU 
BUMN no 19/2003 and PP Privatisation no 33/2005 highlighted the existence of social welfare 
objectives, which must not constitute a burden or barrier for SOEs to achieve good performance. For 
this requirement, the law facilitated a mechanism for SOEs to invest in social functions, or PSOs, by 
separating the SOEs’ PSO function from their core business (UU BUMN 2003; PP Privatisation 2005). 
This situation still causes several SOEs were experiences with the government requirement which 
might be different from their original objectives. 
The social welfare expectation may not be in line with the new expectation from the UU BUMN and 
PP Privatisation. Through both laws, the government underlined that it was crucial for SOEs to 
implement full corporatisation without causing conflict with other objectives. The laws also 
emphasised, as a requirement for privatisation, the importance for SOEs to prove good performance 
in achieving both social and economic objectives for at least five years prior to privatisation taking 
place. While emphasis on economic objectives encouraged the SOEs to focus more on maximising 
profit, at the same time it limited government financial support (only available to selected SOEs)19, 
resulting in the commercialisation of public utility provision. Later, the implication of social welfare 
obligation and economic constraint cause difference treatment whether the SOE allow to be 
privatised or not.  The Privatisation Rule re-emphasised the social function of SOEs. Through this law, 
the issue of privatisation restrictions were accommodated by categorising the SOEs based on their 
function and criteria (PP Privatisation 2005). Where SOEs had PSO duties, privatisation occurred 
after the SOEs separated their PSO assets and activities. These made some SOEs are restricted to be 
privatised because of this socio-political reason. 
 
 
 
                                                          
19
 Only ten SOEs received subsidies from the government to provide PSOs services.  
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7.4 Identifying Privatisation Policy and Government-Stated Objectives: discussion 
This section analyses the implication of privatisation policy for the government-stated objectives 
based on two approaches, the path dependence and privatisation. This section also investigates 
proposition two regarding whether changes in the SOEs market economy environment through the 
introduction of privatisation policy and liberalisation of market economy generates changes in the 
government and SOEs’ objectives. The change of SOEs market economy environment is expected to 
encourage the government to review its policies and objectives for SOEs. Therefore, the government 
and SOEs objectives are changed 
The analysis on this chapter is referred to historical path analysis of the Indonesian privatisation 
which is employed to guidance the analysis of privatisation based on historical and path perspective. 
Privatisation is considered as a deviant or causal event that also sharpens the current SOEs structure 
and objectives. Meanwhile, privatisation theory is selected to guide the analysis as to what extent 
the privatisation impacts on the government-stated objectives and SOEs structure.  
Privatisation during the Indonesian SOEs evolution can be analysed as an important alternative 
event of the sequence. A part from the diffusion of Indonesian SOE evolution, privatisation occurs as 
an unusual event or contingent event during the timeline. In practice, this event plays an important 
role.  Privatisation during the Indonesian evolution is viewed as road junction event from Ebbinghaus 
(2005) where it becomes a spontaneous choice that repeatedly used in subsequence events 
(Ebbinghaus, 2005). From his study in path dependence, Ebbinghaus emphasises four crucial factors 
that determine the path dependence; the equal starting condition, self-reinforcing process, 
irreversibility and inefficient path (Ebbinghaus, 2005). Although these are not only factor on 
determining the path dependence applied for this privatisation case, some crucial factors appear as 
part of the privatisation path in Indonesia. From the description in Sections 7.1 and 7.2, it is shown 
that privatisation has been adopted as common event by the Indonesian government to resolve the 
fiscal or financial problems. The economic or financial problems both in 1966 and 1991-1998 are 
driving factors for the government to conduct privatisation. Those two periods of privatisation in 
Indonesia were motivated by two similar situations. It has been used several times despite not being 
the preferred option at the beginning; it has been seen flourish as preferred pattern of particular 
phenomenon. Privatisation becomes an irreversible event or pattern for the Indonesian government 
to resolve the fiscal or financial problems.  
The study of privatisation has shown many different results in regard to control, and ownership. A 
theory of privatisation, was developed based on the privatisation case in Russia, shows that 
privatisation can be a facility to reduce the politician and government  involvement  and control 
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pressure on SOEs where these factors are considered a main reason for inefficiency (Aharoni, 1984; 
Boycko et al., 1996; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Yarrow, 1999).  Another study of changes in 
ownership of public enterprises like SOEs indicates that, to an increasing extent, privatisation 
switches of firms’ goal from social welfare maximising to profit maximising (Bös, 1987). This shows 
that the ownership structure as an impact of privatisation is commonly the main factor for analysing 
the successful of privatisation. Boycko et al (1996) note two important items in regards to a 
company’s control: managers and politicians who influence the success of restructuring of the 
company (Boycko et al., 1996). Referring to this study, the distance between shareholders in the 
politician affects the extent of restructuring. In other words, the closer shareholders to the 
politician, the more difficult the company’s restructuring.  
Referring to privatisation analysis above; some items from earlier privatisation studies are applied to 
help the analysis of the privatisation in Indonesian. The case of Indonesian privatisation shows that 
privatisation originally aims to reduce the government involvement in SOEs business activities by 
extending the public or community participation within the SOEs ownership (UU BUMN 2003; PP 
Privatisation 2005). Meanwhile, privatisation in Indonesia is pursued to improve the confidence of 
international investors in the market, and to assist the recovery of the national economy (Tjager, 
2000). These statements can be understood that the new shareholders should distance themselves 
from politicians in order to bring a new culture to SOEs. In practice, full transfer of ownership or 
privatisation during the period between 1991 and 2010 occurred mostly when the government held 
a minority ownership or the former owners were foreign investors.20 Privatisation in Indonesian is 
aimed to enhance the opportunity for community participation (UU BUMN 2003; PP Privatisation 
2005), this causes the influence of new private owners also limited. Although it is common that 
privatisation may not distinguish between government control and access to production (Bienen & 
Waterbury, 1989), Indonesian privatisation has shown that privatisation does not make any 
difference to the government’s control and access to production. From the previous analysis in 
                                                          
20
 Transfer of ownership in 1966 occurred by returning nationalised companies to their previous owners, the 
majority of which were foreign investors as mentioned in Section 7.1. The transfer of ownership of PT 
Indocement Tunggal Prakarya (PT INTP), PT Socfindo, and PT Wisma Nusantara Indonesia were occurred as 
part of the IMF’s LoI. The LOI required Indonesian government to sell its minority ownership including PT 
Socfindo, PT INTP and PT Wisma Nusantara Indonesia. During this period, the Indonesian government sold its 
minority ownership of PT Socfindo, PT INTP and PT Wisma Nusantara Indonesia.  
 PT INTP was sold to majority owners; Heidelberg Cement Co. PT Wisma Nusantara Indonesia was sold to the 
majority owner JAL Hotel Co. The Indonesian government only sold its 20 per cent of PT Socfindo’s ownership 
to Plantation Nord-Sumetra Belgia SA (PNS) who was PT Socfindo’s majority owners.   
Meanwhile, transfer ownership of PT Atmindo, PT JIHD, PT Kertas Padalarang, PT Kertas Blabak and PT Intirub 
were postponed due to legal issues (MSOES, 2008; Laporan Kinerja BUMN Tahun 2003-2007 (SOEs 
Performance Report 2003-2007). 
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Chapter 6 Section 6.4, the centralisation of control and influence of state welfare orientations are 
deemed as a barrier for the implementation of full privatisation. 
The motivation of privatisation can be vary. The study of privatisation by Aharoni in 1984 shows 
several different motivations for government to privatise its SOEs; from ideology to pragmatic 
consideration (Aharoni, 1984). Using this study, the motivation of Indonesian SOEs is likely to be 
economic and political shift reason. Economic reason for privatisation can be identified as the 
expectation for SOEs to be more efficient, while political reason is shown through the requirement 
to support state budget or the government economic commitment (Aharoni, 1984). These reasons 
are found within the Indonesian privatisation as seen through nationalisation and the IMF’s LoI 
agreement. The privatisation in Indonesian is often used to provide a support for the state budget 
and reduce corruption (Abeng, 2001). Privatisation of PT Semen Gresik, PT Indosat and fast-track 
privatisation are examples of economic stabilisation’s influence on government privatisation 
decisions. Meanwhile, political shift reason is found through the shift of political power in 
Indonesian in 1966, which later becomes a starting point for (re)-privatisation in Indonesia. The 
partial privatisation under New Order regime has shifted the centralisation economic which was set 
by previous regime to the market orientation.  
Focusing on proposition two, the change of SOEs market economy environment through 
privatisation should alter the government and SOEs objectives. Privatisation policy in Indonesia does 
not seem to make any different regarding the government policy. Limited changes in regard to 
government control over the production and decision making process is also found through limited 
changes in context of government objectives for SOEs. Social welfare expectation is still the 
government main concern, even though the government encourages SOEs to meet profit and 
efficiency objectives as shown through the implementation of UU BUMN no 19/2003 and PP 
Privatisation no 33/2005. The importance of social welfare expectation is shown as the laws set 
boundaries whether the SOEs allow or restriction to be privatised. At the same time, the laws 
provide a “space” for SOEs to attain the social welfare expectation. This can be seen that the 
privatisation in Indonesia is only a pattern or constant event taken by the Indonesian government in 
order to resolve the financial or national economic problems. A part of path institutional changes, 
the original government social welfare objectives still exist and affect government decisions 
regarding the privatisation policy. Consequently, conflict of interests and constraints between state 
welfare orientations and market pressure influence the government decisions. Partial privatisation is 
the most popular choice for the Indonesian government to resolve conflict and financial problems.  
The selection of partial privatisation is motivated by the possibility for the Indonesian government to 
accommodate the state welfare orientation expectation and pressure from market.  
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In sum, the analysis above shows that privatisation in Indonesia are likely to become an alternative 
event that has been repeated use as a subsequence during the timeline of evolution. The economic 
and political power shift motivates the government to conduct privatisation in order to assure the 
continuity of Indonesian SOEs journey. From these finding above, privatisation is seen as a pattern 
whenever the government has to resolve the financial or national economic problems. Although 
privatisation has been set for economic motivation, the non-economic reasons remained stronger. 
The changes of SOEs market economy environment through privatisation and liberalisation  
generates two consequences; the existence of social welfare expectations that in line with profit or 
efficiency objectives; and the different treatment or classification of SOEs in relations to provision of 
public utilities and privatisation policy.   
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Chapter 8:  
The Objectives of State-Owned Enterprises in Practice: 
Publicly Listed State-Owned Enterprise Cases 
 
This chapter examines the extent to which publicly listed SOEs’ objectives were in harmony or 
conflict following the intensive privatisation programme that ran from 2002 to 200421. This chapter 
builds in Chapter 7, which showed that privatisation caused the development of financial objectives 
such as profit and efficiency. Later, these objectives generated to the changes of SOEs structures. 
Persero and Perum are the current existing structure as a result from the implementation of 
privatisation policy. Privatisation also causes some changes in the SOEs business activities, for 
example, removing monopoly rights for several new publicly listed SOEs following their privatisation. 
In some cases, the changes may affect the company’s business activities and the possibility to meet 
the government’s expectation. Meanwhile, the analysis of privatisation motives in Chapter 7 reveals 
that privatisation is an alternative or causal event that occurs during the sequence of time which 
later sharpens the SOEs objectives and structure. As the government set the SOEs for social welfare 
purpose at the beginning of the evolution, the change makes the objectives are not purely economic 
objectives in term of efficiency. The economic objectives in context of protecting national interest 
are stronger as the motivation for the Indonesian SOEs privatisation. This situation has some 
consequences, which one of them is on the obligation for publicly listed SOEs to the provision of 
public utilities. Since the monopoly and protection from government is no longer available for the 
publicly listed SOEs, the companies still have to deal with this issue social welfare obligation and to 
compete fairly with other business entities.   
Focusing on both content and interpretive analysis of government and SOE documents regarding 
privatisation, this chapter analyses the issues identified in the preliminary analysis in Chapters 6 and 
7 regarding government policies and objectives affecting publicly listed SOEs’ objectives and 
business activities. There were 17 publicly listed SOEs during 2004–2010; however, this analysis 
focuses on only 14 of them. PT Bank Tabungan Negara Tbk (state bank) and PT Krakatau Steel Tbk 
(steel manufacturing SOE) are the exception for this analysis, since these companies were listed 
relatively recently, in 2009 and 2010, and may not yet provide sufficient information to analyse the 
changes.22 PT Pembangunan Perumahan Tbk (housing SOE) is also another exception in this chapter. 
While the company was publicly listed in 2010, PT Pembangunan Perumahan Tbk underwent an 
                                                          
21
 The term of publicly listed SOEs is used because the government remains the majority shareholder, although 
the company has been privatised.  
22
 Tbk, an abbreviation of Terbuka (open), is an indication that the company is publicly listed. 
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Employee Management Buy-Outs (EMBO) in 2004. The analysis of PT Pembangunan Perumahan 
Tbk’s objectives shows no significant changes since the company was publicly listed. Therefore, PT 
Pembangunan Perumahan Tbk is not included in this analysis. This chapter is important for the 
further the performance and objectives analysis in Chapters 10 and 11, and is organised into four 
sections: Section 8.1 examines publicly listed SOEs to provide a brief picture of current Indonesian 
publicly listed SOEs; Section 8.2 analyses the government and SOEs objectives; Section 8.3 analyses 
the policy implications of privatisation, focusing on the effects of the policy on the current publicly 
listed SOEs; and Section 8.4 presents the findings from the previous sections in this chapter. 
8.1 The Publicly Listed State-Owned Enterprises: A Brief Picture 
From Chapters 6 and 7, privatisation in Indonesia shows different results from common privatisation 
practices. As the market is a natural environment for economic activities that influence or shape 
institutions (Landesmann & Pagano, 1994), the requirement to follow every change in the market 
environment may cause changes to an organisation’s goals and practices. Privatisation, for example, 
causes a change in control of ownership for SOEs, from state to market approaches (Newbery, 
1996), or from government to private ownership (Bös, 1987). This also involves a change in 
government and SOE orientation from social welfare or non-economic objectives to an economic or 
financial orientation (Bös, 1987). An earlier study of privatisation shows that potential conflict 
appears when the publicly listed SOEs have to meet both the government interest on the provision 
of public utilities for community and the shareholders interest in regard to maximising their value 
(Ogden and Watson, 1999). The further analyse in the following sections show the implications of 
changes in the SOEs structure and objectives for publicly listed SOEs.  
From the evolution of privatisation policy in Chapter 7, privatisation in Indonesia is likely to become 
the national economic saviours whenever the government is confronted with fiscal problems or 
external pressure. The analysis in the previous chapter, Chapter 7, shows despite the government’s 
statement that privatisation is to extend community participation in SOE ownership (UU BUMN 
2003, PP Privatisation 2005), reducing government involvement and control may not be the 
government’s intention, since the government still holds majority ownership and control in most 
privatised SOEs. The new ownership structures were represented by institutional investors who had 
links with the government, as shown in Table 8.1. Table 8.1 shows that ownership was widespread 
between individuals and institutions, where the majority of top local institutional shareholders were 
still dominated by government institutions, such as pension funds, other SOEs, foundations or 
cooperatives. These new compositions indicated that government gained cash flow from new 
shareholders, but still had indirect control of SOEs through relationships and links with new 
shareholders.  
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Table 8.1: The Ownership Structure of Publicly Listed SOEs 
SOE Government (per cent) 
Domestic International 
Individual (per cent) Institutions (per cent) Individual (per cent) Institutional (per cent) 
PT Kimia Farma Tbk 90.02 9.70 Employees 0.27   
PT Indofarma Tbk 80.66 13.37    13.37 
PT BRI Tbk 56.75 0.84 
Employee 
Regional government 
Domestic institution 
0.46 
0.00 
5.14 0.00 36.81 
PT Jasa Marga Tbk 70 9.63 
Pension Fund 
Companies 
Mutual Funds 
3.35 
2.55 
0.87  
0.53 
13.83 
PT Wijaya Karya Tbk 66.65 7.07 
Employees 
Cooperatives 
Foundation 
Pension fund 
Insurance 
Banks 
Companies 
Mutual funds 
3.03 
0.10 
0.21 
1.09 
1.39 
<0.01 
3.86 
4.56 0.16 11.81 
PT Adhi Karya Tbk 52.28 9.19 
Mutual Funds 
Pension Funds 
Insurance 
Companies 
Foundation 
Employees 
7.61 
5.05 
0.14 
1.01 
0.34 
< 0.01 0.05 24.34 
PT Bank Mandiri Tbk 66.68  
Employees 
Cooperatives 
Foundation 
Pension fund 
Insurance 
Corporation 
Mutual fund 
0.59 
0.00 
0.04 
0.81 
1.21 
2.23 
1.76  26.68 
PT TBA Tbk 65.02 1.30 
Local government 
Employees 
Cooperative 
Foundation 
Pension Fund 
Insurance 
Bank 
Other Persero 
Mutual fund 
1.22 
< 0.01 
< 0.01 
0.10 
1.30 
2.22 
< 0.01 
3.69 
3.36 0.02 21.99 
PT Timah Tbk 65 9.63 
 
13.37 0.07 11.93 
PT Aneka Tambang Tbk 65  
Pension Fund 
Companies 
4.96 
1.70  5.85 
PT BNI Tbk 60 2.26 
Foundation 
Pension Funds 
Insurance 
Custodian Bank 
Companies 
Mutual Funds 
0.16 
1.50 
2.12 
< 0.01 
6.27 
< 0.01 0.03 22.96 
PT PGN Tbk 56.96 1.08 
Cooperative 
Foundation 
Pension fund 
Insurance 
Bank 
Other Persero 
Mutual fund 
0.00 
0.04 
0.87 
1.91 
0.01 
1.70 
1.95 0.01 36.17 
PT Telkom 52.47 1.55 
Employees 
Cooperatives 
Foundation 
Pension Funds 
Insurance 
Bank 
Companies 
Mutual Funds 
0.07 
< 0.01 
0.03 
0.93 
1.39 
< 0.01 
4.31 
1.54 0.03 37.66 
PT Semen Gresik 51.01 0.60  8.92 0.01 39.46 
Notes: Italics indicate a government link. Source: WijayaKarya 2010; Timah 2009; Telkom 2010; SemenGresik 2010; PGN 2010; KimiaFarma 2010; JasaMarga 2010; Indofarma 2010; BukitAsam 2010; BRI 2010; 
BNI 2010; Mandiri 2010; AnTam 2010; AdhiKarya 2010. 
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Privatisation can have a significant impact on market competition. Although the majority of 
Indonesian publicly listed SOEs operate in an open and competitive market, some publicly listed 
SOEs were experienced with removing their monopoly right and privileges as their market was 
currently less regulated followed by the privatisation. Fourteen publicly listed SOEs operate in six 
industries: banking, construction, pharmaceutical, mining, telecommunication and cement. Banking, 
cement and construction and with the exception of PT Jasa Marga Tbk (road toll SOE), were run in 
highly competitive industries where the government limited its involvement. Mining, 
telecommunication, pharmaceutical and PT Jasa Marga Tbk were categorised as less competitive 
industries, since the government remained in control and regulated these industries for strategic 
purposes.23 For some publicly listed SOEs used to operate in highly regulated industries, for example 
telecommunication, toll road, and mining industries; privatisation caused significant changes in their 
industrial policy. In common practice, privatisation may reduce government control and 
involvement, particularly for those SOEs whose products may operate under natural monopoly 
(Baijal, 2002; Morgan & England, 1988). The market may force SOEs to operate in a more 
competitive and thus potentially fairer system following the privatisation. Some indications show 
that the government may withdraw from the production unit; while in practice, the government 
provides the fees and charges for the SOEs to keep its control over certain good and services (Baijal, 
2002). This situation applies with the Indonesian publicly listed SOEs. Several highly regulated 
industries were opened up, following privatisation, to private participants. Examples of this were PT 
Telekomunikasi Indonesia Tbk (PT Telkom/telecommunications SOE) and PT Jasa Marga Tbk, which 
experienced the removal of their control right prior to privatisation. In practice, these industries still 
find it difficult to attract private or foreign investors since the government still keeps its control of 
the fees and tarrifs. This causes several SOEs to still operate with unfair or less competition, such as 
PT Perusahaan Gas Negara Tbk (PT PGN/natural Gas SOE), PT Jasa Marga Tbk and PT Telkom Tbk. 
This imbalanced competition is driven by the requirement for new entrants to have huge investment 
funds, while the government still hold the residual control of fees and tariffs for their products. 
These factors make it difficult for new entrants to compete with SOEs who receive support and 
facilities from the government.  
For some cases, privatisation may deal with constitution consideration. Some natural monopoly of 
public services may be more efficient under the SOEs or public enterprises than private enterprises’ 
operation (Boardman and Vining, 1989). Non-economic side of public enterprises of SOEs became a 
dilemma for government in relations to privatisation since privatisation might change the social 
                                                          
23
 The mining industry is controlled due to the government requirement to support the state budget. 
Pharmaceutical, telecommunication and PT Jasa Marga Tbk companies are controlled in relation to the 
provision of public utilities related to their products or services. 
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effect on community (Morgan and England, 1988). This situation was found with Indonesian 
privatisation particularly for SOEs with the provision of public utilities like pharmaceutical. While 
pharmaceutical SOEs are a competitive industry, the importance of medicine for the community 
means that the government provides certain privileges for these SOEs. Control and monopolies 
remain noticeable, even after the privatisation of the SOEs, which was particularly intertwined with 
the centralisation of economic policy as mentioned in the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia. 
8.2 The Objectives 
Privatisation brings particular changes to the way publicly listed SOEs operate their businesses. 
Besides the change in company structure from non-privatised to publicly listed SOE, the presence of 
new owners usually creates new perspectives for the company, affecting its culture, objectives and 
profit maximising expectations (Boardman et al. 1986; Guthrie, 1990). For Indonesian SOEs, 
privatisation is also expected to bring professionalism, reduce corruption and improve performance 
(UU BUMN 2003; Abeng 2001, 2002; Tjager 2000). Changed objectives are the most common effects 
following the inclusion of new owners, as they are likely to set new objectives that are mostly 
dominated by economic or commercial goals. The role of objectives is important to determine the 
end result of strategies and plans (Boyd & Levy, 1966; Granger, 1964; Keeney, 1988). Therefore, this 
section focuses exclusively on how the privatisation policy caused the changes in the government-
stated objectives for SOEs and the SOEs objectives.  
8.2.1 The Objectives Imposed by Government 
As mentioned in Chapters 6 and 7, transfer of ownership from the government to private hands has 
not fully taken place within Indonesian publicly listed SOEs. As shown in Table 8.1, the government 
still holds majority control made the changes in the government-stated objectives were very limited. 
Although the government has privatised fourteen SOEs since 1991, changes in government-stated 
objectives only applied to PT Telkom Tbk, PT PGN Tbk and PT Bank Mandiri Tbk (state bank). The 
changes of government-stated objectives for these publicly listed SOEs occurred as PT PGN Tbk and 
PT Bank Mandiri Tbk were experienced with the change of their companies’ status, from non-
privatised to publicly listed SOEs. For PT Telkom Tbk, the change of the government-stated 
objectives took place when the company was experienced with the change of the company’s scope 
of business in relation to the company’s provision of public telecommunication facilities. The 
government-stated objectives for the remaining publicly listed SOEs have not changed since their 
establishment. 
The changes of objectives for these four publicly listed SOEs were occurred prior to privatisation. The 
change of government-stated objectives for PT Telkom was made when the government changed 
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the scope of business services (PP Perum Telkom 1980) and when the company structure was 
changed to Persero status (PP Persero Telkom 1991, PP Perum Telkom 1974). The change of 
government-stated objectives for PT PGN occurred as the company was separated from the national 
electricity company (PLN) in 1965 (PP PLN and PGN 1965). The Indonesian government needed to 
set new objectives for PT Bank Mandiri Tbk when the bank was established through the merger of 
four state banks in 1998. For PT Bank Mandiri Tbk, the establishment during the market orientation 
era meant that government-stated objectives for the bank differed from the objectives of other 
SOEs. PT Bank Mandiri Tbk had more economic objectives, such as profit and efficiency, with a 
limited number of social welfare expectations (PP Perbankan 1998). From these changes, the 
economic or financial objectives emerged as part of the government-stated objectives was found 
only with PT Bank Mandiri Tbk. For the rest of the publicly listed SOEs, there were no significant 
changes in the government-stated objectives for the SOEs.  
In relation to the introduction of profit and efficiency objectives, through UU BUMN no 19/2003 and 
PP Privatisation no 33/2005, the government implemented the rules inconsistently. The 
government-stated economic or financial objectives for each publicly listed SOE were still limited. 
Profit was the government’s only economic or financial stated objective for the publicly listed SOEs 
as shown in Table 8.2. Four publicly listed SOEs, PT Kimia Farma Tbk (pharmaceutical SOE), PT Aneka 
Tambang Tbk (AnTam/gold mining SOE), PT Timah Tbk (tin SOE) and PT Bank Mandiri Tbk were the 
companies with the government profit stated objectives. This could be attributed to the elimination 
of overlapping policies, since publicly listed SOEs needed to comply with stock market regulations. In 
contrast, social welfare or non-economic objectives were still more often to be found as part of the 
government-stated objectives for the Indonesian publicly listed SOEs. National economic was the 
most frequent government-stated objectives for publicly listed SOEs. Nine publicly listed SOEs had 
the objective as part of the government-stated objectives. Meanwhile, the provision of public goods 
and services was found within seven publicly listed SOEs which were the second most frequent 
government-stated objectives. From Table 8.2, the government-stated social welfare or non-
economic objectives were more dominant than economic or financial objectives.  
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Table 8.2: Government-Stated objectives for Publicly Listed SOEs 
No Objectives indicated 
Government-stated objectives 
No. of SOEs holding the objectives 
Total number of SOEs = 14 
Economic or financial objectives 
1 Profit 4 
2 Quality  
3 Market domination  
4 Corporate principles  
5 Efficiency  
6 Resources utilisation  
7 Reputation  
8 Company value  
9 Technology  
10 Research  
11 Environmental  
Social welfare objectives 
1 The provision of goods/services 7 
2 Community development  
3 Community prosperity 6 
4 Community needs 5 
5 Market supply  
6 OHS 5 
7 Pioneer  
8 Supply & price stabilisation  
9 National economy 9 
10 National development 3 
11 National security 1 
12 Industrialisation 1 
13 Government assignment/policy  
14 Government needs  
15 State income 2 
Source: Data were obtained from the government rules for the establishment of the Indonesian publicly listed SOEs  
From 1945 to 2010. 
 
 
8.2.2 The Company’s Constitution Objectives24 
The role of objectives is an important part of the relationship between a company and its owners. 
Understanding the relationship between owners and objectives is the key factor to evaluate whether 
the company has successfully introduced strategies and achieved its objectives (Mascarenhas, 1989). 
In the context of SOEs, the process of acknowledging government-stated objectives is a reflection of 
the relationship between government and the SOE. As the government sets the objectives, these are 
later recognised by the SOEs or their management. For the purpose of this study, the SOEs’ 
objectives are separated between the company constitution objectives, which refer to the Articles of 
Association (AoA) and management objectives, as referred to in their vision and mission statements. 
 
                                                          
24
 The SOE or company constitution objectives are the objectives that are stated in the Articles of Association, 
the organisation’s annual report or financial report. 
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The influences of market economy on the publicly listed SOEs begin to become apparent when the 
company constitution diverged from those of the government. During the period of this study, 
several publicly listed SOEs changed their objectives due changes in their economic environments as 
shown in Table 8.3.  Most of publicly listed SOEs made changes in their company constitution and 
management’s objectives where the economic objectives started to replace the social welfare or 
non-economic objectives. The change of objectives in both company constitution and management’s 
objectives were found, for example, at PT AnTam Tbk, PT Telkom Tbk and PT TBA Tbk. PT AnTam Tbk 
replaced the profit objective with efficiency and competition objectives in 2010, while PT TBA Tbk 
removed industrialisation, the requirement to meet government policy and national economic 
expectation in 2008. PT Telkom removed the requirement to meet government policy and the 
provision of public goods and services in 2007. In addition to the changes of company’s institution 
statement, the publicly listed SOEs did changes in their management’s vision and mission. The 
changes of structure and status from non-privatised to become publicly listed SOEs generated the 
changes of management’s vision and mission at PT Wijaya Karya Tbk (construction SOE), and PT PGN 
Tbk. These publicly listed SOEs changed their structure and status from non-privatised to publicly 
listed SOEs in 2003 and 2004. Changes in their objectives were noticeable when, for instance, PT 
PGN Tbk introduced new objectives including growing from public company to a world class 
company (PGN, 2004; 2008; 2009; 2010). The others publicly listed SOEs were also experienced with 
the change of management’s objectives. These changes happened as the companies needed to focus 
on their business activities or follow market regulations. Meanwhile, changes occurred within other 
publicly listed SOEs, motivated by the financial crisis in 2007. The management did more often 
changes in their objectives by focusing on the economic. Several economic or financial objectives 
appeared to replace the social welfare or non-economic objectives as shown in Table 8.3. 
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Table 8.3: Changes in Objectives for Publicly Listed SOEs 
SOEs Government Company Constitution Management 
Objective Social Economic Social Economic Social Economic 
Change: 
+ = added 
- = removed 
+ _ + _ + - + - + - + - 
PT Jasa Marga Tbk     1        
PT Adhi Karya Tbk             
PT Wijaya Karya Tbk           1  
PT Aneka Tambang Tbk       1 1   1 1 
PT Timah Tbk            1 
PT Batubara Bukit Asam Tbk     1    1 1 1 1 
PT Kimia Farma Tbk         1 1 1 1 
PT Indofarma Tbk         1    
PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia Tbk           1 1 
PT Bank Negara Indonesia Tbk           1 1 
PT Bank Mandiri Tbk         1 1 1  
PT Semen Gresik Tbk         1 1  1 
PT Perusahaan Gas Negara Tbk         1 1 1  
PT Telekomunikasi  Indonesia Tbk      1 1   1  1 
Total 0 0 0 0 2 1 2 1 6 6 8 8 
Source: Data were obtained from the Indonesian publicly listed SOEs’ annual and financial reports, 2004–2010, and the government rules for the establishment of the SOEs including their amendments during 2004-
2010. 
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Referring to the changes in Table 8.3, the current objectives of publicly listed SOEs showed the 
economic or financial objectives are more often to be found as part of the company constitutions 
and management objectives. From previous table, Table 8.3, the government did not make any 
changes in regard to its objectives for SOEs, while there were changes in the company constitution 
and management. Table 8.4 shows the company constitution and management developed some 
new objectives as the extension from the existing government-stated objectives. Table 8.4 also 
shows the influence of changes in the economic environment made certain objectives, such as 
market domination, quality and competitiveness appear as part of a number of publicly listed SOEs’ 
vision and mission statements. As shown in Table 8.4, quality and competition became one of the 
most frequent objectives for publicly listed SOEs. At the same time, the requirement to comply with 
regulations and policy made the implementation of good corporate governance or the 
corporatisation principle objectives an important part of the AoA objectives or the companies’ 
constitution objectives statement.  
The influence of government-stated objectives appeared as social welfare expectations were still the 
SOEs’ main concern, although some economic or financial objectives had begun to be part of the 
SOEs’ objectives. The appearance of social welfare objectives was also influenced by the 
government’s inconsistency in applying financial objectives, which was mirrored by the SOEs. This 
made the provision of public goods and services objective was the most frequent social welfare or 
non-economic objectives for the SOEs, as shown in Table 8.4. This objective was followed by national 
economic development and employee skill improvement objectives. Community development was 
still one of the publicly listed SOEs’ main concerns. Several publicly listed SOEs still hold this 
objective as part of their objectives.  These more frequent social welfare maximising objectives 
ensured that the profit and efficiency objectives were not the SOEs main concern; as shown, they 
were less apparent. Focusing exclusively on each objective resource, the difference was visible 
between the government and the SOEs objectives25. The differences appeared as the SOEs were 
likely to focus on economic objectives such as competitive, quality of the products and meeting the 
stakeholder’s expectation. The table also shows that not all the original government-stated 
objectives were recognised by the SOEs. The government-stated provision of community needs 
objective, for example, was found in five publicly listed SOEs, while only one the publicly listed SOEs 
recognised the objective as part of its company’s constitution objectives.   
                                                          
25
 For SOEs or companies’ constitution objectives, data were selected based on firm-year method since the 
SOEs and management did changes i in  their objectives several times during this period of study 
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Table 8.4: The Current Objectives of Publicly Listed SOEs 
No Objectives indicated 
Government-Stated objectives 
SOE objectives 
(as combined between company 
and management objectives) 
No. of SOEs holding the objectives 
No. of SOEs holding the 
objectives 
(Firm-Year data) 
Number of SOEs = 14 
Economic or financial objectives 
1 Profit 4 2 
2 Performance  7 
3 Quality  12 
4 Competitive  11 
5 Market domination  10 
6 Customer satisfaction  5 
7 Corporate principles
26
  7 
8 Efficiency  3 
9 Growth  3 
10 Resources utilisation   
11 Company value  11 
12 Meeting shareholders’ expectations  8 
13 Meeting stakeholders’ expectations  8 
14 Productivity  7 
15 Reputation  3 
16 Technology  3 
17 Research   
18 Environmental  3 
Social welfare objectives 
1 The provision of goods & services 7 9 
2 Employee skills  8 
3 Employee welfare  3 
4 OHS 5 3 
5 Community development  4 
6 Community prosperity 6 2 
7 Community needs 5 1 
8 Market supply  1 
9 Supply & price stabilisation   
10 Pioneer   
11 National economy 9 4 
12 National development 3 4 
13 National security 1  
14 Industrialisation 1 3 
15 Government assignment/policy  2 
16 Government needs   
17 State income 2  
18 Synergy  2 
Source: Data was obtained from the Indonesian publicly listed SOEs’ annual and financial reports, 2004–2010, and the government rules 
for the establishment of the SOEs including their amendments. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
26
 Corporate principles objective are collected based on the government-stated objective for compliance to corporate 
governance or corporate principles was stated in the rules when the company was established, including all the 
amendments to this rule. 
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8.3 Policy Implications 
As government bodies, the SOEs were very sensitive to policy changes.  The main motivation to 
establish the SOEs commonly refer to the country’s constitution (Aharoni, 1981). This is also the 
foundation of relationship between the government and SOEs. The relationship between the SOEs 
and the government meant that the SOEs were required to comply with government policies. 
Previous studies find that SOEs were also often used to facilitate government policies (Ang & Ding, 
2006; Astami et al. 2010; Caporaso, 1982; Gillis, 1980; Martin, 1996; Yu, 2001). In several cases, 
privatisation aimed to reduce the government involvement or protection within SOEs, this created 
some changes that the new publicly listed companies had to adjust to in their new market 
environments (Baijal, 2002; Morgan & England, 1988). In this case, privatisation also became a 
driving factor for the government to review industrial policy. Focusing exclusively on industrial and 
control policies, this section examines the implications of these policies on the Indonesian publicly 
listed SOEs’ business activities, including their objectives. To support the analysis about the policy 
implication, the last part of this section presents a case regarding how industrial and control policies 
affects the publicly listed SOEs business activities and decision making process.  
8.3.1 Industrial Policies 
The privatisation of Indonesian SOEs also had implications for industrial policies. For some SOEs, 
their roles included facilitating government industrial regulation (Caporaso ,1982; Dornstein, 1976; 
Kole & Mulherin, 1997; Levy, 1987; Nellis & Kikeri, 1989), as well as industrialisation and national 
economic development (Yu, 2001). As the industry no longer held a monopoly or highly regulated, 
this caused changes for the government and the SOEs in the provision of public utilities and national 
economic development. After privatisation, the role of government was more likely to ensure 
economic and social stability than to regulate SOEs or markets (Bai et al. 2000; Ramamurti, 1999). 
However, for some Indonesian industries that were highly regulated (such as telecommunications, 
toll roads and natural gas), privatisation was a key to breaking up their monopoly by allowing private 
participants to participate in these business activities. This situation might be considered to contrast 
with the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia’s statement, where the government was to be the only 
authority to operate and provide these products and services. In practice, only PT Jasa Marga Tbk 
and PT Telkom Tbk experienced this type of change. After privatisation and the establishment of the 
Badan Pengatur Jalan Tol (BPJT/Indonesia Toll Road Authority), PT Jasa Marga Tbk was no longer the 
toll road authority body. Meanwhile, PT Telkom Tbk was no longer the single telecommunications 
player for domestic phone lines following privatisation and the issuance of UU Telekomunikasi no 
52/2002 (Telecommunication Act no. 52/2002), and the establishment of Badan Regulasi 
Telekomunikasi Indonesia (BRTI/The Telecommunication Regulation Agency)(Telecommunication Act 
  113 
2002). The establishment of new government structures was not limited to toll roads and 
telecommunication industries. The mining industry also encountered the establishment of new 
government structures, such as Badan Pengatur Hilir Minyak dan Gas Bumi (BPH MIGAS, the 
government body with the authority to supervise and control the distribution of oil and natural gas). 
The establishment of BPH MIGAS had some policy implications for the business and decision-making 
process of PT PGN Tbk. These changes in SOE structures and authority might be seen as the 
government detaching from providing products and services. Conversely, the government still holds 
control through pricing, distribution and fees (Baijal, 2002). 
The change of economic environment, new government bodies, and monopoly resulted in some 
conflicts of interests and overlapping policies. Conflict commonly appeared when control over the 
resources had implications for particular parties. Conflict in relation to industrial policy appeared 
when the government controlled prices, tariffs and licences. Control also became an issue when 
economic objectives were in conflict with regulatory constraints. Government control over price and 
licences created some implications for SOEs decision-making process and business activities. In 
certain cases, control of prices and tariffs were barriers for publicly listed SOEs to achieve their 
economic or financial expectations, such as profit and efficiency. The control of tariffs for PT Jasa 
Marga Tbk, for example, occurred because the tariff needed to be adjusted every two years. In 
practice, the adjustment of tariffs had to deal with several obstacles creating risks for the company, 
such as public objections and the projects’ achievement (JasaMarga, 2004; 2005). PT Telkom Tbk and 
the mining publicly listed SOEs experienced licencing issues. The establishment of BRTI meant that 
BRTI held the authority to control and monitor telecommunications licences. Several cases showed 
that telecommunication licences were a barrier to PT Telkom Tbk fully meeting its profit and 
efficiency objectives; for instance, the introduction of international code access caused limited cover 
for PT Telkom in certain regions, or when the government changed the licence due to business 
prospects (Telkom, 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009). A similar case is detailed in Section 7.3.4, 
where licencing is still a major issue for mining publicly listed SOEs. 
Privatisation in Indonesia still provided a space for government to facilitate privileges and protection 
for publicly listed SOEs. Although not all the publicly listed SOEs had a duty to provide public utilities, 
there was a pattern showing that government privileges still existed, even after privatisation. The 
reason for this was that both the UU BUMN no. 19/2003 and PP Privatisation no. 33/2005 still 
underlined the ability of the government to ask SOEs to carry out certain duties in relation to 
providing public utilities (UU BUMN 2003; PP Privatisation 2005). The importance of medicine for the 
community, for example, motivated the government to provide some privileges for PT Kimia Farma 
Tbk and PT Indofarma Tbk. The majority of these SOEs’ business came from the government, as has 
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been shown through a number of Ministry of Health projects carried out by these companies. In 
addition, PT Kimia Farma Tbk still held licences to produce narcotics and iodine drugs for social 
welfare purposes. Several government policies also benefited the publicly listed SOEs when the 
government encouraged companies to take part in new social welfare rules. The government 
programmes in energy sustainability gave an opportunity for PTBA Tbk to develop briquette 
products, even though these products were not accepted by the market (BukitAsam, 2004; 2005; 
2006; 2007; 2008; 2009). Government privilege was also found through bank re-capitalisation 
programmes. Following the fiscal problems at the beginning of the 2000s, most of the Indonesian 
state banks obtained support from the government to resolve their internal financial problems (BNI 
2008; Mandiri 2008b). This re-capitalisation programme did not apply to the private banks. Several 
banks were still confronted with financial problems where government support was needed (BNI, 
2007; Mandiri, 2009). 
The provision of public utilities did not always result in special treatment for the SOEs. In some 
cases, the provision of public utilities separated publicly listed SOEs from other business entities. For 
example, the provision of public utilities encouraged the government to introduce a new regulation 
for telecommunication operators to build a number of telecommunication networks in rural areas 
during the period 2004–2008. At the same time, the Universal Service Obligation (USO) regulation 
obligated every telecommunications operator to contribute 0.75 per cent of their profit to the USO. 
Although the company had contributed five per cent annually to the USO, the detailed procedures 
remained unclear (Telkom, 2004 ). In the meantime, as a government entity, PT Telkom had to 
accept the greatest share of this social obligation (Telkom, 2008; 2009). This showed that 
privatisation of SOEs did not prevent government involvement in SOEs to prioritise the provision of 
public utilities. 
8.3.2 Control Policy 
As mentioned in the previous section, government control and protection were still the main issues 
for Indonesian publicly listed SOEs. Government control, transparency and the privatisation process 
in Indonesia are still main public critiques in regard to privatisation in Indonesia (Astami et al. 2010; 
Daily, 1995; McLeod, 2002b; Pangestu & Habir, 1989; Sutojo, 1996). This made Indonesian 
privatisation far from the public’s or the IMF’s expectations. The case of PT AnTam Tbk in relation to 
the ASX requirements, and the IMF LoI, were two examples of how government control hindered 
privatisation expectations. This section aims to analyse how the control system applied and what the 
implications of the control system were for Indonesian publicly listed SOEs.  
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Owners control is a main critique for privatisation in Indonesia. In a market economy, equity 
commonly works as a combination of cash flow and control rights, in the form of ‘one share, one 
vote’. In contrast, several privatisation cases showed that cash flow and control might not follow this 
common practice (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). In their study, Shleifer and Vishny (1994) refuted the 
combination of control rights and cash flow; since regulation after privatisation could mean a 
transfer of cash flow without control rights, and based on the fact that private firms still had political 
influence (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994: p. 102). This situation applied to Indonesian privatisation, in 
which cash flow and control rights operated separately. Table 8.1 shows that the new structures of 
Indonesian publicly listed SOEs are still dominated by government ownership. The government still 
hold 51 per cent or more through direct and indirect ownership. From Table 8.1, in addition to 
government ownership, the new biggest investors for publicly listed SOEs were still dominated by 
the government subsidiaries such as other SOEs, pension fund or cooperative. These situations are a 
major public critique for privatisation in Indonesia.  
In addition to new ownership structures, government control was also found in the board structures. 
Board structures were still dominated by bureaucrats who acted on behalf of government 
representatives on both executive and supervisory boards. Assuming that non-independent 
members were persons who had no relationship with majority shareholders (government) and 
companies, privatisation in Indonesia had successfully implemented the aim to reduce government 
intervention through gaining commercial culture from overseeing boards, even though both board 
were  still dominated by members who had affiliation with the majority shareholder (government) or 
non-independent  members.27 The management and supervisory boards were still controlled by non-
independent members, as shown in Table 8.5. Some independent executives were found within 
banking companies, while the rest of the publicly listed SOEs’ members were still dominated by non-
independent members. Although Ramamurti (1999) argued that the role of bureaucrats was still 
necessary, even though government ownership had been relinquished to build political and 
economic institutions and to assist the SOEs, reform remained an important role (Ramamurti, 
1999:p. 152). This composition suggested that the government was still resistant to moving from a 
bureaucratic to a commercial culture in relation to partial privatisation SOEs.  
                                                          
27
 Independent refers to the UU BUMN no 19/2003, meaning that the person has no relationship with majority 
shareholders or the company. If the person used to work for, or has retired from the company, he/she must 
have had no relationship with the company for a minimum of three years before he/she is considered as 
independent. 
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Table 8.5: Composition of the Board of Directors and Board of Commissioners among 15 SOEs 
Publicly Listed in 2009 
SOE 
Board of Commissioners Board of Directors
28
 
Independent Non-independent Independent Non-independent 
PT Kimia Farma Tbk 5 3 0 5 
PT Indofarma Tbk 0 3 0 4 
PT BNI Tbk 3 4 0 9 
PT Jasa Marga Tbk 2 4 0 5 
PT Wijaya Karya Tbk 2 3 0 5 
PT Bank Mandiri Tbk 4 2 2 11 
PT Tambang Batubara Bukit Asam Tbk 2 3 0 6 
PT Timah Tbk 3 3 0 5 
PT Bank Rakyat Indonesia Tbk 4 2 2 8 
PT PGN Tbk 2 3 0 5 
PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia Tbk 3 2 0 8 
PT Semen Gresik Tbk 3 3 0 6 
PT Adhi Karya Tbk 2 3 0 6 
PT Aneka Tambang Tbk 2 3 0 6 
PT Bank Tabungan Negara Tbk 2 2 2 6 
Total number of members (people) 
39 43 6 100 
Source: MSOEs; AdhiKarya 2009; AnTam 2009; BNI 2009; BRI 2009; BTN 2009; BukitAsam 2009; Indofarma 2009; JasaMarga 2009; 
KimiaFarma 2009; Mandiri 2009; PGN 2009; SemenGresik 2009; Telkom 2009; Timah 2009; WijayaKarya 2009. 
 
 
The composition of board structures revealed some implications for publicly listed SOE business 
activities and objectives. In common practice, one of the privatisation goals was to discipline 
managers to maximise shareholder values and company profits. After privatisation, the new owners 
were expected to bring in the management and governance skills needed to move the bureaucratic 
culture to a commercial culture that focused on competition and efficiency (Abeng, 2001; 2002). 
Since SOEs were commonly operating under bureaucratic control on behalf of the government (Bai 
et al., 2000), the ‘real’ owners were usually biased or unclear (Chang & Wong, 2009; McLellan, 2005; 
OECD, 2005). Bureaucratic and political control was claimed as a reason for inefficiency, due to the 
tendency to focus on the maximisation of social welfare. These ‘real’ owners resulted in the absence 
of management discipline and control for maximising productivity (Jim Brumby, 1997; 2005; Shirley, 
1999). At the same time, as government entities, SOE managers commonly performed two different 
                                                          
28
 The board terminology is used in Indonesia is Dewan. There are two board structures in each SOE; Dewan 
Komisaris (Supervisory board for Persero) or Dewan Pengawas (Oversight board for Perum) and Dewan Direksi 
(management board). Director (Direktur), the title for each  management board member, and a Commissioner 
(Komisaris) is a title for each supervisory board member for Persero (public limited liabilities), and anggota 
dewan pengawas (Oversight Board member) for Perum (public company)  
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functions: business management and political management. SOE business activities were commonly 
influenced by managerial behaviour and orientation (Zif, 1981). As bureaucrats, they might 
potentially have a role in political liaison between government and the company, and this allowed a 
significant influence over the SOEs’ objectives, which were likely to be dominated by social welfare 
maximisation goals (Javidan & Dastmalchian, 1988). Thus, the composition of the board structure for 
Indonesian publicly listed SOEs, which were still dominated by non-independent members, ensured 
the influence of social welfare maximisation on the SOEs’ objectives and business activities. 
8.3.3 Mining: A Special Case 
This section is a special case that presents to show how conflict of interest appears even after the 
SOEs privatised. This section is a picture in regards to control and industrial policies are in conflict 
and have implications on the publicly listed SOEs. This section also aims to show that privatisation 
does not stop the government involvement in the publicly listed SOEs particularly in relation to the 
provision of social welfare.  
In contrast to other SOEs, the publicly listed mining SOEs revealed a unique case. Although only 
occurring in publicly listed mining SOEs, similar potential cases existed in SOEs in different industries. 
For the purpose of this study, the mining SOEs were examined separately as part of a broader 
analysis of whether the government and SOE objectives were in harmony or conflict. Conflict 
occurred mostly at the government level, but these conflicts had significant impact on the 
operations of the SOEs. The mining license was the main factor in conflicts of interest between 
government bodies and the SOEs. This was found to be the case for PT AnTam Tbk and PTBA Tbk. 
The main licence issue emerged as a result of decentralisation policy, driven during the post-New 
Order regime era, when the government introduced the Undang-Undang no. 32/2004 tentang 
Otonomi Daerah (Regional Autonomy Act no. 32/2004) (Green, 2004) and the Undang-Undang no. 
4/2009 tentang Pertambangan Mineral dan Batubara (Mineral and Coal Mining Act no. 4/2009). 
These Acts required companies to improve local communities, support regional and state incomes, 
and create job opportunities. 
Conflict arose because the rules stated that authority over natural resources was held by both 
central and regional government. The case of Integrated FeNi and the Stainless Steel project in Obi, 
North Maluku Island for PT AnTam Tbk, showed how conflict occurred when the regional 
government cancelled the mining licence (AnTam, 2008). In addition, the case of the coal mining 
licence in Lahat, South Sumatera province, for PTBA Tbk where the regional government issued 
licences for several miners to explore the same area owned by PTBA Tbk (BukitAsam, 2006), clearly 
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showed a conflict of power and interest between government bodies. Although the financial losses 
could not be calculated, both companies suffered operationally. 
In addition to these mining licence issues, publicly listed mining SOEs were also confronted with fee 
issues. During this period of study, although issues concerning fees occurred in different ways, most 
publicly listed mining SOEs had to deal with such issues. These usually applied to production; as the 
government required the SOEs to pay fees for mining production. For example, the fee for tin 
production was not only applied to PT Timah Tbk, but also to unconventional mines. The same 
occurred with PTBA, as the company was asked to pay Rp. 500 per tonne of coal produced as a 
donation to the regional government (BukitAsam, 2004). This donation was later used by the 
regional government to buy the company’s ownership.29 
8.4 The government-Stated Objectives in Practice: Discussion   
This section discusses the government stated objectives for publicly listed SOEs, and examines 
hypothesis one regarding whether the introduction of new objectives as a consequence of 
privatisation policy causes conflicting objectives for new privatised SOEs objectives and business 
activities. The hypothesis expects that the government and new privatised firm alter their objectives 
following the implementation of privatisation policy and liberalisation of their market economy, and 
that these changes generate conflicting objectives. 
From the analysis in Chapters 6 and 7, privatisation is an alternative event that impacts the current 
SOEs structure and objectives. Later, this event constructs the current SOEs objectives and structure 
which may differ from the original framework or goal. The current structure of SOEs is likely to 
facilitate the new government-stated objectives, profit and efficiency, which introduced through the 
UU BUMN no 19/20003 and PP Privatisation no 33/2005 when privatisation has become part of the 
SOEs evolution. In practice, the restricting the SOEs objectives and structure does not work evenly. 
This section analysis shows the objectives apply in practice after the SOEs were privatised.   
8.4.1 The Objectives in Harmony  
As the government body, SOEs have an obligation to comply with the constitution and government 
policy. As the constitution is the main reason for the government to establish SOEs (Aharoni, 1984), 
this is also background for the relationship between the government and SOEs. This relationship has 
some implications. For example is an obligation for SOEs to carry the government’s role and duty in 
the provision of public utilities. This obligation has also an implication on the objectives.  
                                                          
29
 The regional government owned around 1 per cent of the company. 
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Privatisation may not stop the government involvement in publicly listed SOEs even after the 
privatisation. Natural monopolies which are commonly controlled by the government through SOEs 
are still more efficient under the government authority (Yarrow, 1999; Bai et al. 2000). Although the 
government may not be part of the company’s structure, the government may still be part of the 
publicly listed SOEs business activities. The market, price, distribution and fees are some areas 
where the government may still hold the control with the publicly listed SOEs (Baijal 2002; Bel 2005; 
Yarrow, 1999). The empirical studies in regard to privatisation result show that the government 
retain its control within the companies even after the privatisation through the golden share 
ownership (Perotti, 1992; 1995; Bel, 2005). This makes the government involvement and influence 
remain strong ever through the regulation, management or ownership within the company. This also 
makes no significant changes in regard to the political objectives of the government for the 
companies (Bel, 2005).  
The studies of privatisation above are also found, in practice, with the case of Indonesian publicly 
listed SOEs. Privatisation does not make any different in regard to the government control. The 
structure of ownership and management shows that the Indonesian publicly listed SOEs are still 
dominated by the government’s agents. The government retained its majority control have an 
implication to the domination of social welfare or non-economic objectives. As indicated previously 
in Table 8.3, social welfare objectives were still part of publicly listed SOEs. This is also supported by 
the market for some Indonesian publicly listed SOEs are still highly regulated or the government still 
provide some privileges for the SOEs as shown through the case of PT Kimia Farma Tbk, PT 
Indofarma Tbk, PT Telkom Tbk, PT Jasa Marga Tbk and PT PGN Tbk.  
The change of market economies after privatisation still placed social welfare or non-economic 
objectives as a government priority. Although the provision of public utilities was not the most 
frequent objective, several other non-economic objectives often appeared as part of government-
stated objectives. For example, the requirement for SOEs to support national economic and 
contribute to state budgets made this requirement still part of the SOEs’ objectives. The high 
dependence of the government on the SOEs’ budget support, which mainly came from taxes and 
dividends, became clearly apparent for several publicly listed SOEs, particularly in mining. Four 
publicly listed SOEs held this objective: PT AnTam Tbk, PT Timah Tbk, PTBA Tbk, and PT Kimia Farma 
Tbk. As government bodies, several SOEs, including publicly listed SOEs, also had also an obligation 
to provide employment. Four publicly listed SOEs were required to achieve this objective: PT Timah 
Tbk, PT AnTam Tbk, PT Kimia Farma Tbk, and PT Semen Gresik Tbk. From these finding, it presume 
that the government-stated objectives are likely to be in harmony with the SOEs’ company 
constitution and management’s objectives.   
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8.4.2 The Objectives in Conflict 
The subsection analyses in what extend the objectives are in conflict based on the privatisation and 
institutional changes perspectives. From the privatisation perspective, the changes of ownership 
structure through privatisation have some implications on the new publicly listed SOEs’ business and 
objectives. The involvement of new owners may lead to uneasy situation for publicly listed SOEs in 
regard to the requirement to meet multiple expectations. Earlier studies of SOEs show that profit 
may not be the government main concern for SOEs (Boardman et al 1986; Hafsi, 1985; Martin, 1996; 
Ramamurti, 1989). The existence of new shareholder with economic or value added expectation may 
place the publicly listed SOEs’ management in difficult situation to deal or balance these 
expectations (Ogden and Watson, 1999). The other impact of the privatisation is found when 
privatisation aims to improve the SOEs performance and efficiency. Performance and efficiency are 
two major public pressure that are motivated the government to conduct privatisation. In practices, 
the provision of public utilities is commonly high cost due to socio-economic reasons (Hanschen and 
Erspamer, 2004; Hamzah, 2007; Martin, 1996; Yu, 2001). This makes efficiency is not an easy goal for 
SOEs. Privatisation may change the cost of the provision of public utilities as the market where SOEs 
run the business may also be changed. In some case, privatisation may reduce the government 
particularly politician and bureaucrats’ influence on the SOEs for social welfare reason. This 
privatisation may generate the commercialisation of public utilities. 
Privatisation in Indonesian shows that privatisation encouraged the government to open a number 
of industries that had previously been SOEs only. Some market industries has no longer highly 
regulated following the privatisation of the SOEs. From the analysis in Section 8.1, the government 
remove the PT Telkom’s Tbk and PT Jasa Marga Tbk authority prior their privatisation. The change of 
market economy activities has altered the SOEs’ objectives. Some publicly listed SOEs make changes 
in their objectives as the consequence of financial crisis in 2007 or change of the management’s 
structure. In contrast, the government has never made any changes for its objectives on each 
individual SOE. Therefore, the gap between the government and SOE objectives is noticeable as 
shown in Tables 8.3. From Table 8.3, publicly listed SOEs started to make some changes in their 
objectives to adjust to these changes in their operational environment. The economic objectives, 
such as market domination, competitiveness and quality, became part of the SOEs’ new objectives.  
From the institutional changes perspective, the current SOEs structure and objectives for publicly 
listed SOEs is a picture of how the organisation changes during period of time. From the analysis of 
privatisation and the evolution of Indonesian SOEs in Chapters 6 and 7, privatisation is considered as 
an event that disrupts the original of government-stated objectives for SOEs. This has some 
consequences on the current publicly listed SOEs. The potential conflicting of interest and constraint 
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appears through limited of full privatisation occurred during this period of study unless the company 
owned by foreign investors30. A similar conflict is also found through the gap between the 
government privatisation plans and its realisation in Table 7.1.  The Table shows that the constraint 
to control the SOEs for social welfare purpose and regulation is intertwined with the economic 
expectation and external pressure of privatisation.  
The conflict of interest and constraint is also found amongst the government bodies. The conflict of 
objectives and interest are found when privatisation affects the cost of the provision of public 
utilities. Although the conflict between the government and new owners is limited, privatisation of 
Indonesian SOEs shows some potential conflicting objectives and interest amongst the government 
bodies. The conflict mostly occurs as the government economic objectives intertwine with the 
regulation constraint, and the potential overlapping or conflict of the policies. Policy conflict in 
Indonesia is driven by ideological reasons in context of control for natural resources. The case of the 
Indonesian mining and telecommunications publicly listed SOEs, for example, indicates the conflict 
between government bodies also affects company business activities (Telkom, 2008; 2009; Timah, 
2009). The conflict of interest is also found from the decentralisation of regulation and the 
separation of functions between regulatory bodies and shareholders cases. Overlapping policies also 
create conflict of interest amongst the government agents as shown through the mining special case 
in Section 8.3.3.  
The control policy is still part of the institutional changes and privatisation conflict in Indonesian 
cases. The conflict of control policy still hinders the company to meet the economic or financial 
objectives.  In most privatisation cases, privatisation breaks up the nature of government 
monopolies and public services (Morgan & England, 1988). The reason is because this control of 
companies by government or politicians is claimed as a reason for SOEs’ inefficiency and high rent or 
risk (Ramamurti, 1999; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). In Indonesia, several publicly listed SOEs, such as PT 
Jasa Marga Tbk and PT Telkom Tbk; pharmaceutical publicly listed SOEs (PT Kimia Farma Tbk and PT 
Indofarma Tbk); and mining publicly listed SOEs PT Aneka Tambang Tbk (PT AnTam/gold mining 
SOE), PT Timah Tbk (tin SOE), PT Tambang Batubara Bukit Asam Tbk (PTBA/coal mining SOE), as well 
as PT PGN Tbk are experience with this conflict. For several publicly listed SOEs, these control of 
tariff led to conflict of interest and objectives as shown through the case of toll road tariff for PT Jasa 
Marga Tbk. The case of toll road tariff revealed the conflict between financial and socio-economic 
interest between the regulators, shareholders and the company. In the Indonesian publicly listed 
                                                          
30
 During this period of study, two companies were fully privatised, PT Indocement Tunggal Prakasya Tbk and 
PT Wisma Nusantara Indonesia. Both the companies owned by foreign investors (Heidelberg for PT 
Indocement Tunggal Prakasya and JAL for PT Wisma Nusantara Indonesia).   
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SOEs, privileges still occurred and were identified in various ways. A common practice for these 
publicly listed SOEs was for them to be still dominated by government projects. Privileges and 
protection were also found in soft loans and refinancing to solve banks’ financial problems, or in 
control price and distribution. These cases confirm that monopoly and privilege practices still 
applied, even after the SOEs were privatised. This shows that control policy may become a barrier 
for publicly listed SOEs to fairly compete in market economy and to achieve their economic or 
financial objectives. 
Referring to hypothesis one, the introduction of privatisation policy and liberalisation of market 
economy for new privatised firm substantially encourages some changes. Privatisation removed the 
firm control and authority as shown through the case of PT Telkom Tbk and PT Jasa Marga Tbk. The 
analysis above shows that the privatisation policy encourages some changes as the new policy has 
financial consequences. These consequences also encourages the firms have to review their 
objectives. The changes of firm constitution and management objectives are identified. In contrast, 
the introduction of privatisation policy does not make any different for the provision of public 
utilities for the government. This concern is found through the government resistance to make 
changes in the objectives for individual new privatised firm. The potential conflict appears as 
consequence of this resistance. 
In sum, from the analysis above, privatisation policy has significant impact on the publicly listed SOEs 
objectives in practice. Partial privatisation is considered as a compromise between the constraint of 
constitution and external pressure. Partial privatisation is also an outcome from the path of 
institutional changes when privatisation becomes part of the sequence of the Indonesian SOEs’ 
evolution. These outcomes have implications on the publicly listed SOEs objectives as the objectives 
are still influenced by the government in regard to the social welfare expectation.  The change of 
companies’ structure, from non-privatised to publicly listed, generated potential conflict of policy, 
and objectives regarding the government and SOEs’ social welfare and financial expectations.  
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Chapter 9:  
The Objectives of State Owned Enterprises in Practice: 
Non Privatised State Owned Enterprises 
 
This chapter examines whether the non-privatised SOEs’ objectives, in practice, are in harmony or 
conflict following the implementation of privatisation policy. Chapters 6 and 7 show that the 
implementation of the UU BUMN no. 19/2003 and PP Privatisation no. 33/2005 underlined the 
importance of profit and efficiency objectives, along with the provision of public utilities. The 
implications of privatisation policy are also found through the requirement for SOEs both publicly 
listed and non-privatised to implement full corporatisation. Profit and efficiency objectives became 
the main part of the implementation of full corporatisation though the UU BUMN no 19/2003 and 
PP Privatisation no 33/2005. The implementation of UU BUMN no. 19/2003 and PP Privatisation no. 
33/2005 also underline that provision of public utilities cannot hinder SOEs from being profitable. 
For publicly listed SOEs as argued in Chapter 8, this change required them to make some 
adjustments to their structure and objectives. However, there is limited information regarding the 
effects of privatisation policy for non-privatised SOEs, particularly since the government is the only 
owner of non-privatised SOEs.  
The impact of privatisation policy in Indonesian is not limited to the introduction of profit and 
efficiency objectives. The argument and analyses in Chapters 7 and 8 show that privatisation has 
some consequences for the government industrial policies, particularly when privatisation breaks up 
the government monopoly, and is then followed by commercialisation of public utilities. Although 
privatisation may not directly affect the non-privatised SOEs, the previous analysis reveals the 
possibilities for the government to review industrial policy, where the non-privatised SOEs operate 
or run their business, as a consequence of privatisation policy. Some industries are no longer highly 
regulated as a consequence of this policy. In contrast, the UU BUMN no. 19/2003 and PP 
Privatisation no. 33/2005 still emphasise that some SOEs may not be available to be privatised. This 
privatisation restriction makes some industries or SOEs remain highly regulated or monopolised 
where the government still provide privileges and protection. In contrast, some other industries are 
open for private and foreign investment participants. This causes some differences in the way the 
government treats these SOEs and their objectives.  
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Using content analysis and interpretive analysis from government and SOE documents from 126 out 
of 127 SOEs during 2004 to 2010, this chapter focuses on analysing the implications of privatisation 
policy on the non-privatised SOEs’ objectives31. The chapter is divided in four sections: Section 9.1 
the brief picture of Indonesia non-privatised SOEs; Section 9.2 focuses on analysing the objectives of 
the government and SOEs; Section 9.3 examines the implication of privatisation policy and whether 
the policy makes changes to SOEs objectives; Section 9.4 identify the SOEs’ objectives in practice in 
what extend they are in conflict or harmony. 
9.1 The Non-Privatised State-Owned Enterprises: A Brief Picture 
The Indonesian non-privatised SOEs are still playing important roles in many socio-economic sectors 
in Indonesia. The current structure of Indonesian non-privatised SOEs is categorised into two groups; 
Perum and Persero. Perum runs in general welfare and whole owned by the government, while 
Persero operates in more commercial basis where the share wholly or partly owned by the 
government. In practice, the roles of SOEs, both non-privatised and publicly listed are mostly in 
relations to social welfare provision and maintenance of economic stability. There are 127 non-
privatised SOEs which operate in approximately 35 industries, where most of them are linked with 
the provision of public utilities or national economic development.32 Some SOEs operate as the 
single player in their industries, due to lack of private participation or for national security reasons. 
SOEs in strategic industries (energy, mining and fertiliser production) are in this category. Some of 
these SOEs operate in a semi-competitive market due to their product niches and government 
provision of privileges and protection. For example, the government still provided privileges and 
protection for Perum Percetakan Negara Indonesia (Perum PNRI/ printing SOE), Perum Perusahaan 
Uang Republik Indonesia (Perum Peruri/printing SOE for money or security paper), some insurance 
SOEs and PT Pos Indonesia (postal SOE), due to these companies’ roles in providing public utilities.33 
Some SOEs operated in competitive markets where their function was to improve the market 
activities without disadvantaging other players. SOEs in trading, plantation, construction and 
industrial estates were in this category. There is no much change in context of industrial policy 
during this period of study, except for petroleum industry. The change of industrial policy occurred 
                                                          
31
 There were 141 SOEs in Indonesia during 2004 to 2010. Fourteen were privatised and 127 SOEs were non-
privatised. However, PT Reasuransi Indonesia is officially bankrupt, even though the government still admitted 
the company due to it being run by its subsidiary. For the purpose of this study, PT Reassuransi Indonesia is not 
examined. PT Sarana Multi Infrastruktur is a new SOE established in 2007, but only officially operating in 2010. 
There is not sufficient data for this company; therefore it is not included in this study. Therefore, there were 
only 140 SOEs examined for this thesis.  
32
 The industrial categorisation for this study refers to the Indonesian MSOEs’ industry categories. For this 
study, PT Pembangunan Perumahan, PT Bank Tabungan Negara and PT Krakatau Steel were still categorised as 
non-privatised SOEs, although they were privatised in 2010.  
33
 PT ASABRI (Insurance SOE for army and defence members), PT ASKES (health insurance SOE for government 
officers) are insurance SOEs to which government provides protection and privileges. 
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for petroleum industry when the government restructured PT Pertamina status (petroleum SOE), 
from special agent under president’s authority to become the Persero structure. The change 
occurred in 2003 following the government removed its protection for the industry.  These roles and 
changes affected for both the government and SOEs determination of their objectives.  
Some SOEs still continue to rely on government support. During 2004–2010, ten SOEs obtained 
subsidies from the government: two of these were under the Perum structure and the rest were 
under the Persero structure. This showed that even the Persero structure, which entailed more 
economic or financial objectives, still engaged with the PSO duty and get subsidies from the 
government. For these SOEs, this role became part of their objectives and meshed with financial 
objectives that might conflict with their other non-economic objectives. The reason for this conflict 
emerged as the provision of public utilities was a government duty, which commonly merged with 
inefficiency, slowness and a less profitable performance (Bai et al. 2000; Diah, 2003; Hanschen & 
Erspamer, 2004; Mardjana, 1995; Martin, 1996; Willner, 1999). These services were usually large and 
had less economic benefits for the company. The PSO services in Indonesian are not limited to public 
utilities such as electricity, train and railway or postal services. PSO services in Indonesia are 
including fertiliser, rice seed, petroleum, and passenger ship services. In addition to those SOEs, 
Perum Antara (government media SOE) and Perum BULOG (basic staples distribution SOE) are in 
these PSO categories. These PSOs services show the large and less benefit services of PSOs for the 
companies’ benefits or performance.  
The requirement for government support is not only limited for PSO duty. Some studies argued that 
social roles were barriers for companies to be profitable (Hanschen & Erspamer, 2004; Martin, 
1996). The fewer possibilities for companies to meet multiple objectives since, for instance, indirect 
reimbursement for running the PSO were several barriers preventing these companies from 
becoming profitable (Chang & Wong, 2009; Martin, 1996). Similar cases are found with the 
Indonesian non-privatised SOEs. Several SOEs with PSO duties experiences indirect reimbursement 
for running this service. For example, PT Pos Indonesia (post SOE) received their reimbursement in 
2008 for the company’s PSO’s services in 2006 and 2007 (Pos 2008). Although the government 
provided subsidies for these ten non-privatised SOEs, in practice, several SOEs such as PT 
Perusahaan Listrik Negara (PT PLN/electricity SOE) and Perum Perusahaan Film Negara (Perum 
PFN/film production SOE) still received government support due to their financial performance 
issues (PFN, 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009; PLN, 2004; 2005; 2006; 2007; 2008; 2009). This 
made the involvement of government in SOEs business activities a critical issue for public, in terms 
of privileges and efficiency. 
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As the government is the only or major owners, the government influence in business process, 
decision making process, and determine the objectives are noticeable. The influence of government 
is found through the control structure. In addition to the Ministry of State Owned Enterprises 
(MSOEs) who act as the state shareholders representative, the SOEs operate under around 18 
ministerial regulation authority. The control structure is also found through the composition of 
board members. The board members compositions, commissioners or supervisory board members 
and management boards, were still dominated by non-independent members34. This control 
structure has significant impacts on the objectives. The development of social welfare and non-
economic objectives, based on a number of studies, is also influenced by bureaucrats, who acting as 
government representative shareholders, on SOE business activities and decision-making processes 
(Abeng, 2001; 2002; Eric Williams, 2002; Javidan and Dastmalchian, 1988; Ramamurti, 1987; Willner, 
1999; Yarrow, 1999; Chang and Wong, 2009). This involvement created a tendency for the SOEs to 
accommodate their own interests beside their original objectives. Compare to publicly listed SOEs, 
the government involvement in non-privatised are more often to be found. As mentioned in Chapter 
1 Section 1.3, during this period of study, the government required the SOEs to take part in national 
energy and food sustainability programmes (Sugiharto, 2005; MSOEs, 2012).  This is an example on 
how the government involvement may cause the SOEs to carry particular duty which is different 
from the original government-stated objectives.  
9.2 The Effect of Privatisation Policy 
The introduction of privatisation policy generated changes in government and SOE objectives. The 
UU BUMN no. 19/2003 and PP Privatisation no. 33/2005 identified the importance of financial 
objectives, such as profit and efficiency, along with the provision of public utilities. The changes 
mostly occurred after the government encouraged all SOEs, both publicly listed and non-privatised; 
fully implement corporatisation practices a part of the introduction of fast track privatisation policy 
in 2002. The implementation of UU BUMN no. 19/2003 and PP Privatisation no. 33/2005 also 
worked with SOE business activities with regard to the provision of public utilities, as found through 
the mechanism of PSO duties and government financial support only being available for limited 
SOEs. This requirement had implications for their duty to provide public utilities. Through these laws, 
provision of public utilities or PSO was no longer a barrier for SOEs to be profitable or to be 
privatised. However, in practice this rule was applied differently; this is further analysed in this 
section. 
                                                          
34
 The data of board composition showed that 14 per cent of the commissioners or supervisory board 
members were independent, and only 4 per cent of the management board members were independent.  
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The changes of objectives were affected by changes in the economic environment in which the SOEs 
operated. In this case, the changes of objectives were caused by the introduction of a new policy 
which was linked with privatisation expectations. Privatisation aims, which mainly required the 
government to reduce its involvement in the SOEs’ business activities and decision-making 
processes, meant that some industries were no longer monopolised by the SOEs only. For example, 
PT Pertamina was experience with the change of structure form special body under President’s 
control to Persero. This change had an impact on the petroleum industry which has been opened to 
private participation. The introduction of privatisation policy also caused some changes in the way 
the government classified the SOEs. Through the laws, the government underlined the criteria for 
privatisation which meant not all SOEs are available to be privatised (UU BUMN 2003; PP 
Privatisation 2005). The rules emphasised that certain SOEs were to be restricted from privatisation 
due to socio-political reasons. Based on the restricted categories, as referred to in the PP 
Privatisation no. 33/2005, UU BUMN no 19/2003, and the Peraturan Presiden (PerPRes) no. 36/2010: 
Daftar Negatif Investasi Indonesia (PerPRes Negatif  list Investasi no. 36/2010 The Negative 
Investments List), there were 39 SOEs categorised as restricted. This treatment diverged from both 
government and SOE objectives as well as the criteria of SOEs as whether they allow to be privatised 
or not.  
9.3 The Objectives 
Objectives have various roles in business activities. In addition to the relationship between agents 
and principals, the roles of objectives have been shown to determine the aim of actions, or to 
reduce differences during the process of achieving expectations (Boyd & Levy, 1966). A preliminary 
analysis in Chapter 6 revealed that the Indonesian SOEs’ objectives evolved from socio-political to 
socio-economic then from socio-economic to financial objectives. When the government introduced 
economic or financial objectives through privatisation and corporatisation, the differences in 
objectives created complexity or conflicting goals. Similar to Chapter 8, for the purpose of this study, 
in addition to government-stated objectives, the SOE objectives are shown in detail by separating 
the sources of objectives: company constitution objectives, as stated in AoA or financial reports; and 
management objectives as stated in vision and mission statements. 
Similar to the publicly listed SOEs, the government-stated objectives for the many individual 
Indonesian SOEs have never been changed. The government has never made any changes in its 
objectives for majority individual SOEs since the companies were established in 1960s. Some of the 
SOEs were experiences with the changes of their structure, from Perum or Perjan to Persero 
structure; it did not affect the government-stated objectives for the companies. However, during 
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this period of study, the government changed its objectives for ten SOEs, including SOEs with Perum 
status. The changes are as shown in Table 9.1. These changes were:  
1. Two SOEs were experienced with the change of government-stated objectives when the 
government emphasised the national economic development as part of its objectives. The 
SOEs were Perum Perhutani (forestry SOEs) and Perum BULOG.  
2. Four SOEs were experienced a change of government-stated objectives when the 
government reviewed these companies’ duties regarding the provision of goods and 
services. The SOEs were Perum Jasa Tirta I and Perum Jasa Tirta II (water and irrigation 
SOEs), PT Perusahaan Pengelola Aset (PT PPA/asset management SOE) and Perum Perumnas 
(housing SOE for middle and lower class families). 
3. Two SOEs, Perum Peruri and Perum PNRI, were experienced with the changes of the 
government-stated objectives when the government emphasised the importance of the 
national economy and the provision of goods and services. For these SOEs, the changes were 
likely motivated by the requirement to reduce competition because their products were very 
specific.35  
4. The government changed its objectives for PT Jaminan Kredit Indonesia (PT Jamkrindo/credit 
insurance SOE) and PT Pertamina (petroleum SOE) when the companies were changed to 
Persero structure. The government-stated objectives for PT Jamkrindo were focused on the 
national economy and provision of goods and services. For PT Pertamina, the government-
introduced profit objectives meshed with the company’s other objectives. 
 
From these changes of the government-stated objectives, the changes were still dominated by the 
additional or replacement of social welfare or non-economic objectives, while the changes of 
government-stated economic or financial objective by introducing the profit objective took place for 
PT Pertamina only.  
The changes of government-stated objectives for these ten SOEs did not affect the companies’ 
constitution objectives. Table 9.1 shows that the change of the government-stated objectives was 
wholly recognised by PT Jamkrindo only. Perum PNRI, Perum Perumnas and Perum Perhutani 
acknowledged only some parts of the government’s stated new objectives. These companies 
recognised the national development objective as part of their objectives, but not the provision of 
goods and services objectives. This might be because these companies’ products are very specific 
                                                          
35
 Most of the SOEs that experienced a change of objectives were SOEs with monopoly rights. Their products 
are very specific or are categorised as vital for the state and communities. 
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and less competitive.36 The remaining SOEs did not provide sufficient data to allow an analysis of the 
consequences of these changes. Meanwhile for the other SOEs, since the government-stated 
objectives remained relatively unchanged, the SOEs had to make some changes to their objectives to 
adjust to market activities. For example, the financial crisis caused a lack in the government’s ability 
to provide financial support to the SOEs; which had to deal with financial difficulties and 
performance problems (Vernon, 1984). Lack of government support compelled the SOEs to find 
alternative financial resources to support their businesses, and therefore economic or commercial 
indicators began to constitute a larger portion of their objectives as shown in Table 9.1. 
Competitiveness was one of the most common additional objectives, while customer satisfaction 
started to become a concern for the SOEs. 
In addition to company’s constitution objectives, management may add new objectives for the SOEs. 
Although this part is not part of the analysis, the management vision and mission statement is added 
part of this section to show potential difference between the governments stated objectives, the 
company’s constitution and management vision statement. The ten SOEs that experienced changes 
of government-stated objectives during the period 2003–2010 did not wholly acknowledge the new 
objectives as part of their own objectives. The analysis of the management’s vision and mission 
statements showed that the role of the market in determining objectives was observable; the 
objectives of management started to demonstrate the domination of economic objectives. The 
effect of competition showed that management had a tendency to strengthen their business by 
focusing on quality, employees and meeting the stakeholders’ expectation. 
  
                                                          
36
 Perum Perumnas operates in the provision of housing for low and middle class communities. Perum PNRI is 
a printing SOE for government purposes such as security and money. Perum Perhutani is forestry SOE in the 
Jawa/Java area. These SOEs are still the single business player in their areas. 
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Table 9.1: Summary the changes of the objectives 
SOEs  
Government SOEs Constitution  Management 
Social Economic Social  Economic  Social Economic  
+ - + - + - + - + - + - 
PT Danareksa 
    
1 1 
 
1 1 1 
  PT Biro Kliring Indonesia 
          
1 
 Perum Pegadaian  
    
1 1 
    
1 1 
PT Permodalan Nasional Madani 
    
1 1 
 
1 
    PT Jamkrindo 1 
   
1 
   
1 1 1 1 
PT Perusahan Pengelola Aset 1 
       
1 1 1 
 PT Bank Ekspor Indonesia 
         
1 
  PT Surveyor Indonesia 
     
1 1 
 
1 1 1 1 
PT Pertamina 1       
Perum BULOG 1 
    
1 
   
1 1 
 PT Sarinah 
        
1 1 1 
 PT Brantas Adipraya 
    
1 1 1 1 
 
1 1 1 
PT Hutama Karya 
       
1 1 1 
 
1 
PT Nindya Karya 
     
1 
   
1 
  PT Pembangunan Perumahan  
    
1 
 
1 
  
1 
 
1 
PT Waskita Karya 
      
1 
  
1 1 
 PT Bina Karya  
    
1 1 1 
 
1 
  
1 
PT Inhutani I 
     
1 
 
1 1 
 
1 
 PT Inhutani III 
        
1 1 1 1 
PT Inhutani IV 
     
1 1 
     Perum Perhutani 1 1 
          Perum Perumnas 1 
   
1 
  
1 
    PT Industri Kapal Indonesia 
        
1 
 
1 
 PT Batan Teknologi 
          
1 
 PT Perkebunan Nusantara I 
        
1 
 
1 
 PT Perkebunan Nusantara III 
        
1 
 
1 
 PT Perkebunan Nusantara IV 
         
1 1 
 PT Perkebunan Nusantara V 
     
1 1 
 
1 
 
1 1 
PT ASABRI 
     
1 1 
 
1 1 1 1 
PT Asuransi Jiwasraya 
         
1 1 
 PT Asuransi Tenaga Kerja  
    
1 1 1 
  
1 1 1 
Perum Peruri 1 1 
  
1 
       Perum PNRI 1 1 1 
PT Garuda Indonesia  
     
1 1 
 
1 1 
  PT Pelabuhan Indonesia II     1 1 
PT Pelabuhan Indonesia IV         1 1 1 1 
PT Angkasa Pura I       1  1 1 1 1 
PT Angkasa Pura  II      1 1 1  1 1 1 
PT Perikanan Nusantara      1       
Perum Prasarana Perikanan Samudra     1 1       
Perum Jasa Tirta I 1            
Perum Jasa Tirta II 1    1 1       
PT PUSRI     1 1 1  1 1 1 1 
Perum Bio Farma     1 1 1      
Source: Data were obtained from the Indonesian non-privatised SOEs’ annual and financial reports, 2004–2010, and the government rules 
for the establishment of the SOEs including their amendments. 
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From this analysis of objectives above, the government and SOEs objectives start to show 
differences. Table 9.2 shows that the companies added new objectives as part of the SOEs’ 
objectives.  The influence of market economy where the SOEs run their business appears as the 
market domination and competition became part of the SOEs objectives. The influence of market 
economy caused competition crucial for non-privatised without privatisation restriction as shown in 
Table 9.2. Competition became the most frequent economic or financial objectives for non-
privatised SOEs without privatisation restriction. Since some of non-privatised SOEs with 
privatisation restriction run in single market, competition was not their main concern.  This group of 
SOEs had a tendency to focus on quality. Therefore, quality was the most frequent economic or 
financial objectives for non-privatised SOEs with privatisation restriction.  
Some government social welfare or non-economic objectives were still acknowledged by non-
privatised SOEs as part of their obejctives. A number of non-privatised SOEs without privatisation 
restriction were more likely to acknowledge the government social welfare objectives to be part of 
their company’s objectives than non-privatised SOEs with privatisation restriction. In practice, 
several social welfare or non-economic objectives less frequent appears to be part of the SOEs 
objectives. For examples, the provision of public goods and services was less frequent to be part of 
non-privatised SOEs with privatisation restriction objectives. The occupational health and safety was 
no longer being part of non-privatised SOEs with privatisation restriction’s objectives, while the 
provision of community needs and community prosperity were less frequent to be part of non-
privatised SOEs without privatisation restriction’s objectives. This situation makes a gap between the 
government and companies’ constitution objectives as shown in Table 9.2. 
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Table 9.2: The Government and SOE Objectives in Non-privatised SOEs 
No Objectives indicated 
Government-Stated objectives 
SOE objectives 
(as combined between company and 
management objectives) 
No. of SOEs holding the objectives No. of SOEs holding the objectives 
Restricted for 
Privatisation 
Non-restricted for 
Privatisation 
Restricted for 
Privatisation 
Non-restricted 
for Privatisation 
Number of SOEs in total = 127 
Economic of Financial Objectives  
1 Profit 3 4 11 26 
2 Performance   10 23 
3 Quality 3 2 21 42 
4 Competitive   17 58 
5 Market domination 1  12 31 
6 Customer satisfaction   7 12 
7 Corporate principles
37
 4 3 11 24 
8 Efficiency 1 4 11 14 
9 Growth   5 22 
10 Resources utilisation 1 2 7 9 
11 Company value  1 6 15 
12 Meeting shareholders’ expectation    7 19 
13 Meeting stakeholders expectations   13 12 
14 Productivity   3 6 
15 Reputation 1  13  
16 Technology 1  2 15 
17 Research   1  
18 Environmental  1 9 23 
Social Welfare or Non-Economic Objectives 
1 The provision of goods & services 29 45 19 49 
2 Employee skills   14 40 
3 Employee welfare   2  
4 OHS 4 16  7 
5 Community development 2 4 7 16 
6 Community prosperity 7 18 8 8 
7 Community needs 11 21 11 1 
8 Market supply  1 7 4 
9 Supply & price stabilisation  1 1 2 
10 Pioneer  1 1 3 
11 National economy 15 28 20 40 
12 National development 10 5 20 39 
13 National security 2 1 2 3 
14 Industrialisation 1 12 3 18 
15 Government assignment/policy 2 5 6 6 
16 Government needs 1 4 3 2 
17 State income  3 7 14 
18 Synergy   2  
Source: Data were obtained from the Indonesian non-privatised SOEs’ annual and financial reports, 2004–2010, and the government rules 
for the establishment of the SOEs including their amendments. 
  
                                                          
37
 The corporate principles objectives are collected based on the government-statedobjective for compliance to corporate 
governance or corporate principles was stated in the rules when the company was established, including all the 
amendments to this rule 
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9.4. Objectives in Practice: Discussion 
This section identifies whether, in practice, the government and SOEs objectives were likely to be in 
harmony or conflict. This section also examines hypothesis one regarding whether the introduction 
of new objectives as a consequence of privatisation policy and liberalisation of the market economy 
causes conflicting objectives for SOEs objectives and business activities. The hypothesis expects that 
the privatisation policy may indirectly affect the non-privatised SOEs market. Therefore, the 
government and SOEs have to review the objectives. The introduction of privatisation policy and 
liberalisation of markets may alter the government objectives. A previous study identified control as 
being one of the most common issues, causing difficulty not only for SOEs to determine the ‘owner’, 
but also to sort out issues between their objectives (Vernon, 1984). In regard to the objectives issue, 
the involvement of bureaucrats and politicians generated multiple objectives, not only for economic, 
but also for other socio-political purposes (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994). Competing interests were a 
factor that made the objectives statements vague and ambiguous (Javidan & Dastmalchian, 1988). 
9.4.1 The Objectives in Harmony 
The analyses in Chapters 6 and 7 showed that the SOEs’ objectives had been set since their 
establishment. As corporate entities created by the government, the SOEs were more likely to 
become vehicles to meet government public policy aims (Sundaram & Inkpen, 2004). With reference 
to the previous sections in this chapter, most of the government’s objectives were recognised by the 
SOEs as part of the companies’ constitution objectives. Later, SOEs extended the government-stated 
objectives to include an additional ten new objectives as a consequence of changes in market 
economy around the SOEs. Analysing each additional objective demonstrated that several new 
objectives were modified from the original government-stated objectives. For example, quality was 
modified from the government’s objectives for the provision of goods and services, which were 
influenced by market competition. This modification was the process used to determine company 
constitution objectives through the acknowledgement of the government’s objectives; while at the 
same time, the company tried to accommodate changes in its business area. This acknowledgement 
represented the obligation for SOEs to become public vehicles for the government to meet public 
policy expectations. 
9.4.1 The Objectives in Conflict 
The path of institutional changes analysis in Chapter 6 shows a branching point of path which 
determines the current SOEs’ objectives and structure. The introduction of privatisation during the 
evolution of Indonesian SOEs has disrupted the original government-stated objectives for SOEs. This 
shows through the introduction of profit and efficiency through UU BUMN no. 19/2003 and PP 
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Privatisation no. 33/2005. As mentioned in Chapter 6, Section 6.3.2.1, the government limited the 
SOEs structure for Perum and Persero structure, because Perjan structure could not match this 
economic policy requirement. This makes profit and efficiency are the government main concerns 
for SOEs, both Perum and Persero (UU BUMN 2003; PP Privatisation 2005). In practice, both Perum 
and Persero are still required to carry social welfare expectation as shown through the PSOs duty 
that applies for both structure38. The laws also provide a “space” for the government to require the 
SOEs to carry social welfare duty. These exceptional requirements may create conflicting objectives 
for SOEs.  
Most SOEs have operated in their industries since the beginning of Indonesian statehood when the 
objectives framework was set. During the period of SOEs’ evolution, the change of market economy 
following privatisation policy, monopoly breaking, and the financial crisis in 2007 ensured that the 
SOEs reviewed their goals. Several studies of institutions and organisations showed how the 
institutions developed constraints through creating standard and expected actions to reduce 
uncertainty (Washington & Ventresca, 2004). In practice, several standard and expected actions 
have been developed with clear objective statements whenever the SOEs or government 
encountered changes in the economic environment as shown through the evolution of Indonesian 
SOEs in Chapter 6. The implementation of profit and efficiency was a standard and expectation 
action when the market economies around the SOEs were changed due to the pressures of 
privatisation. In practice, the conflict between the state welfare orientation and market pressure 
makes the change occurs improperly. The importance of social welfare has differed the treatment 
and objectives of the non-privatised SOEs between the one with privatisation restriction and without 
the restriction. Profit and efficiency may not be in conflict when the SOEs do not mainly operate for 
the social welfare purposes.  
Referring to hypothesis one, the introduction of privatisation policy and liberalisation of market 
economy has indirectly affected the non-privatised SOEs market economy. The policy encourages 
the government and SOEs to consider economic or financial objectives such as profit and efficiency. 
The pressure to survive in market competition persuaded the SOEs to introduce several new 
objectives. This situation is followed by the introduction of new government policies that underline 
the profit and efficiency objectives. These new objectives were the requirement for SOEs to fully 
implement the corporatisation practice, and it might cause different situations for SOEs. In contrast, 
the government interest regarding the provision of public utilities discourages the changes. The 
potential conflicting objectives appears when the SOEs have to accommodate both market and 
                                                          
38
 As mentioned on Section 5.1, ten SOEs have PSOs duty, only two out of ten are under Perum structure. The 
others are under Persero structure.  
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government requirements. The analysis in previous section, Section 9.4.1, shows that there is less 
possibility for SOEs not to follow the government-stated objectives because of its financial support 
and privileges, and the bureaucratic influences. Meanwhile, focusing exclusively on each objective, 
the analysis of changes in Section 9.3 revealed that not all SOEs fully acknowledged the 
government’s new objectives as part of their own objectives. This indicates that the SOEs’ 
expectations might differ from the government goals.  
In sum, from the analysis above shows, the change of market economy followed by the introduction 
of privatisation policy indirectly motivates the government and SOEs to review their objectives. The 
result shows that government alters the objective for certain SOEs only, while the rest remains 
unchanged. In practice, the objectives are in harmony since the SOEs still highly rely on the 
government support and privileges. Since the government is the only owner for these non-privatised 
SOEs, the influence of the government in determining the SOEs objectives remain stronger. 
However, potential conflicting appears as a consequence of the government inconsistency to 
implement profit and efficiency objectives policy on each individual SOE. This inconsistency leads to 
potential conflicting of objectives between the government and SOEs.   
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Chapter 10:  
The Relations between the Government-Stated Objectives 
And SOEs’ Financial Performance 
 
This chapter examines SOEs’ performance in relation to attaining the government-stated objectives. 
Mixed objectives are potentially conflicting, as identified in Chapters 8 (for publicly listed SOEs) and 
9 (for non-privatised SOEs). These potential conflicting objectives occur when the government is 
required to make changes in the market economy environment while still required to provide public 
utilities and social welfare for the community through the roles of SOEs. The conflicts are 
conceptually found when privatisation and the liberalisation of regulated market policies for SOEs 
are implemented. This is the main area of analysis in this chapter. 
The importance of the profit and efficiency objectives, which were formalised through UU BUMN no. 
19/2003 and PP Privatisation no. 33/2005, exist alongside other government-stated social welfare 
and non-economic objectives for each SOE. The analysis in Chapters 7–9 shows that the 
government’s inconsistency in applying both the profit and efficiency objectives to individual SOEs 
has generated potential conflicting objectives. This inconsistency is followed by the partial 
privatisation of SOEs and the transferring of their monopoly status under the government authority. 
This transfer still gives the Indonesian government an opportunity to control and protect privatised 
firms. These inconsistencies result in potential differences between the government and SOEs’ 
objectives, and among the government bodies. Chapters 8 and 9 also identify that changes in 
policies and conflicting objectives may affect SOEs’ performance. 
This chapter focuses on analysing the potential for conflicting objectives for SOEs’ measurable 
performance in relation to the government-stated objectives during the current political regime 
2004–2010. This analysis distinguishes three types of SOEs: publicly listed SOEs, non-privatised 
without privatisation restrictions and non-privatised with privatisation restrictions 39. This chapter is 
divided into three sections. Section 10.1 briefly overviews SOEs’ objectives based on the analysis 
from previous chapters. Section 10.2 describes the expected relations between SOEs’ measurable 
performance and the government-stated objectives. Section 10.3 presents and discusses the 
findings. 
 
 
                                                          
39
 The term ‘publicly listed SOEs’ is used in this thesis because the government still owns more than 51 per 
cent, even if the firm has been publicly listed. 
  137 
10.1 State-Owned Enterprises’ Objectives: An Overview 
Changes in the economic environment affect the structure and objectives of Indonesian SOEs. From 
the analysis of the evolution of Indonesian SOEs, the Persero and Perum structures introduced in 
2003 were designed based on their functions and objectives. Persero were specifically given 
commercial or economic objectives, while Perum were intended to mainly serve the government’s 
social welfare objectives. However, Chapters 8 and 9 revealed that both Perum and Persero had 
similar social welfare or non-economic objectives. They also indicated that the government had not 
changed its stated objectives for individual SOEs, despite introducing UU BUMN no. 19/2003 and PP 
Privatisation no. 33/2005, which required SOEs to focus on either economic or financial objectives. 
Through UU BUMN no. 19/2003 and PP Privatisation no. 33/2005, the government required all SOEs 
to pursue a profit objective in addition to their individual objectives for the provision of public 
utilities and social welfare. Through these laws, the government also highlighted the criteria for 
whether or not SOEs may be privatised, as shown in Table 10.1. There were 140 out of 141 SOEs 
divided into three groups: 14 SOEs were categorised as publicly listed, 89 SOEs were categorised as 
non-privatised with non-restricted privatisations and 39 SOEs were classified as non-privatised with 
privatisation restrictions.  As seen in Table 10.1, only 39 SOEs were in the category of restricted to be 
privatised, and these SOEs commonly had a monopoly status or privilege because of their products 
or services, which were important for socio-economic reasons. Some SOEs in this category were 
single players in their industry, while others operated in highly regulated industries with limited 
competition. The rest of the SOEs operated in an open and competitive market. These criteria might 
have influenced some SOEs’ business activities and objectives, as emphasised by the corporate 
constitution objective, even though these criteria did not affect the government-stated objectives. 
Table 10.1 Number of SOEs Based on Groups and Industries 
Industries Publicly 
 Listed 
No Restrictions 
for Privatisation 
Privatisation 
Restriction 
Total SOEs 
(per row) 
Farming & Fishery  1 5 6 
Plantation  15  15 
Forestry   6 6 
Mining 4 2 1 7 
Retail & Garment  5  5 
Heavy Industry  9 3 12 
Chemical and Pharmaceutical 2 4 2 8 
Property, Logistic and Tourism  9 4 13 
Building Construction 2 5  7 
Energy, Telecommunication and Electronic (Public Utilities) 2 3 1 6 
Infrastructure 1 4 3 8 
Transportation  5 4 9 
Consultation & Certification  10 1 11 
Banking 3 2  5 
Finance  6 1 7 
Insurance  5 4 9 
Paper & Media  2 4 6 
Total 14 87 39 140 
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As discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, the government and SOEs’ objectives started to show a difference, 
which resulted from several factors. The first factor was the conflict between the state welfare 
orientations and market pressure. The analyses in Chapters 6–9 revealed that the influence of state 
welfare orientations was a reason for the government maintaining control of economic policy. This 
also made the social welfare of the community the government’s main goal, as it was implemented 
through the role of SOEs. In contrast, the government and SOEs also needed to accommodate 
changes in the market where the SOEs ran their businesses. The pressure from the market was for 
SOEs to run their businesses and compete fairly. This pressure resulted in the emergence of 
economic or financial objectives, including profit and efficiency. These interests and pressures were 
a driving factor for differences and conflicting objectives, as shown in Chapters 8 and 9. 
The second factor was the government’s inconsistency in implementing the policy for the new 
economic or financial objectives. The issuance of UU BUMN no. 19/2003 and PP Privatisation no. 
33/2005, which underlined the importance of the profit and efficiency objectives, did not make any 
difference to the government-stated objectives for individual SOEs. Later, these situations might 
conflict with the government’s existing objectives. Table 10.2 presents the economic or financial 
objectives and other objectives that were influenced by the market to become part of Indonesian 
SOEs’ objectives. Table 10.2 also shows that the profit and efficiency objectives were still very 
limited and appeared to be part of the government-stated objectives even for publicly listed SOEs 
and those without privatisation restrictions. No publicly listed SOEs had the government-stated 
objective for efficiency, while only four publicly listed SOEs had the government-stated objective for 
profit. Profit and efficiency were found to be part of the government-stated objectives for only four 
non-privatised SOEs without privatisation restrictions. Meanwhile, the other economic or financial 
objectives were very limited as part of the government-stated objectives. These findings confirm 
that economic or financial objectives were not the government’s main concern for SOEs. 
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Table 10.2: Government’s Economic or Financial Objectives for SOEs Per Industry Based on the Number of Firms Holding the Objective in 2010 
 Profit Efficiency Corporate Principles Technology and research Company value and reputation Quality Environment and utilisation 
Number of SOEs 14 87 39 14 87 39 14 87 39 14 87 39 14 87 39 14 87 39 14 87 39 
Industry/ 
Company type 
Listed 
Non-
Restricted 
Restricted Listed 
Non-
Restricted 
Restricted Listed 
Non-
Restricted 
Restricted Listed 
Non-
Restricted 
Restricted Listed 
Non-
Restricted 
Restricted Listed 
Non-
Restricted 
Restricted Listed 
Non-
Restricted 
Restricted 
Farming & fishery  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 2  0 0  0 0  0 0 
Plantation  1   0   0   0   0   0   0  
Forestry  0 0  0 0  0 2  0 0  0 0  0 1  0 0 
Mining 2 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Retail & garment  0   0   0   0   0   0   0  
Heavy industry  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  1 1 
Chemical and 
pharmaceutical 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Property, logistic 
and tourism  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
Building 
construction 0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  
Energy, 
telecommunication 
 & electronic  
(public utilities) 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 
Infrastructure 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Transportation  1 0  0 0  1 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
Consultation & 
certification  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  1 0  2 0  1 0 
Banking 1 1  0 0  0 1  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0 0 
Finance  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0  
Insurance  1   2 0  1 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
Paper & media  0 0  0 0  0 1  0 0  0 1  0 1  0 0 
Total 4 4 3 0 4 1 0 3 4 0 0 2 0 1 1 0 2 3 0 3 1 
The objectives were collected and calculated as dummy variables, 1 when the SOE has the government-stated objective, and 0 when the SOE does not have the objective. 
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The crucial role of the state in national economic development made the socio-political objectives 
more dominant than other objectives. This happened at the time of the establishment of the SOE 
model in Indonesia. Several studies of SOEs indicated that SOEs are often used to meet certain 
purposes or to facilitate the government’s industrial policies (Levy, 1987; Caporaso, 1982; Dornstein, 
1976; Kole and Mulherin, 1997; Nellis and Kikeri, 1989). Given that SOEs are the government’s 
vehicle for industrialisation; this is one of the objectives of the government and SOEs. In his study of 
public enterprises, Bhatt (1984) noted that the government established the SOE structure and 
objectives to allow the state to be involved in national economic policy through SOEs (Bhatt, 1984). 
This is also found in Indonesian SOEs. UU BUMN no. 19/2003 provides a ‘space’ for the government 
to require SOEs to carry out particular duties (UU BUMN 2003). The analysis presented in Chapter 6 
shows that SOEs were also supervised by their regulatory ministries, which also positively affected 
the emergence of social-welfare-maximising objectives or the requirement for SOEs to carry out 
other objectives (Abeng, 2000, 2001; Mardjana, 1995). This control resulted in some industries 
remaining monopolised or experiencing less competition for socio-political reasons. 
As shown in Table 10.3, most SOEs still held the government’s original socio-political objectives in 
relation to industrialisation and national economic development. The provision of public goods and 
services was still the main government-stated objective, as more than 50 per cent of SOEs in each 
group had the objective. The requirement to support national economic activities was also one of 
the government’s main concerns. The requirement for SOEs to improve or stabilise national 
economic activities was shown in this objective, which was found in the majority of publicly listed 
SOEs and those without privatisation restrictions. Industrialisation was still the government’s 
concern for SOEs in heavy industry, chemical and pharmaceutical, and public utilities. Meanwhile, 
Occupational Health and Safety (OHS) was also the more frequent government-stated objective for 
SOEs. This can be seen as the SOEs or government’s obligation to provide jobs for the community, as 
stated in Article 34 of the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia. These findings show that Indonesian SOEs 
still played a role in facilitating the government’s industrial policy and being involved in national 
economic activities. SOEs, particularly publicly listed SOEs and those without privatisation 
restrictions were still used as the government’s economic vehicles in regards to stabilising national 
economic or market activities. 
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Table 10.3: Government’s Social Welfare or Non-Economic Objectives for SOEs Per Industry Based on the Number of Firms Holding the Objective in 2010 
 Provision of public goods/services National economy National development Industrialisation National security OHS Market supply and stabilisation 
Number of SOEs 14 87 39 14 87 39 14 87 39 14 87 39 14 87 39 14 87 39 14 87 39 
Industry/ 
company type 
Listed Non- 
Restricted 
Restricted Listed Non- 
Restricted 
Restricted Listed Non- 
Restricted 
Restricted Listed Non- 
Restricted 
Restricted Listed Non- 
Restricted 
Restricted Listed Non-
Restricted 
Restricted Listed Non-
Restricted 
Restricted 
Farming & fishery  1 3  0 4  0 2  0 0  0 0  0 1  0 0 
Plantation  13   2   0   0   0   0   0  
Forestry   6   4   4   0   0 1  2 0 0 0 
Mining 2 0 0 3 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0  0 0  0 0 
Retail & garment  1   1   0   1   0   1   0  
Heavy industry  3 2  3 1  0 0  3 0  0 1 1 4 0 0 0 0 
Chemical and 
pharmaceutical 1 0 1 1 2 1 0 0 1 0 4 0 0 0 0  0 1  1 0 
Property, logistic 
and tourism  5 2  1 1  0 0  0 0  0 0 2 0 0 0 1 0 
Building 
construction 0 0  2 4  0 0  0 1  0 0  0 4  0 0  
Energy, 
telecommunication 
& electronic 
(public utilities) 1 3 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Infrastructure 0 4 3 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0  0 0  0 0 
Transportation  2 1  3 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  2 0  1 0 
Consultation & 
certification  2 1  7 0  1 1  0 0  0 0  5 0  0 0 
Banking 3 2  2 0  1 1  0 0  0 0  1 0  0 0  
Finance  2 1  1 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
Insurance  5 4  3 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0 
Paper & media  2 4  0 2  1 1  0 0  1 0  0 0  0 0 
Total 7 45 29 9 28 15 3 5 10 1 12 1 1 1 1 5 16 1 0 3 1 
The objectives were collected and calculated as dummy variables, 1 when the SOE has the government-stated objective, and 0 when the SOE does not have the objective. 
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The role of SOEs in national socio-economic activities is still important. The importance of national 
activities and equality of social welfare for communities became part of the government-stated 
objectives for SOEs. As shown in Table 10.4, social welfare is still part of the government-stated 
objectives for SOEs. The requirement for SOEs to focus on the community was shown in the 
government-stated objectives for SOEs to take part in community development and improve 
communities’ prosperity. Although these objectives were also part of the corporate social 
responsibilities duties, for SOEs, these objectives were also part of their role to provide public 
utilities for communities. As shown in Table 10.4, the government-stated objectives for community 
prosperity and the provision of government needs were frequently found to be part of the 
objectives for non-privatised SOEs. These objectives were more frequently found to be part of the 
government-stated objectives for consultant and certification SOEs, as well as infrastructure and 
transportation SOEs. 
In addition to the government’s requirement for SOEs to take part in community development and 
prosperity, they were also required to provide support for the government in relation to the state 
budget and policy implementation. Table 10.4 shows that three SOEs—one publicly listed and two 
without privatisation restrictions—had an obligation to support the government’s state budget. This 
requirement was part of their government-stated objectives. The importance of socio-economic 
stability made it possible for the government to require SOEs to undertake additional assignments or 
roles. This requirement to meet the government assignment and need was found to be part of the 
government-stated objectives for SOEs, although the number was limited. Part of this requirement 
was also mentioned and stated in UU BUMN no. 19/2003 and PP Privatisation no. 33/2005. This 
objective shows that, other than the original government-stated objectives, the SOEs had to carry 
out other objectives. 
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Table 10.4: Government’s Social Welfare or Non-Economic Objectives for SOEs Per Industry Based on the Number of Firms Holding the Objective in 2010 
 Community development Community prosperity Community needs Government policy Government needs/interest State budget 
Number of SOEs 14 87 39 14 87 39 14 87 39 14 87 39 14 87 39 14 87 39 
Industries/ 
company type 
Listed Non-
Restricted 
Restricted Listed Non-
Restricted 
Restricted Listed Non-
Restricted 
Restricted Listed Non-
Restricted 
Restricted Listed Non-
Restricted 
Restricted Listed Non-
Restricted 
Restricted 
Farming & fishery  1 1  0 1  0 1  0 1  0 1  1 0 
Plantation  0   1   0   0   1   2  
Forestry   0   2   1   0   0   0 
Mining 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 
Retail & garment  0   1   1   1   0   0  
Heavy industry  1 0  1 0  2 0  1 0  0 0  0 0 
Chemical and 
pharmaceutical 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Property, logistic 
and tourism  0 0  0 0  0 1  0 1  0 0  0 0 
Building construction 0 0  2 3  2 2  0 0  0 0  0 0  
Energy, 
telecommunication 
and electronic 
(public utilities) 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Infrastructure 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Transportation  0 0  3 1  3 1  0 0  1 0  0 0 
Consultation & 
certification  0 0  7 0  7 0  0 0  1 0  0 0 
Banking 0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  0 0  
Finance  0 0  0 1  1 1  1 0  1 0  0 0 
Insurance  1 0  0 0  2 2  0 0  0 0  0 0 
Paper & media  0 0  1 0  1 1  0 0  0 0  0 0 
Total 0 4 2 6 18 7 5 21 11 0 5 2 0 4 1 2 3 0 
The objectives were collected and calculated as dummy variables, 1 when the SOE has the government-stated objective, and 0 when the SOE does not have the objective. 
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As discussed in Chapters 8 and 9, during this period of study, the government and SOEs made some 
changes to their objectives. Although the numbers were limited, the government also made changes 
to its stated objectives for SOEs. Table 10.5 shows that the changes in government-stated objectives 
occurred for non-privatised SOEs, both with and without privatisation restrictions. The changes were 
found more frequently in relation to socio-political or non-economic objectives. Only one SOE—PT 
Pertamina—experienced the introduction of the government-stated objective for profit. Table 10.5 
shows that the government had a tendency to introduce new social welfare or non-economic 
objectives for these SOEs. Compared to the government-stated objectives, changes in SOEs’ 
objectives occurred more frequently. These changes were made as companies replaced or removed 
objectives, particularly their social welfare or non-economic objectives. Some social welfare or non-
economic objectives were replaced by economic or financial objectives during the period of this 
study. Sixteen SOEs experienced the introduction of new economic or financial objectives, while 
eight of those SOEs removed their economic or financial objectives. To provide detailed analysis, 
some SOEs’ objectives were separated into the company’s constitution statement and management 
statement objectives, as shown in the company’s vision and mission. Focusing exclusively on the 
management sphere, Table 10.5 shows that management was likely to introduce new economic or 
financial objectives, and also often remove social welfare or non-economic objectives. 
The market economy had an influence in determining SOEs’ objectives, as shown by the number of 
changes made by the government, the SOEs and their management. SOEs that encountered market 
competition, such as publicly listed SOEs and those without privatisation restrictions, frequently 
made changes to their economic or financial objectives. Meanwhile, SOEs with privatisation 
restrictions often modified their social welfare or non-economic objectives. Removing social welfare 
or non-economic objectives and introducing new economic or financial objectives occurred more 
often than the introduction of social welfare or non-economic objectives or the removal of economic 
or financial objectives. Non-privatised SOEs with privatisation restrictions frequently changed their 
corporate constitution objectives, while changes to management objectives occurred more often in 
publicly listed SOEs and non-privatised SOEs without privatisation restrictions. Fifty-seven SOEs 
experienced changes to their objectives. The government made 13 changes in 10 SOEs. There were 
63 changes to companies’ constitution statement objectives, while the management statement 
objectives made 109 changes during this period of study. 
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Table 10.5: Changes in Objectives 
SOEs  Government SOE as a corporation Management 
Objective  Social Economic Social Economic Social Economic 
Change: 
+ = added 
- = removed 
No. of SOES 
made 
changes/ 
total SOEs  
+ _ + _ + - + - + - + - 
Total for restricted  19/39 4 3 1 0 5 10 6 2 4 6 6 5 
Total for unrestricted  26/89 0 0 0 0 4 6 6 2 10 11 13 9 
Total for publicly listed 12/14 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 1 6 5 7 7 
Overall total  57/140 4 3 1 0 11 18 14 5 20 22 26 21 
Source: Indonesia SOEs’ annual and financial reports 2004–2010 
In conjunction with the profit and provision of public goods and services objectives, SOEs were also 
required to meet other objectives. Multiple or mixed objectives were a common problem for SOEs, 
and this has been reported in a number of studies (Aharoni, 1981; Chang and Wong, 2009; Javidan 
and Dastmalchian, 1988; Lawson, 1994). In addition to profit and provision of public goods and 
services objectives, there were 26 other government-stated objectives. Eleven of these were 
economic or financial objectives, and 15 were social welfare or non-economic objectives. Several 
objectives were merged because insufficient data were available for their analysis. In this study, 
there were seven economic or financial objectives and 14 social welfare or non-economic objectives 
that SOEs needed to attain in addition to their profit and efficiency objectives. In Tables 10.2–10.4, 
non-economic objectives were found more often than economic objectives in all industries. The 
analysis above shows that each SOE had to achieve an average of seven objectives. This situation re-
confirmed that SOEs deal with multiple or mixed objectives, between non-economic and economic 
objectives where social welfare is still the government’s main concern. 
Changes in the economic environment have implications for the structure and objectives of 
Indonesian SOEs. From the analysis of the evolution of Indonesian SOEs, Persero were specifically 
given commercial or economic objectives, while Perum were intended to mainly serve the 
government’s social welfare objectives. However, the analyses in Chapters 8 and 9 reveal that both 
Perum and Persero had similar social welfare or non-economic objectives. These analyses also 
indicate that the government did not change its stated objectives for individual SOEs, despite 
introducing UU BUMN no. 19/2003 and PP Privatisation no. 33/2005, which required SOEs to focus 
on either economic or financial objectives. The conflicting objectives within the government-stated 
objectives occurred when the government introduced new rules—UU BUMN no. 19/2003 and PP 
Privatisation no. 33/2005—which underlined the importance of the profit and efficiency objectives, 
while government continuesly requires SOEs to meet social welfare expectations.  These potential 
conflicting objectives had some consequences for SOEs’ objectives and business activities. The next 
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section details the effects of these potential conflicting objectives and the government’s existing 
objectives on SOEs’ financial performance. 
10.2 Relations between SOEs’ Measurable Performance and Objectives 
The picture of Indonesian SOEs thus far shows that social welfare objectives remained the 
government’s main concern. At the same time, UU BUMN no. 19/2003 and PP Privatisation no. 
33/2005 required SOEs to be profitable and efficient. This section examines the relations between 
the government-stated objectives for SOEs and SOEs’ performance using the available financial 
performance measure. This section is divided into two sub-sections. Section 10.2.1 presents the 
available financial performance measure. Section 10.2.2 compares the mean financial performance 
of three types of SOEs. 
10.2.1 Available Performance Measure 
Some financial performance measurements were employed to measure the relations between the 
government-stated objectives and SOEs’ performance. Sixteen financial performance measurements 
were each used as dependent variables. As the focus of the measurement was performance, several 
financial performances were applied, particularly to examine whether the company was successful 
in attaining the objectives as reflected in their measureable performance. Several additional 
performance indicators were applied that were considered to present or reflect the social-welfare-
maximising objectives. The common performance measurements determined the efficiency (Reeves 
and Ryan, 1998; Zhonghua and Ye, 2012). Therefore, the Indonesian government emphasised the 
importance of all SOEs being efficient. Several profit and efficiency ratios were employed to measure 
the reflection of these objectives: 
- Return On Assets (ROA), measured by Earnings Before Interest and Tax (EBIT) divided by 
total assets 
- Return On Equity (ROE), measured by an emphasise on the equity impact as Earning After 
Tax (EAT) divided by average equity (0.5 x (Equity t + Equity t-1)) 
- Operating profit return, measured by operating income divided by total assets 
- Operating profit margin, measured by operating income divided by total sales 
- EBIT margin, measured by EBIT divided by total sales 
- Asset turnover, measured by total sales divided by total assets. 
 
In addition to these profit and efficiency ratios, several financial performance measurements were 
included as part of the measurement: 
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- Market value of equity was measured by multiplying the stock price with the shares (Berk 
and DeMarzo, 2009; Brealey and Myers, 1991). It was only applied for publicly listed SOEs. 
For non-privatised SOEs, the book value of equity was employed, which was measured by 
total assets minus total debt and other liabilities’ shares (Berk and DeMarzo, 2009; Brealey 
and Myers, 1991). 
- Net income was considered the company’s profitability during the period of business. 
- Operating income was the company’s income from its core business or operation during the 
period of business (Berk and DeMarzo, 2009). It was also the company’s gross profit, which 
was calculated from total revenue or sales after the deduction of operating expenses. 
 
For banking, finance and insurance SOEs, the operating margin and ROA data were provided to 
complement the analysis rather than interpret or compare them to other sectors. This is because of 
the differences in operating expenses and asset structures. These financial performance 
measurements were employed to estimate the relationship between the government-stated 
objectives and SOEs’ financial performance. 
As government entities, SOEs had an obligation to provide social welfare and public utilities. The 
provision of public goods and services was found to be the most dominant objective for the 
government and SOEs. The analysis in Section 10.1 shows that other social welfare and non-
economic objectives were frequently found within the government-stated objectives for SOEs. For 
example, SOEs were commonly required to contribute to national economic factors such as 
employment or GDP (Reeves and Ryan, 1998). Therefore, the performance measurement for SOEs 
also had to consider their non-economic or social welfare objectives (Zhonghua and Ye, 2012). In 
addition to these social welfare and non-economic objectives, Indonesian SOEs were required to 
support the community through Program Kemitraan and Bina Lingkungan (PKBL/community 
development through cooperative and environmental programmes). This was a reason to add 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) funds to this category. The non-economic or social-welfare-
maximising representative financial performance included: 
- Effective corporate tax rate, measured based on the tax paid divided book income before 
interest and tax (Gupta and Newberry, 1997). For this study, two different measurements—
tax divided by EBIT and tax divided by Earnings Before Tax (EBT)—were applied to obtain 
detailed results on whether the company’s liabilities affected performance. 
- Dividend payout ratio was measured based on the company’s dividend paid divided by 
earnings (Berk and DeMarzo, 2009; Chay and Suh, 2009). For this study, two different 
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measurements—dividend paid divided by EBIT and dividend paid divided by EBT—were 
applied to obtain detailed results on whether the company’s liabilities affected performance. 
- Employment intensity was measured by the natural log of employees divided by sales. 
- Labour cost was considered the company’s expenses for employment. 
- CSR funds were part of the government’s requirement to provide support for community 
development. 
 
As part of the analysis, the model included five control variables: leverage, size (ln asset), company 
type (publicly listed or non-privatised), year, and SOE industry. There was a large range in the size of 
SOEs; therefore, natural log assets and leverage were applied to control this large range. As 
mentioned in Section 5.2, some industries were combined because of some small numbers. 
10.2.2 Compare Mean Performance of Three Types of SOEs 
This section provides an overview of current Indonesian SOEs’ performance based on their mean 
available financial performance. Table 10.6 shows the general mean financial performance of 
Indonesian SOEs during 2004–2010. Based on this table, the current average performance of 
Indonesian SOEs is poor and inefficient. The table shows that less than 10 per cent of the mean 
financial performance of Indonesian SOEs showed a negative income and earnings performance. The 
ROA mean in general was less than 5 per cent, while less than 10 per cent of SOEs showed a negative 
ROA performance. A similar picture is presented in the mean ROE performance. ROE data showed a 
relatively small performance, with less than 10 per cent for the groups’ average. This indicates the 
inefficiency of Indonesian SOEs, where the capability for SOEs to use their available capital can only 
generate less than 10 per cent of earnings. This inefficiency is supported by the fact that more than 
10 per cent of Indonesian SOEs had negative equity during this period of study. This poor 
performance could affect their ability to contribute to the state budget and community, as shown in 
their tax, dividend and CSR performance. The mean of effective tax and dividend rates were 
negatives, in particular when the interest was excluded from the measurement. This situation 
indicated that SOEs still contributed to state budget, although they suffered from losses. This 
occurred as SOEs got external supported to meet this expectation. As the number of employees is 
quite high, their productivity, as shown in their mean employment intensity, was small. On average, 
the employment intensity of Indonesian SOEs was less than 3 per cent. 
Focusing specifically on individual indicators, the mean performance of Indonesian SOEs shows they 
rely on non-core business as their major income. The reliance was explained through their mean 
operating income as their gross profit after operating expenses, which was very small (Rp. 733.68 
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billion compared to their revenue or sales of Rp. 5,968.82 billion). This high reliance on non-core 
business income was also supported by the operating profit margin and operating profit return. The 
average operating profit margin was less than 0.02. This means that only 2 per cent of Indonesian 
SOEs’ income actually comes from their core business. A similar picture was shown in their operating 
profit returns, which were less than 0.05. This means that less than 5 per cent of their assets were 
used to generate income from their core business. 
The table also shows that Indonesian SOEs heavily relied on external financial support. Referring to 
Table 10.6, the mean of Indonesian SOEs’ assets came from liabilities, such as soft loans or 
government short-term borrowing, as discussed in Chapter 8. This liability performance was around 
70 per cent of SOEs’ assets. This high reliance on external financial support was supported by SOEs’ 
mean EBIT and EBT performances, as well as their relations with the mean of net income. The mean 
of net income was less than half of their mean EBIT and EBT, which indicated high interest paid 
during this period of study. This situation supported the fact that Indonesian SOEs were likely to rely 
on short-term borrowing, as shown in high liability performance, which might affect the high interest 
paid. Focusing on their mean of equity, more than 10 per cent of SOEs showed negative equity. 
Table 10.6 also shows a large gap in equity performance among the SOEs, as shown in the gap 
between the maximum and minimum size of equity. Referring to these findings based in Table 10.6, 
Indonesian SOEs are less likely to be able to make a profit from their revenues because of high 
interest paid and reliance on non-core business income. 
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Table 10.6 Data Description 
Variables Mean Median SD Max Min 10% 90% 
Total assets (Rp. billion) 13,076.37 877.615 49,789.85 44,9774.6 4.21 5.14 39,4616 
Ln assets 6.8152 6.7772 2.1936 13.0165 1.4375 1.6371 12.8857 
Liability (Rp. billion) 9,516.456 478.81 38,989.05 408,231.8 0.16 0.62 359,507.8 
Total debt (Rp. billion) 1,315.927 113 3,560.124 30,543 0 0 26,265 
Equity (Rp. billion) 3,555.038 314.465 15,689.6 149,565.6 -2,057 -1,974 142,348 
Market/book value of equity 4,634.128 303.86 18,514.75 149,585.6 -2,057.01 -1,973.62 142,349 
Revenue (Rp. billion) 5,968.824 516.43 34,195.18 558,164 0.16 0.78 385,873 
Cost of sales (Rp. billion) 3,039.125 320.285 26,979.95 502,316 0 0 326,484 
Operating income (Rp. billion) 733.6839 35.96 3,068.599 32,894 -4,155 -688 28,494 
Operating expenses (Rp. billion) 3,134.999 106.235 2,1689.23 357,379 -6.74 1.63 301,463 
Net income (Rp. billion) 384.1984 19.85 1,911.24 21,158 -12,303 -5,900 16,881 
EBIT 774.0161 35.53 3,285.217 34,905 -3,783 -952 30,306 
EBT 658.5226 28 3,093.038 33,455 -12,191 -3,098 29,901.62 
Labour costs (Rp. billion) 397.6594 52.03 1,254.837 12,954.42 0.3 0.817 9,758 
CSR fund (Rp. billion) 8.9838 1.32 28.6611 286.22 0 0 219.249 
Tax paid (Rp. billion) 250.9735 11.97 1,148.364 13,301 -1,388 -44.49 12,243 
Dividend (Rp. billion) 406.7222 26.015 1,573.705 19,848 -0.51 0.03 11,006 
Subsidies (Rp. billion) 11,785.74 355 26,988.79 138,035 0.18 1.88 80,302.7 
Operating profit return (operating income/total asset) 0.0477 0.05055 0.1429 1.0667 -1.2528 -0.8852 0.6522 
Operating profit margin (operating income/total sales) 0.0183 0.07014 0.7787 1.1463 -15.4375 -7.9375 0.9479 
Leverage (debt/total asset) 0.1391 0.0451 0.2099 1.7312 0 0 1.2453 
ROA 0.0497 0.0512 0.1419 1.0657 -1.2528 -0.9353 0.6521 
ROE 0.0223 0.0271 0.2903 1.9545 -5.7165 -1.8529 1.2080 
EBIT margin 0.0498 0.0513 0.1421 1.0657 -1.2528 -0.8852 0.6522 
Effective tax rate1 -0.1515 0.1812 7.5743 38.75 -212.5 -94.6897 8.2090 
Effective tax rate 2 0.3012 0.2450 2.6553 68.6667 -15.6191 -4.2105 26.3804 
Dividend rate 1 -0.1071 0 7.7232 5.9083 -228.5625 -0.9248 3.3168 
Dividend rate 2 0.2229 0 3.2754 103.6667 -1.2632 -0.5933 1.7590 
Asset turnover 0.7761 0.6956 0.5659 4.1397 0.0032 0.0079 3.786 
Employment intensity 0.0296 0.0065 0.0674 0.8267 0 0 0.4226 
Number of employees (people) 5,927.916 1,432 9,465.948 28 67,139 28 47,155 
Source: Indonesian SOEs’ financial and annual reports 2003–2010. 
Notes: The calculation for this result is: ROA = EBIT divided by total assets; ROE= EAT divided by average equity (equity t + equity t-1); EBIT margin = EBIT divided by total sales; operating profit return = operating 
income divided by total asset; operating profit margin = operating income divided by total sales; asset turnover = total sales divided by total assets; effective tax rate 1 = tax divided by EBIT; effective tax rate 2 = tax 
divided by EBT, employment intensity = natural log of employees divided by sales; dividend rate 1 = dividend payment divided by EBIT; dividend rate 2 = dividend payment divided by EBT, net income = total earning 
after tax and interest during the period of study; operating income = gross profit net after deduction of operating expenses; revenue = total of firm income from sales; total assets = total of company assets; leverage 
= total debts divided by total assets. Market or book value of equity is calculated in two different ways: for unlisted or non-privatised SOEs, it is based on book value of equity; for publicly listed SOEs, it is calculated 
based on the number of shares multiply with share price.  
  151 
Table 10.7 shows the mean performance of Indonesian SOEs based on their type of group. The table 
shows that, on average, publicly listed SOEs had the largest assets, while non-privatised SOEs with 
privatisation restrictions had the largest revenue or sales. Publicly listed SOEs were the most 
profitable group, as shown in their mean of net income, ROA and earnings performance—EBIT and 
EBT. In the context of efficiency, publicly listed SOEs also had the most efficient performance 
compared to other groups, as shown in their mean of ROE, operating profit margin and return 
performance. In contrast, non-privatised SOEs with privatisation restrictions had the worst 
performance for efficiency. The poor performance of non-privatised SOEs with privatisation 
restrictions made it difficult for them to contribute to the state budget and community. This is 
shown in their mean effective tax rates and dividend rates in Table 10.7. Non-privatised SOEs with 
privatisation restrictions had a negative performance particularly when interest was included in the 
measure. This shows that external funds and interest paid became an issue for SOEs and affected 
their financial performance. While non-privatised SOEs with privatisation restrictions had a negative 
mean effective tax and dividend performance, they made a better contribution to the community 
than non-privatised SOEs without privatisation restrictions, as shown in their mean CSR fund 
performance. 
Focusing specifically on individual performance indicators in Table 10.7, it is shown that publicly 
listed SOEs and non-privatised SOEs with privatisation restrictions highly relied on external funds, as 
shown in their mean debt and liability performance. The groups’ mean liabilities showed that more 
than half of SOEs’ operating funds came from external financial support such as subsidies or loans. 
High reliance on short-term financial support resulted in high interest rates, which affected SOEs’ 
financial performance, as shown in their mean EBIT and EBT performance. Besides external financial 
support, Table 10.7 also shows SOEs’ reliance on non-core business income. All groups present a 
reliance on non-core business income, as shown in their mean operating income performance. 
Publicly listed SOEs earned the highest operating income among the groups. Compared to their 
mean revenue, most SOEs could earn less than one-third of their income from operating income or 
core business activities. This is supported by their mean operating profit margin performance. 
Publicly listed SOEs showed that around 24 per cent of their operating income came from their core 
business, while non-privatised SOEs without privatisation restrictions earned only around 7 per cent 
of their mean operating income from their core business activities. Although non-privatised SOEs 
with privatisation restrictions had a mean operating income of Rp. 1,015.62 billion, the mean 
operating profit margin performance showed a negative performance. This occurred because some 
SOEs had a negative operating income, which affected their performance. This negative result is 
explained in detail in the industrial performances analysis in Tables 10.8 and 10.9. 
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SOEs’ poor performance significantly affected their ability to achieve their social welfare objectives. 
Table 10.7 shows that publicly listed SOEs made the largest contribution to the state budget through 
tax paid and dividends, with the average of their effective tax rates around 0.3–0.6. Lower-income 
performance, as shown in the mean net income and operating income, made it difficult for non-
privatised SOEs with privatisation restrictions to contribute to dividends and CSR funds. Although the 
table shows that SOEs had better performance for CSR funds, their dividend rate was very small and 
tended to be negative. This negative performance was particularly shown when SOEs had an 
obligation to pay interest. Their average of dividend rates, for example, was around -0.7 to 0.09. 
Negative dividend rate was presented when interest was included as part of measurement. Despite 
of their financial losses, high reliance on external fund made the SOEs able to distribute dividend. 
The other social welfare representative financial performance was related to employment, as SOEs 
were often required to meet the employment objective. Table 10.7 shows that publicly listed SOEs 
had the largest number of employees. Consequently, their mean labour costs were higher than 
other groups of SOEs. The high numbers of employees has consequences on their productivity, as 
shown in the mean employment intensity. This figure shows that most Indonesian SOEs were labour-
intensive, which is part of the government’s objectives for SOEs to resolve employment issues. 
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Table 10.7: Mean Performance of SOEs Per Group 
Financial indicator/performance Publicly listed 
Non-privatised SOEs 
without privatisation 
restrictions 
Non-privatised SOEs 
with privatisation 
restrictions 
Number of SOEs 14 39 87 
Assets (Rp. billion) 64,973.97 1,811.257 18,599.2 
Liabilities (Rp. billion) 55,312.9 1,294.603 10,662.73 
Operating income (Rp. billion) 3,684.977 106.8903 1,015.618 
Revenue (Rp. billion) 11,035.57 1,111.425 14,665.61 
Net income (Rp. billion) 2,263.324 64.39485 386.5692 
Operating expenses 5,204.402 410.3356 8,287.903 
Debt (Rp billion) 2,973.329 452.4504 8,220.77 
Equity (Rp. billion) 9,641.434 516.501 7,926.717 
Tax paid (Rp. billion) 1,084.857 34.9643 385.4123 
CSR fund (Rp. billion) 36.2425 3.7144 7.2757 
Subsidies (Rp. billion)   11,785.74 
Dividends (Rp. billion) 1,113.9 44.4101 746.5689 
Earnings before interest and tax (EBIT) 4,046.548 110.8274 1,011.883 
Earning before tax (EBT) 3,516.226 95.9023 831.6001 
Labour costs (Rp. billion) 1,565.346 112.1843 538.2894 
Employee numbers (people) 10,027.13 4,911.682 6,225.664 
Operating profit return (operating 
income/total asset) 0.1283 0.0481 0.0177 
Operating profit margin (operating 
income/revenue) 0.2385 0.0711 -0.1766 
ROE (EAT/average equity t + equity t-1) 0.0559 0.0207 0.0135 
ROA (EBIT/total asset) 0.1296 0.0492 0.0217 
EBIT margin (EBIT/total sales) 0.1296 0.0492 0.0218 
Leverage (debt/total asset) 0.0807 0.16667 0.09877 
Asset turnover 0.7892 0.8219 0.6716 
Effective tax rate1 (tax/EBIT) 0.2844 0.1482 -0.9721 
Effective tax rate2 (tax/EBT) 0.5985 0.3438 0.0961 
Dividend rate1 (dividend/EBIT) 0.2865 0.0995 -0.6966 
Dividend rate2 (dividend/EBT) 0.3058 0.2726 0.0857 
Employment intensity (LN employees/sales) 0.0021 0.0365 0.0274 
Source: Indonesian SOE financial and annual reports 2003–2010. 
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Table 10.8 presents the detailed mean performance of SOEs based on their groups and industries. 
Publicly listed SOEs in public utilities presented the highest mean operating income among SOEs. 
Meanwhile, non-privatised SOEs with privatisation restrictions in mining showed the highest mean 
net income among SOEs. The number of SOEs in non-privatised SOEs without privatisation 
restrictions had a negative income performance in both operating income and net income. Non-
privatised SOEs without privatisation restrictions in transportation had the lowest mean operating 
income performance, while chemical and pharmaceutical non-privatised SOEs without privatisation 
restrictions had the smallest mean net income performance. Farming and fishery non-privatised 
SOEs without privatisation restrictions had the lowest mean operating profit margin of -0.44, while 
their operating profit return was -0.23. The largest mean operating profit margin and return 
performance were publicly listed SOEs in infrastructure and mining. Publicly listed SOEs in 
infrastructure had a 0.41 mean operating profit margin, while publicly listed SOEs in mining had a 
0.23 mean operating profit margin. This operating profit performance supports the description and 
previous analysis that Indonesian SOEs’ income came from non-core business activities.  
Focusing exclusively on their leverage and debt performance, this result supports previous study 
regarding SOEs’ high reliance on government support. High reliance on external funds was shown in 
their leverage and debt performance. Farming and fishery non-privatised SOEs without privatisation 
restrictions had the highest mean leverage performance of 0.67. This performance indicated that 
SOEs had to finance their operation by relying on external funds to keep operating. This high reliance 
on external funds was also shown in their negative mean equity performance. Consequently, the 
SOEs found it difficult to be profitable or efficient. This poor performance was shown through their 
negative mean ROE, operating profit margin and ROA performance. In the context of efficiency, 
mining non-privatised SOEs without privatisation restrictions had the lowest ROE performance of -
0.43. Farming and fishery non-privatised SOEs without privatisation restrictions had a negative EBIT 
margin of -0.22. 
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Table 10.8: SOEs’ Mean Financial Performance Based on the Groups and Industries during 2004–2010 
  
Asset Operating income Net income 
Industries No. of SOEs Publicly listed Unrestricted Restricted Publicly listed Unrestricted Restricted Publicly listed Unrestricted Restricted 
Farming & fishery 6  94.70 277.17  -10.09 19.77  -15.58 9.98 
Plantation 15  1902.43   228.94   119.22  
Forestry 6   445.84   12.12   14.13 
Mining 7 6671.05 385.09 223,982.33 1,699.09 79.12 21480.51 1253.98 46.43 12908.82 
Retail & garment 5  302.89   -15.41   2.83  
Heavy industry 12  1891.35 1190.45  73.00 -7.75  32.33 -6.55 
Chemical and pharmaceutical 8 1051.58 556.55 12728.49 68.95 -39.55 1259.92 28.81 -53.81 793.81 
Property, logistic and tourism 13  168.32 5120.88  16.02 184.37  10.12 -4.09 
Building construction 7 4198.71 1644.31  316.85 112.74  132.43 45.38  
Energy, telecommunication and 
electronic (public utilities) 6 48,061.63 393.46 269,643.31 11838.15 13.74 3473.15 5999.38 4.83 -4123.04 
Infrastructure 8 15,903.78 3550.61 4269.48 1472.55 456.04 346.89 792.37 360.36 307.99 
Transportation 9  3540.74 3089.17  1.32 -80.70  0.32 -45.50 
Consultation & certification 11  174.09 8.86  15.93 -0.89  7.24 -0.71 
Banking 5 22,2075.26 20105.54  5231.95 389.47  3791.35 278.28  
Finance 7  1747.56 9544.95  87.03 671.81  19.97 494.60 
Insurance 9  2396.40 23835.49  118.52 1759.00  148.05 558.14 
Paper & media 6  50.50 417.86  -3.79 43.13  -11.59 35.40 
Total 140 64,973.97 1,811.26 18,599.20 3684.98 106.89 1015.62 2263.32 64.39 386.57 
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Table 10.8: SOEs’ Mean Financial Performance Based on the Groups and Industries During 2004–2010 
  
Equity Liability Operating profit margin 
Industries No. of SOEs Publicly listed Unrestricted Restricted Publicly listed Unrestricted Restricted Publicly listed Unrestricted Restricted 
Farming & fishery 6  -63.70 115.16  158.49 162.11  -0.44 0.08 
Plantation 15  673.38   1228.99   0.11  
Forestry 6   323.10   122.58   -0.79 
Mining 7 4586.73 133.97 97684.37 2077.80 250.40 126177.15 0.23 0.10 0.05 
Retail & garment 5  -40.56   343.48   -0.08  
Heavy industry 12  545.46 436.16  1343.78 759.58  -0.09 0.01 
Chemical and pharmaceutical 8 593.41 -34.36 5558.03 458.25 591.01 7168.46 0.04 -0.43 0.18 
Property, logistic and tourism 13  117.56 1389.38  50.10 3731.18  0.17 0.05 
Building construction 7 839.76 226.27  3358.44 1417.62  0.06 0.04  
Energy, telecommunication and electronic 
(public utilities) 6 18318.64 198.05 139850.08 29665.16 195.44 129790.11 0.37 0.02 0.02 
Infrastructure 8 6867.50 2123.26 3646.28 8880.96 1418.08 615.64 0.41 0.32 0.16 
Transportation 9  578.77 1902.87  2962.03 1081.70  -0.01 -0.20 
Consultation & certification 11  76.52 4.93  98.15 3.93  0.04 -2.78 
Banking 5 20579.88 3270.43  201495.31 16834.79  0.35 0.51  
Finance 7  451.28 1646.23  1295.98 7505.98  0.28 0.25 
Insurance 9  851.97 2680.45  1557.19 21290.37  0.31 0.30 
Paper & media 6  -8.86 183.91  59.43 233.89  -0.46 -0.77 
Total 140 9641.43 516.50 7926.72 55312.90 1294.60 10662.73 0.24 0.07 -0.18 
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Table 10.8: SOEs’ Mean Financial Performance Based on the Groups and Industries During 2004–2010 (cont.) 
  
Operating profit return ROA ROE 
Industries No. of SOEs Publicly listed 
Unrestricte
d Restricted Publicly listed Unrestricted Restricted Publicly listed Unrestricted Restricted 
Farming & fishery 6 
 
-0.23 0.07 
 
-0.22 0.07 
 
0.02 0.02 
Plantation 15 
 
0.10 
  
0.10 
  
0.06 
 Forestry 6 
  
-0.02 
  
-0.01 
  
0.01 
Mining 7 0.23 0.10 0.09 0.23 0.11 0.09 0.08 -0.43 0.04 
Retail & garment 5 
 
-0.05 
  
-0.04 
  
-0.07 
 Heavy industry 12 
 
0.00 0.04 
 
0.00 0.04 
 
0.05 0.02 
Chemical and pharmaceutical 8 0.06 -0.08 0.17 0.06 -0.08 0.16 0.01 -0.01 0.04 
Property, logistic and tourism 13 
 
0.11 0.03 
 
0.11 0.03 
 
0.03 0.01 
Building construction 7 0.08 0.06 
 
0.07 0.05 
 
0.05 0.02 
 Energy, telecommunication and electronic 
(public utilities) 6 0.21 0.04 0.01 0.22 0.04 0.01 0.09 0.02 -0.01 
Infrastructure 8 0.09 0.14 0.05 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.01 
Transportation 9 
 
-0.04 -0.17 
 
-0.04 -0.17 
 
0.01 -0.01 
Consultation & certification 11 
 
0.06 -0.11 
 
0.07 -0.03 
 
0.05 -0.09 
Banking 5 0.02 0.03 
 
0.03 0.03 
 
0.05 0.03 
 Finance 7 
 
0.07 0.07 
 
0.07 0.07 
 
0.03 0.08 
Insurance 9 
 
0.06 0.07 
 
0.07 0.07 
 
0.04 0.07 
Paper & media 6 
 
-0.15 -0.03 
 
-0.14 -0.01 
 
0.05 -0.05 
Total 140 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.01 
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Table 10.8: SOEs’ Mean Financial Performance Based on the Groups and Industries During 2004–2010 (cont.) 
  
Leverage EBIT margin Asset turnover 
Industries No. of SOEs Publicly listed Unrestricted Restricted Publicly listed Unrestricted Restricted Publicly listed Unrestricted Restricted 
Farming & fishery 6 
 
0.67 0.04 
 
-0.22 0.07 
 
0.55 1.42 
Plantation 15 
 
0.12 
  
0.10 
  
0.93 
 Forestry 6 
  
0.09 
  
-0.01 
  
0.36 
Mining 7 0.04 0.11 0.05 0.23 0.11 0.09 1.03 0.80 1.46 
Retail & garment 5 
 
0.11 
  
-0.04 
  
1.28 
 Heavy industry 12 
 
0.21 0.27 
 
0.00 0.04 
 
0.67 0.80 
Chemical and pharmaceutical 8 0.09 0.40 0.06 0.06 -0.08 0.16 1.49 0.52 0.91 
Property, logistic and tourism 13 
 
0.03 0.23 
 
0.11 0.03 
 
0.85 0.53 
Building construction 7 0.08 0.16 
 
0.07 0.05 
 
1.27 1.24 
 Energy, telecommunication and electronic 
(Public Utilities) 6 0.22 0.12 0.09 0.22 0.04 0.01 0.57 0.95 0.40 
Infrastructure 8 0.11 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.14 0.06 0.22 0.43 0.31 
Transportation 9 
 
0.18 0.04 
 
-0.04 -0.17 
 
1.06 0.75 
Consultation & certification 11 
 
0.24 0.00 
 
0.07 -0.04 
 
1.29 0.32 
Banking 5 0.02 0.16 
 
0.03 0.03 
 
0.07 0.05 
 Finance 7 
 
0.37 0.48 
 
0.07 0.07 
 
0.23 0.28 
Insurance 9 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
0.07 0.07 
 
0.25 0.48 
Paper & media 6 
 
0.24 0.03 
 
-0.14 -0.01 
 
0.67 0.55 
Total 140 0.08 0.17 0.10 0.13 0.05 0.02 0.79 0.82 0.67 
 
Source: Indonesian SOE financial and annual reports 2003–2010. 
Notes: The calculation for this result is: ROA = EBIT divided by total assets; ROE= EAT divided by average equity (equity t + equity t-1); EBIT margin = EBIT divided by total sales; operating profit return = operating 
income divided by total assets; operating profit margin = operating income divided by total sales; asset turnover = total sales divided by total assets; net income = total profitability during the period; operating 
income = gross profit net after deduction of operating expenses; revenue = total of firm income from sales; total assets = total of company assets; leverage = total debts divided by total assets; equity value: for non-
privatised SOEs is calculated from total assets minus total liabilities, for publicly listed SOEs is calculated from total share multiplied by share price. 
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Table 10.9 presents SOEs’ mean available social welfare representative financial performance based 
on groups and industries. Taxes and dividends were the two main SOE contributions to the state 
budget, while CSR fund, labour cost and employment intensity represented the other social welfare 
or non-economic objectives. Focusing exclusively on tax and dividend contributions, Table 10.9 
shows that non-privatised SOEs with privatisation restrictions found it difficult to meet these 
expectations. High reliance on external funds made it difficult for farming and fishery, public utilities, 
property and logistics, transportation, and insurance non-privatised SOEs to contribute through 
taxes. These groups of SOEs had a negative mean effective tax rate. Non-privatised SOEs with 
privatisation restrictions in public utilities had the smallest mean effective tax rate when interest 
was included in the measurement, while non-privatised SOEs with privatisation restrictions in 
property and logistics had the smallest mean effective tax rate when interest was excluded in the 
measurement. This performance supports the prior analysis that interest plays an important role in 
determining Indonesian SOEs’ financial performance. Besides taxes, SOEs were required to 
contribute through dividend payments. The influence of interest is shown in both dividend rate 
calculations, as the mean dividend rate was better when interest was excluded from the 
measurement. Publicly listed SOEs in mining and banking had the largest mean dividend rate, while 
non-privatised SOEs with privatisation restrictions in insurance had the lowest mean effective tax 
and dividend rates when interest was excluded in the measurement (-6.79 and 7.28 respectively). 
Besides state budget contributions, SOEs were required to contribute to community development 
and employment. Non-privatised SOEs with privatisation restrictions in public utilities had the 
largest mean number of employees (average of 45,645), while non-privatised SOEs with privatisation 
restrictions in the consultant and certification group had the smallest mean number of employees 
(average of 38). The small number of employees meant that SOEs in this group had the highest 
employment intensity performance among other SOEs. This number of SOEs also indicates that 
Indonesian SOEs were labour-intensive companies that were considered part of the government’s 
requirement regarding employment expectations. For CSR fund performance, publicly listed SOEs in 
banking had the highest mean CSR fund performance, while non-privatisation SOEs without 
privatisation restrictions in transportation had the smallest mean CSR fund performance. 
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Table 10.9: Mean Performance of SOEs’ Social Welfare Representative Financial Performance during 2004–2010 Based on Group and Industry 
  
Effective Tax1 Effective Tax2 Dividend Rate1 Dividend Rate2 
Industries 
No. of 
SOEs 
Publicly 
listed Unrestricted Restricted 
Publicly 
listed Unrestricted Restricted 
Publicly 
listed Unrestricted Restricted 
Publicly 
listed Unrestricted Restricted 
Farming & fishery 6 
 
-0.51 0.33 
 
-0.33 0.18 
 
0.00 0.08 
 
0.00 0.09 
Plantation 15 
 
0.21 
  
0.40 
  
0.07 
  
0.11 
 Forestry 6 
  
0.05 
  
0.33 
  
0.01 
  
0.01 
Mining 7 0.31 0.13 0.28 1.12 0.16 0.27 0.30 0.06 0.34 0.43 0.07 0.34 
Retail & garment 5 
 
-0.65 
  
2.06 
  
0.02 
  
3.00 
 Heavy industry 12 
 
0.06 0.27 
 
0.04 0.30 
 
0.00 0.27 
 
0.01 0.13 
Chemical and 
pharmaceutical 8 0.23 -0.08 0.35 0.52 0.02 0.37 0.07 0.00 0.16 0.08 0.01 0.17 
Property, logistic and 
tourism 13 
 
0.14 0.05 
 
0.72 -0.50 
 
0.10 0.06 
 
0.10 0.02 
Building construction 7 0.24 0.22 
 
0.33 0.31 
 
0.13 0.12 
 
0.19 0.14 
 Energy, telecommunication 
and electronic (public 
Utilise)  6 0.26 -0.01 -11.84 0.30 -0.05 -0.27 0.29 0.08 0.04 0.34 0.13 0.04 
Infrastructure 8 0.15 0.28 0.00 0.23 0.26 0.12 0.18 0.28 0.23 0.22 0.26 0.16 
Transportation 9 
 
0.43 -0.13 
 
0.10 -0.02 
 
0.01 0.00 
 
0.01 0.00 
Consultation & certification 11 
 
0.43 0.01 
 
0.06 0.02 
 
0.07 0.00 
 
0.08 0.00 
Banking 5 0.34 0.36 
 
0.37 0.31 
 
0.49 0.26 
 
0.34 0.25 
 Finance 7 
 
0.13 0.31 
 
0.18 0.30 
 
0.24 0.16 
 
0.15 0.15 
Insurance 9 
 
0.27 -6.79 
 
0.23 0.08 
 
0.28 -7.28 
 
0.24 0.09 
Paper & media 6 
 
0.01 0.16 
 
0.14 0.05 
 
0.03 0.16 
 
0.04 0.16 
Total 140 0.28 0.15 -0.97 0.60 0.34 0.10 0.29 0.10 -0.70 0.31 0.27 0.09 
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Table 10.9: Mean Performance of SOEs’ Social Welfare Representative Financial Performance During 2004–2010 Based on Group and Industry (cont.) 
  
Employment intensity Number of employees Labour cost CSR fund 
Industries 
No. of 
SOEs 
Publicly 
listed Unrestricted Restricted Publicly listed Unrestricted Restricted 
Publicly 
listed Unrestricted Restricted 
Publicly 
listed Unrestricted Restricted 
Farming & fishery 6 
  
0.05 
  
882.5 
  
32.14 
  
0.36 
Plantation 15 
 
0.01 
  
18121.53 
  
166.14 
  
7.56 
 Forestry 6 
  
0.03 
  
2056.69 
  
42.10 
   Mining 7 0.00 0.19 0.00 4293.47 503.15 21541.50 279.02 20.41 3815.26 18.22 1.36 
 Retail & garment 5 
 
0.05 
  
1584.44 
  
23.68 
  
0.29 
 Heavy industry 12 
 
0.04 0.01 
 
3510.76 1925.52 
 
90.39 50.45 
 
4.99 0.52 
Chemical and pharmaceutical 8 0.01 0.02 0.01 3465.13 1458.53 6894.13 118.36 24.38 596.12 0.80 0.24 21.53 
Property, logistic and tourism 13 
 
0.08 0.00 
 
794.48 12906.14 
 
13.25 422.63 
 
0.51 0.26 
Building construction 7 0.00 0.00 
 
1452.67 907.89 
 
101.35 43.42 
 
1.99 1.26 
 Energy, telecommunication 
and electronic (public Utilise)  6 0.00 0.08 0.00 14222.63 387.05 45645.63 3786.19 20.98 7812.43 28.52 0.34 
 Infrastructure 8 0.00 0.00 0.01 5452.75 2620.59 2994.64 234.42 195.74 321.92 17.36 8.01 11.36 
Transportation 9 
 
0.01 0.03 
 
4639.72 12351.09 
 
542.18 249.38 
 
0.07 0.24 
Consultation & certification 11 
 
0.10 0.39 
 
791.26 38.00 
 
37.74 1.09 
 
0.41 
 Banking 5 0.00 0.00 
 
23728.44 1573.36 
 
3552.75 268.02 
 
113.89 5.44 
 Finance 7 
 
0.02 0.00 
 
266.24 9715.25 
 
164.16 695.72 
 
1.42 5.21 
Insurance 9 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
927.24 2320.16 
 
117.66 353.23 
 
2.19 11.87 
Paper & media 6 
 
0.07 0.07 
 
362.20 1276.50 
 
4.01 23.49 
 
0.08 1.40 
Total 140 0.00 0.04 0.03 10027.13 4911.68 6225.66 1565.35 112.18 538.29 36.24 3.71 7.28 
 
Source: Indonesian SOE financial and annual reports 2003–2010. 
Notes: Effective tax rate 1 = tax divided by EBIT; effective tax rate 2 = tax divided by EBT; dividend rate 1 = dividend payment divided by EBIT; dividend rate 2 = dividend payment divided by EBT; CSR = company’s 
contribution for community development, usually around 0.5–1 per cent of profit; employment intensity = natural log of employees divided by sales; labour costs = total labour cost including salary allowances and 
all human resources costs; leverage = total debt divided by total assets. 
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10.3 The Relations between Objectives and Performance 
This chapter presents the first method that was employed: two-sample t-test. The other method, 
regression test, is presented in Chapter 11. The test aims to examine whether there are differences 
between two groups of SOEs with and without the objectives of SOEs’ performance. As mentioned in 
Chapters 5 and 10, 26 objectives were combined to give a total of 21 objectives in order to obtain 
sufficient data. Seventeen financial performance indicators were used based on the sufficient data 
to be measured or represent the objectives. In this section, the objectives are categorised as 
economic or financial objectives and social welfare or non-economic objectives. There are seven 
economic or financial objectives and 14 social welfare or non-economic objectives. The test focuses 
on examining differences in SOEs’ performance between two groups of SOEs with and without the 
objectives for α = 0.05 or 1.9647. 
Table 10.10 shows whether the government-stated economic or financial objectives made a 
difference to SOEs’ performance. Focusing exclusively on the potential for conflicting or 
complementary government-stated economic or financial objectives, potential conflicts occur when 
the objectives generate negative effects or prevent SOEs from showing better performance. In 
contrast, the government-stated economic or financial objectives potentially complement SOEs’ 
performance when the result is positive. A positive result means that the objectives generates or 
improves SOEs’ performance. SOEs’ performance in Table 10.10 shows differences between two 
groups of SOEs. The government-stated profit and efficiency objectives differentiate most SOEs’ 
financial performance, except ROE, asset turnover and leverage. The government-stated profit 
objective distinguishes SOEs’ operating profit margin, operating profit return, operating income, 
ROA, EBIT margin, liability, market/book value of equity and net income performance, and the 
objective may worsen SOEs’ performance. The government-stated efficiency objective distinguishes 
SOEs’ operating profit margin, operating profit return, ROA and EBIT margin. The objective is 
associated positively with SOEs’ performance. The government-stated efficiency objective also 
differentiates SOEs’ operating income, net income, liability and market/book value of equity. The 
objective shows negative effects on these performances. The other government-stated economic or 
financial objectives, such as compliance with corporate principles, corporate value and reputation 
improvement, environment and resource utilisation, and technology and research objectives, 
differentiate some SOEs’ performance. The objectives, except the government-stated objectives for 
environment and resources utilisation, and quality, tend to be positively associated with most SOEs’ 
financial performance. The government-stated environment and resources utilisation objectives 
generate have a negative effect on SOEs’ operating profit return, while the government-stated 
quality objective has a negative effect on asset turnover and liability performance.  
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Table 10.10: Two Sample t-test Results of SOEs’ Mean Performance and Government-Stated 
Economic or Financial Objectives during 2004–2010 
  
Objectives 
Operating profit  return Operating income Operating profit Margin Net Income  Number of SOEs 
T-stat p T-stat p T-stat p T-stat p 
With  
the 
Objective 
Without 
the 
Objective 
Profit -2.6032 0.0108 -3.4250 0.0010 -2.1691 0.0312 -2.0620 0.0425 11 129 
Efficiency 3.2249 0.0029 -2.4566 0.0200 2.6068 0.0129 -2.4755 0.0199 5 135 
Corporate principle 2.9230 0.0053 0.2848 0.7770 2.1581 0.0348 2.4650 0.0176 7 134 
Corporate value and reputation -0.7493 0.4650 7.2270 0.0000 -1.0344 0.3036 6.1202 0.0000 1 139 
Environment and resources utilisation -2.6032 0.0108 7.4411 0.0000 -0.6995 0.4860 6.2924 0.0000 1 139 
Technology and research 5.1513 0.0000 7.5814 0.0000 0.3052 0.7603 6.3685 0.0000 1 139 
Quality -0.0883 0.9302 -0.4013 0.6911 -0.0381 0.9697 2.1478 0.0404 5 135 
 
 
  
Objectives 
ROA ROE EBIT Margin  Leverage  Number of SOEs 
T-stat p T-stat p T-stat p T-stat p 
With 
 the 
Objectives 
Without the 
Objectives 
Profit -2.3624 0.0203 -1.1552 0.2495 -2.3556 0.0206 1.0244 0.3084 11 129 
Efficiency  3.1043 0.0040 -0.3450 0.7321 3.1081 0.0040 -0.4986 0.6216 5 135 
Corporate principle 2.4394 0.0185 0.8041 0.4259 2.4450 0.0182 1.1311 0.2636 7 134 
Corporate value and reputation -1.6877 0.1122 0.3175 0.7510 -1.6817 0.1133 5.0875 0.0001 1 139 
Environment and resources utilisation -0.1240 0.9020 -0.1183 0.9066 -0.1168 0.9077 4.8808 0.0000 1 139 
Technology and research  5.2571 0.0000 1.0668 0.2866 5.2681 0.0000 21.0068 0.0000 1 139 
Quality -1.0007 0.3240 0.7955 0.4333 -0.9930 0.3277 7.7964 0.0000 5 135 
Objectives 
Asset turnover Leverage Market/book value of equity Liability Number of SOEs 
T-stat p T-stat p T-stat p T-stat p 
With  
the 
Objective 
Without the 
Objective 
Profit -2.6913 0.0085 1.0244 0.3084 -5.1032 0.0000 -4.3270 0.0000 11 129 
Efficiency -2.7217 0.0104 -0.4986 0.6216 -2.5346 0.0167 -2.2501 0.0317 5 135 
Corporate principle 0.0284 0.9775 1.1311 0.2636 -2.6422 0.0114 -1.7500 0.0870 7 134 
Corporate value and reputation -0.7574 0.4619 5.0875 0.0001 7.6197 0.0000 7.6639 0.0000 1 139 
Environment and resources utilisation 1.0671 0.2944 4.8808 0.0000 7.8322 0.0000 7.7038 0.0000 1 139 
Technology and research -2.6793 0.0174 21.0068 0.0000 7.8900 0.0000 7.6438 0.0000 1 139 
Quality -2.2866 0.0293 7.7964 0.0000 -2.9627 0.0061 -2.2152 0.0349 5 135 
Source: Indonesian SOE financial and annual reports 2003–2010. 
Notes: The calculation for this result is: ROA = EBIT divided by total assets; ROE = EAT divided by equity (equity t + equity t-1);  
EBIT margin = EBIT divided by total sales; operating profit return= operating income divided by total asset; 
 operating profit  margin = operating income divided by total sales; asset turnover = total sales divided by total assets;  
net income = total earning after tax and interest during the period of study; operating income = gross profit net after deduction of operating 
expenses; revenue = total of firm income from sales; total assets = total of company assets; leverage = total debts divided by total assets.  
The objectives were collected and calculated as a dummy variable, 1 when the SOE holds the government-stated objective and  
0 when the SOE does not hold the objective 
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Table 10.11 presents the two-sample t-test result of SOEs’ social welfare representative financial 
performance relations with the government-stated economic or financial objectives. Effective tax 
rates, dividend rates, CSR fund, labour cost and employment intensity were the social welfare 
representative financial performances that were employed to test their relations with the 
government-stated economic or financial objectives. As shown in Table 10.11, none of the 
government-stated economic or financial objectives differentiated SOEs’ effective tax rate 
performance. In contrast, all government-stated economic or financial objectives distinguished SOEs’ 
CSR fund performance. The objectives, except the government-stated profit objective, were 
associated positively with SOEs’ CSR fund performance. The government-stated profit objective had 
a negative effect on SOEs’ dividend rate when interest was excluded from the measurement. The 
government-stated technology and research objective was associated positively with SOEs’ dividend 
rate when interest was excluded from the measurement. Besides tax, dividend and CSR, 
employment was another social welfare objective that SOEs were required to achieve. Table 10.11 
shows that SOEs’ labour cost performance was distinguished by most government-stated economic 
or financial objectives, except the government-stated efficiency objective. The government-stated 
objectives for profit, quality, and compliance with corporate principles had a negative effect on 
SOEs’ labour cost performance. Meanwhile, the government-stated objectives for corporate value 
and reputation improvement, environment and resources utilisation, and technology and research 
purposes differentiated SOEs’ labour cost performance and might be associated positively with 
performance. The government-stated objectives for profit, and corporate value and reputation 
improvement differentiated SOEs’ employment intensity. The other objectives were positively 
associated with SOEs’ employment intensity performance. 
Table 10.11: Two-Sample t-test Result of SOEs’ Social Welfare Representative Performance and 
Government-Stated Economic or Financial Objectives during 2004–2010 
Objectives 
Effective tax rate 1 Effective tax rate 2 Dividend rate 1 Dividend rate 2 Number of SOEs  
T-stat p T-stat p T-stat p T-stat p 
With the 
Objective 
Without the 
Objective 
Profit 0.6878 0.4936 -1.3597 0.1778 -1.2523 0.2108 -2.1926 0.0314 11 129 
Efficiency  -0.8894 0.3740 -1.0256 0.3133 -0.8803 0.3789 0.8390 0.4074 5 135 
Corporate principle 0.9291 0.3580 1.7133 0.0912 -0.6712 0.5023 4.7573 0.0000 7 134 
Corporate value and reputation -1.3566 0.1753 0.3383 0.7383 -0.9344 0.3520 -0.8263 0.4234 1 139 
Environment and resources utilisation -1.1657 0.2440 1.1927 0.2346 -0.8163 0.4145 1.4053 0.1704 1 139 
Technology and research -1.6333 0.1158 0.8973 0.3728 -0.7122 0.4765 4.6740 0.0001 1 139 
Quality 0.9026 0.3744 0.5518 0.5845 -0.9474 0.3437 0..1476 0.8836 5 135 
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Table 10.11: Two-Sample t-test Result of SOEs’ Social Welfare Representative Performance and 
Government-Stated Economic or Financial Objectives during 2004–2010 (cont.) 
Objectives 
Labour cost Employment intensity CSR fund Number of SOEs 
T-stat p T-stat p T-stat p 
With the 
Objective 
Without the 
Objective 
Profit -4.1116 0.0001 6.1706 0.0000 -2.2959 0.0265 11 129 
Efficiency  -1.6266 0.1157 0.2280 0.8212 6.6917 0.0000 5 135 
Corporate principle -22901 0.0270 -0.6071 0.5468 6.4977 0.0000 7 134 
Corporate value and reputation 7.7837 0.0000 6.9374 0.0000 6.4493 0.0000 1 139 
Environment and resources utilisation 8.4121 0.0000 -2.4220 0.0320 6.5014 0.0000 1 139 
Technology and research 9.3557 0.0000 -1.7146 0.1017 6.6892 0.0000 1 139 
Quality -2.7754 0.0101 -0.1905 0.8501 6.3206 0.0000 5 135 
 
Source: Indonesian SOE financial and annual reports 2003–2010. 
Notes: The calculations for these results are: Effective tax rate 1 = Tax divided by EBIT; Effective tax rate 2 = Tax divided by EBT; 
Employment intensity = Natural log employees divided by sales; Dividend rate 1 = Dividend payment divided by EBIT; Dividend rate 2 = 
Dividend payment divided by EBT; CSR = The company contribution for community development, usually around 0.5–1 per cent of profit; 
Labour cost = Total labour costs including salary, allowances and all human resources costs; Leverage = Total debt divided by total assets. 
The objectives were collected and calculated as a dummy variable; 1 when the SOE holds the government-stated objective and 0 when the 
SOE does not hold the objective. 
 
 
Tables 10.12 and 10.13 present the two-sample t-tests result of the relations between the 
government-stated social welfare or non-economic objectives and SOEs’ financial performance. 
Focusing exclusively on Table 10.12, the government’s social welfare or non-economic objectives 
had less effect on SOEs’ financial performance. The government-stated provision of public goods and 
services objective, for example, only differentiated SOEs’ liability, asset turnover, and leverage 
performance. The objective had a negative effect on SOEs’ liability performance, and it had a 
positive effect on SOEs’ leverage and asset turnover performance. The government-stated national 
economic improvement objective differentiated asset turnover and market/book value of equity. 
The objective worsened SOEs’ asset turnover and market/book value of equity. Meanwhile, the 
government-stated national development objective distinguished the same performance, and it was 
positively associated with SOEs’ asset turnover and market/book value of equity. Both the 
government-stated objectives for national security and industrialisation differentiated operating 
profit return, net income, EBIT margin, operating profit margin, and ROA, and they might 
complement SOEs’ performance. 
As part of the government-stated social welfare or non-economic objectives, SOEs were required to 
focus on community development. The government-stated objectives for community development 
and community prosperity distinguished the operating profit return, EBIT margin, ROA and net 
income. These objectives positively complemented SOEs’ performance. The government-stated 
community development objective had a negative effect on SOEs’ operating income and net income, 
while the government-stated community prosperity objective might have worsened SOEs’ asset 
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turnover performance. The government-stated provision of community needs objective 
differentiated SOEs’ operating income and net income. The objective had a positive effect on these 
performances. Meanwhile, this government objective had a negative effect on SOEs’ asset turnover 
performance. 
As part of the government body, SOEs were also required to contribute to the state budget and 
support the government’s activities. The government-stated objectives for compliance with 
government policy and provision of special needs distinguished SOEs’ operating income, net income, 
liability, operating profit margin, asset turnover, and market/book value of equity. These objectives 
had a negative effect on SOEs’ operating profit margin and asset turnover. In contrast, they 
positively complemented the other performances. The government-stated compliance with 
government policy objective had a negative effect on SOEs’ operating profit return. The 
government-stated state budget contribution objective distinguished SOEs’ liability and asset 
turnover performance, and it might have worsened these SOEs’ performance. 
Table 10.12: Two-Sample t-test Result of the Relations between SOEs’ Financial Performance and 
Government-Stated Social Welfare or Non-Economic Objectives during 2004–2010 
Objectives 
Operating profit return Operating income Operating profit  margin  Net Income Number of SOEs  
T-stat P T-stat P T-stat P T-stat P 
With the 
Objective 
Without the 
Objective 
Provision of public goods and services -1.7375 0.0827 0.1039 09173 -0.0776 0.9382 0.7321 0.4644 81 59 
National economic 1.3331 0.1828 -1.8674 0.0623 1.3157 0.1886 -1.3222 0.1867 52 88 
National development 1.1925 0.2347 1.8869 0.0596 1.4661 0.1447 0.6374 0.5241 18 122 
National security 3.1502 0.0035 3.9080 0.0001 2.0363 0.0500 3.3249 0.0011 4 136 
Industrialisation 3.1139 0.0023 1.2673 0.2067 2.2888 0.0236 2.7612 0.0067 14 126 
OHS 1.2307 0.2192 1.2534 0.2106 1.8344 0.0676 -0.0726 0.9422 20 120 
Community development 5.3552 0.0000 -2.2381 0.0303 3.2154 0.0024 -2.2308 0.0308 11 129 
Community prosperity 3.0763 0.0023 -1.6605 0.0980 1.3332 0.1830 -0.6073 0.5442 31 109 
Community needs 1.6647 0.0966 2.3135 0.0209 0.3012 0.7633 2.9769 0.0030 37 103 
Government policy  -2.0844 0.0430 5.0779 0.0000 -3.1330 0.0022 4.4042 0.0000 7 133 
Government special needs -1.0759 0.2884 6.0580 0.0000 -3.1707 0.0020 5.1950 0.0000 5 135 
State budget -0.7955 0.4315 0.2968 0.7678 -0.4511 0.6536 -0.5685 0.5724 5 135 
Market supply and stabilisation  2.7241 0.0108 -0.3664 0.7168 -2.1910 0.0335 2.2040 0.0361 2 138 
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Table 10.12: Two-Sample t-test Result of the Relations between SOEs’ Financial Performance and 
Government-Stated Social Welfare or Non-Economic Objectives during 2004–2010 
 
Objectives 
ROA ROE Leverage  Number of SOEs 
T-stat p T-stat p T-stat p 
With the 
Objective 
Without the 
Objective 
Provision of public goods and 
services -1.7956 0.0729 -1.3720 0.1709 6.2510 0.0000 81 59 
National economic 1.1956 0.2322 0.7620 0.4465 0.3313 0.7405 52 88 
National development 0.9410 0.3480 1.0288 0.3054 4.6602 0.0000 18 122 
National security 3.2882 0.0024 -0.0401 0.9682 -1.7954 0.0815 4 136 
Industrialisation 3.2395 0.0015 1.1548 0.2508 -3.9884 0.0001 14 126 
OHS 1.2072 0.2282 -0.7549 0.4510 -0.0436 0.9653 20 120 
Community development 5.1305 0.0000 0.6460 0.5218 -0.5941 0.5555 11 129 
Community prosperity 2.8616 0.0045 -0.5648 0.5725 -1.6406 0.1016 31 109 
Community needs 1.4354 0.1518 -0.8753 0.3819 -1.1805 0.2383 37 103 
Government policy  -1.9924 0.0526 1.0515 0.2993 0.4597 0.6477 7 133 
Government special needs -1.1449 0.2590 -0.5691 0.5699 2.8216 0.0070 5 135 
State budget -0.7324 0.4686 -1.1547 0.2535 -1.5533 0.1313 5 135 
Market supply and stabilisation  2.7843 0.0093 -0.2659 0.7908 0.5789 0.5670 2 138 
Source: Indonesian SOE financial and annual reports 2003–2010. 
Notes: The calculation for this result is: ROA = EBIT divided by total assets; ROE  = EAT divided by equity (equity t + equity t-1); EBIT margin = 
EBIT divided by total sales; operating profit return = opeating income divided by total sales’ operating profit margin = operating income 
divided by total sales; asset turnover = total sales divided by total assets; net income = total earning after tax and interest during the period 
of study; operating income = gross profit net after deduction of operating expenses; revenue = total of firm income from sales; total assets = 
total of company assets; leverage = total debts divided by total assets.The objectives were collected and calculated as a dummy variable, 1 
when the SOE holds the government-stated objective and 0 when the SOE does not hold the objective. 
 
 
 
Objectives 
Market Value of Equity EBIT Margin Liability  Asset Turnover  Number of SOEs 
T-stat P T-stat P T-stat P T-stat P 
With the 
Objective 
Without the 
Objective 
Provision of public goods and services -0.3478 0.7281 -1.850 0.0699 -2.2152 0.0349 5.6571 0.0000 81 59 
National economic -4.5745 0.0000 1.2158 0.2244 -2.6359 0.0086 -3.5399 0.0004 52 88 
National development 2.2964 0.0220 0.8934 0.3729 -0.2812 0.7788 2.4426 0.0154 18 122 
National security 2.6712 0.0093 3.2906 0.0024 5.3361 0.0000 2.8102 0.0081 4 136 
Industrialisation -2.0540 0.0425 3.2477 0.0015 -0.4717 0.6380 -1.5128 0.1327 14 126 
OHS 1.0368 0.3006 1.2208 0.2230 -0.0853 0.9321 -7.4861 0.0000 20 120 
Community development -2.2210 0.0315 5.1354 0.000 -1.8790 0.0665 1.1792 0.2444 11 129 
Community prosperity -3.6713 0.0003 2.8784 0.0043 -0.5568 0.5780 -6.0714 0.0000 31 109 
Community needs -1.8430 0.0663 1.4506 0.1475 1.5619 0.1187 -3.7926 0.0002 37 103 
Government policy  4.9759 0.0000 -1.9888 0.0530 6.2711 0.0000 -3.9677 0.0002 7 133 
Government special needs 6.9620 0.0000 -1.1417 0.2603 6.9264 0.0000 -3.4358 0.0013 5 135 
State budget 1.1658 0.2483 -0.7292 0.4706 6.5257 0.0000 -2.2799 0.0278 5 135 
Market supply and stabilisation  -2.9717 0.0061 2.7888 0.0092 -2.2640 0.0317 1.2890 0.2079 2 138 
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Table 10.13 shows the two-sample t-test result of the relations between the government-stated 
social welfare or non-economic objectives and SOEs’ social welfare representative performance. 
Similar to the result shown in Table 10.12, none of the social welfare or non-economic objectives 
affected the effective tax rate performance. The government-stated objectives for industrialisation, 
community prosperity improvement and provision of community needs distinguished the dividend 
rate when interest was excluded from the measurement. These objectives positively complemented 
the dividend rate performance. The government-stated objectives for industrialisation, compliance 
with government policy, community development, and market supply and stabilisation 
differentiated SOEs’ CSR fund performance. These objectives had a positive effect on SOEs’ CSR fund 
performance. Meanwhile, the government-stated objectives for provision of public utilities, national 
economic improvement, and market supply and stabilisation differentiated SOEs’ labour cost and 
might have worsened their performance. In contrast, the government-stated objectives for national 
security, compliance with government policy and provision of government needs had a positive 
relation with SOEs’ labour cost performance. While the government-stated objectives for national 
development and compliance with government policy might prevent SOEs from improving their 
employment intensity performance, the government-stated objectives for provision of public 
utilities, provision of government needs, state budget contribution, and market supply and 
stabilisation had a positive effect on SOEs’ employment intensity performance. 
Table 10.13: Two-Sample t-test Result of the Relations between SOEs’ Social Welfare 
Representative Performance and Government-Stated Social Welfare or Non-Economic Objectives 
during 2004–2010 
 
  
Objectives 
Effective tax rate 1 Effective tax rate 2 Dividend rate 1 Dividend rate 2 Number of SOEs 
T-stat p T-stat p T-stat p T-stat p 
With the 
Objective 
Without the 
Objective 
Provision of public goods and services 1.2697 0.2046 0.4746 0.6353 0.9387 0.3483 -2.6677 0.0078 81 59 
National economic -0.3975 0.6911 -0.4965 0.6197 -0.9533 0.3408 0.5558 0.5785 52 88 
National development -1.2828 0.1999 0.3420 0.7325 -0.9944 0.3203 0.6783 0.4982 18 122 
National security -1.1983 0.2311 1.3723 0.1724 -1.3030 0.1930 -0.2237 0.8243 4 136 
Industrialisation 0.8326 0.4068 2.6998 0.0072 -0.7416 0.4585 2.3356 0.0209 14 126 
OHS -1.0135 0.3111 1.0517 0.2937 -0.8321 0.4056 2.7039 0.0071 20 120 
Community development -1.3893 0.1657 1.5741 0.1198 -0.8718 0.3836 1.2142 0.2300 11 129 
Community prosperity 0.3626 0.7171 0.5161 0.6061 -0.8222 0.4113 2.9821 0.0030 31 109 
Community needs 1.2313 0.2194 1.4778 0.1399 1.0350 0.3017 2.8869 0.0040 37 103 
Government policy  -0.5483 0.5842 -0.0251 0.9800 -1.4001 0.1619 -0.7119 0.4804 7 133 
Government special needs -1.6219 0.1051 0.2656 0.7908 -1.5739 0.1160 -1.9527 0.0578 5 135 
State budget -1.2204 0.2227 -1.2634 0.2147 -1.1675 0.2433 -1.2915 0.2054 5 135 
Market supply and stabilisation  0.9701 0.3408 1.5059 0.1418 -1.1784 0.2389 -0.4636 0.6468 2 138 
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Table 10.13: Two-Sample t-test Result of the Relations between SOEs’ Social Welfare 
Representative Performance and Government-Stated Social Welfare or Non-Economic Objectives 
during 2004–2010 
Objectives 
Employment intensity Labour cost CSR fund Number of SOEs  
T-stat p T-stat p T-stat p With the objective Without the objective 
Provision of public goods and services 2.1456 0.0325 -3.3285 0.0009 -1.3685 0.1719 81 59 
National economic -1.5258 0.1277 -2.4679 0.0139 0.0728 0.9420 52 88 
National development -2.2917 0.0235 1.1493 0.2513 0.3001 0.7646 18 122 
National security -0.4618 0.6476 7.5763 0.0000 0.4296 0.6732 4 136 
Industrialisation 1.1979 0.2333 -1.5099 0.1341 4.6878 0.0000 14 126 
OHS 1.6437 0.1014 0.4284 0.0669 -0.7154 0.4768 20 120 
Community development 1.1211 0.2714 -1.2973 0.2021 6.5719 0.0000 11 129 
Community prosperity -1.3052 0.1929 -1.7433 0.0824 1.9334 0.0548 31 109 
Community needs -1.5634 0.1190 -0.3122 0.7550 0.9891 0.3235 37 103 
Government policy  -3.3011 0.0020 3.0166 0.0031 4.0106 0.0001 7 133 
Government special needs 4.8015 0.0000 2.4020 0.0179 5.6041 0.0000 5 135 
State budget 8.3894 0.0000 5.9321 0.0000 -0.8605 0.3976 5 135 
Market supply and stabilisation  6.0996 0.0000 -2.7634 0.0106 6.6482 0.0000 2 138 
Source: Indonesian SOE financial and annual reports 2003–2010. 
Notes: The calculations for these results are: effective tax rate 1 = tax divided by EBIT; effective tax rate 2 = tax divided by EBT;  
employment intensity = natural log employees divided by sales; dividend rate 1 = dividend payment divided by EBIT;  
dividend rate 2 = dividend payment divided by EBT; CSR = company’s contribution to community development, usually around 0.5–1 per cent 
of profit; labour cost = total labour costs including salary, allowances and all human resources costs; leverage = total debt divided by total 
assets. The objectives were collected and calculated as a dummy variable, 1 when the SOE holds the government-stated objective  and 0 
when the SOE does not hold the objective. 
 
 
10.4 Finding and Discussion 
This section aims to examine hypothesis two; that is, whether changes to SOEs and new privatised 
firms’ objectives and business activities as the result of the privatisation policy improve SOEs and 
new privatised firms’ performance. The previous chapters showed that the objectives are 
theoretically in conflict, and that the potential conflict occurs when the government changes the 
policies by introducing profit and efficiency objectives. Chapters 8 and 9 discussed the government’s 
resistance to, and inconsistency in, implementing the new policy or making changes to SOEs’ 
objectives. As evidence, only 11 SOEs held the government-stated profit objective, while only 4 held 
the government-stated efficiency objective. The government-stated social welfare or non-economic 
objectives remained dominant or occurred more frequently as part of SOEs’ objectives compared to 
economic or financial objectives. Previous findings in Section 10.1 also showed that the government 
altered its objectives within 10 SOEs. In practice, only one SOE experienced the introduction of the 
profit objective. The rest of the SOEs experienced changes in their social welfare or non-economic 
objectives. Based on these findings, the relations were examined to estimate whether the objectives 
showed relations or effects on SOEs’ financial performance. This also indicates that Indonesian SOEs 
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are based on labour intensive which is influenced by the government objective regarding the 
employment.  
Section 10.2 indicated that Indonesian SOEs’ poor and inefficient performance resulted from their 
heavy reliance on external financial support and non-core business incomes. Most of the external 
financial support was short-term loans that may generate high interest. As most SOEs were 
obligated to pay interest, they found it difficult to contribute to the state budget and community 
development. This situation was supported by the small to negative performance of tax, dividends 
and CSR funds. Meanwhile, employment remained the problem of SOEs when overstaffing led to 
poor productivity, as shown in SOEs’ employment intensity. 
The tests showed different results compared to the prior qualitative findings in Chapters 8 and 9 
regarding the relations between the government-stated objectives and SOEs’ performance. Further 
tests indicated the relations between the objectives and SOEs’ performance, even though the 
numbers were limited. Tables 10.10–10.13 show that some objectives do not have relations with 
SOEs’ performance. Two of the government’s major concerns—profit and efficiency expectations as 
part of the new government policies and objectives—had a limited influence on SOEs’ financial 
performance. This result is different from hypothesis two’s expectation that changes to SOEs and 
new privatised firms’ objectives as a result of introducing the profit and efficiency objective would 
improve SOEs or privatised firms’ performance. 
Chapters 7–9 showed that the government remained concerned about the social welfare and non-
economic objectives. These two sample t-test results differed from hypotheses one and two’s 
expectations in this thesis, which expected that the introduction of the privatisation policy would 
alter the government’s objectives. The role of SOEs as government vehicles regarding the provision 
of public utilities and national economic development became part of the government-stated 
objectives for SOEs. The test results showed limited relations between the government-stated 
objectives for provision of public utilities and national economic matters with SOEs’ financial 
performance. From these limited relations, the results indicated that the objectives tended to 
generate negative effects on SOEs’ financial performance. These results support earlier studies 
regarding SOEs’ social welfare duties, which tended to prevent SOEs from being profitable or 
efficient (Bai et al., 2000; Boycko et al., 1996). The government-stated objectives for community 
development matters showed positive relations with SOEs’ financial performance. This result is 
explained by the Indonesian government’s requirement for SOEs to spend a portion of their profits 
on community development programs. Meanwhile, the analysis showed that none of the 
government-stated objectives had relations with SOEs’ social welfare representative financial 
performance unless the SOEs had external financial support. This was shown in the positive result in 
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the relations between the objectives and SOEs’ effective tax and dividend rates when interest was 
not part of the measurement. 
In summary, the Indonesian government’s inconsistency in, and resistance to, making changes 
regarding its government-stated objectives for each SOE had two implications. The first consequence 
was potential conflicting objectives, which appeared because the government resisted removing 
social welfare and non-economic objectives as part of its stated objectives for SOEs. In practice, 
conflicting objectives occurred between the government and SOEs’ objectives; while for the 
government-stated objectives, the objectives were theoretically in conflict. The second consequence 
was limited relations between the government-stated objectives and SOEs’ performance. Limited 
government-stated objectives influence SOEs’ financial performance. From these limited relations, 
the government-stated objectives had a tendency to worsen SOEs’ financial performance. 
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Chapter 11:  
The Success of State-Owned Enterprises in Achieving 
Government-Stated Objectives 
 
This chapter examines the relations between government-stated objectives and SOEs’ financial 
performance. It focuses on SOEs’ performance and government objectives following the 
introduction of UU BUMN no. 19/2003 and PP Privatisation no. 33/2005. This chapter emphasises 
the test based on the results from Chapters 6 to 10 using multivariate analysis. A regression test is 
employed to examine and estimate the relations and implications of government-stated objectives 
on SOEs’ financial performance following the introduction of privatisation policies in 2003. 
The analyses’ results from Chapters 6 to 9 show that government-stated objectives are theoretically 
in conflict. The government’s inconsistency and resistance to make changes regarding its stated 
objectives for SOEs may result in conflicting objectives. These theoretically conflicting objectives are 
also shown through the two sample t-test results, which indicate that there are limited relations 
between the objectives and performance. These limited relations indicate that the government-
stated objectives may prevent better performance from SOEs. Based on these results, the regression 
method is employed to examine and estimate the relations between government-stated objectives 
and SOEs’ financial performance. This chapter is separated into four sections: Section 11.1 describes 
the data; Section 11.2 presents the regression test results; Section 11.3 discusses potential 
conflicting objectives; and Section 11.4 presents the findings and discussion. 
11.1 Measurable Data and Hypotheses 
As mentioned in Chapters 8 and 9, policies distinguish SOEs into three groups: publicly listed firms, 
non-privatisation SOEs without privatisation restrictions and non-privatisation SOEs with 
privatisation restrictions. A significant amount of data was classified and combined to obtain 
sufficient data for analysis in this thesis. Twenty-six objectives were combined to give a total of 21 
objectives, comprising seven economic or financial objectives and 14 social welfare or non-economic 
objectives. Further, 14 financial performance indicators were employed in this thesis, as mentioned 
in Section 10.1. For this thesis, the financial performance indicators were considered dependent 
variables, while the objectives were treated as independent variables. To analyse these relations, 
this thesis developed the model shown in Equation (1). The model included five control variables: 
leverage, size (ln asset), company type, year, and SOE industry. As mentioned in Chapter 5, there is a 
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large range in the size of SOEs. Therefore, natural log asset was applied to control this large range of 
SOEs. The model was developed as: 
Financial 
Performance = 
β0+ Σ βn objectives + β23 Size +β24 leverage + β25Company type + Σ 
n=1 
Year + Σ n=1 Industrial sector + Ɛ (1) 
 
Or in detail, the model is:  
 
Financial 
performance  
= 
β0 + β1 profit + β2 efficiency + β3 corporate principles + β4 corporate value and reputation 
+ β5 provision of public goods and services + β6 quality + β7 environment and resources 
utilisation + β8 technology and research + β9 national economic + β10 national 
development + β 11 national security + β12 industrialisation + β13 OHS + β14 community 
development + β15 community prosperity + β16 community needs + β17 government policy 
+ β18 government needs/assignments + β19 state budget + β20 market supply + β 21 
market and price stabilisation + β22 Ln Asset + β23 leverage +β 24 company type + Σ 
n=1 
year + Σ n=1 industrial sector + Ɛ 
 
 
(1) 
Note: The model explanations are given in Appendix 1. 
 
For this test, the hypotheses are tested based on the knowledge gaps from the literature review in 
Chapter 2. The hypotheses are: 
H1: The introduction of new objectives resulting from the privatisation policy and the 
liberalisation of the market economy cause conflicting objectives for SOEs and new privatised 
firms’ objectives and business activities. 
 
H2: Changes to SOEs and new privatised objectives and business activities resulting from the 
privatisation policy improve SOEs and new privatised firms’ performance. 
 
 
11.2 Test Result 
The results from the qualitative analyses in Chapters 8 and 9 show that the introduction of the 
privatisation policy and the liberalisation of the market economy result in changes to government-
stated objectives for SOEs. These changes are shown in the introduction of new objectives—profit 
and efficiency—as part of the government objectives. The introduction of these new objectives is 
aimed at improving SOEs’ financial performance. Therefore, for this thesis, the profit and efficiency 
objectives are expected to complement SOEs’ financial performance. In contrast, the objectives are 
theoretically in conflict because the Indonesian government is inconsistent in implementing the 
policies. The social welfare and non-economic objectives are still the dominant part of the 
government-stated objectives for each SOE. Early studies of SOEs showed that the social welfare 
duties and objectives have a tendency to prevent SOEs from being profitable and efficient (Bai et al., 
2000; Boycko et al., 1996). Based on these studies, the social welfare and non-economic objectives 
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are conflicting and prevent SOEs from being profitable and efficient. These findings are used as 
predictions for further tests regarding relations between the objectives and SOEs’ performance. 
Tables 11.1 and 11.2 present the regression results of the relations between the government’s 
objectives and SOEs’ performance. The results show that the government-stated profit objective 
does not have any relations with the financial performance of all publicly listed SOEs. It also shows 
no relations with the financial performance of most non-privatised SOEs without privatisation 
restrictions, except for the performance of ROE. The objective increases 2.3 points for the SOEs’ ROE 
performance. The government-stated profit objective is associated positively with non-privatised 
SOEs with privatisation restrictions’ EBIT margin and ROA for around 8.09 points. In contrast, the 
objective hinders SOEs’ operating income, market/book value of equity and net income 
performance. The efficiency objective does not affect any of the SOEs’ financial performance. 
Focusing exclusively on each group of SOEs, Table 11.1 shows that non-privatised SOEs with 
privatisation restrictions show more relations between other government-stated economic or 
financial objectives and SOEs’ financial performance. The government-stated objectives for 
compliance with corporate principles, corporate value and reputation improvement, environment 
and resource utilisation, technology and research, and quality—show their relation with SOEs’ ROA, 
EBIT margin, operating profit return, asset turnover, and net income performance. The government-
stated compliance with corporate principle objective may prevent SOEs from improving their 
financial performance, except for operating income, asset turnover, and net income performance. 
The other government economic or financial objectives may increase SOEs’ ROA, EBIT margin and 
operating profit margin. However, the government-stated objective for technology and research 
may prevent non-privatised SOEs with privatisation restrictions from improving their net income 
performance.  
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Table 11.1: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Economic or Financial 
Objectives and SOEs’ Financial Performance during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups 
 Dependent  Variable : Operating profit margin   
Independent  
variables 
Pred. 
 sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coefft t p 
Constant  -0.3875  -0.92 0.374 -0.1631 -1.40 0.166 -2.3817 -1.44 0.157 -0.0568 -0.32 0.752 
Asset + 0.0812 1.85 0.085 0.0232 1.76 0.082 0.3081 2.62 0.013 0.0408 2.13 0.035 
Leverage - 0.2088 0.83 0.418 -0.1108 -1.20 0.235 -1.1782 -1.81 0.078 -0.2471 -1.64 0.104 
Profit + -0.0867 -1.18 0.258 0.0400 0.51 0.612 1.1877 2.04 0.048 -0.0488 -0.39 0.699 
Efficiency  +    0.0527 0.29 0.775    0.1659 0.65 0.517 
Corporate Principle +    -0.1553 -1.31 0.194 0.7875 1.38 0.174 0.1973 0.77 0.445 
Corporate Value and reputation +    -0.1049 -0.63 0.528 0.9903 0.96 0.343 0.4099 1.32 0.190 
Environment and Resources  
utilization 
 
   0.0237 0.38 0.707 1.0792 2.08 0.044 -0.1505 -1.10 0.271 
Technology and research         -1.0990 -1.01 0.317 0.1770 0.61 0.541 
Quality +    0.1949 1.17 0.247 0.1014 0.07 0.942 -0.1673 -0.90 0.368 
Company type    -0.0140 -0.04 0.968 -0.0728 -0.95 0.345 
Listed      0.1661 0.96 0.340 
Number of observation  85 511 240 836 
Adjusted R-square  0.7221 0.5033 0.2801 0.2456 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Operating Profit Return   
Independent  
variables 
Pred. 
sin Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant  -0.5802 -1.65 0.121 -0.0811 -1.33 0.186 -0.5207 -4.37 0.000 -0.0174 -0.37 0.714 
Asset + 0.0757 2.09 0.056 0.0182 2.51 0.014 0.0348 2.80 0.008 0.0203 3.31 0.001 
Leverage - 0.1220 0.55 0.589 -0.1365 -3.76 0.000 -0.0241 -0.49 0.630 -0.1401 -4.30 0.000 
Profit + -0.1220 -2.02 0.063 0.0402 0.90 0.370 0.2422 7.39 0.000 0.0382 1.14 0.258 
Efficiency  +    -0.0422 -0.39 0.699    -0.0894 -1.68 0.095 
Corporate Principle +    -0.0219 -0.34 0.736 -0.2333 -4.55 0.000 -0.0306 -0.80 0.428 
Corporate Value and reputation +    -0.0875 -0.73 0.466 0.1088 1.68 0.101 0.0096 0.19 0.852 
Environment and Resources  
 utilization 
 
   0.0079 0.18 0.861 0.2067 4.60 0.000 -0.0246 -0.77 0.442 
Technology and research         0.2715 4.11 0.000 0.0007 0.01 0.989 
Quality +    0.0248 0.40 0.692 0.2791 3.69 0.001 -0.0609 -1.21 0.229 
Company type      0.0381 1.38 0.177 -0.0339 -1.25 0.215 
Listed       0.0783 -1.47 0.145 
Number of observation  85 514 242 841 
Adjusted R-square  0.6889 0.3955 0.6288 0.4038 
 
 
 
  
  176 
Table 11.1: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Economic or Financial 
Objectives and SOEs’ Financial Performance during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
 Dependent  Variable : Operating income  
Independent  
variables 
Pred. 
 sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coefft t p 
Constant  -34178.1 -2.82 0.014 -370.3627 -3.73 0.000 -3312.879 -1.37 0.178 -4794.702 3.90 0.000 
Asset + 4160.524 3.31 0.005 81.7677 5.07 0.000 687.452 2.11 0.041 847.0619 4.10 0.000 
Leverage - 2050.408 0.36 0.726 -149.2703 -2.87 0.005 270.8609 0.52 0.608 -1393.485 -1.98 0.049 
Profit + -892.9961 -0.42 0.678 -43.1188 -0.78 0.439 -1571.953 -2.49 0.017 937.1615 0.84 0.402 
Efficiency  +    -61.8457 -1.43 0.157    3419.029 1.66 0.099 
Corporate Principle +    -93.0644 -1.09 0.277 2918.185 2.12 0.041 351.6166 0.37 0.709 
Corporate Value and reputation +    151.6653 1.36 0.177 -2336.083 -1.70 0.097 -1324.361 -1.29 0.200 
Environment and Resources  
utilization 
 
   -28.4616 -0.45 0.657 1871.632 1.61 0.115 -402.39 -0.50 0.618 
Technology and research         -2679.754 -1.71 0.096 -2050.115 -1.84 0.068 
Quality +    -94.8119 -1.66 0.100 -3706.94 -1.70 0.097 -2205.272 -1.58 0.117 
Company type    749.0292 1.07 0.290 180.3942 0.51 0.611 
Listed      201.6036 0.16 0.873 
Number of observation  85 514 242 841 
Adjusted R-square  0.9080 0.4616 0.8527 0.5505 
 
 
Dependent Variable: Net Income  
Independent  
variables 
Pred. 
sin Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant  26421.35 -2.91 0.011 -340.5505 -3.75 0.000 854.8298 -2.10 0.043 -2278.733 -2.96 0.004 
Asset + 3080.945 3.27 0.006 60.9836 4.40 0.000 211.4282 3.04 0.004 400.848 3.45 0.001 
Leverage - 594.855 0.16 0.879 -95.0712 -2.47 0.015 7.3823 0.05 0.960 -793.9326 -2.12 0.036 
Profit + -996.8655 -0.63 0.540 -1.2709 -0.03 0.978 -1269.87 -8.54 0.000 287.2031 0.38 0.702 
Efficiency  +    -9.5110 -0.25 0.806    2619.768 1.70 0.091 
Corporate Principle +    -36.4583 -0.56 0.574 509.1922 2.18 0.036 -323.7802 -0.52 0.601 
Corporate Value and reputation +    -104.7704 -1.05 0.295 -685.4831 -2.83 0.007 -197.0412 0.24 0.809 
Environment and Resources  
 utilization 
 
   41.9574 0.79 0.430 743.3678 2.90 0.006 170.7703 0.44 0.660 
Technology and research         -735.7438 -2.43 0.020 -1067.365 -1.38 0.171 
Quality +    31.0340 0.53 0.596 -1075.963 -2.81 0.008 -2152.444 -1.97 0.050 
Company type    182.9662 1.74 0.090 203.5348 0.90 0.368 
Listed       251.719 0.34 0.733 
Number of observation  85 510 242 837 
Adjusted R-square  0.8370 0.3819 0.7405 0.4688 
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Table 11.1: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Economic or Financial 
Objectives and SOEs’ Financial Performance during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
 Dependent Variable: ROA 
Independent  
variables 
Pred.
sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant  -0.6077 -1.66 0.120 -0.1024 -1.74 0.085 -0.4252 -3.95 0.000 -0.0137 -0.30 0.767 
Asset + 0.0814 2.14 0.051 0.0218 3.02 0.003 0.0280 2.26 0.029 0.0202 3.35 0.001 
Leverage - 0.0837 0.35 0.733 -0.1561 -3.78 0.000 -0.0217 -0.41 0.681 -0.1466 -4.32 0.000 
Profit + -0.1314 -2.06 0.058 0.0603 1.28 0.205 0.2342 8.09 0.000 0.0240 0.77 0.442 
Efficiency  +    -0.0427 -0.40 0.691    -0.0865 -1.66 0.099 
Corporate Principle +    -0.0420 -0.65 0.517 -0.2370 -5.00 0.000 -0.0129 -0.34 0.735 
Corporate Value and reputation +    -0.0917 -0.84 0.405 0.1296 2.61 0.013 0.0182 0.43 0.664 
Environment and Resources utilization     0.0185 0.44 0.665 0.3256 3.64 0.001 -0.3300 -1.01 0.316 
Technology and research         0.2949 4.05 0.000 0.0021 0.04 0.965 
Quality +    0.0049 0.08 0.933 0.3256 4.44 0.000 -0.0521 -1.14 0.257 
Company type    
 
1.28 0.208 -0.0319 -1.19 0.236 
Listed     0.0815 1.53 0.127 
Number of observation  85 514 242 841 
Adjusted R-square  0.6800 0.3872 0.6033 0.3941 
 
 
 Dependent Variable : EBIT Margin 
Independent  
variables 
Pred. 
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant  -0.6077 -1.66 0.120 -0.4252 -1.74 0.085 -0.1024 3.95 0.000 -0.0137 0.30 0.767 
Asset + 0.0814 2.14 0.051 0.0280 3.02 0.003 0.0218 2.26 0.029 0.0202 3.35 0.001 
Leverage - 0.0837 0.35 0.733 -0.0217 -3.78 0.000 -0.1561 -0.41 0.681 -0.1466 -4.32 0.000 
Profit + -0.1314 -2.06 0.058 0.2342 1.28 0.205 0.0603 8.09 0.000 0.0240 0.77 0.442 
Efficiency  +     -0.40 0.691 -0.0427   -0.0865 -1.66 0.099 
Corporate Principle +    -0.2370 -0.65 0.517 -0.0420 -5.00 0.000 -0.0129 -0.34 0.735 
Corporate Value and reputation +    0.1296 -0.84 0.405 -0.0917 2.61 0.013 0.0182 0.43 0.664 
Environment and Resources utilization     0.3256 0.44 0.665 0.0185 4.05 0.000 -0.0330 -1.01 0.316 
Technology and research      0.2949    5.14 0.000 0.0021 0.04 0.965 
Quality +    0.3256 0.08 0.933 0.0049 4.44 0.000 -0.0521 0.09 0.931 
Company type     1.28 0.208 -0.0319 -1.19 0.236 
Listed      0.0815 1.53 0.127 
Number of observation  85 514 242 841 
Adjusted R-square  0.6800 0.3872 0.6033 0.3941 
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Table 11.1: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Economic or Financial 
Objectives and SOEs’ Financial Performance during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
 Dependent Variable :Asset Turnover 
Independent  
variables 
Pred. 
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant  -0.2542 -0.36 0.721 0.5986 2.41 0.018 1.9669 1.86 0.071 0.4773 2.70 0.008 
Asset + 0.0309 0.43 0.676 -0.0254 -0.83 0.410 -0.0531 -0.73 0.471 0.0037 0.19 0.852 
Leverage - 0.3830 1.21 0.245 0.0147 0.11 0.912 -0.0613 -0.16 0.871 -0.0008 -0.01 0.996 
Profit + -0.0450 -0.37 0.718 0.0656 0.36 0.722 0.0492 0.16 0.876 0.2152 1.67 0.097 
Efficiency  +    0.5991 3.65 0.000    0.4344 2.44 0.016 
Corporate Principle +    0.2203 0.80 0.427 1.3191 2.55 0.015 -0.0444 -0.22 0.823 
Corporate Value and reputation +    0.2182 0.49 0.625 -1.2093 -1.84 0.073 0.0057 0.03 0.975 
Environment and Resources utilization     -0.3571 -1.52 0.132 0.1460 0.41 0.687 -0.2582 -2.10 0.038 
Technology and research         -1.7965 -3.07 0.004 0.0099 0.02 0.982 
Quality +    -0.0815   -1.7513   0.1483 0.74 0.461 
Company type    0.3128 0.95 0.346 0.0803 0.82 0.414 
Listed      -0.0660 -0.35 0.726 
Number of observation  85 511 242 836 
Adjusted R-square  0.9452 0.5103 0.5967 0.4391 
 
 
Dependent  Variable:Market/Book Value of Equity 
Independent  
variables 
Pred.
siign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coef t p Coeff. t p 
Constant  -321374.2 -2.54 0.024 -2468.1 -3.52 0.001 767.2262 0.27 0.788 -24968.89 -3.72 0.000 
Asset + 35063.53 2.68 0.018 460.9026 4.82 0.000 1252.032 2.82 0.008 3560.807 5.14 0.000 
Leverage - 49244.57 0.77 0.455 -850.6955 -2.82 0.006 -97.6662 -0.09 0.925 -2124.175 -0.60 0.552 
Profit + 9792.053 0.45 0.662 -314.2967 -1.06 0.292 -7036.501 -5.49 0.000 16288.44 2.24 0.027 
Efficiency  +    -284.4325 -0.91 0.363    11192.21 1.59 0.113 
Corporate Principle +    408.1109 0.80 0.424 383.8683 0.25 0.802 -148.2402 -0.03 0.979 
Corporate Value and reputation +    -640.5083 -0.74 0.460 -2283.723 -1.25 0.218 -13770.57 -0.93 0.353 
Environment and Resources 
 utilization 
 
   127.8762 -0.26 0.795 3465.136 2.17 0.036 -4883.434 -0.74 0.458 
Technology and research         -1966.648 -0.89 0.379 -10302.6 -1.63 0.106 
Quality +    6.2766 0.02 0.987 -2754.846 -0.99 0.327 18824.92 1.87 0.064 
Company type    687.0602 0.85 0.398 -1591.091 -0.70 0.488 
Listed      4765.032 0.72 0.472 
Number of observation  83 514 242 839 
Adjusted R-square  0.7384 0.6510 0.9693 0.6441 
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Table 11.1: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Economic or Financial 
Objectives and SOEs’ Financial Performance during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
Dependent variable : ROE 
Independent variables 
Pred.  
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff. t p Coeff. t p Coeff t p 
Constant  -0.1412 -1.18 0.256 -0.3046 -1.97 0.052 -0.2492 -4.54 0.000 -0.2353 -1.38 0.169 
Asset + 0.0233 1.89 0.080 0.0368 1.96 0.063 0.0046 0.51 0.612 0.0260 1.58 0.117 
Leverage - 0.0828 1.19 0.254 -0.1314 -1.88 0.063 0.0135 0.26 0.794 -0.0825 -1.49 0.137 
Profit + -0.0335 -1.63 0.126 0.1852 2.31 0.023 -0.0404 -1.70 0.097 0.0110 0.32 0.753 
Efficiency  +    0.1505 1.77 0.080    0.1298 2.17 0.032 
Corporate principle +    -0.2475 -2.12 0.037 -0.0640 -1.64 0.110 -0.0641 -1.84 0.068 
Corporate value and reputation +    -0.2051 -1.07 0.288 0.0993 1.71 0.096 0.0155 0.27 0.786 
Environment and resources utilisation     0.1023 1.12 0.265 0.0524 1.59 0.121 0.0562 1.12 0.265 
Technology and research        0.0919 1.57 0.126 0.0075 0.15 0.884 
Quality +    0.0185 0.23 0.815 -0.0545 -0.75 0.461 -0.1455 -2.02 0.029 
Company type      0.0799 4.38 0.000 0.0235 0.95 0.342 
Perum/listed        0.0067 0.20 0.841 
No. of observations 
 
 85  512  242  839 
Adjusted R-square   0.4879  0.0122  -0.0163  0.0044 
 
Source: Indonesian SOE financial and annual reports 2003–2010. 
Notes: Data were collected as follows: ROA = EBIT divided by total assets; ROE = EAT divided by average equity (equity  t + equity t-1); EBIT 
margin = EBIT divided by total sales; operating profit margin = operating income divided by total sales; operating profit return = operating 
income divided by total assets; asset turnover = total sales divided by total assets; The objectives were collected and calculated as dummy 
variables: 1 when the SOE had the government-stated objective and 0 otherwise. 
 
 
Table 11.2 presents the relations between the government-stated economic or financial objectives 
and SOEs’ social welfare representative financial performance. The results show limited relations 
between the objectives and performance. The government-stated profit objective positively affects 
publicly listed SOEs’ dividend rates, effective tax rate when interest is included in measurement and 
employment intensity performance only. The profit objective only shows a positive relation with 
non-privatised SOEs without privatisation restrictions’ effective tax rate when the interest is 
excluded in the measurement. Meanwhile, the profit objective shows a negative effect of -3.34  and 
-4.22 points for non-privatised SOEs with privatisation restrictions’ labour cost and employment 
intensity respectively. The government-stated efficiency objective only presents a relation with non-
privatised SOEs without privatisation restrictions’ effective tax rate when interest is excluded in the 
measurement of 2.02 points, while the objective shows a negative effect of -2.33 points for non-
privatised SOEs without privatisation restrictions’ employment intensity performance. 
The other government-stated economic or financial objectives only present a few indications of 
relations with SOEs’ social welfare representative financial performance. None of the other 
government-stated economic or financial objectives shows relations with publicly listed SOEs’ social 
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welfare representative financial performance. The group of non-privatised SOEs without 
privatisation restrictions shows relations between the government-stated objective for compliance 
with corporate principles and SOEs’ effective tax rate when interest is excluded in the measurement 
of 2.02 points, but negative effects of -2.28 points for SOEs’ labour cost performance. A similar 
objective helps non-privatised SOEs with privatisation restrictions to improve their labour cost and 
employment intensity performance by 2.79 and 6.57 points respectively. The government-stated 
corporate value and reputation improvement objective shows relations with non-privatised SOEs 
with privatisation restrictions’ dividend rate when interest is excluded in the measurement of 2.19 
points, while the objective hinders non-privatised SOEs without privatisation restrictions by -2.02 
points on their CSR fund performance. 
Table 11.2: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Economic or Financial 
Objectives and SOEs’ Social Welfare Representative Financial Performance during 2004–2010 
Based on SOE-type Groups 
 Dependent Variable : Effective Tax Rate 1 
Independent  
variables 
Pred. 
sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant  0.8504 1.71 0.109 0.1162 0.34 0.738 -16.3940 -1.17 0.249 -0.2611 -0.19 0.850 
Asset + -0.0567 -1.09 0.293 -0.0198 -0.40 0.687 2.6687 1.28 0.209 0.0261 0.19 0.847 
Leverage - 0.0266 0.08 0.935 -0.3548 -1.39 0.169 -0.1444 -0.06 0.954 -0.4945 -1.13 0.261 
Profit + 0.2283 2.59 0.021 0.0548 0.19 0.853 1.5003 0.36 0.721 -1.1122 -1.40 0.163 
Efficiency  +    0.2642 0.64 0.523    0.1166 0.15 0.880 
Corporate Principle +    -0.2950 -0.80 0.428 13.9875 1.45 0.157 0.3532 0.24 0.810 
Corporate Value and reputation +    -0.1273 -0.25 0.804 -9.4904 -1.08 0.287 0.4717 0.28 0.783 
Environment and Resources utilization     0.1675 0.54 0.589 -2.3990 0.98 0.332 0.6638 1.09 0.278 
Technology and research         -11.2386 -1.09 0.281 1.5758 1.58 0.116 
Quality +    0.9588 1.23 0.221 -15.1225 -1.05 0.301 -2.6290 -1.64 0.104 
Company type       0.2167 0.71 0.481 
Listed    3.3545 0.80 0.429 0.4498 0.66 0.508 
Number of observation  85 505 236 826 
Adjusted R-square  0.0180 -0.0507 -0.0583 -0.0168 
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Table 11.2: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Economic or Financial 
Objectives and SOEs’ Social Welfare Representative Financial Performance during 2004–2010 
Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
 Dependent Variable : Effective Tax Rate 2 
Independent  
variables 
Pred.  
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant  1.3745 1.81 0.092 0.1798 0.58 0.562 -1.3386 -2.68 0.011 0.5541 1.72 0.089 
Asset + -0.1053 -1.37 0.192 -0.0434 -0.87 0.385 0.0525 1.19 0.243 -0.0628 -1.41 0.161 
Leverage - -1.4248 -1.48 0.160 0.0493 0.24 0.813 -1.1005 -0.61 0.544 -0.3955 -1.30 0.196 
Profit + 0.2856 -0.15 0.885 1.1634 4.32 0.000 -0.7589 -1.98 0.055 -0.1938 1.66 0.099 
Efficiency  +    3.8423 2.02 0.047    2.3262 -2.69 0.008 
Corporate Principle +    -1.1640 -3.09 0.003 -0.3763 -1.38 0.177 -0.5517 1.84 0.068 
Corporate Value and reputation +    -0.3328 -0.76 0.451 0.3163 0.66 0.516 0.8646 -1.06 0.290 
Environment and Resources utilization     0.00678 0.03 0.976 1.6723 4.12 0.000 -0.2366 0.90 0.371 
Technology and research         0.3743 0.86 0.397 0.2562 0.86 0.391 
Quality +    1.2501 2.70 0.008 0.1087 0.16 0.872 0.9145 2.20 0.029 
Company type       0.1389 1.07 0.286 
Listed    1.0354 1.51 0.138 0.0983 0.48 0.635 
Number of observation  85 505 239 826 
Adjusted R-square  0.1884 0.0593 0.0380 0.0267 
 
 
 Dependent Variable :Dividend Rate 1 
Independent  
variables 
Pred.  
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant  0.3640 0.79 0.490 0.02523 0.22 0.827 -18.9976 -1.07 0.291 -1.2840 -0.93 0.352 
Asset + -0.0219 -0.38 0.711 0.0194 1.33 0.188 2.5014 1.16 0.254 0.1252 0.90 0.371 
Leverage - -0.0043 -0.44 0.664 -0.1179 -2.00 0.049 0.1815 0.07 0.944 -0.0731 -0.22 0.829 
Profit + -0.3359 2.79 0.014 0.0753 1.11 0.269 1.4818 0.36 0.724 -0.4052 -0.64 0.524 
Efficiency  +    -0.0719 -0.94 0.350    -0.3547 -0.54 0.591 
Corporate Principle +    -0.1890 -1.22 0.225 13.6445 1.34 0.189 1.0804 0.80 0.424 
Corporate Value and reputation +    0.2898 0.87 0.389 -8.6048 -0.91 0.369 -0.8137 -0.76 0.446 
Environment and Resources utilization     -0.1755 -1.24 0.219 5.7454 0.84 0.406 -0.1457 -0.44 0.664 
Technology and research         -10.2380 -0.98 0.332 1.0587 1.06 0.291 
Quality +    -0.0212 -0.12 0.905 -13.6303 -0.89 0.378 -0.3963 -0.53 0.600 
Company type    3.3856 0077 0.444 -0.1076 -0.41 0.686 
Listed       0.4335 0.70 0.485 
Number of observation  85 500 241 826 
Adjusted R-square  0.3370 0.2193 -0.0704 -0.0272 
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Table 11.2: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Economic or Financial 
Objectives and SOEs’ Social Welfare Representative Financial Performance during 2004–2010 
Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
 Dependent Variable : Dividend Rate 2 
Independent  
variables 
Pred. 
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff T p Coeff t p 
Constant  0.3640 0.79 0.440 -0.0223 -0.29 0.776 -0.0503 -0.41 0.685 0.0669 1.27 0.205 
Asset + -0.0220 -0.46 0.651 0.0217 1.91 0.060 0.0160 1.04 0.307 0.0139 2.33 0.021 
Leverage - -0.0043 -0.02 0.988 -0.0681 -1.06 0.292 -0.1196 -2.22 0.033 -0.0896 -1.76 0.080 
Profit + 0.3359 4.22 0.001 0.0065 0.12 0.908 -0.0110 -0.25 0.803 0.0401 1.50 0.136 
Efficiency  +    -0.0601 -0.95 0.342    -0.0406 -1.10 0.274 
Corporate Principle +    -0.0926 -0.92 0.363 0.0407 0.66 0.516 -0.1090 -2.49 0.014 
Corporate Value and reputation +    0.0251 0.13 0.898 0.1913 2.19 0.035 0.2217 4.47 0.000 
Environment and Resources utilization     -0.0807 -0.91 0.364 0.1089 1.94 0.060 -0.1021 -1.99 0.048 
Technology and research         -0.0145 -0.18 0.861 0.0442 0.92 0.357 
Quality +    0.1139 1.00 0.320 -0.2458 -1.96 0.057 -0.0688 -0.97 0.332 
Company type    0.0621 2.02 0.050 -0.0302 -1.66 0.098 
Listed       0.1241 2.75 0.007 
Number of observation  85 501 241 827 
Adjusted R-square  0.4171 0.2049 0.2544 0.2377 
 
 Dependent Variable : Labour Cost  
Independent  
variables 
Pred.  
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant   -7885.632 -1.57 0.138 -526.8515 -2.26 0.027 -383.8643 -0.68 0.499 -223.084 -4.58 0.000 
Asset + 1041.772 2.00 0.065 106.8771 3.01 0.003 207.5294 3.66 0.001 325.4277 5.05 0.000 
Leverage - -804.983 -0.62 0.548 -175.4506 -2.25 0.027 -286.1981 -2.34 0.025 -452.3754 -1.63 0.105 
Profit + 1467.905 1.68 0.115 166.3587 1.44 0.155 -674.4676 -3.34 0.002 685.043 1.62 0.107 
Efficiency  +    -59.5774 -0.89 0.375    565.6367 1.59 0.114 
Corporate Principle +    -295.9549 -2.28 0.025 558.2089 2.79 0.008 38.6023 0.11 0.914 
Corporate Value and reputation +    183.9759 0.52 0.607 -349.529 -0.89 0.377 -847.6488 -1.09 0279 
Environment and Resources  
utilization 
 
   -33.8183 -0.11 0.912 -165.702 -0.84 0.404 -934.3007 -1.34 0.184 
Technology and research         -773.2315 -1.93 0.061 156.9957 0.34 0.731 
Quality +    -112.828 -0.77 0.444 -354.1883 -0.56 0.582 984.4649 1.45 0.150 
Company type    -59.7448 -0.32 0.749 -35.8097 -0.28 0.777 
Listed       430.2745 1.06 0.290 
Number of observation  85 469 235 789 
Adjusted R-square  0.9152 0.4941 0.7830 0.5926 
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Table 11.2: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Economic or Financial 
Objectives and SOEs’ Social Welfare Representative Financial Performance during 2004–2010 
Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
 Dependent variable :Employment Intensity 
Independent  
Variables 
 
 
Pred.  
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant  0.0175 2.93 0.011 0.2666 6.57 0.000 0.1606 5.25 0.000 0.1708 5.00 0.000 
Asset + -0.0016 -2.63 0.020 -0.0288 -6.39 0.000 -0.0126 -2.85 0.007 -0.0180 -5.29 0.000 
Leverage - -0.0037 -0.83 0.418 -0.0071 -0.44 0.660 0.0008 0.11 0.913 -0.0196 -1.02 0.311 
Profit + 0.0025 2.56 0.023 -0.0777 -2.86 0.005 -0.0566 -4.22 0.000 0.0023 0.18 0.855 
Efficiency  +    -0.0482 -2.33 0.023    -0.0134 -0.86 0.393 
Corporate Principle +    -0.0204 -0.95 0.347 0.0576 6.56 0.000 0.0164 0.68 0.496 
Corporate Value and reputation +    0.0026 0.04 0.965    -0.1551 -2.70 0.008 
Environment and Resources utilization     0.1673 3.18 0.002    0.0702 2.00 0.048 
Technology and research         -0.0417 -1.55 0.131 -0.0294 -1.56 0.122 
Quality +    -0.0861 -3.29 0.002 -0.0288   -0.0147 -0.42 0.673 
Company type       -0.0048 -0.83 0.408 
Listed    0.0037 0.38 0.710 0.0120 0.91 0.365 
Number of observation  85 407 187 679 
Adjusted R-square  0.9467 0.7381 0.9651 0.6139 
 
Dependent variable :CSR Fund 
Independent variables 
Pred. 
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t P Coeff t P 
Constant  -473.1429 -1.78 0.103 -25.5957 -1.65 0.104 -38.5492 -1.98 0.062 -71.6719 -4.29 0.000 
Asset + 57.1498 2.09 0.061 3.0581 1.61 0.114 7.7650 4.22 0.000 8.4443 4.69 0.000 
Leverage - 94.9121 1.64 0.129 -1.5063 -0.70 0.488 -8.0231 -2.05 0.055 -2.0030 -0.26 0.797 
Profit +  1.56 0.147 9.0032 1.39 0.169    49.4327 2.31 0.023 
Efficiency  +          19.6724 0.83 0.407 
Corporate principle +          -51.5515 -1.95 0.054 
Corporate value and reputation +    -37.6777 -2.02 0.049    0.5563 0.04 0.968 
Environment and resources 
utilisation 
 
   17.2327 1.97 0.055    -1.5911 -0.26 0.797 
Technology and research           34.6656 2.46 0.016 
Quality +    5.1816 0.58 0.566    9.5735 0.71 0.480 
Company type           -1.5280 -0.41 0.682 
Perum/listed           30.7432 2.14 0.035 
No. of observations   52  237  102  391 
Adjusted R-square   0.6582  0.2468  0.6219  0.5113 
 
Source: Indonesian SOE financial and annual reports 2003–2010. 
Notes: Data were collected as follows effective tax rate 1 = tax divided by EBIT; effective tax rate 2 = tax divided by EBT; employment 
intensity = natural log employees divided by sales; dividend rate 1 = dividend payment divided by EBT; dividend rate 2 = dividend payment 
divided by EBT. The objectives were collected and calculated as dummy variables: 1 when the SOE had the government-stated objective, 
and 0 otherwise. 
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Tables 11.3 and 11.4 present the regression results of the relations between government-stated 
social welfare or non-economic objectives and SOEs’ financial performance. The government-stated 
social welfare or non-economic objectives show limited relations with SOEs’ financial performance. 
In Table 11.3, publicly listed SOEs only show some relations between the government objectives and 
SOEs’ performance. The government-stated objective for the provision of public goods and services 
only shows relations with publicly listed SOEs’ operating profit margin, asset turnover and ROE 
performance. The objective may worsen SOEs’ operating profit margin and ROE performance, while 
it improves SOEs’ asset turnover performance by 24.26 points. The government-stated objectives for 
national economic improvement shows a negative effect on the operating profit margin, net income, 
operating profit return, asset turnover and market/book value of equity. However, this objective 
helps SOEs to improve their asset turnover and ROE performance. The government-stated national 
development objective hinders SOEs’ ability to improve their ROE, asset turnover and operating 
profit margin performance. The requirement for SOEs to meet the government community 
development objectives also has limited effects on SOEs’ performance. The government-stated 
provision of community needs objective indicates its relations with operating profit return, asset 
turnover, ROA, market/book value of equity, operating income and EBIT margin. Most of these 
relations are negative, except market/book value of equity performance. This means that the 
objective prevents SOEs from performing better, except for market/book value of equity 
performance. The government-stated state budget contribution objective has relations with asset 
turnover, operating income and market/book value of equity. The objective decreases the 
market/book value of equity by -6.49 points, and it increases operating income and asset turnover 
by 2.53 and 6.15 points respectively. 
Non-privatised SOEs without privatisation restrictions indicate a similar picture to publicly listed 
SOEs. The government-stated provision of public utilities objective shows relations with SOEs’ asset 
turnover and ROE of 2.35 and 2.16 points respectively. The government-stated objectives for 
national economic improvement and national development do not have any relations with SOEs’ 
financial performance. Meanwhile, the government-stated community development objective has 
negative effects on SOEs’ net income, operating profit margin, operating profit return, operating 
income, EBIT margin and ROA. The requirement for SOEs to meet the government-stated state 
budget contribution objective results in negative effects on SOEs’ operating profit margin, operating 
profit return, ROE, ROA and EBIT margin performance. 
Non-privatised SOEs with privatisation restriction also indicates a similar picture to the other two 
groups of SOEs. The government-stated objective for provision of public goods and services shows 
its relations with several SOEs financial performance such as operating profit return, net income, 
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ROA, EBIT margin and ROE. The objective helps the SOEs to improve these financial performances, 
except for their net income performance. Table 11.13 shows that the government-stated objective 
for provision of public goods and services hinders the SOEs to improve their net income 
performance for-8.54 points. Meanwhile, the government-stated objective for national economic 
improvement shows its relations with the SOEs’ operating profit return, ROA, and EBIT margin, and 
the objective helps the SOEs to improve these financial performances. The requirement for SOEs to 
meet the government-stated objectives for community development and community prosperity 
show their negative effects on the SOEs’ operating profit return, ROA, and EBIT margin 
performances. Both the government-stated objective for community development reduces the 
SOEs’ ROA and EBIT margin performance of -3.26 points.  In contrast, the government-stated 
objectives for community prosperity and provision of community need help the SOEs to improve 
their net income performance. None of the SOEs financial performance shows their relations with 
the government-stated objectives for contribution to state budget.  
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Table 11.3: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Social Welfare or Non-economic Objectives and SOEs’ Financial Performance 
during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups 
 Dependent Variable :Operating profit Margin 
Independent  
variables 
Pred. 
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant  -0.3875 -0.92 0.374 -0.1631 -1.40 0.166 -2.3817 -1.44 0.157 -0.0568 -0.32 0.752 
Asset + 0.0812 1.85 0.085 0.0232 1.76 0.082 0.3081 2.62 0.013 0.0408 2.13 0.035 
Leverage - 0.2088 0.83 0.418 -0.1108 -1.20 0.235 -1.1782 -1.81 0.078 -0.2471 -1.64 0.104 
Provision of public goods and services - -0.1319 -6.98 0.000 0.1314 1.79 0.077 -0.2190 -0.23 0.820 -0.0847 -0.86 0.392 
National economic - -0.0429 -2.70 0.017 0.0788 0.89 0.377 -0.5476 -0.47 0.642 -0.0365 -0.27 0.789 
National development - -0.1265 -2.56 0.023 0.0336 0.49 0.627 0.8081 2.22 0.032 0.2024 1.26 0.211 
National security -    0.0229 -0.22 0.827 -0.7338 -2.26 0.029 -0.6400 -1.80 0.074 
Industrialisation -    0.0634 0.76 0.449    -0.1965 -2.32 0.022 
OHS - 0.0165 0.27 0.792 -0.0050 -0.09 0.930 -0.3927 -5.23 0.000 -0.0934 -1.30 0.194 
Community development -    -0.9604 -2.67 0.009 1.4339 1.16 0.254 -0.5759 -2.25 0.026 
Community prosperity - -0.0658 -0.65 0.524 0.0179 0.28 0.777 0.7559 1.41 0.167 0.0654 0.60 0.548 
Community needs - 0.0034 0.13 0.899 0.0858 0.95 0.346 0.1159 0.42 0.674 0.0578 0.62 0.533 
Government policy  -    0.1643 1.98 0.051 0.0936 0.09 0.925 0.1325 1.45 0.149 
Government special needs -    -0.04016 -0.56 0.578 -0.1321 -0.14 0.892 0.0061 0.09 0.928 
State budget - -0.0025 -0.04 0.969 -0.0538 -2.01 0.048    0.0419 0.41 0.684 
Market supply and stabilisation -     2.00 0.049    0.1238 0.90 0.372 
Company type    -0.0140 -0.04 0.968 -0.0728 -0.95 0.345 
Listed     0.1661 0.96 0.340 
Number of observation  85 511 240 836 
Adjusted R-square  0.7221 0.5033 0.2801 0.2456 
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Table 11.3: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Social Welfare or Non-economic Objectives and SOEs’ Financial Performance 
during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
Dependent  Variable: Operating Profit Return  
Independent  
variables 
Pred. 
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant  -0.5802 -1.65 0.121 -0.0811 -1.33 0.186 -0.5207 -4.37 0.000 -0.0174 -0.37 0.714 
Asset + 0.0757 2.09 0.056 0.0182 2.51 0.014 0.0348 2.80 0.008 0.0203 3.31 0.001 
Leverage - 0.1220 0.55 0.589 -0.1365 -3.76 0.000 -0.0241 -0.49 0.630 -0.1401 -4.30 0.000 
Provision of public goods and services - 0.0300 1.97 0.069 0.0640 1.48 0.142 0.2284 3.49 0.001 0.0059 0.10 0.924 
National economic - -0.0330 -2.43 0.029 -0.0195 -0.89 0.377 0.2342 4.05 0.000 0.0174 -0.00 1.0000 
National development - -0.0339 -0.90 0.383 0.0285 0.82 0.417 -0.0588 -0.99 0.328 -0.0059 -0.82 0.413 
National security -    -0.0104 -0.20 0.843 -0.4669 -3.16 0.003 -0.1345 -1.31 0.194 
Industrialisation -    0.0133 0.40 0.689    -0.0495 -1.64 0.104 
OHS - -0.0273 -0.59 0.567 0.0338 1.09 0.279 0.0054 0.64 0.527 -0.0055 0.04 0.969 
Community development -    -0.1144 -3.19 0.002 -0.2376 -2.70 0.010 -0.1224 2.37 0.019 
Community prosperity - 0.1159 1.46 0.167 0.0414 1.10 0.275 -0.2062 -3.83 0.000 -0.0302 0.79 0.431 
Community needs - -0.0584 -2.28 0.039 0.0044 0.19 0.848 0.0160 0.50 0.622 0.0171 -1.98 0.049 
Government policy  -    0.0920 2.43 0.017 0.0215 0.25 0.807 0.0712 0.06 0.949 
Government special needs -    0.0003 0.01 0.994 0.0039 0.05 0.960 0.03730 -0.50 0.617 
State budget - 0.1064 2.09 0.055 -0.0428 -2.32 0.023    -0.0644 -1.75 0.082 
Market supply and stabilisation -     -1.30 0.197    -0.0726 -0.40 0.690 
Company type      0.0381 1.38 0.177 -0.0339 -1.25 0.215 
Listed     0.0783 1.47 0.145 
Number of observation  85 514 242 841 
Adjusted R-square  0.6889 0.3955 0.6288 0.4038 
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Table 11.3: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Social Welfare or Non-economic Objectives and SOEs’ Financial Performance 
during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
 Dependent  Variable: Operating Income  
Independent  
variables 
Pred. 
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant  -34178.1 -2.82 0.014 -370.3627 -3.73 0.000 -3312.879 -1.37 0.178 -4794.702 3.90 0.000 
Asset + 4160.524 3.31 0.005 81.7677 5.07 0.000 687.452 2.11 0.041 847.0619 4.10 0.000 
Leverage - 2050.408 0.36 0.726 -149.2703 -2.87 0.005 270.8609 0.52 0.608 -1393.485 -1.98 0.049 
Provision of public goods  
and services 
- 
859.8283 1.59 0.135 -6.5214 -0.16 0.871 -832.058 -0.79 0.436 51.2893 0.10 0.924 
National economic - -4842.168 -13.04 0.000 -40.0732 -1.26 0.209 -2656.685 -1.71 0.095 -0.31611 -0.00 1.000 
National development - 2387.119 1.72 0.107 65.1717 1.72 0.089 -18.2984 -0.03 0.973 -352.0952 -0.82 0.413 
National security -    -1.0413 -0.01 0.991 304.4628 0.86 0.394 -1031.979 -1.31 0.194 
Industrialisation -    -2.3943 -0.05 0.962    -1702.793 -1.64 0.104 
OHS - 7014.502 4.09 0.001 -60.75801 -2.03 0.046 154.4526 0.49 0.630 26.5975 0.04 0.969 
Community development -    -71.7299 -2.11 0.038 5342.827 1.94 0.060 4380.243 2.37 0.019 
Community prosperity - -4337.497 -1.50 0.155 57.3634 1.50 0.137 2063.471 1.66 0.105 561.1708 0.79 0.431 
Community needs - -1400.688 -2.17 0.048 71.2934 3.56 0.001 -1174.909 -1.24 0.222 -1375.356 -1.98 0.049 
Government policy  -    189.8087 4.25 0.000 2597.004 1.39 0.174 53.6348 0.06 0.949 
Government special needs -    -14.1537 -0.30 0.767 1570.182 1.03 0.310 -254.0491 -0.50 0.617 
State budget - 4537.591 2.53 0.024 -108.1029 -1.73 0.087    -2193.777 -1.75 0.082 
Market supply and stabilisation -    -59.8285 -1.53 0.129    -331.3481 -0.40 0.690 
Company type    749.0292 1.07 0.290 180.3942 0.51 0.611 
Listed      201.6036 0.16 0.873 
Number of observation  85 514 242 841 
Adjusted R-square  0.9080 0.4616 0.8527 0.5505 
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Table 11.3: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Social Welfare or Non-economic Objectives and SOEs’ Financial Performance 
during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
Dependent Variable : Net Income 
Independent  
variables 
Pred.  
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant  26421.35 -2.91 0.011 -340.5505 -3.75 0.000 854.8298 -2.10 0.043 -2278.733 -2.96 0.004 
Asset + 3080.945 3.27 0.006 60.9836 4.40 0.000 211.4282 3.04 0.004 400.848 3.45 0.001 
Leverage - 594.855 0.16 0.879 -95.0712 -2.47 0.015 7.3823 0.05 0.960 -793.9326 -2.12 0.036 
Provision of public goods and services - 449.77 1.10 0.291 35.7726 1.00 0.319 -262.1591 -8.54 0.000 18.9277 0.06 0.954 
National economic - -1029.635 -4.03 0.001 1.1653 0.04 0.968 -671.1772 -1.34 0.187 8.2307 0.02 0.982 
National development - -774.7114 -0.73 0.478 94.1017 1.97 0.052 -129.4409 -2.20 0.034 -270.8509 -1.00 0.317 
National security -    -156.6919 -1.58 0.117 28.5465 -1.29 0.204 -702.1844 -1.49 0.138 
Industrialisation -    15.1873 0.37 0.715  0.37 0.712 -1037.149 -1.87 0.064 
OHS - 2691.319 2.05 0.060 -21.5803 -0.80 0.428 -39.6007   134.0254 0.32 0.752 
Community development -    -98.7443 -2.59 0.011 1117.414 -0.87 0.388 2605.24 2.25 0.026 
Community prosperity - -2044.478 -0.93 0.367 36.3177 1.08 0.283 678.815 2.26 0.030 190.1961 0.41 0.681 
Community needs - 69.9309 0.17 0.869 76.7828 2.67 0.009 95.7965 2.26 0.013 -764.3536 -1.92 0.057 
Government policy  -    107.047 3.40 0.001 957.3017 0.42 0.678 15.2275 0.03 0.974 
Government special needs -    -40.0770 -0.88 0.380 679.0421 2.34 0.025 154.8684 0.42 0.672 
State budget - 992.4588 0.73 0.475 -55.2369 -1.23 0.221  2.01 0.051 -1173.539 -1.51 0.134 
Market supply and stabilisation -    -64.8256 -1.70 0.092    -1243.911 -1.32 0.190 
Company type    182.9662 1.74 0.090 203.5348 0.90 0.368 
Listed       251.719 0.34 0.733 
Number of observation  85 510 242 837 
Adjusted R-square  0.8370 0.3819 0.7405 0.4688 
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Table 11.3: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Social Welfare or Non-economic Objectives and SOEs’ Financial Performance 
during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
 Dependeent  Variables : ROA 
Independent  
variables 
Pred. Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant  -0.6077 -1.66 0.120 -0.1024 -1.74 0.085 -0.4252 -3.95 0.000 -0.0137 -0.30 0.767 
Asset + 0.0814 2.14 0.051 0.0218 3.02 0.003 0.0280 2.26 0.029 0.0202 3.35 0.001 
Leverage - 0.0837 0.35 0.733 -0.1561 -3.78 0.000 -0.0217 -0.41 0.681 -0.1466 -4.32 0.000 
Provision of public goods and services - 0.0096 0.58 0.569 0.0656 1.57 0.121 0.1861 3.64 0.001 0.0017 0.09 0.931 
National economic - -0.0223 -1.47 0.163 -0.0161 -0.74 0.460 0.2258 4.67 0.000 0.0152 0.77 0.445 
National development - -0.0528 -1.21 0.245 0.0342 1.07 0.287 -0.0356 -1.45 0.156 -0.0055 -0.21 0.832 
National security -    -0.0159 -0.37 0.710 -0.1906 -3.98 0.000 -0.1513 -2.41 0.017 
Industrialisation -    0.0197 0.61 0.545    -0.0511 -2.16 0.033 
OHS - -0.0275 -0.51 0.617 0.0452 1.52 0.132 0.0339 4.21 0.000 0.0024 0.12 0.907 
Community development -    -0.1213 -3.45 0.001 -0.2746 -3.26 0.002 -0.1167 -4.55 0.000 
Community prosperity - 0.1015 1.16 0.265 0.0354 0.95 0.347 -0.1996 -4.31 0.000 -0.0295 -1.31 0.192 
Community needs - -0.0644 -2.58 0.022 -0.0018 -0.08 0.939 0.0224 0.72 0.479 0.0126 0.75 0.454 
Government policy  -    0.0853 2.29 0.024 0.0633 0.82 0.415 0.0719 3.02 0.003 
Government special needs -    0.0074 0.19 0.854 0.0390 0.58 0.567 0.0349 1.27 0.205 
State budget - 0.0782 1.45 0.170 -0.0511 -2.62 0.010    -0.0589 -2.29 0.024 
Market supply and stabilisation -    -0.1027 1.37 0.174    -0.0714 -1.25 0.215 
Company type    
 
1.28 0.208 -0.0319 -1.19 0.236 
Listed     0.0815 1.53 0.127 
Number of observation  85 514 242 841 
Adjusted R-square  0.6800 0.3872 0.6033 0.3941 
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Table 11.3: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Social Welfare or Non-economic Objectives and SOEs’ Financial Performance 
during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
Dependent  Variable : EBIT Margin 
Independent  
variables 
Pred. 
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant   -0.6077 -1.66 0.120 -0.4252 -1.74 0.085 -0.1024 3.95 0.000 -0.0137 0.30 0.767 
Asset + 0.0814 2.14 0.051 0.0280 3.02 0.003 0.0218 2.26 0.029 0.0202 3.35 0.001 
Leverage - 0.0837 0.35 0.733 -0.0217 -3.78 0.000 -0.1561 -0.41 0.681 -0.1466 -4.32 0.000 
Provision of public goods and services - 0.0095 0.58 0.569 0.0656 1.57 0.121 0.1861 3.64 0.001 0.0018 0.09 0.931 
National economic - -0.0223 -1.47 0.163 -0.0161 -0.74 0.460 0.2258 4.67 0.000 0.0153 0.77 0.445 
National development - --0.0528 -1.21 0.245 0.0342 1.07 0.287 -0.0356 -1.45 0.156 -0.0055 -0.21 0.832 
National security -    -0.0159 -0.37 0.710 -0.1906 -3.98 0.000 -0.1514 -2.41 0.017 
Industrialisation -    0.0196 0.61 0.545    -0.0510 -2.16 0.832 
OHS - -0.0275 -0.51 0.617 0.0452 1.52 0.132 0.0339 4.21 0.000 0.0024 0.12 0.907 
Community development -    -0.1213 -3.45 0.001 -0.2476 -3.26 0.002 -0.1166 -4.55 0.000 
Community prosperity - 0.1015 1.16 0.265 0.0354 0.95 0.347 -0.1996 -4.31 0.000 -0.0295 -1.31 0.192 
Community needs - -0.0643 -2.58 0.022 -0.0018 -0.08 0.939 0.0224 0.72 0.047 0.0127 0.75 0.454 
Government policy  -    0.0857 2.29 0.024 0.0633 0.82 0.415 0.0719 3.02 0.003 
Government special needs -    0.0074 0.19 0.854 0.0390 0.58 0.567 0.0349 1.27 0.205 
State budget - 0.0782 1.45 0.170 -0.0511 -2.62 0.010    -0.0589 -2.29 0.024 
Market supply and stabilisation -    -0.1026 -1.37 0.174    -0.0714 -1.25 0.215 
Company type     1.28 0.208 -0.0319 -1.19 0.236 
Listed      0.0815 1.53 0.127 
Number of observation  85 514 242 841 
Adjusted R-square  0.6800 0.3872 0.6033 0.3941 
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Table 11.3: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Social Welfare or Non-economic Objectives and SOEs’ Financial Performance 
during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
 Dependent  Variable: Asset Turnover 
Independent  
variables 
Pred.  
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant   -0.2542 -0.36 0.721 0.5986 2.41 0.018 1.9669 1.86 0.071 0.4773 2.70 0.008 
Asset + 0.0309 0.43 0.676 -0.0254 -0.83 0.410 -0.0531 -0.73 0.471 0.0037 0.19 0.852 
Leverage - 0.3830 1.21 0.245 0.0147 0.11 0.912 -0.0613 -0.16 0.871 -0.0008 -0.01 0.996 
Provision of public goods and services - 0.7723 24.26 0.000 0.3868 2.35 0.021 -1.1051 -1.85 0.072 0.1864 1.49 0.138 
National economic - -0.1080 -5.07 0.000 0.0555 0.56 0.579 -0.2586 -0.45 0.658 0.0107 0.14 0.891 
National development - 0.1065 1.24 0.234 -0.0730 -0.57 0.571 -0.1829 -0.90 0.375 -0.1258 -1.18 0.241 
National security -    0.1423 0.86 0.391 -1.1038 -3.30 0.002 -0.1135 -0.94 0.347 
Industrialisation -    0.1523 0.91 0.367    0.0224 0.22 0.823 
OHS - 0.1373 1.30 0.215 0.3648 2.48 0.015 -0.4384 -1.65 0.108 0.3435 2.63 0.010 
Community development -    -0.2706 -1.06 0.294 -1.1306 -1.40 0.170 -0.2413 -1.29 0.198 
Community prosperity - 09273 5.38 0.000 -0.1109 -0.72 0.471 0.8025 -1.52 0.136 -0.0047 -0.04 0.964 
Community needs - -0.2688 -9.04 0.000 0.0713 0.66 0.512 -0.0110 -0.04 0.968 -0.0378 -0.40 0.688 
Government policy  -    0.5555 3.27 0.002 -1.1068 -1.25 0.220 0.3938 2.39 0.018 
Government special needs -    0.3013 1.22 0.226 -1.3559 -1.62 0.114 0.1000 0.47 0.642 
State budget - 0.6430 6.15 0.000 0.1142 1.43 0.156    -0.1675 -0.92 0.358 
Market supply and stabilisation -    -0.1789 -0.50 0.619    -0.3108 -0.97 0.335 
Company type    0.3128 0.95 0.346 0.0803 0.82 0.414 
Listed      -0.0660 -0.35 0.726 
Number of observation  85 511 242 836 
Adjusted R-square  0.9452 0.5103 0.5967 0.4391 
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Table 11.3: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Social Welfare or Non-economic Objectives and SOEs’ Financial Performance 
during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
Dependent Variable : Market/Book Value of Equity 
Independent 
variables 
 
Pred. 
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Cons  -321374.2 -2.54 0.024 -2468.1 -3.52 0.001 767.2262 0.27 0.788 -24968.89 -3.72 0.000 
Asset + 35063.53 2.68 0.018 460.9026 4.82 0.000 1252.032 2.82 0.008 3560.807 5.14 0.000 
Leverage - 49244.57 0.77 0.455 -850.6955 -2.82 0.006 -97.6662 -0.09 0.925 -2124.175 -0.60 0.552 
Provision of public goods 
 and services 
- 
1312.229 0.24 0.818 172.3316 0.55 0.582 -1811.645 -1.18 0.247 3644.018 1.04 0.299 
National economic - 70966.69 14.71 0.000 140.1708 0.68 0.499 -1268.827 -0.61 0.548 5958.461 1.68 0.095 
National development - -84852.07 -5.70 0.000 422.9746 1.58 0.118 -1521.324 -2.52 0.016 -955.0907 -0.34 0.732 
National security -    -953.4827 -1.76 0.082 -645.9694 -0.84 0.409 -4842.422 -1.03 0.306 
Industrialisation -    478.7285 1.09 0.278    -1560.07 -0.32 0.748 
OHS - -48620.54 -2.67 0.018 -53.7414 -2.05 0.044 -93.0989 -0.67 0.504 -4560.338 -1.01 0.312 
Community development -    -490.0271 -1.73 0.088 1803.843 0.53 0.603 15568 2.32 0.022 
Community prosperity - -19183.9 -0.66 0.518 478.6508 1.56 0.122 2413.153 1.50 0.141 6955.177 1.98 0.049 
Community needs - 30721.81 4.00 0.001 201.8035 1.32 0.190 1220.502 2.00 0.053 530.4526 0.18 0.857 
Government policy  -    1605.254 2.84 0.006 4839.692 1.98 0.055 3625.769 0.85 0.394 
Government special needs -    -414.7939 -1.09 0.277 2886.505 1.46 0.151 -4483.156 -1.26 0.208 
State budget - -114820.9 -6.49 0.000 -68.9744 -0.45 0.652    -15677.69 -2.03 0.045 
Market supply and stabilisation -    -477.3054 -2.23 0.028    10220.68 1.74 0.084 
Company type    687.0602 0.85 0.398 -1591.091 -0.70 0.488 
Listed      4765.032 0.72 0.472 
Number of observation  83 514 242 839 
Adjusted R-square  0.7384 0.6510 0.9693 0.6441 
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Table 11.3: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Social Welfare or Non-economic Objectives and SOEs’ Financial Performance 
during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
Dependent variable : ROE 
Independent variables 
Pred. 
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coef t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant  -0.1412 -1.18 0.256 -0.3046 -1.97 0.052 -02492 -4.54 0.000 -0.2353 -1.38 0.169 
Asset + 0.0233 1.89 0.080 0.0369 1.96 0.063 0.0046 0.51 0.612 0.0259 1.58 0.117 
Leverage - 0.0828 1.19 0.254 -0.1314 -1.88 0.063 0.0135 0.26 0.794 -0.0825 -1.49 0.137 
Provision of public goods 
 and services 
- 
-0.0206 -3.94 0.001 0.1304 2.16 0.034 0.1607 3.53 0.001 0.0656 1.66 0.100 
National economic - 0.0213 4.90 0.000 -0.0452 -0.98 0.328 0.0865 1.55 0.130 -0.0143 -0.60 0.552 
National development - -0.0398 -3.03 0.009 -0.1264 -1.49 0.139 0.0107 0.67 0.510 -0.0600 -1.26 0.209 
National security -    -0.1354 1.75 0.083 0.0111 0.90 0.375 0.0479 1.73 0.086 
Industrialisation -    0.0735 0.69 0.492    0.0591 0.73 0.464 
OHS - -0.0027 -0.17 0.870 0.0766 1.54 0.127 -0.0101 -0.78 0.440 0.0469 1.68 0.096 
Community development -    -0.1243 -1.77 0.127 -0.0801 -1.06 0.296 -0.0435 -0.98 0.331 
Community prosperity - -0.0199 -0.73 0.480 0.0595 0.91 0.364 -0.0918 -1.94 0.060 0.0093 0.36 0.719 
Community needs - -0.0145 -1.82 0.091 0.0789 2.19 0.032 -0.0315 -1.77 0.086 0.0333 1.64 0.104 
Government policy  -    0.0873 1.07 0.286 -0.1511 -2.17 0.036 0.0262 0.41 0.686 
Government special needs -    -0.0233 -0.44 0.661 -0.1660 -2.86 0.007 0.0403 1.30 0.196 
State budget - -0.0248 -1.42 0.177 -0.0617 -2.38 0.019    0.0795 0.99 0.322 
Market supply and stabilisation -    -0.0108 -0.19 0.854    0.0186 0.50 0.618 
Company type      0.0795 4.38 0.000 0.235 0.95 0.342 
Perum/listed        0.0067 0.20 0.841 
No. of observations  85 512 242 839 
Adjusted R-square  0.4879 0.0122 -0.0163 0.0044 
 
Source: Indonesian SOE financial and annual reports 2003–2010. 
Notes: Data were collected as follows: ROA = EBIT divided by total assets; ROE = EAT divided by average equity (equity t + equity t-1); EBIT margin = EBIT divided by total sales; operating profit margin = operating income 
divided by total sales; operating profit  return = operating income divided by total assets; asset turnover = total sales divided by total assets; The objectives were collected and calculated as dummy variables: 1 when the 
SOE had the government-stated objective, and 0 otherwise. 
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Table 11.4 presents the regression results of the relations between government-stated social welfare 
or non-economic objectives and SOEs’ social welfare representative financial performance. The table 
shows that the government-stated social welfare or non-economic objectives show more relations 
with publicly listed SOEs’ social welfare representative financial performance than government-stated 
for economic or financial objectives. The government-stated provision of public goods and services 
objective shows relations with publicly listed SOEs’ CSR fund performance only. The government-
stated national economic improvement objective shows negative effects on SOEs’ labour cost 
performance of -8.15 points. The objective helps SOEs to improve their performance in employment 
intensity performance by 2.95 points. The influence of interest is found through two different dividend 
rate calculations. The interest increases the dividend rate by 12.01 points when it is included in the 
measurement. When the interest is excluded, the objective improves the dividend rate by 18.01 
points. The government-stated objective for community prosperity shows negative effects on labour 
cost, CSR funds and employment intensity performance. The government-stated provision of 
community needs objective generates a positive effect of 4.53 points on SOEs’ employment intensity 
performance. Meanwhile, the government-stated state budget contribution objective may prevent 
SOEs from improving their effective tax rates and dividend rates financial performance 
The regression results of the relations between government-stated social welfare or non-economic 
objectives and non-privatised SOEs’ social welfare representative financial performance also support 
the previous results regarding the important role of interest in SOEs’ financial performance. Table 11.4 
shows the role of interest in improving performance of effective tax rates and dividend rates. For 
example, government-stated national development objective has a positive effect on non-privatised 
SOEs without privatisation restrictions’ dividend rate performance when the interest is part of the 
measurement. In contrast, the objective does not show any relation with SOEs’ dividend rate 
performance when the interest is not part of the measurement. The government-stated objectives for 
national economic development and OHS show effects on non-privatised SOEs with privatisation 
restrictions’ effective tax rates when the interest is not part of the measurement. 
The requirement for SOEs to achieve government community development matters and other non-
economic objectives also affects non-privatised SOEs’ performance. The government-stated objectives 
for community development show a positive effect on both non-privatised SOEs’ group performance 
for employment intensity. While government-stated compliance with the government policy objective 
improves non-privatised SOEs with privatisation restrictions’ employment intensity and CSR fund, it 
hinders non-privatised SOEs without privatisation restrictions’ employment intensity by -2.08 points. 
None of non-privatised SOEs’ social welfare representative financial performance is influenced by the 
government-stated state budget contribution objective.  
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Table 11.4: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Social Welfare or Non-economic Objectives and SOEs’ Social Welfare 
Representative Financial Performance during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups 
 Dependent  Variable : Effective Tax Rate 1 
Independent  
variables 
Pred. 
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant  0.8504 1.71 0.109 0.1162 0.34 0.738 -16.3940 -1.17 0.249 -0.2611 -0.19 0.850 
Asset + -0.0567 -1.09 0.293 -0.0198 -0.40 0.687 2.6687 1.28 0.209 0.0261 0.19 0.847 
Leverage - 0.0266 0.08 0.935 -0.3548 -1.39 0.169 -0.1444 -0.06 0.954 -0.4945 -1.13 0.261 
Provision of public goods and services - -0.0427 -1.83 0.089 0.0404 0.25 0.804 -2.3989 -0.33 0.740 -0.0337 -0.06 0.955 
National economic - -0.02711 -1.28 0.221 0.0864 0.71 0.480 -11.6336 -1.14 0.261 0.7775 0.78 0.436 
National development - 0.0823 1.19 0.252 0.1661 0.61 0.542 0.3394 00.4 0.893 -0.3093 -0.64 0.526 
National security -    -0.0128 -0.05 0.958 1.8613 0.81 0.423 -0.2508 -0.45 0.654 
Industrialisation -    0.3032 1.24 0.217    -0.3615 -0.69 0.654 
OHS - 0.0658 0.78 0.451 0.0518 0.09 0.925 1.0269 0.49 0.630 0.3193 0.64 0.525 
Community development -    -0.1560 -0.57 0.567 26.0189 1.40 0.169 1.3935 0.95 0.346 
Community prosperity - -0.1987 -1.52 0.150 -0.1373 -0.74 0.460 7.3654 0.95 0.350 -0.5584 -1.38 0.168 
Community needs - 0.0445 1.87 0.082 0.2254 1.31 0.195 -7.8516 -1.25 0.218 -1.7229 -1.15 0.253 
Government policy  -    0.2233 1.40 0.165 9.0920 0.80 0.427 0.2978 0.53 0.594 
Government special needs -    -0.0336 -0.36 0.721 4.5795 0.51 0.616 0.3112 0.53 0.600 
State budget - -0.2194 -2.87 0.012 -0.0017 -0.04 0.971    -0.0159 -0.04 0.971 
Market supply and stabilisation -    0.0267 0.23 0.819    -2.6748 -1.81 0.072 
Company type       0.2167 0.71 0.481 
Listed    3.3545 0.80 0.429 0.4498 0.66 0.508 
Number of observation  85 505 236 826 
Adjusted R-square  0.0180 -0.0507 -0.0583 -0.0168 
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Table 11.4: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Social Welfare or Non-economic Objectives and SOEs’ Social Welfare 
Representative Financial Performance during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
 Dependent  Variable : Effective Tax Rate 2 
Independent  
variables 
Pred. 
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant  1.3745 1.81 0.092 0.1798 0.58 0.562 -1.3386 -2.68 0.011 0.55415 1.72 0.089 
Asset + -0.1053 -1.37 0.192 -0.0434 -0.87 0.385 0.0525 1.19 0.243 -0.0628 -1.41 0.161 
Leverage - -1.4248 -1.48 0.160 0.0493 0.24 0.813 -1.1005 -0.61 0.544 -0.3955 -1.30 0.196 
Provision of public goods and services - -0.039 -0.15 0.885 0.0531 0.34 0.732 0.8090 1.96 0.058 -0.1932 -1.10 0.272 
National economic - 0.1167 2.06 0059 -0.0300 -0.28 0.780 1.1026 2.32 0.026 0.0768 0.86 0.391 
National development - -0.0146 -0.32 0.752 0.0842 0.52 0.606 -0.2094 -1.12 0.270 -0.0537 0.46 0.644 
National security -    -0.1398 -0.69 0.493 -0.5284 -1.55 0.130 0.0085 0.04 0.967 
Industrialisation -    0.1994 0.91 0.368    -0.0347 -0.28 0.777 
OHS - -0.0263 -0.48 0.639 -0.0571 -0.22 0.829 -0.8355 -5.78 0.000 -0.0769 -0.47 0.641 
Community development -    0.0203 0.13 0.896 -1.8260 -1.52 0.137 -0.5471 -1.51 0.133 
Community prosperity - -0.4116 -3.73 0.002 0.2811 1.37 0.173 0.1701 0.54 0.590 -0.1242 -0.65 0.516 
Community needs - 0.4529 4.07 0.001 0.1372 1.01 0.314 0.4842 1.91 0.063 0.1212 1.51 0.133 
Government policy  -    0.4725 2.18 0.032 -1.3225 -1.38 0.176 0.2277 1.36 0.176 
Government special needs -    -0.1438 -1.02 0.309 -1.4338 -1.68 0.100 -0.1425 -0.87 0.384 
State budget - -0.2620 -2.77 0.015 -0.0525 -0.62 0.539    0.5074 1.35 0.180 
Market supply and stabilisation -    -0.1777 -0.70 0.485    -0.0730 -0.35 0.728 
Company type        0.1389 1.07 0.286 
Listed    1.0354 1.51 0.138 0.0983 0.48 0.635 
Number of observation  85 505 239 826 
Adjusted R-square  0.1884 0.0593 0.0380 0.0267 
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Table 11.4: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Social Welfare or Non-economic Objectives and SOEs’ Social Welfare 
Representative Financial Performance during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
Dependent  Variable : Dividend Rate 1 
Independent  
variables 
Pred. 
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant  0.3640 0.79 0.490 0.02523 0.22 0.827 -18.9976 -1.07 0.291 -1.2840 -0.93 0.352 
Asset + -0.0219 -0.38 0.711 0.0194 1.33 0.188 2.5014 1.16 0.254 0.1252 0.90 0.371 
Leverage - -0.0043 -0.44 0.664 -0.1179 -2.00 0.049 0.1815 0.07 0.944 -0.0731 -0.22 0.829 
Provision of public goods and services - -0.0080 -0.30 0.767 -0.0054 -0.67 0.505 -1.4768 -0.20 0.842 0.4903 0.86 0.389 
National economic - 0.2677 12.01 0.000 -0.1138 -1.95 0.054 -10.5599 -1.02 0.314 1.0587 1.01 0.316 
National development - 0.0096 0.13 0.895 0.0358 2.10 0.038 0.2441 0.10 0.924 1.0619 -0.26 0.796 
National security -    0.0669 -0.92 0.358 2.1466 0.85 0.401 -0.1165 -0.67 0.507 
Industrialisation -    0.0119 -1.20 0.234    -0.3152 -0.24 0.807 
OHS - -0.0958 -1.08 0.298 0.0423 1.07 0.289 1.4494 0.64 0.527 -0.0755 0.62 0.539 
Community development -    -0.0385 -0.99 0.325 24.589 1.28 0.209 0.23155 0.97 0.334 
Community prosperity - -0.2669 -1.86 0.084 0.0303 -0.66 0.509 6.5080 0.82 0.416 1.4189 0.07 0.946 
Community needs - 0.0475 1.38 0.188 0.06114 2.43 0.017 -8.6382 -1.27 0.211 -1.712 -1.08 0.283 
Government policy  -    0.06440 1.60 0.114 7.9058 0.68 0.498 0.5683 1.12 0.264 
Government special needs -    0.0976 1.28 0.220 3.6189 0.39 0.697 -0.0485 -0.12 0.907 
State budget - -0.4564 -5.20 0.000 -0.0021 1.24 0.220    -0.1039 -0.26 0.793 
Market supply and stabilisation -    0.1739 1.25 0.214    -0.4008 -0.62 0.538 
Company type    3.3856 0077 0.444 -0.1076 -0.41 0.686 
Listed       0.4335 0.70 0.485 
Number of observation  85 500 241 826 
Adjusted R-square  0.3370 0.2193 -0.0704 -0.0272 
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Table 11.4: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Social Welfare or Non-economic Objectives and SOEs’ Social Welfare 
Representative Financial Performance during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
 Dependent  Variable : Dividend Rate 2 
Independent  
variables 
Pred. 
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff T p Coeff t p 
Constant   0.3640 0.79 0.440 -0.0223 -0.29 0.776 -0.0503 -0.41 0.685 0.0669 1.27 0.205 
Asset + -0.0220 -0.46 0.651 0.0217 1.91 0.060 0.0160 1.04 0.307 0.0139 2.33 0.021 
Leverage - -0.0043 -0.02 0.988 -0.0681 -1.06 0.292 -0.1196 -2.22 0.033 -0.0896 -1.76 0.080 
Provision of public goods and services - 0.0264 1.30 0.214 -0.00539 0.12 0.908 -0.0514 -0.72 0.473 -0.0115 -0.46 0.646 
National economic - 0.3153 18.05 0.000 -0.11380 -2.23 0.029 -0.0483 -0.59 0.562 -0.0930 -1.29 0.199 
National development - -0.0029 -0.06 0.956 0.0358 0.99 0.323 -0.0344 -0.59 0.562 0.0103 0.41 0.684 
National security -    0.0669 1.06 0.291 -0.0566 -0.92 0.361 0.0282 0.43 0.667 
Industrialisation -    0.0119 0.21 0.836  -2.02 0.051 0.0362 -1.32 0.188 
OHS -  -1.47 0.165 0.0423 1.27 0.208 -0.0161   -0.0201 1.10 0.271 
Community development -    -0.0386 -0.90 0.368 -0.0485 -1.05 0.301 0.0079 1.45 0.151 
Community prosperity - -0.2789 -2.58 0.022 0.0303 0.65 0.517 0.0648 -0.39 0.697 0.0677 -0.84 0.402 
Community needs - 0.0714 2.36 0.033 0.0611 1.43 0.155 0.0155 0.98 0.332 0.1376 0.34 0.738 
Government policy  -    0.0644 0.75 0.453 0.0927 0.42 0.680 0.0677 1.26 0.208 
Government special needs -    0.0976 1.07 0.287 0.0312 0.97 0.338 0.1376 2.40 0.018 
State budget - -0.5574 -8.27 0.000 -0.0022 -0.08 0.934  0.40 0.690 0.0174 0.55 0.585 
Market supply and stabilisation -    0.1739 1.42 0.158    0.1091 0.87 0.385 
Company type    0.0621 2.02 0.050 -0.0302 -1.66 0.098 
Listed       0.1241 2.75 0.007 
Number of observation  85 501 241 827 
Adjusted R-square  0.4171 0.2049 0.2544 0.2377 
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Table 11.4: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Social Welfare or Non-economic Objectives and SOEs’ Social Welfare 
Representative Financial Performance during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
 Dependent  Variable: Labour Cost  
Independent  
variables 
Pred.  
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant   -7885.632 -1.57 0.138 -526.8515 -2.26 0.027 -383.8643 -0.68 0.499 -223.084 -4.58 0.000 
Asset + 1041.772 2.00 0.065 106.8771 3.01 0.003 207.5294 3.66 0.001 325.4277 5.05 0.000 
Leverage - -804.983 -0.62 0.548 -175.4506 -2.25 0.027 -286.1981 -2.34 0.025 -452.3754 -1.63 0.105 
Provision of public goods and services - 428.4466 1.91 0.076 -40.1749 -0.71 0.481 -231.5505 -0.58 0.566 414.2086 1.61 0.109 
National economic - -750.4008 -8.15 0.000 51.3385 1.12 0.268 -508.7517 -1.29 0.204 345.8717 1.57 0.119 
National development - 1614.241 2.94 0.011 -89.0022 -0.90 0.372 -23.4444 -0.20 0.840 -102.0381 -0.64 0.526 
National security -    -96.7673 -1.02 0.309 63.5825 0.63 0.535 -238.5671 -0.80 0.422 
Industrialisation -    -104.8994 -0.87 0.389    -16.6436 -0.04 0.967 
OHS - 3387.615 4.97 0.000 88.0658 0.76 0.451 -37.1390 -4.72 0.000 364.6219 1.09 0.279 
Community development -    -47.4855 -0.80 0.426 1261.415 2.69 0.011 625.3237 1.95 0.054 
Community prosperity - -4371.495 -3.70 0.002 -27.2050 -0.32 0.749 292.2525 0.92 0.362 -106.7168 -0.45 0.656 
Community needs - -140.7177 -0.69 0.501 6.8745 0.12 0.903 -344.5718 -1.75 0.089 -319.9757 -1.34 0.184 
Government policy  -    227.44 1.60 0.113 485.4055 1.02 0.313 519.19 1.53 0.129 
Government special needs -    106.952 0.90 0.370 234.5083 0.54 0.590 -380.4061 -1.53 0.130 
State budget - -1097.274 -1.48 0.161 -64.8017 -1.37 0.173    -709.0133 -1.71 0.089 
Market supply and stabilisation -    -123.5776 -1.27 0.206    896.585 1.51 0.133 
Company type    -59.7448 -0.32 0.749 -35.8097 -0.28 0.777 
Listed       430.2745 1.06 0.290 
Number of observation  85 469 235 789 
Adjusted R-square  0.9152 0.4941 0.7830 0.5926 
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Table 11.4: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Social Welfare or Non-economic Objectives and SOEs’ Social Welfare 
Representative Financial Performance during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
Dependent Variable : Employment Intensity 
Independent  
variables 
Pred. 
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant  0.0175 2.93 0.011 0.2666 6.57 0.000 0.1606 5.25 0.000 0.1708 5.00 0.000 
Asset + -0.0016 -2.63 0.020 -0.0288 -6.39 0.000 -0.0126 -2.85 0.007 -0.0180 -5.29 0.000 
Leverage - -0.0037 -0.83 0.418 -0.0071 -0.44 0.660 0.0008 0.11 0.913 -0.0196 -1.02 0.311 
Provision of public goods and services - -0.0001 -0.47 0.649 -0.0506 -2.58 0.012 -0.0385 -2.01 0.053 -0.0092 -0.85 0.399 
National economic - 0.0007 2.95 0.010 -0.0259 -1.94 0.057 -0.0356 -1.45 0.157 -0.0012 -0.13 0.895 
National development - 0.0005 1.24 0.235 0.0216 1.13 0.261 -0.0207 -1.83 0.076 0.01806 1.15 0.252 
National security -    -0.0635 -1.48 0.144 0.0063 0.74 0.462 -0.0105 -0.88 0.382 
Industrialisation -    0.0075 0.21 0.831    -0.0286 -1.43 0.156 
OHS - 0.0009 1.57 0.139 -0.0611 -2.06 0.043 -0.0038 -5.74 0.000 -0.0202 -1.69 0.094 
Community development -    0.0311 2.91 0.005 0.0691 2.71 0.010 0.0201 1.08 0.283 
Community prosperity - -0.0046 -4.16 0.001 0.0313 1.65 0.103 0.0377 2.78 0.009 0.0065 0.77 0.441 
Community needs - 0.0026 4.53 0.000 0.0214 2.57 0.012 -0.0168 -1.30 0.203 0.0044 0.53 0.599 
Government policy  -    -0.0500 -2.06 0.043 0.0992 4.86 0.000 0.0202 1.17 0.244 
Government special needs -    0.0081 1.00 0.319 0.0509 2.67 0.012 -0.0383 -2.19 0.030 
State budget - -0.0324 -4.00 0.001 0.0004 0.09 0.926    -0.0207 -1.31 0.191 
Market supply and stabilisation -    -0.0155 -1.04 0.301    0.0332 1.35 0.180 
Company type       -0.0048 -0.83 0.408 
Listed    0.0037 0.38 0.710 0.0120 0.91 0.365 
Number of observation  85 407 187 679 
Adjusted R-square  0.9467 0.7381 0.9651 0.6139 
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Table 11.4: Regression Results of Relations between Government-stated Social Welfare or Non-economic Objectives and SOEs’ Social Welfare 
Representative Financial Performance during 2004–2010 Based on SOE-type Groups (cont.) 
Dependent variable : CSR Fund 
Independent variables 
Pred. 
Sign Publicly listed Non-restricted Restricted All 
+/- Coeff t P Coeff t p Coeff t p Coeff t p 
Constant  -473.1429 -1.78 0.103 -25.5956 -1.65 0.104 -38.5492 -1.98 0.062 -71.672 -4.29 0.000 
Asset + 57.1498 2.09 0.061 3.0581 1.61 0.114 7.7649 4.22 0.000 8.4443 4.69 0.000 
Leverage - 94.9121 1.64 0.129 -1.50063. -0.70 0.488 -8.0231 -2.05 0.055 -2.0030 -0.26 0.797 
Provision of public goods and service - 29.5269 2.30 0.042 8.1226 1.97 0.055 -13.6570 -2.45 0.024 9.5856 1.33 0.187 
National economic - 76.5665 1.55 0.149 1.9637 0.98 0.330 -4.9464 -1.37 0.188 -1.8970 -0.23 0.821 
National development -    -0.0534 -0.04 0.968 -8.9191 -1.61 0.124 13.4548 1.38 0.173 
National security -    2.3916 0.48 0.632 0.6230 0.99 0.335 -11.0927 -0.68 0.500 
Industrialisation -    3.7659 0.54 0.589    5.7263 0.43 0.670 
OHS -    6.2886 0.88 0.382 13.6852 3.43 0.003 47.6310 2.82 0.006 
Community development -    -7.8589 -2.93 0.005    -12.0186 -1.20 0.233 
Community prosperity - -181.391 -2.20 0.050 -0.8617 -0.38 0.704    -30.6817 -2.96 0.004 
Community needs -    1.5413 1.13 0.263 2.3130 0.24 0.809 8.8892 1.34 0.183 
Government policy  -    9.1351 1.08 0.286 28.5499 4.07 0.001 8.2314 1.05 0.297 
Government special needs -    -0.9017 -0.12 0.908 17.6149 4.09 0.001 0.1757 0.03 0.977 
State budget - -163.1311 -1.74 0.110 -5.9598 -1.84 0.072    -27.3463 -1.57 0.119 
Market supply and 
 stabilisation 
- 
         103.6236 3.07 0.003 
Company type           -1.5280 -0.41 0.682 
Perum/listed           30.7432 2.14 0.035 
No. of observations   52  237  102  391 
Adjusted R-square   0.6582  0.2468  0.6219  0.5113 
 
Source: Indonesian SOE financial and annual reports 2003–2010. 
Notes: Data were collected as follows: effective tax rate 1 = tax divided by EBIT; effective tax rate 2 = tax divided by EBT; employment intensity = natural log employees divided by sales; dividend rate 1 = dividend 
payment divided by EBT; dividend rate 2 = dividend payment divided by EBT. The objectives were collected and calculated as dummy variables: 1 when the SOE had the government-stated objective, and 0 otherwise. 
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11.3 Potential Conflicting Objectives 
Referring to Chapters 8 and 9, the analysis of government-stated objectives and the privatisation 
policy shows that there are some potentially conflicting objectives. These potential conflicts arise 
following the implementation of privatisation policies that encourage SOEs to have multiple or 
mixed objectives, including economic and financial along with non-economic objectives. Conflicts 
also occur as a result of competing interests between the market and state welfare orientations in 
regard to economic control policy. This thesis shows that, on average, each SOE holds at least seven 
objectives, with three government-stated objectives and four corporate objectives. This thesis 
conducts additional tests to estimate whether there is sufficient evidence to support previous 
qualitative results in this thesis regarding potential conflicts of objectives that may affect SOEs’ 
performance. This is done using a similar regression model as shown in Equation (1).  
From the previous test in Section 11.1, the combined seven economic and financial objectives tested 
against the combined 14 social welfare and non-economic objectives showed limited effects on 
SOEs’ performance. Meanwhile, the analysis in Chapters 8 and 9 showed that potentially conflicting 
objectives occurred following the introduction of new profit and efficiency objectives. This section 
focuses on the extent to which SOEs’ financial performance is affected when only two objectives 
(profit and efficiency) are tested against the 14 social welfare and non-economic objectives. Early 
studies regarding public service obligations showed that profit and efficiency are the most common 
objectives that are hindered by social welfare maximising and national economic objectives 
(Hanschen, 2004; Martin, 1996). Using this assumption, this section focuses only on SOEs that hold 
government-stated profit and efficiency objectives combined with social welfare maximising and 
non-economic objectives. Tests between the combined profit and efficiency objectives against the 
government-stated social welfare and non-economic objectives resulted in no effects on all SOEs’ 
financial performance. This is because the profit and efficiency objectives were eliminated (or 
‘omitted’) when the testing specifically focused on combining only the profit and efficiency 
objectives against the social welfare and non-economic objectives. 
11.4 Discussion and Findings 
This section aimed to provide sufficient evidence to support the results regarding the examination of 
hypotheses one and two. Hypothesis one examined whether the introduction of new objectives 
resulting from the privatisation policy and the liberalisation of the market economy resulted in 
conflicting objectives for SOEs and new privatised firms’ objectives and business activities. 
Hypothesis two examined whether changes to SOEs’ and new privatised firms’ objectives and 
business activities resulting from the privatisation policy improved their performance. The 
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preliminary results from the qualitative analysis and two-sample t-tests showed that the 
government-stated objectives were theoretically in conflict because the government was 
inconsistent in implementing its new policies regarding the introduction of the profit and efficiency 
objectives. This inconsistency affected the relations between the objectives and performance, as 
shown in the two-sample t-test results, which indicated that the objectives tend to decrease 
financial performance. Using the regression results, this chapter examined and estimated the 
relations between the government-stated objectives and SOEs’ financial performance. 
The regression results also showed the lesser ability of SOE groups to estimate relations between the 
objectives and performance. Tables 11.1–11.4 indicated that non-privatised SOEs show more 
relations between the government-stated objectives and financial performance than publicly listed 
SOEs. The government-stated economic or financial objectives indicated some positive relations with 
non-privatised SOEs’ financial performance. The government-stated profit objective showed a 
positive estimated relation with the ROA and EBIT margin for non-privatised SOEs with privatisation 
restrictions, and for ROE performance for non-privatised SOEs without privatisation restrictions. In 
contrast, this profit objective showed a negative association of -8.54 points for non-privatised SOEs 
with privatisation restrictions’ net income. None of the SOEs’ financial performance, except for non-
privatised SOEs without privatisation restriction’s employment intensity and effective tax rates when 
the interest is excluded in measurement, estimated the relations with the government-stated 
efficiency objectives. 
The government-stated social welfare or non-economic objectives showed more influences on each 
SOE group’s performance. Publicly listed SOEs showed more relations between the government-
stated social welfare or non-economic objectives and SOEs’ financial performances. The objectives 
could prevent SOEs from showing better financial performance. The estimation of the relations 
between SOEs’ social welfare representative financial performance and the government-stated 
social welfare or non-economic objectives supports the results from the previous two-sample t-test. 
Limited relations between the government-stated social welfare or non-economic objectives and 
SOEs’ social welfare representative financial performance showed that Indonesian SOEs can only 
make contributions through taxes and dividends when they are supported by external funds. Table 
11.4 showed that when interest is part of the measurement, SOEs’ social welfare representative 
financial performance, such as taxes and dividends, is improved. Contradictory relations are found as 
the government-stated state budget contribution objective prevents publicly listed SOEs from 
contributing through taxes and dividends, as shown through their effective tax and dividend rates 
performance. 
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In summary, a high reliance on non-core business and external financial support makes it difficult for 
SOEs to meet the government’s expectations. Despite the introduction of new rules regarding the 
implementation of profit and efficiency objectives, the Indonesian government has shown 
inconsistency and resistance to changing or implementing them for each SOE. This has resulted in 
few to no relations between the government-stated objectives and SOEs’ financial performances. 
Further effects were found in SOEs’ lack of ability to make contributions to state budget or 
community development, as most SOEs showed poor performance. Meanwhile, the estimation of 
the relations between the government-stated social welfare or non-economic objectives and SOEs’ 
financial performance supports previous studies, which found that public service obligation and 
social welfare duties prevent SOEs from being profitable and efficient. A contradictory result was 
found when the government encouraged SOEs to make contributions to the state budget, as the 
objective prevented SOEs from making contributions, as shown in the tax and dividend results. 
Employment remains an issue for both publicly listed and non-privatised SOEs. The government-
stated objective regarding employment matters may worsen SOEs’ productivity and financial 
performance. Focusing exclusively on hypothesis two, whether the changes to SOEs’ and new 
privatised firms’ objectives and business activities as the result of the privatisation policy improve 
SOEs’ and new privatised firm’s performance, the results showed that changes to SOEs’ and new 
privatised firms’ objectives and business activities resulting from the privatisation policy do not 
affect SOEs’ and new privatised firms’ performance. These results are supported by the fact that 
most Indonesian SOEs are highly reliant on external financial support and non-core business 
incomes. SOEs still deal with poor performance and inefficiency issues, as shown from the results in 
this chapter. The results from the qualitative analysis showed that the government-stated objectives 
for SOEs are theoretically in conflict. In fact, the regression results did not support this result. The 
regression results showed that the theoretically conflicting objectives have no effect on SOEs’ 
financial performance. Based on these results, Indonesian SOEs can be successful vehicles for 
attaining the government-stated social welfare objectives; however, these social welfare and non-
economic expectations create risks for SOEs’ other (financial) performance, which may hinder their 
ability to independently carry out their social welfare duties unless the government keeps providing 
(financial) support. 
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Chapter 12:  
Discussion and Conclusion 
 
This Chapter first summarises this thesis and then discusses the main results based. The last part of 
this chapter discusses the contribution and implications and limitations. Future research is the next 
section which is aimed to show potential studies as results or may need further analysis from this 
thesis. Conclusion is the last section of this chapter.  
12.1 Summary  
This thesis assesses the extent to which Indonesian SOEs are successful vehicles for attaining 
government objectives by examining three main issues. First, the evolution of SOEs is examined in 
relation to the historical changes in government-stated objectives for SOEs. Second, as a crucial 
element in the evolution of Indonesian SOEs, this thesis examines the implications of privatisation 
policy and partial privatisation on the government-stated objectives for SOEs. Third, the thesis 
evaluates the potential for Indonesian SOE objectives to be in harmony or conflict. 
12.1.1 The Evolution of SOEs in Relation to the Historical Changes in Government-Stated Objectives 
for SOEs 
The evolution of SOEs in relation to the historical changes in government-stated objectives for SOEs 
is examined using historical path analysis. This analysis shows that the evolution of Indonesian SOEs 
occurred in three main stages in terms of policy and political regimes: Indonesianisation (1945-
1958), Nationalisation (1958-1965) and Corporatisation (1965-2010). The Indonesianisation and 
Nationalisation stages occurred under Old Order political regime. The Corporatisation stage was 
spread across two political regimes. It was initiated in 1968 under New Order regime (1965-1998) 
and continued under the Reformation regime (from 1998).  
The first period of evolution, Indonesianisation, commenced with Indonesia’s political independence 
in 1945 and continued until to 1958. In this period, SOEs were established as Indonesia state 
enterprises to achieve socio-political purposes, as a consequence of centralisation control policy 
when the political and economic state was unstable. The centralisation control policy was mainly 
intended to protect the nation’s resources from conflict and abuse of power. The state enterprises 
generally carried multiple socio-political objectives.  
The second period of evolution, Nationalisation, commenced in 1958 in response to ongoing 
economic and political conflict between the new Indonesian republic and its old colonial rulers, The 
Netherlands. Labour unrest and challenges to the government’s authority led the government to 
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forcibly take over Dutch companies, often using the military to ensure control these companies and 
other nationalised business. A new SOE structure, Perusahaan Negara, was introduced to eliminate 
diversity in organisation structure of nationalised entities and previously held state-owned entities, 
followed by categorising the companies based on purposes; provision of service, handling of public 
interest and obtaining review. The centralisation of control over resources under 822 state 
companies attracted international economic reprisals, leading to a change in the political regime in 
1965. 
The third period of evolution is the corporatisation of SOEs that from commenced in 1969 and 
continued to 2010. With the implementation of corporatisation policies, the Perusahaan Negara was 
modified into three different structures; Perjan, Perum and Persero. However, this corporatisation 
was limited to management scope. Perjan (Bureau Enterprise) is an enterprise providing public 
services without any explicit profit making objective. Perum (Public Company) is an incorporated 
entity providing public utilities that have an explicit profit objective and with management structures 
that are intended to follow orthodox private sector corporations in market-oriented economies. 
Persero (limited liability) is a corporation owned by the government through share ownership and 
operated on a commercial basis. In 1983, the Indonesian government introduced the Badan Usaha 
Milik Negara (BUMN/SOE) structure to replace the Perusahaan Negara. The introduction of the 
BUMN structure was driven by increased market orientation policies that emphasised the profit 
objectives, particularly for the Persero. The introduction of fast track privatisation in 2002 increased 
the emphasis on economic objectives and included implementation of full corporatisation principles 
for all SOEs. Facilitating the fast tract privatisation program lead to profit and efficiency objectives 
becoming the affected SOEs’ and the government’s main concerns. Consequently, the government 
eliminated the Perjan structure because it was considered to be a barrier to implementing the full 
corporatisation principles where profit and efficiency objectives become main concerns. 
12.1.2 The Implications of Privatisation Policy, and Partial Privatisation, on the Government-Stated 
Objectives for SOEs 
The implications of privatisation policy and partial privatisation on the government-stated objectives 
for SOEs are examined through historical path analysis. Indonesia’s moves towards a market 
economy included the introduction of privatisation policies. Privatisation in Indonesia occurred in 
two periods; these were the re-privatisations of nationalised enterprises in 1966 and partial 
privatisations of SOEs since 1971. Re-privatisations were the consequence of external pressures for 
the Indonesian government to compensate previous owners of the nationalisation companies, which 
led the government to transfer full ownership back to previous owners in 1966. Since 1971, 
  208 
privatisations Indonesia were motivated by the implementation of market orientation policy. This 
was mainly affected through partial privatisation.  
The analyses in Chapters 6 and 7 show the privatisation policies substantially affected government-
stated SOEs’ objectives. Profit and efficiency objectives become the government and SOEs main 
concern as the government issued regulations to the UU BUMN no. 19/2003 (SOEs Act no 19/2003) 
and to  and PP Privatisation no. 33/2005 (Privatisation Rule no 33/2005). As discussed in Chapter 7 
privatisation policy in Indonesian is aimed to support state budget or enhance market development. 
Potential conflicting objectives emerged when the government was required to accommodate public 
and market pressure regarding fair competition for SOEs. Through privatisation policy, the 
government was required to open the markets which used to be monopolised for SOEs only. This 
makes economic objectives such as profit and efficiency become SOEs and government concerns. In 
practice, the potential for conflicting objectives is increased when the government retains its control 
of partially privatised SOEs and continues to impose social welfare and non-economic objectives, 
while the government also encourages SOEs and partial privatised SOEs to achieve profit and 
efficiency objectives as stated on the SOEs Act no 19/2003 and Privatisation Rule no 33/2005. 
12.1.3 The Potential for Indonesian SOE Objectives to be in Harmony or Conflict 
Interpretive content analyses are used to examine the potential for the Indonesian SOEs objectives 
to be in harmony or conflict in Chapters 8 and 9. The results show that the government is 
inconsistent in implementing the new policies for SOEs. The government did not change its stated 
social welfare and non-economic objectives for any partially privatised SOEs, which nonetheless 
were expected to meet market expectations. The analysis in Chapter 9 shows that the government 
changed its stated social welfare and non-economic objectives for ten non-privatised SOEs but 
introduced a government-stated profit objective for only one, PT Pertamina.  
The analyses in Chapters 8 and 9 show SOEs’ management tended to restate their versions of SOEs’ 
objectives to accommodate both the government and market interests. The interpretive analysis in 
Chapters 8 and 9 indicate substantial potential for conflict in attempting to satisfy the government’s 
social welfare and non-economic objectives and the inferred profitability and efficiency objectives of 
market investors. 
12.1.4. Overall Evidence as to the Extent to which the Indonesian SOEs are Successful Vehicles for 
Attaining Government Objectives 
The potential for conflict between social welfare and non-economic objectives and profitability and 
efficiency objectives is assessed quantitatively in Chapters 10 and 11. As reported in Chapter 10, t-
tests indicate some weak negative relations between various government objectives and SOEs’ 
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financial performance. This is also supported by the regression results reported in Chapter 11. The 
regression results indicate that social welfare objectives have some tendency to impair the SOEs’ 
financial performance, but they are not sufficiently persuasive to conclude that the potentially 
conflicting social welfare and non-economic objectives impact on SOEs’ financial performance.  
Overall, the analyses reveal some major SOEs issues. Poor financial performance and inefficiency are 
a major problem for Indonesian SOEs, which are highly reliant on non-core business income and 
external financial support through subsidies and or other government financial support. The poor 
performance and inefficiency is often as a consequence of the requirement for SOEs to carry 
additional duties other than their original or existing duties. This additional duty usually affects the 
SOEs financial performance as reported through several cases in Chapter 8. This situation is 
consistent with earlier SOEs studies that show that government involvement in SOEs’ decisions and 
business activities may affect the SOEs financial performance (Ang and Ding, 2006; Astami et al., 
2010; Shirley, 1999; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). 
Centralisation of control in Indonesian emerged as a consequence of the failure of the market 
orientation policies during Indonesianisation period.  In practice, the historical analysis in Chapters 6 
and 7 show that the fiscal problems occur as a consequence of the government centralisation of 
economic policy control. This centralisation of control makes the Indonesian government objectives 
for SOEs are still dominated by social welfare or non-financial objectives. Profit and efficiency 
objectives which were introduced through UU BUMN no. 19/2003 and Privatisation Rule no. 
33/2005 are still limited to be part of the SOEs or government’s objectives for SOEs. The domination 
of social welfare and non-economic objectives are in relations to the provision of public goods and 
services. Meanwhile, the rules still provide a space for the government to ask the SOEs to carry 
social welfare or socio-political obligations other than existing objectives, even after the firms are 
privatised. This poor performance and inefficiency is occurred as the consequences of theses social 
welfare duties. Social welfare may hinder the possibility for SOEs to earn profit (Hamzah, 2007; 
Hanschen and Erspamer, 2004; Martin, 1996) as shown through the quantitative results in this 
thesis. High cost of production requires the government support for SOEs to keep running their 
business (Hill, 1982). The fact that the Indonesian SOEs rely on the external financial supports is 
shown through their financial figures in Chapters 10 and 11. Negative equity requires support from 
the government other than subsidies as found through several cases such as PT PLN and Perum PFN. 
Several other cases in Chapters 8 and 9 shows the government support through soft loans or 
privileges for SOEs to get access for financial support.  
The implementation of privatisation policy aimed to improve the SOEs performance. In practice, the 
policy fails to meet the economic expectations. Privatisation policy is followed by the liberalisation of 
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market economy affects both the Indonesian publicly listed SOEs and non-privatised SOEs’ objectives 
and business activities. Privatisation policy brings the economic or financial objectives; profit and 
efficiency to be part of the government and SOEs concerns. In practice, privatisation does not seem 
to make any different for the Indonesian government-stated objectives for each individual SOE. The 
content analysis in Chapters 8 and 9 shows the government is inconsistent to implement the new 
policies. The conflicting objectives start when government-stated objectives for social welfare and 
non-economic should be in line with profit and efficiency objectives. Further analysis in Chapters 10 
and 11 indicate some weak negative relations between the objectives and financial performance.  
Decoupling appears as a consequence of the Indonesian government inconsistency to implement 
new rules. Decoupling emerges when the changes are the consequences of external pressure or 
coercive. Coercive changes occur when the change is driven by enforcement internal or external the 
organisation (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Mizruchi and Fein, 1999). The pressure for the Indonesian 
government to reform its SOEs is motivated by the requirement to resolve fiscal problems and the 
IMF engagement. Partial privatisation is a reflection of decoupling which is selected as to 
accommodate both interests. Partial privatisation allows the government to meet the privatisation 
expectation, while this also allows the government to keep controlling the new privatised firm as 
shown on earlier studies of privatisation in various emerging market economies (Boubakri et al., 
2005b; 2005c, Milne, 1992; Ramamurti, 1999; Shirley, 1999). Although fully privatisation has been 
done in very limited numbers, in particular for the companies which were less political sensitivity or 
the government was minority shareholders; partial privatisation is selected by the Indonesian 
government to meet both the IMF’s privatisation and the 1945 Constitution of Indonesia 
expectations. Partial privatisation is also argued to allow the government to assure the quality and 
quantity of public services and goods for community (Ramamurti, 1999). This situation is supported 
by the fact that the Indonesian government remains controlling the tariff and distribution for 
publicly listed SOEs as shown within toll road, telecommunication and mining publicly listed SOEs 
cases in Chapter 8.  
12.2 Contributions  
This thesis better informs Indonesian SOEs policy development and contributes to the research 
literature concerned with Indonesian government policy development and, more broadly, the 
consequences of (partial) privatisation policies in emerging markets, and to the literature regarding 
government objectives and SOE performance.  
PSOs usually relate to government duties for the provision of public goods and services due to the 
absence of private participants able to provide the necessary products. Although earlier studies 
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show mixed results with respect to government ownership, subsidies, supply and the cost of PSOs 
(Anderson, 1983), the Indonesian SOEs demonstrate that certain public utilities can be operated on a 
commercial basis. Commercialisation of PSOs may enable the SOEs to attain other objectives and 
improve their performance. This can be achieved through separate financial control for PSO duties. 
Separate financial control makes it easy for the SOEs to attain their social welfare objectives without 
disadvantaging their other objectives.  
This thesis also contributes to the study of government policies for SOEs. The results from this thesis 
show the important roles of government policy for SOEs. This thesis shows the government policies 
are still a major problem preventing the SOEs from attaining their objectives. Overlapping 
regulations make it difficult for SOEs to accommodate all parties’ interests, particularly when the 
interests are conflicting. In contrast, the results of this thesis also present the crucial role of 
government policy in enabling SOEs to operate their businesses and to make business decisions. The 
implementation of privatisation policy, for example, encourages the development of economic 
objectives such as profit, efficiency and competition. In practice, management authority in decision 
making process and limited government involvement are shown to have positive impacts on the 
ability of SOEs to meet the expectations.  
Privatisation policies in particular partial privatisation provide certain contributions to studies of 
SOEs. This study of the Indonesian privatisation shows that privatisation is more likely to be 
undertaken for socio-economic purposes. This thesis demonstrates that the process of privatisation 
and re-privatisation in Indonesia become a pattern for the government to achieved national 
economic stability and resolve fiscal problems. This means that privatisation has no effect on the 
SOEs’ objectives, performances, and policies. This study reveals that this unfinished privatisation or 
partial privatisation is actually due to the government’s intention to accommodate various parties’ 
interests and the legal constraints that emphasise that control policies should remain in the 
government’s hands. 
SOEs’ performance is also one of these thesis contributions. This study reveals some implications 
from the previous path of institutional changes or the evolution including the government 
involvement and control which claim as determinant factor for this poor performance and 
inefficiency. The long term performance expectation for the Indonesian SOEs is set to provide social 
welfare equality for community. The current performance of Indonesian SOEs is considered as the 
best outcome for society even though it is not the most efficient performance. This current 
performance is considered to give the best outcome in relations to distribution of benefits and 
resources allocation for community. This current performance is also a reflection of the government 
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legitimacy and political interest protection. This result supports the previous SOEs study to 
understand why the government keep its SOEs running in poor performance.  
The evolution of government objectives and their implications for SOE activities and performance 
are the main focus of this thesis. The reported analyses contribute to the academic literature by 
demonstrating the continuing importance of government-stated objectives following patial 
privatisation. The historical path analysis of Indonesian government-stated objectives for SOEs 
shows a crucial continuing influence of socio-economic dynamics during the establishment and 
development of SOEs. The analysis of government objectives for SOEs in relation to policy 
development and market reforms identified potential conflict between various government-stated 
objectives for SOEs. However, the potentially conflicting objectives only weakly explain differences in 
SOEs financial performance. The evolution of government-stated objectives also demonstrates 
limited changes to SOEs’ objectives even when market and structures are changed, suggesting that 
the government either decoupled its SOE objective setting processes from its privatisation programs, 
or that partial privatisations were not regarded as a potential source of conflict in determining 
objectives. This analysis of government-stated objectives also supports early studies of the roles and 
function of SOEs and government in social welfare and national stabilisation. Government resistance 
to changes causes the objectives to be dominated by non-financial expectations rather than financial 
expectations. These non-financial objectives influence SOEs’ financial performance. The reported 
analysis of SOEs financial performance shows that SOEs are high reliance on government or external 
financial support to attain these non-financial objectives. The results are expected to better inform 
SOEs policy development in developing countries like Indonesia.   
12.3 Implications of this Thesis for Government and SOEs Policies and Development 
The results from this thesis have implications for the future government and SOEs policy and 
development. The results from this thesis show that the changes of market economy encourage the 
government to review and issues numbers of new public policies regarding SOEs. This thesis shows 
that privatisation drives the government to open the market including the market for non-privatised 
SOEs. Opening market economy for private participants encourages fair competition and the 
development of economic expectations. The changes of market also encourage SOEs managers to 
make some adjustments regarding their objectives and business activities. Profit, efficiency and 
competition become part of SOEs managers concerns following the changes of market economy. 
This situation should be followed by government commitment to implement this liberalisation and 
new policies.  
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This thesis shows that government policies are still major problem preventing SOEs from attaining 
the main or existing objectives. Overlapping regulations make it difficult for SOEs to accommodate 
all parties’ interests. The establishment of SOEs supervisory and control agent like the Indonesian 
Ministry of SOEs may reduce these overlapping issues. Managing or coordinating these policies 
under certain agent or government body will considerably reduce these problems. By reducing these 
policies issues, SOEs management is able to focus on the existing objectives and eliminate the 
uncertainty. This situation is crucial for SOEs and management since SOEs play important roles in the 
emerging market economies like Indonesia.  
Privatisation is a critical policy issue for Indonesian SOEs. As the most conventional economic policy, 
privatisation is likely to become the state’s economic saviour, used to resolve national economic or 
fiscal problems. This thesis shows that privatisation has political cost implications for the Indonesian 
government rather than economic benefits for the SOEs.  This political cost makes limited use of the 
goals of privatisation, which emphasise improvement in performance and reducing the 
government’s involvement. Since the Indonesian publicly listed SOEs also rely on the non-core 
business income and external financial supports, though there is a need for further study of these 
issues, the current situation is not beneficial for the sustainability of the SOEs and the Indonesian 
national economy in particular when the government continues to use privatisation for the state 
economic saviour.  
The improvement of SOE performance is crucial for Indonesian SOEs, since this meaningfully affects 
other contributions from the SOEs to the Indonesian national economy. This thesis shows that lack 
of control and commitment from the government is a key factor for the Indonesian SOEs poor 
performance. Focusing on corporatisation may be an alternative for the government to improve the 
SOEs’ performance without compromising the 1945 Constitution’s goal. The implementation of 
corporatisation should be followed by the government control and commitment. The government 
control and commitment to implement profit and efficiency objectives are crucial. Meanwhile, 
commercialisation of PSOs may enable the SOEs to attain other social objectives, while SOEs can 
improve their performance. By separating their financial report for PSOs’ duties enables the SOEs to 
focus on social welfare expectation without disadvantages the firm’s financial performance. To meet 
this expectation, control policy from the government and the role of supervisory boards are needed, 
particularly to eliminate conflicts of interest and improve the financial performances. 
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12.4 Limitations 
The analysis of SOE objectives and performance is constrained by missing data as a result of the 
unavailability of some SOEs’ annual reports. This occurs because some SOEs have not published their 
financial report, although the government and the public encourage SOEs to publish their financial 
reports. These situations make it difficult to treat all data equally particularly for social welfare 
representative financial performance such as employees’ number, dividend and CSR fund are often 
not available.   
A more substantial limitation to the analysis in this thesis is the inability to measure performance in 
relation many of the socio-political of welfare objectives. While some proxies for socio-political of 
welfare have been considered, a consequence of this general limitation is the emphasis on financial 
performance outcomes in the empirical analysis. 
12.5 Future Research  
Given the results in this thesis, at least two related areas of require further study to better 
understand determinants of SOE effectiveness as vehicles for government policy.  
First, further analysis is needed to understand the implications of managements’ changes to their 
statements of their SOEs’ objectives, as identified in Chapters 8 and 9. Managements’ restatements 
of SOEs’ objectives may have important implications for SOE performance. The analysis in Chapters 8 
and 9 reveals that, while the government seldom modified objectives to reflect market interests in 
partially-privatised or privatisable SOEs, but management often incorporated growth, efficiency and 
profit objectives in their restatements of their SOEs’ objectives. Given that the statistical tests reveal 
only weak or no relations between the government’s stated objectives and SOE performance, it is 
plausible but not assured that managements’ choices are more influential in this regard. 
Second, Chapter 8 suggests that changes in the government’s industrial policies may impact on SOE 
performance. The analysis in this study suggests that changes in industrial policy have a substantial 
influence on the SOEs’ decision-making processes and performance. As government agencies, the 
SOEs play an important role in the industrialisation process. Because all Indonesian SOEs operate 
across more than one industrial sector, the SOEs must deal with more than one ministerial authority. 
There is potential for conflict between the interests and directions given to SOEs by different 
ministerial agencies; for example, one ministry may emphasise efficiency or profitability while 
another may emphasise socio-political or welfare objectives. The impacts on individual SOEs may 
vary with a number of factors, including differences in the political importance of individual SOEs or 
the attributes of SOE management.  
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These two issues are related through the choices of management in emphasising particular 
government-stated objectives or by or adopting objectives not formally determined by government.  
Analysis of these potentially complex relations is beyond the scope of this thesis.  
 12.6 Conclusion  
This thesis assessed the extent to which the Indonesian SOEs are successful vehicles for attaining the 
government objectives. The analyses indicate potential for conflict between government-stated 
objectives. The potential conflict is particularly evident when the government has been inconsistent 
in implementing new policies that confer profit and efficiency objectives on SOEs, while the 
government continues to emphasise SOEs’ social welfare objectives. This potential conflict is mainly 
found when changes in government policy introduce general profit and efficiency requirements but 
the government does not make changes its stated objectives for individual SOEs, with social welfare 
objectives dominating the formally stated objectives for individual SOEs. Empirical analysis shows 
some weak negative relations between government-stated objectives and SOEs financial 
performance. The financial analysis in Chapters 10 and 11 suggests that the need to subsidise social 
welfare and non-economic objectives makes the Indonesian SOEs highly reliant on the non-core 
business income (such as subsidies and asset disposals) and external financial support (such as soft 
loans from government-controlled lenders).  
Overall, while Indonesian SOEs may have potential to become more successful vehicles for attaining 
the government socio-economic objectives, these social welfare and non-economic objectives are 
likely to continue to impede the attainment of financial objectives.  
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Appendix 1 
Variable Definition and Sources 
Panel A Dependent variables (Corporate performance) 
ROA EBIT divided by total assets 
ROE  EAT divided by average equity (equity t + equity t-1) 
EBIT margin EBIT divided by total sales 
Operating profit  margin Operating income divided by total sales 
Operating profit return Operating income divided by total assets 
Asset turnover Total sales divided by total assets 
Effective tax rate 1 Tax divided by EBIT 
Effective tax rate 2 Tax divided by EBT 
Employment intensity Natural log employees divided by sales 
Dividend rate 1 Dividend payment divided by EBIT 
Dividend rate 2 Dividend payment divided by EBT 
 Net income Total profitability during the period 
Operating income Gross profit net after deduction of operating expenses 
Revenue Total of firm income from sales 
CSR 
The company contribution for community development, usually around 0.5–1 per 
cent of profit 
Labour costs Total labour costs, including salary, allowances and all human resources cost 
Panel B Independent variables (Government-statedobjectives) 
Profit 
The government-statedobjective for profit was stated in the rules when the company 
was established, including all the amendments to this rule 
Efficiency 
The government-statedobjective for efficiency was stated in the rules when the 
company was established, including all the amendments to this rule 
Corporate principles 
The government-statedobjective for compliance to corporate governance or 
corporate principles was stated in the rules when the company was established, 
including all the amendments to this rule 
Corporate values & reputation 
The government-statedobjective for corporate value improvement and reputation 
was stated in the rules when the company was established, including all the 
amendment to this rule 
Provision of public goods/services 
The government-statedobjective for provision of public goods or services was stated 
in the rules when the company was established, including all the amendments to this 
rule 
Quality 
The government-statedobjective for quality improvement was stated in the rules 
when the company was established, including all the amendment to this rule 
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Appendix 1: Variable Definition and Sources 
Environment & resource 
utilisation 
The government-statedobjective for environment and resource utilisation improvement was 
stated in the rules when the company was established, including all the amendments to this 
rule 
Technology and research 
The government-statedobjective for technology, research and development was stated in the 
rules when the company was established, including all the amendments to this rule 
National economic 
The government-statedobjective for improving the national economy was stated in the rules 
when the company was established, including all the amendments to this rule 
National development 
The government-statedobjective for participating in national development was stated in the 
rules when the company was established, including all the amendments to this rule 
National security 
The government-statedobjective for participating in national security was stated in the rules 
when the company was established, including all the amendments to this rule 
Industrialisation 
The government-statedobjective for participating in development of industrialisation was 
stated in the rules when the company was established, including all the amendments to this 
rule 
OHS 
The government-statedobjective for the provision of workplace safety and safe working 
environments was stated in the rules when the company was established, including all the 
amendments to this rule 
Community development 
The government-statedobjective for community development contributions was stated in the 
rules when the company was established, including all the amendments to this rule 
Community prosperity 
The government-statedobjective for the improvement of community prosperity was stated in 
the rules when the company was established, including all the amendments to this rule 
Community needs 
The government-statedobjective for the provision of community needs and supply was stated 
in the rules when the company was established, including all the amendments to this rule 
Government policy 
The government-statedobjective for supporting government policy was stated in the rules 
when the company was established, including all the amendments to this rule 
Government special 
needs 
The government-statedobjective for fulfilling government requirements and needs was 
stated in the rule when the company was established, including all the amendments to this 
rule 
State budget 
The government-statedobjective for contributions to the state budget was stated in the rules 
when the company was established, including all the amendments to this rule 
Market supply & 
stabilisation 
The government-statedobjective for stabilising sufficient and affordable supply and prices of 
products and services was stated in the rules when the company was established, including 
all the amendments to this rule 
Panel C Control Variables 
Ln assets Natural Log of the total SOE assets from 2003–2010 
Leverage Total debt or loan/total assets during 2003–2010 
Year Period of study from 2004 to 2010 
Industrial sector 
The 33 industrial sectors where the SOEs operate. Due to insufficient data, some industries 
are combined to give a total of 17 industries 
Company  The type of company structure; Perum, Persero and Publicly listed SOEs.  
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